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Preface 
This study began in 1961 as a limited attempt to assess the impact 
of science and modern technology on the negotiating process and 
concepts of international organization, using the test ban negoti-
ations then in progress as a case study. When the Moscow Treaty 
was signed, however, it seemed wise to broaden the focus and to 
capture as many of the details as we could that might help to 
explain this first formal arms control agreement between East and 
West in the nuclear age. Our analysis is clearly not definitive, but 
hopefully, it will be a useful source, even after all relevant docu-
ments have been published. We hope also that the study will fulfill 
something of its original purpose. 
The principal written sources have been the records of the 
negotiations and the memoirs thus far published. In addition, a 
large number of the participants have been interviewed. These in-
clude President Eisenhower, all three of the Special Assistants to 
 the President for Science and Technology who were involved, 
Ambassador Arthur H. Dean, Adrian S. Fisher, John J. McNaugh-
 ton, various other officials of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of De-
fense, the Department of State, and most of the American scientists 
who took part, including Robert F. Bacher, Hans A. Bethe, James B. 
Fisk, Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, and Edward Teller. Several United 
 Nations and United Kingdom officials were also interviewed. For 
 obvious reasons, there are no citations for any of the material 
gained through interviews. 
The study was undertaken as part of The University of Michi-
gan Law School's Atomic Energy Research Project. We are in-
c;lebted to the director of that project, Professor Samuel D. Estep, 
for his assistance. We appreciate the financial support of the Ford 
Foundation and The University of Michigan Phoenix Project which 
made the study possible. We are especially grateful to the many 
individuals who kindly submitted to our interviews. 
v 
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Agnes Cacamindin, Judith Lane, Lynne Edelstein, Helen Jus-
sila, and Judith Rote all helped in the preparation of the book by 
serving as research assistants, and the last named did the onerous 
task of checking the notes. Alice J. Russell's invaluable contribution 
was in editing the manuscript Eleanor Herp unflinchingly bore the 
brunt of the typing. This book would not exist without their help. 
Abraham Bargman, Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Elisabeth Case, Inis 
L. Claude, Jr., Philip J. Farley, Lawrence S. Finkelstein, Warren 
E. Hewitt, Fred C. Ikle, George M. Kavanagh, John H. Morse, 
Mrs. Alva Myrdal, Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, E. Raymond Platig, 
Marshall D. Shulman, Rudolph K. Skeete, J. David Singer, Ronald 
I. Spiers, Jerome B. Wiesner, Christopher Wright, and Ciro Elliott 
Zoppo all read part or all of the manuscript, and we and the book 
have benefited greatly from their wisdom. 
Of course, we alone are responsible for whatever errors of 
commission and omission the study may contain. 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 
HAROLD KARAN JACOBSON 
ERIC STEIN 
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PART I 
BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION 
Chapter I 
The Nuclear Age, the United States, 
and the Test Ban Negotiations 
I 
The Moscow Treaty: A Turning Point? 
In Moscow, on July 25, 1963, representatives of the Soviet Union, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States initialed the Treaty 
Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, 
and Under Water. Eleven days later, again in Moscow, the foreign 
ministers of the three states signed the Treaty, which became the 
first major formal arms control agreement between the two sides 
in the Cold War. Moreover, the Treaty dealt-although in a very 
limited fashion only-with the most awesome aspect of the competi-
tion between East and West, the nuclear-missile arms race. 
Eighteen years earlier, almost to the day, on July 26, 1945, the 
first test detonation of a nuclear device occurred at Alamogordo, 
New Mexico, and the first detonation of a nuclear weapon in war 
devastated Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. These events had intro-
duced a new phase into mankind's existence. The two events in 
Moscow in 1963, falling as they did, seemed to suggest, at the 
least, a punctuation of this phase. More generally, they offered hope 
that mankind had begun to take steps to control the destructive 
potential of modem technology, of which the development of nuclear 
weapons has been but one aspect. For the United States, which had 
first developed nuclear weapons and had created the largest stock-
pile, and probably for most of the world, the Moscow Treaty repre-
sented the first concrete step toward a goal that had been sought 
since the very outset of the nuclear age. 
II 
The United States and the Nuclear Age 
The Changed International System 
To begin to assess the significance of the Moscow Treaty, it is 
necessary to recall that the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945 
3 
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fundamentally altered the international political system. Although 
the full dimensions of this revolution were then and still remain 
obscure, certain salient features were immediately apparent. Nuclear 
weapons increased the potential human and physical costs of war 
to such an extent that its traditional role as the ultima ratio in 
international politics was brought sharply into question and a 
search for new means for the peaceful adjustment of conflicts 
appeared particularly urgent. Again, because of the enormous de-
structive capacity of nuclear weapons and the cost and complexity 
of building a nuclear arsenal and appropriate delivery systems, the 
distinction between those states which possessed such weapons and 
those which did not seemed greater than any difference in the 
power position of states that had previously existed. As a conse-
quence of these developments, many of the traditional modes and 
patterns of international politics appeared to be fundamentally al-
tered. Alliances seemed not to mean the same thing that they had 
prior to the summer of 1945. The tasks and techniques of diplomacy 
seemed to acquire new dimensions. Concepts of international organi-
zation assumed new meanings. Some analysts even questioned 
whether or not the territorial state continued to have relevance.1 
The changes in the international system bore especially heavily 
on the United States as the state which had introduced nuclear 
weapons and which, at first at any rate, would have the greatest 
capacity to develop them. To compound the complexity, these 
changes occurred at precisely the same time that the United States 
was forced to abandon finally its isolationist stance and to accept 
seemingly permanent and deep involvement in international affairs. 
The balance of power in Europe which had helped to guarantee 
America's secUrity in the nineteenth century probably ceased to 
exist during the First World War and certainly was no longer 
operative after the Second World War.2 Instead of being able to 
rely on the exertion of others to protect its security, the United 
States now had to undertake that task itself. Moreover, it became 
increasingly apparent that the security of a large number of other 
lJohn H. Herz, for one. See his International Politics in the Atomic 
Age (1959), p. 22. 
2For an excellent analysis of these developments and their implications 
for the United States see Hajo Holbom, The Political Collapse of Europe 
(1951). 
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states was dependent upon American efforts. Thus, in 1945, the 
problems of· adjustment for the United States were piled one on top 
of the other. The United States faced a changed world and faced 
it from a new perspective. 
Weapons Development versus Weapons Control: Two Conflicting 
Strains in American Policy 
From the outset, American attitudes and policies toward nuclear 
weapons have been characterized by a deep ambivalence. On the 
one hand, the United States has felt that for reasons of its security 
it could not forego the development of nuclear weapons; yet at the 
same time, it has found the development of these weapons and 
dependence on them distasteful and has continually sought some 
means of controlling them. Prominent among the sources of this 
ambivalence has been the fact that nuclear weapons and other 
aspects of modem military technology have enormously increased 
the vulnerability of the United States. The relative predominance 
of one or the other of the two conflicting strains-and the resulting 
policy mixture-have, of course, varied with time, but both of these 
strains have been constant components of American thought and 
actions, causing important stresses and uncertainties in the policy-
making process and in American negotiating postures. 
The policy strain which caused the United States to develop 
nuclear weapons-and which motivated the development of its 
nuclear arsenal-was based upon the consideration that in the mid-
twentieth-century world of sovereign and often sharply clashing 
states, American security depended first and foremost upon Ameri-
can power, particularly the national military establishment based 
broadly upon the immense American industrial capacity and steadily 
evolving technology. The initial decisions tu develop nuclear weapons 
were made with the knowledge that Nazi Germany was also pursu-
ing this goal and at least partly because of the fear that it might 
succeed. 3 In addition, nuclear weapons were viewed as a possible 
means of shortening the Second World War, and the President's 
decision to employ them in Japan was basically motivated by this 
SSee Louis Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," in U.S. 
Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, Command 
Decisions (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 493-
518, at 494. 
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purpose. These decisions were made in wartime secrecy, and despite 
the wartime emergency, not without soul searching on the part of 
those who made them. It is thus not surprising that American plans 
for the control of nuclear weapons-reflecting the second policy 
strain--began to evolve almost simultaneously with the initial use 
of these weapons. But for a variety of reasons, negotiations to 
establish international control foundered. 4 As the failure of these 
negotiations emerged, so did the deep Soviet-American clash about 
the nature of the post-war world. The United States came to per-
ceive the Soviet Union as an expansionist power with virtually 
unlimited objectives, the achievement of most of which would 
seriously jeopardize fundamental American interests. In this situa-
tion, the build-up of the nuclear arsenal again seemed to offer an 
important means of gaining security, particularly in view of Soviet 
superiority in manpower and conventional weapons. Beyond that, 
there was always the fear that the Soviet Union might make a tech-
nological breakthrough which it would then exploit for its purposes, 
a fear which became particularly acute after the USSR's first detona-
tion of a nuclear device in 1949, several years ahead of American 
expectations.5 As during the Nazi period, therefore, it was not even 
necessary to face the issue of the value of nuclear weapons on its 
merits in order to advocate their development; one could simply 
argue the inexorable necessity of keeping ahead of the other side. 
Although the tempo of the nuclear arms race quickened as the 
years went by, the United States never completely abandoned the 
quest for the control of these weapons. Moreover, several new 
factors emerged bearing upon this issue. First and foremost was the 
increase in Soviet nuclear power. As the USSR's nuclear stockpile 
grew, and it became apparent that the Soviet Uriion could devastate 
the United States just about as easily as the United States could 
wreck the Soviet Union, the role that nuclear weapons could and 
should play in American strategies was increasingly called into 
4For accounts of the negotiations see Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar 
Negotiations /or Arms Control (1961), and Joseph L. Nogee, Soviet Policy 
Towards International Control of Atomic Energy (1961). 
5How the Soviet detonation spurred the United States to develop its 
nuclear capacity still further is shown in Warner R. Schilling, "The H-Bomb 
Decision: How to Decide Without Actually Choosing," Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. LXXVI, No. 1. (March 1961), pp. 24-46. 
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question. And if a world in which two states had large numbers of 
nuclear weapons and ample means to deliver them seemed frighten-
ing, the prospect of a world in which this capacity was dispersed 
among additional states was even more horrendous. Even if the 
majority of Americans active in foreign policy did not see increased 
prospects for the control of nuclear weapons, they certainly saw 
increased need for such control. 
Linking the Control of Nuclear Weapons with Improved World 
Order: Another Source of Ambivalence 
Another complicating element in the evolution of American 
policy arose from the fact that the search for means of controlling 
nuclear weapons inevitably became linked with one of the themes 
which had characterized American foreign policy since the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, the search for institutional means of 
regulating the conduct of world politics. 6 One reason was that in 
the American view, it was precisely the absence of effective inter-
national institutions that compelled the United States to rely pri-
marily on national military power for its security and to develop 
nuclear weapons as an essential component of that power. Another 
reason was that it seemed to be difficult to seek control arrange-
ments for one of the most crucial elements in the relations among 
states without considering other relevant elements and the problem 
of world order in general. The existence of the United Nations and 
the tasks that it assumed in the field of regulation of armaments 
was a further reason for the linkage. 
Like the American attitude toward nuclear weapons, that toward 
the problem of creating a more effective world order was also 
characterized by a fundamental ambiguity. On the one hand the 
United States envisaged the image of a future world in which inter-
national institutions would have significant powers with a correspond-
ing reduction in the powers of states; on the other, it was very 
reluctant to see any derogation of its own sovereignty. From the 
early days of the twentieth century, American policies concerning 
6For a critical analysis of this strain see Roland N. Stromberg, Col-
lective Security and American Foreign Policy: From the League of Nations 
to NATO (1963). How it affects contemporary American policy can be seen 
in former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Richard N. Gardner's In Pursuit 
of World Order: U.S. Foreign Policy and International Organizations (1964). 
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these matters were characterized by a series of compromises and 
followed a zig-zag path. This was dramatized by the American 
pressure for and subsequent rejection of the League of Nations. 
Although the scale of oscillation appears to have narrowed after the 
Second World War, the ambiguity has remained clearly discernible, 
for instance in the American posture toward the United Nations. 
Thus the linking of this strain of American foreign policy with 
developing American attitudes and policies toward the control of 
nuclear weapons tied the latter to a fairly well developed, yet com-
plicated and sometimes conflicting, set of concepts. 
The linkage had consequences for both components. On the 
one hand, American thinking on the framework for the control of 
nuclear weapons tended to be cast into predetermined molds. Uni-
versal international organizations, such as the United Nations and 
the specialized agencies, were used as models, without much thought 
being given to the relationship between the specific weapons control 
functions to be performed and the nature of the organization re-
quired. On the other hand, as the United States began to grapple 
with the problem of controlling nuclear weapons, it was forced to 
reappraise certain of its views concerning international organiza-
tion. For example, the question immediately arose as to whether or 
not it would be possible to control nuclear weapons completely 
without at the same time controlling all uses of nuclear energy. If 
the answer was negative, what would be the impact on the tradi-
tional doctrine of domestic jurisdiction? 
In the years after 1945 both the changes in the international 
system wrought by the advent of nuclear weapons and the new 
status of the United States within that system compelled a broader 
reevaluation of American concepts of world order. Old concepts 
generally were questioned and reformulated. What did security 
mean in the new age? Under the circumstances, what would an 
organized and orderly system for the conduct of international politics 
be like? What was the relationship between the reconciliation of the 
conflicting aims and ambitions of states and the control of violence? 
Since these concepts originated within the international political 
system, their development was inevitably and profoundly affected 
by the conduct of other actors within this system and especially of 
the state that the United States perceived as the principal threat, 
the USSR. This interaction was characterized by a process of bargain-
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ing which went on formally and informally, explicitly and implicitly, 
all of the time.7 In the American view, the need for nuclear weapons, 
the need for their control, and the requirements for that control 
were all intimately related to Soviet behavior. 
New Actors in the Security Policy Process, the Scientists 
Just as the new age required a new conceptual understanding 
of the changed world on the part of American policy-makers, 
opinion leaders, and the informed segments of the public, it also 
required adjustments in the processes for formulating and imple-
menting security policy. One crucial new requirement was to bring 
scientists into the policy process. 8 In the first place, they alone could 
provide the knowledge which would be essential for rational policy 
formulation with respect to many key issues. Again, many of those 
scientists who had participated in unlocking the secret of the atom, 
felt that they had a special responsibility concerning the use to 
which their discoveries were put, and demanded a voice in policy-
making. In an open society, and with a base of new-found prestige, 
they were in a good position to realize their demands. Fmally, 
scientists became involved in yet another role: the implementation 
of certain policies, once formulated, also required the services of 
scientists, including their participation in international negotiations. 
The integration of scientists into the policy process had to take 
account of the decentralization in the process of making security 
policy within the United States which stems originally from the 
constitutional division of power between the legislative and execu-
tive branches. The multiplication of executive agencies with respon-
sibilities in security affairs after the Second World War further 
fragmented the process. Given their nature as loose coalitions, in 
which local interests tend to predominate except during Presidential 
election years, American political parties have been able to make 
7The best theoretical analysis of this process is: Thomas C. Schelling, 
The Strategy of Conflict (1960). For an excellent real world application of 
this theoretical framework see Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate 
(1964). 
BFor general analyses of the introduction of scientists into the process 
of formulating and implementing security policy see Robert Gilpin, American 
Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy (1962) and Robert Gilpin and 
Christopher Wright (eds.), Scientists and National Policy Making (1964). 
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at most a modest contribution as unifying forces. The fact that 
different parties can control legislative and executive branches of 
the federal government, as they did from 1946 through 1948 and 
again from 1954 through 1960, adds to the fragmentation. As a 
consequence of all of these factors, the formulation of security 
policy within the United States is characterized by a process of 
bargaining which is not totally unlike that which occurs among 
sovereign states. To formulate a policy requires building a consensus 
adequate to secure its adoption. 9 Depending on the nature of the 
policy (for example, whether or not it requires funds for its imple-
mentation and the magnitude of the funds needed), the process of 
building a consensus might be confined to an executive department 
or even to a bureau within it, or it might extend far wider and 
include several executive agencies, the legislative branch, and seg-
ments of the general public. Because of the nature of this process, 
scientists could and would ha,ve to enter at a variety of points; and 
they did. 
Necessary though this development was, it brought with it 
complicated problems. What would be the best formal arrange-
ments within the structure of government to insure that technical 
data and scientific advice would be available when needed and that 
scientists would be heard and their voice would be accorded neither 
too little nor too much weight alongside and in combination with 
those of other expert and interested groups? On a different level, 
would problems of communication arise between scientists and non-
scientists; and, if they did, how could they be overcome, keeping in 
mind that it would not always be easy or even possible to be aware 
of comm~cation difficulties as they occur? Often only some later 
event would make such difficulties apparent. The problem of com-
munication obviously would affect the nature of the arrangements 
made for the scientists in government. Finally, the way and the 
extent to which scientists were brought into the process of formu-
lating and implementing security policy were important not only from 
DThis concept was first articulated and developed by Roger Hitsman. 
See his excellent articles: "Congressional-Executive Relations and the Foreign 
Policy Consensus," The American Political Science Review, Vol. LIT, No. 
3 (September 1958), pp. 725-44; and, "The Foreign Policy Consensus: An 
Interim Research Report," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. III, No. 
4 (December 1959), pp. 361-82. 
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the viewpoint of insuring that decisions were made as rationally 
and efficiently as possible, but also from that of insuring that the 
elected civilian leaders actually remained in control of the policy 
processes and their output, since civilian control is one of the most 
fundamental values embodied in the American constitutional system. 
Thus, at the same time that the United States grappled with basic 
problems concerning its position in the international political system, 
it also struggled with important organizational problems concern-
ing its own political system. 
III 
The Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations as a Case Study 
The negotiations which culminated in the signature of the Moscow 
Treaty extended over a period of five years, from the summer of 
1958 through the summer of 1963. They were conducted principally 
between the Soviet Union on one side and the United Kingdom 
and the United States on the other, although almost all states 
participated in one form or another. These negotiations provide 
case study material which is both engrossing and instructive. They 
illustrate--perhaps better than any other international negotiations 
which have been conducted since the end of the Second World 
War-how the United States has attempted to resolve the compli-
cated issues relating to the formulation, implementation, and 
substance of security policy stemming from the emergence of nuclear 
weapons. They also offer sharp insights into the functioning of the 
international political system in the nuclear era and possible future 
developments. 
First, with respect to the process of formulating and imple-
menting American security policy, the negotiations provide another 
opportunity to test the consensus-building model and to gain further 
insights into the operation of this process. The negotiations also 
demonstrate in a concrete fashion the practical arrangements which 
have been made for bringing scientific data and scientists into the 
policy process. They show how scientists have exercised their roles 
within this process and the way in which they have interacted 
with nonscientists. They contain evidence concerning the ease or 
difficulty with which the two groups have been able to communicate. 
The record, therefore, provides a suitable basis for evaluating the 
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arrangements that have progressively evolved with respect to these 
matters thus far and for suggesting possible alternatives. 
Second, with respect to the substance of American security 
p~Ucy, the nuclear test ban negotiations provide a focal point for 
examining the development of American attitudes and policies 
toward the problem of obtaining security in a nuclear-missile age. 
They reveal the extent to which the United States was prepared for 
serious negotiations concerning arms control or disarmament and 
provide a basis for assessing the appropriateness of certain widely 
held American concepts concerning the most effective means of 
creating a less dangerous world. 
Third, with respect to the working of the international political 
system, the test ban negotiations illustrate in a graphic manner the 
interaction between domestic events, national policies, and inter-
national occurrences. They offer a striking picture of diplomatic 
intercourse between a totalitarian state with tightly sealed policy-
making and close controls over its mass media on the one hand, 
and two relatively open, pluralistic states on the other. The negotia-
tions show the extent to which states which do not possess nuclear 
weapons can influence the policies of the nuclear states, even 
concerning nuclear weapons, and the modalities through which this 
influence can be exercised. In this connection, they provide a 
number of insights into the role of the United Nations in the con-
temporary international political system. They also provide a wealth 
of data relevant to describing accurately the current state of the 
conflict between East and West and possibly suggest the contours 
of the future course of this struggle, which has been such an im-
portant and pervasive feature of the present period. Finally, the 
negotiations show how far mankind has gone in its efforts to harness 
the atom and illustrate clearly the difficulties which it faces in at-
tempting to control the uses to which modem technology is put; 
Hopefully, a study of the record may lead to suggestions which 
could be useful in surmounting some of these difficulties. 
Whether or not the Moscow Treaty will truly stand as a turn-
ing point in the nuclear age and more generally in the age of mod-
em technology is dependent in varying degrees upon all of these 
factors. Admittedly American policy is only one variable in the 
equation, yet it is a crucially important variable. The substance of 
American policy cannot help but have a profound influence on the 
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course of the future, and the substance of that policy will be shaped 
in important ways by the manner in which it is formulated and 
implemented. Obviously American security policy can only be 
conducted within the framework of the international system, and its 
effectiveness will partly depend upon how appropriate it is for this 
environment. For all these reasons, then, a detailed case study of 
United States policy in the nuclear test ban negotiations should help 
to determine if the Moscow Treaty should be regarded as, and can 
be made, a genuine turning point. 
PART III 
THE PATH TO THE MOSCOW TREATY 
Chapter X 
The Negotiations Resume 
I 
The Context: Elements of Change and Continuity 
Formal negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty resumed on March 
14, 1962, with the opening session of the newly constituted Eighteen-
Nation Disarmament Committee, under conditions which were some-
what different from those which had prevailed during the closing 
days of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon 
Tests. Some of the changes were the result of events which oc-
curred in the month and a half following January 29, the date of 
the last meeting of the Geneva Conference. Others stemmed from 
longer-range developments which either were beginning to come to 
fruition or were perceived during this period. 
The Shifting Military Balance: Toward Increased U.S. Power 
One of the most important longer-run developments which 
inevitably would have an effect on the nuclear test ban negotiations 
was the shifting pattern of military power. Shortly after he became 
President, John F. Kennedy requested a reappraisal of the entire 
defense strategy, capacity, commitments, and needs of the United 
States. On the basis of this reappraisal, and in response to a detefi:-
orating world situation, especially in Southeast Asia, and to a develop-
ing crisis over Berlin, on three separate occasions during the spring 
and summer of 1961, March 28, May 25, and July 25, President 
Kennedy requested additional appropriations for military purposes. 
As a result, in August 1961 Congress finally passed a defense appro-
priation bill totaling $46,662,550,000, a figure which exceeded the 
original request prepared by the Eisenhower Administration by more 
than $3,750,000,000. The additional funds, plus certain savings, 
were allocated both to increasing the United States' strategic power 
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and to enlarging its capacity to deal with limited and guerrilla wars. 
In addition, in the summer of 1961, in connection with the Berlin 
crisis, Congress authorized the President to mobilize 250,000 reserv-
ists, and the first troops called up under this authority reported for 
active duty on October 1, 1961. By the end of 1961 the effects of 
these measures had begun to be felt and the trend of developments 
was clear. The defense appropriation for fiscal year 1963 was even 
greater, $48,136,247,000. 
In the two years from the end of 1961 to the end of 1963 
the United States would double the number of nuclear warheads in 
its strategic alert forces, and more than double their total mega-
tonnage. The number of American operational long-range missiles 
would jump from forty-five to five hundred. The United States would 
increase its combat-ready Army divisions by about forty-five percent, 
from eleven to sixteen; the number of its tactical air squadrons by 
thirty percent; and its airlift capacity by seventy-five percent. Ship 
construction and conversion to modernize the fleet would be dou-
bled.1 
Of course these moves to increase United States power did 
not pass unnoticed by the USSR. On July 9, 1961, Chairman 
Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Defense Ministry had been 
instructed temporarily to suspend the reduction of the armed forces 
planned for 1961, and that the Soviet Government had decided to 
increase defense spending in 1961 by 3,144,000,000 rubles, making 
the total 12,399,000,000. The arms race had been stepped up con-
siderably, and the USSR was determined to create the impression 
that it would match or surpass the United States' military build-up. 
However, when the test ban negotiations resumed in March 1962 it 
was far from certain whether or not the Soviet Union could maintain 
the pace set by the United States. By that time it was apparent that 
instead of the USSR's having many more operational missiles than 
1 These figures are taken from a speech delivered by Secretary of De-
fense McNamara before the Economic Club of New York on November 18, 
1963. See "Major National Security Problems Confronting the United States," 
the Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIX, No. 1277 (December 16, 
1963), pp. 914-21. They are substantially confirmed by the analyses pre-
pared by the Institute of Strategic Studies. See The Communist Bloc and 
the Western Alliances: The Military Balance, 1961-1962; (London: Institute 
of Strategic Studies, 1961); and The Military Balance, 1963-1964 (London: 
Institute of Strategic Studies, 1963). 
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the United States, as several in the West had predicted and feared, 
the balance was about even. By the end of 1963 the USSR would 
have only about one-fifth as many long-range missiles as the United 
States, and only about half as many long-range bombers. The USSR 
would have quantitative superiority vis-a-vis the United States only 
in intermediate and medium-range ballistic missiles and in ground 
forces. Moreover, the USSR's margin of superiority would disapear 
if the comparison were broadened to include all NATO forces on 
one side and all Warsaw Pact forces on the other. The .ground forces 
of NATO would total 3,200,000, while those of the Warsaw Pact 
would total only 3,000,000. NATO would have more ground forces 
in Central Europe than the Warsaw Pact. 
The test ban negotiations would resume then in the midst of a 
quickening arms race from which the United States would emerge 
within a relatively short time with an unquestioned net military 
superiority, although each side would still be able to wreck hor-
rendous damage on the other. 
Exactly how this change in the distribution of military power 
would affect the test ban negotiations could not be foretold. Some 
American policy-makers predicted a favorable impact. They argued 
that since the USSR respected strength, the increased American 
military power should result in increased Soviet propensity to make 
concessions. They also argued that the Soviet Union would feel the 
costs of a spiraling arms race more than the United States, and 
therefore would be more desirous of ending such a race and thus 
more interested in a nuclear test ban. Other policy-makers, among 
them Jerome B. Wiesner, maintained that the American military 
build-up would have exactly the opposite effect, that it would make 
the USSR more intransigent and decrease the chances of obtaining 
a nuclear test ban. 
The Results of the USSR's 1961 Tests: Superiority in High-Yield 
Weapons 
A second element in the changing context was the new situation 
with respect to the development of nuclear weapons, resulting from 
the USSR's surprise abrogation in August 1961 of the nearly three-
year-old moratorium on nuclear testing. The test series which the 
USSR began then was elaborate and extensive. Approximately fifty 
tests were conducted within three months. Some of these apparently 
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related to the development of an anti-intercontinental ballistic mis-
sile. On October 30, 1961, the USSR tested a 58 megaton bomb, 
the largest weapon ever detonated. Furthermore, had the fusion ma-
terial comprising the core of the weapon been encased in a uranium 
rather than a lead jacket, it is estimated that its yield would have 
been 100 megatons or more. Several of the other Soviet tests had 
yields of more than 10 megatons. As a result of these tests, the 
USSR became technically more advanced than the United States in 
the high-yield range. The Soviet Union's superior position related 
both to the construction of such weapons and to understanding their 
effects. 
The largest weapon which the United States had ever tested 
was the 1954 15 megaton Bravo shot. General Curtis E. LeMay, as 
Commander in Chief of the United States Strategic Air Command, 
and the Air Force had recommended in that same year that the 
United States should develop a 50 to 100 megaton yield weapon, 
but this recommendation had not been accepted. The Eisenhower 
Administration consciously chose not to pursue this development 
because it felt that there was no military requirement for such high-
yield weapons. 
As in the past, the results of the Soviet test series were evalu-
ated by several United States governmental groups, including a panel 
of scientists headed by Hans A. Bethe. In a statement published in 
September 1962, Professor Bethe asserted that the kinds of weapons 
which the USSR tested showed "that their laboratories had prob-
ably been working full speed during the whole moratorium on the 
assumption that tests would at some time be resumed," and that 
"it is very likely that they started specific preparations by March 
1961 when the test ban conference reconvened in Geneva."2 As 
early as January 5, 1962, Professor Bethe stated in a public lecture 
in Ithaca, that in his opinion a test ban as such was "no longer a 
desirable goal to pursue. "3 Although he was not concerned about 
high-yield weapons and the effects of the USSR's superiority in this 
area, he felt that the United States should test those designs which 
2Hans A. Bethe, "Disarmament and Strategy," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, Vol. XVIII, No. 7 (September 1962), pp. 14-22, at 18. 
3Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier inserted the text of his speech 
in the Congressional Record, Vol. CVIII, Appendix, pp. A1397-99, A1450-
51, at A1450. 
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had been developed in its laboratories and which fitted its strategic 
needs. On the other hand, he also thought that both sides had 
relatively little more to learn about nuclear weapons. 
In public at least, Professor Bethe did not say, as he very well 
could have, that what he had predicted might happen had in fact 
occurred. In 1958, in arguing for test ban negotiations, he had 
warned that the only result of continued testing of nuclear weapons 
would be to diminish the American superiority over the USSR in 
this category of military technology. 
Again, the effects of this new situation on the nuclear test ban 
negotiations could not be foretold. Since the USSR now held a 
definite lead in certain areas of nuclear weapons development, one 
might have expected that it would try to freeze the situation to 
preserve this lead, following the course which Professor Bethe had 
urged for the United States in 1958. Conversely, one might have 
expected that the United States would seek to recoup its lead, to 
redress the balance, or to minimize the gap between its stage of 
development and that of the USSR. 
The Debate Within the United States: To Test or Not to Test in the 
Atmosphere 
Indeed, the most pressing issue posed by the Soviet test series 
for the United States was whether or not it should resume atmos-
pheric testing. When President Kennedy ordered the resumption of 
nuclear tests on September 5, 1961, he confined his authorization to 
tests which could be conducted in the laboratory and underground. 
Actually, this was all that the United States was prepared to do. The 
grounds at Eniwetok and Bikini had been allowed to run down, and 
in view of their location within the Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands, there was some question about the political wisdom of using 
them again. Certainly there would be an outcry in the United Na-
tions if they were used. There appears to have been little prepara-
tion in the United States' weapons laboratories during the moratorium 
for resumed atmospheric testing. Moreover, the skills and morale 
of the laboratories appear to have deteriorated to some extent during 
this period. 4 Even with respect to underground testing, which had 
4See the testimony of Dr. John Foster, Jr., Director of the Lawrence 
Radiation Laboratory, University of California, Livermore, California, and 
of Dr. Norris E. Bradbury, Director, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory: 
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been regarded as a more likely contingency during the moratorium, 
Ameiican preparations were not extensive. For example, very few 
holes had been prepared. As a consequence of all of these factors, 
the United States conducted only nine underground nuclear explo-
sions in 1961. 
Pressure for the United States to engage in an extensive test 
series and to test in the atmosphere began to mount immediately 
after the Soviet Union broke the moratorium, and it increased in 
intensity as the extensive nature of the Soviet test series became 
apparent. As early as November 2, 1961, President Kennedy an-
nounced that preparations would be made for atmospheric tests so 
that they could be undertaken should it be deemed necessary. 5 And 
in the late fall of 1961 a special task force was formed under the 
command of Major General Alfred D. Starbird to prepare for tests 
in the atmosphere and at high altitudes, and $80,000,000 was allo-
cated for this purpose. Ultimately the task force would include 
11,800 individuals. However, President Kennedy made it clear to 
the Pentagon that these preparations did not commit him actually 
to conduct a testing program. 6 
The President and Prime Minister Macmillan discussed these 
matters at their meeting in Bermuda in late December. British con-
currence with an American decision to resume atmospheric testing 
would be helpful, and if the United States could use the facilities at 
Christmas Island, a British possession in the Pacific, as well perhaps 
as those at Johnston Island, an American possession, it would 
obviate the necessity of again testing in the United States Trust 
Territory. Macmillan made an eloquent plea for one more effort to 
break the cycle of tests and counter-tests. aa He had a deep horror 
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness In-
vestigating Subcommittee, Hearings: Military Aspects and Implications of 
Nuclear Test Ban Proposals and Related Matters, 88th Congress, 1st Session 
(1964), pp. 395-96, 405. See also New York Times, September 26, 1963, 
p. 11. A popular account gives a somewhat more optimistic appraisal: 
George Harris, "How Livermore Survived the Test Ban," Fortune, Vol. 
LXV, No. 4 (April 1960), pp. 127, 236, 241. 
5U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Dis-
armament, 1961 (1962), p. 567. 
6Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 621. 
6aSee the account of the Bermuda meeting in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 
A Thousand Days, pp. 489-90. 
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of nuclear war and was determined to press for a test ban. He had 
thought that a treaty could have been achieved in 1960 and was 
sharply disappointed that it had not been. He had told Kennedy 
that the failure "was all the fault of the American 'big hole' obsession 
and the consequent insistence on a wantonly large number of on-site 
inspections."6b Eventually though, the Prime Minister seemed to agree 
that if the situation did not change he would recommend to the 
Cabinet that permission be given for the United States to utilize the 
facilities at Christmas Island. On December 22, 1961 the two leaders 
issued a communique which paralleled Kennedy's announcement of 
November 2.60 
President Kennedy did not announce a final decision to resume 
atmospheric testing until March 2, 1962. Meanwhile, a bitter debate 
raged within the American Administration, and the British continued 
to play a role in this debate, via letters to the President from Mac-
millan and other means. The debate concerned not only whether or 
not to resume atmospheric testing, but also, if such a decision were 
taken, the number and yield of the weapons to be tested. The division 
within the government paralleled many of those which had previously 
existed concerning issues involving the nuclear ban negotiations. 
Those opposed to the resumption of testing included Dr. Jerome B. 
Wiesner, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technol-
ogy; Adlai E. Stevenson, chief United States delegate to the United 
Nations; the Department of State; and the United States Information 
Agency. The Joint Chiefs of Staff favored the resumption of testing. 
As early as October, they had called for a resumption of atmospheric 
testing in November. The Department of Di!fense took a similar 
position. It was Secretary McNamara who had asked the President to 
authorize development and effect tests in the atmosphere. Still, at a 
lunch with Secretary Rusk and McGeorge Bundy shortly before the 
actual tests began, he suggested "that they were not really neces-
sary."6d The Atomic Energy Commission argued for atmospheric 
testing, but it felt that there should be limitations on the types of 
tests. Several powerful members of the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy also favored the resumption of atmospheric testing. As 
6b[bid., p. 452. 
6cU.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarma-
ment, 1961 (1962), p. 743. 
6dTheodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 622. 
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in the past, this intra-governmental argument both spilled over 
into and reflected a similar debate within the public arena. And 
also as in the past, the American scientific community was deeply 
divided. 
Those favoring the resumption of atmospheric testing argued 
that such action was necessary because of the advances which the 
Soviet Union had made. Starting from this common ground the 
argumentation advanced by those on this side differed with the 
sophistication, background, and interests of the advocate. Perhaps 
Edward Teller developed the most elaborate rationale. He set forth 
his views in a book, The Legacy of Hiroshima, which was pub-
lished on March 2, 1962.7 Excerpts from this book were published 
as three serial articles in the Saturday Evening Post, starting Febru-
ary 3, 1962. Professor Teller argued that the problem of radioactive 
fallout "was not worth worrying about,''8 and that because of the 
difficulty of policing underground tests, a nuclear test ban was a 
chimera. He maintained that further nuclear experiments were es-
sential to United States's security in several ways. The most im-
:eortant reason, he felt, was so that the weight of nuclear warheads 
could be reduced in order to make the total weapons system more 
mobile and effective. This was necessary, in his view, to insure that 
the American retaliatory force could survive an enemy attack. In 
addition, he held out the possibility of a fission-free weapon. 
Those on the other side of the argument took a much more 
serious view of the harm caused by the radioactive fallout resulting 
from nuclear weapons tests. There was little divergence between the 
scientific analysis of the issue by this group and that of those who 
minimized the problem of radioactive fallout; the difference between 
the two groups was in their moral evaluation of the consequences of 
fallout for mankind. President Kennedy himself was deeply troubled 
about the problem of fallout. sa The group opposing the resumption of 
atmospheric testing also raised broader moral arguments against the 
resumption of atmospheric tests. In general, they were more concerned 
about the widespread public opposition to nuclear testing both within 
the United States and abroad and the effects of the expression of this 
7Edward Teller & Allen Brown, The Legacy of Hiroshima (1962). 
8Jbid., p. 180. 
sasee Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 455, and Theodore 
C. Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 621-22. 
The Negotiations Resume 347 
opposition in such forums as the United Nations. They feared that if 
the United States were to resume atmospheric testing, increased ten-
sion would result and that this would diminish the prospects for 
achieving measures of arms control and disarmament, measures which 
they considered vital. So far as the military argument was concerned, 
they felt that the United States had sufficient nuclear weapons to 
devastate the Soviet Union, and that this was all that was required. 
They were sceptical of the need for further testing and felt that 
only marginal advantages would be gained. President Kennedy shared 
this appraisal, and according to one of his closest advisers, "talk 
about a neutron bomb which destroyed only people, not buildings, 
struck him as foolish in the extreme."8b 
Eventually, despite a final and moving plea by Prime Minister 
Macmillan, who even proposed convening a summit meeting, the 
advocates of the resumption of atmospheric tests carried the day. 
Apparently a clinching argument was one which William C. Foster, 
Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
articulated privately and in public. This was that the United States 
could not afford to allow the Soviet Union to engage in another test 
series without having itself tested; that in such circumstances a 
second test series might give the USSR an important advantage. He 
felt that if these conditions were to develop it would be difficult for 
the United States to continue to negotiate for a test ban treaty, 
among other reasons because it would be unlikely that the Senate 
would consent to ratification. 9 The President found the argument 
persuasive. 
At his Press Conference on February 7, 1962, President Ken-
nedy stated that a final decision on whether or not the United States 
would resume atmospheric testing would be taken within a month. 
The following day the White House issued a statement concerning 
the British decision to allow the United States government to use its 
facilities at Christmas Island if atmospheric testing were resumed. 
Finally, on Friday, March 2, 1962, in a special radio-television 
broadcast President Kennedy announced that he had that day au-
thorized the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of 
Defense to conduct a series of nuclear tests in the atmosphere as 
Sb"fheodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 621. 
9See his letter to Washington Post, February 10, 1962. 
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soon as preparations were completed, which would be sometime in 
April. 1o Kennedy had originally planned to give his talk on March 1, 
but he agreed to postpone it for twenty-four hours in response to 
Prime Minister Macmillan's request for further delay.10a By March 2 
the House of Commons would be recessed for the weekend. Although 
the President did not announce this, the test series would also 
include some high altitude shots. President Kennedy said that his 
decision was based on the unanimous recommendation of pertinent 
Department and Agency heads. 
This unanimity had been achieved by way of a compromise. Al-
though the President authorized the resumption of atmospheric tests, 
he ordered that the series should be limited only to those tests which 
were absolutely necessary and could not be conducted underground, 
and that they should be conducted so as to restrict radioactive fallout 
to the minimum. Partly for these reasons, no high-yield tests were 
planned; the 1954 15 megaton Bravo shot would stand as the largest 
ever detonated by the United States. Another factor responsible for 
this was the continuing view of the Administration that there were no 
over-riding military requirements for such high-yield weapons. More-
over, because of this reason, and because they had anticipated being 
able to conduct only underground tests which necessarily would be 
relatively small, American nuclear scientists had not prepared any de-
signs for high-yield weapons. During the actual test series, the Presi-
dent kept careful control to make certain that his directives were 
executed. 
Another element of the compromise in the recommendation 
which President Kennedy accepted was the caveat that the decision 
to resume atmospheric tests would not be executed if the Soviet Union 
would in the meantime agree to a nuclear test ban treaty. This last 
feature was designed to satisfy Prime Minister Macmillan as well 
as elements within the American Administration. Apparently the 
actual proposal came first from Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., a former 
Harvard history professor serving as Special Assistant to the Presi-
dent.l0b Hugh Gaitskell, the leader of the British Labour Party, also 
lOSee U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Publication 19, 
Documents on Disarmament, 1962, 2 vols. (1963), Vol. I, pp. 66-75. 
lOaArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 495, and Theo-
dore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 623. 
lObArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, pp. 491-92. 
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made a similar suggestion to Kennedy. Some within the American 
Administration, including Assistant Secretary of Defense John J. 
McNaughton, had argued that the offer be made conditional on 
Soviet acceptance of an atmospheric ban, policed by national detec-
tion systems, and such a proposal had even been included in an early 
draft of the President's 1962 State of the Union message. However, 
the Departments of Defense and State had objected, and when the 
offer not to resume atmospheric tests was finally made, they insisted 
that it be tied to a comprehensive ban. 
The President's address was notable for its quality of reluctance 
and of being forced by Soviet actions into an unpalatable situation. 
He gave a candid appraisal of the results of the recent Soviet test 
series-as the United States understood them-and the course of 
the nuclear test ban negotiations. He found the primary reasons for 
the United States' decision in these events. However, he also as-
serted that if the United States were to refrain from atmospheric 
testing, the leaders of the Soviet Union would 
. . . chalk it up, not to goodwill, but to a failure of will-
not to our confidence in Western superiority, but to our 
fear of world opinion, the very world opinion for which 
they showed such contempt. 
He continued this line of argumentation by asserting that the Soviet 
Union- would never agree to a "true test ban or mutual disarma-
ment" if the West were in a position of weakness. 
The Summit Correspondence: A Western Preemptive Gambit 
During the same time that consensus was being achieved within 
the American government on resuming atmospheric testing, there 
was a flurry of correspondence between Western and Soviet leaders. 
It was inaugurated on February 7, 1962, by a letter from President 
Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan to Chairman Khrushchev 
in which they proposed that to facilitate progress on disarmament 
the three governments should be represented at the opening of the 
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee by their Foreign Ministers, 
and that the Foreign Ministers should express their willingness to 
return to the negotiations as progress achieved by the permanent 
representatives warranted.11 One of the reasons for this proposal 
11Documents on Disarmament, 1962, supra note 10, Vol. I, pp. 25-26. 
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was to forestall a suggestion, which the two Western leaders knew 
Chairman Khrushchev would make, that the member states of the 
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should be represented 
by their heads of government or chiefs of state. Macmillan originally 
would have been willing to accept this proposal. Indeed, he had made 
a similar suggestion to Kennedy in early January. Obviously, however, 
if such a course were to be chosen, Chairman Khrushchev would have 
an excellent platform from which, among other things, to denounce 
the Western resumption of atmospheric tests, if this decision were 
taken, and at that point it seemed likely that it would be. The pro-
posal of the Western leaders reflected their continuing sensitivity to 
public opinion. Although their preemptive move did not prevent 
Chairman Khrushchev from making his proposal, it made it easier for 
the Western leaders to refuse his suggestion. 
In all, there were three exchanges of correspondence.12 It was 
not until his final letter of March 3, 1962, to President Kennedy 
that Chairman Khrushchev abandoned his proposal that heads of 
state represent their governments and accepted the Western sugges-
tion that Foreign Ministers do this. In this letter, which was dated 
the same day that President Kennedy announced the United States 
decision to resume atmospheric testing, Chairman Khrushchev also 
condemned this decision, and asserted that if it were executed, the 
USSR would "inevitably be forced to meet this challenge too by 
carrying out its own series of new tests. "13 In the course of his letter 
he pointed out that the United States had been the first to test and 
to use nuclear weapons and that the West had conducted many more 
tests over the years than the USSR. He then asserted the right of the 
Soviet Union to "be the last side to complete nuclear weapons 
tests." 
When the formal negotiations for a nuclear test ban reopened, 
both sides would therefore be more or less committed to another 
round of tests. And since each side declared that its move was a 
reaction to the actions of the other, it appeared as if they were 
engaged in an endless spiral. 
At the same time that he aired his suggestion for representation 
by heads of states with President Kennedy and Prime Minister 
12See Ibid. pp. 25-26, 32-36, 36-38, 49-57, 61-63, 64-66, and 75-81. 
I3Jbid., p. 80. 
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Macmillan, Chairman Khrushchev also raised it in an exchange of 
correspondence with General de Gaulle.14 This not only elicited the 
negative reaction that it had produced in the other Western capitals, 
but also the clear statement that France would not participate in 
the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee because disarmament 
was a matter which the French felt should be handled exclusively by 
the nuclear or near nuclear powers. 15 France also reiterated its de-
termination to proceed with its program to develop an independent 
nuclear capacity unless and until the nuclear powers agreed to ban 
the manufacture of nuclear weapons and to destroy those in ex-
istence. 
The Detection of Underground Tests: Continuing Ambivalence 
While these developments, and especially the imminent round 
of tests, cast a shadow over the resumption of negotiations for a 
test ban, there were also some apparently favorable occurrences that 
came to public attention during the recess in the negotiations. These 
related to the detection of underground nuclear explosions. On 
December 10, 1961, as a part of its Project Plowshare, exploring 
the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the United States detonated a 5 
kiloton nuclear device near Carlsbad, New Mexico, in a salt cavern 
1,200 feet beneath the surface of the earth. This detonation, which 
was named Project Gnome, was not a decoupled shot.16 However, 
on the basis of the Project Cowboy experiments, it had been esti-
mated that a tamped shot (one where the device is tightly packed 
in the surrounding medium) in salt, which was what the Gnome 
shot was, would give a seismic signal smaller by a factor of two 
and one-half than the seismic signal of a shot tamped in tuff, which 
is what all of the previous United States detonations had been. Con-
trary to this prediction, the Gnome shot gave a signal several times 
greater than Logan, the 5 kiloton tamped-in-tuff shot detonated on 
October 16, 1958. The Logan shot, it will be recalled, had been 
one of the principal sources of information for the United States' 
14Jbid., pp. 64-66. 
15See de Gaulle's letter and the statement of the French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs: ibid., pp. 48-49, p. 81. 
16See A. Latter, R. Latter, and W. McMillan, The Irrelevance of the 
Gnome Shot to Decoupling (The RAND Corp., 1962: Memorandum RM-
3005-PR). 
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reevaluation of the effectiveness of the control system suggested by 
the Conference of Experts. By mid-December 1961, it became known 
that the Gnome shot had been detected at stations as far away as 
Sweden, Finland, and J apanP In itself, this was an encouraging 
development, and many exaggerated its significance by assuming 
that the evidence disproved the decoupling theory, which in fact, it 
did not. The reason for this erroneous interpretation apparently was 
that much of the discussion concerning decoupling was framed in 
terms of nuclear shots conducted in large underground cavities in 
salt. The test did, however, indicate something about the effects of 
various media on the transmission of seismic signals from under-
ground nuclear explosions; to wit, a shot tamped in salt would yield 
a larger signal than one of identical yield tamped in tuff. 
The Gnome shot also produced some rather discouraging data, 
but this aspect was much less widely known and publicized. The 
Gnome shot made it quite apparent that because of unknown anom-
alies, seismic signals did not travel through the crust of the earth 
at uniform speeds, and, as a consequence, it was much more difficult 
to estimate accurately the epicenter of seismic events from distant 
seismic stations than had been assumed. This would greatly com-
plicate the problem of on-site inspection of unidentified events. In 
fact, American scientists discovered that, applying the then current 
American negotiating position, the actual site of the Gnome shot 
would have been outside of the area which they would have picked 
as being legally open to on-site inspection. Moreover, on the basis 
of the seismic signals they estimated the depth of the shot as 80 
miles rather than the actual 1,200 feet. Had they not known the 
actual facts, they would have concluded that the signals must have 
been generated by an earthquake rather than an explosion, since no 
one thought that explosions could be conducted that deep.18 The 
reason that distant stations did not reach this conclusion was that 
the time, location, and yield of the shot had been announced in 
advance. These somewhat more technical qualifications, however, 
were overlooked in the public debate. 
A second development which sparked public optimism con-
cerning the problem of detecting underground explosions was that 
17See New York Times, December 19, 1961, p. 1. 
lSEarl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, p. 492. 
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on February 2, 1962, the Atomic Energy Commission announced 
that the Soviet Union had apparently set off an underground nuclear 
explosion earlier that day.19 So far as was publicly known in the 
West, this was the first time that the USSR had detonated a nuclear 
device underground. The announcement stated only that "the yield 
was well above the threshold of detectability." This vague state-
ment allowed various interpretations. Some experts commented that 
this meant more than 20 kilotons, but other interpretations were 
possible. Only later did the United States point out that the Soviet 
test took place in a normally aseismic area in Central Siberia, near 
to a fairly well-known weapons proving ground and apparently had 
a yield of from 40 to 50 kilotons. Had all of these facts been pub-
licized, no one would have doubted that it could have been de-
tected. 
The Progress of the Vela Program: Toward a Worldwide 
Seismological Network 
Actually, at this point American scientists felt that the state of 
'technology with respect to the detection of underground nuclear ex-
plosions had improved very little. The United States Vela Program 
had not yet produced significant results, although it had inaugurated 
a vast number of projects. During fiscal years 1960 and 1961, 
$51,438,000 had been appropriated for the project, and the esti-
mated budget for fiscal year 1962 was $59,0000,000. The research 
inaugurated under the Vela Program was both basic and applied. 
As a consequence, among other results, the Vela Program would 
have an enormous leavening effect on the science of seismology. 
Under one aspect of the program the United States Coast and 
Geodetic Survey undertook to construct a worldwide seismological 
network. It offered to supply modem calibrated and standardized 
instrumentation to seismological stations throughout the world, the 
only conditions being that copies of the records be made available 
to the Coast and Geodetic Survey. The program envisaged supply-
ing instrumentation for 125 stations, most of which would be out-
side of the United States. Some of these stations were to be operated 
by governments, others by private groups, such as universities. Three 
million, three hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars was pro-
19See New York Times, February 3, 1962, p. 1. 
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vided for this purpose in fiscal years 1960 and 1961, and $1,175,000 
was budgeted for fiscal year 1962. Although Vela Program officials 
went out of their way to assert that the purpose of this worldwide 
network was not to detect nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union, 
but rather to collect earthquake statistics, obviously within the rele-
vant technological limitations, the stations would record all under-
ground seismic events, including nuclear explosions. Data from the 
initial elements of this worldwide network would become available 
in quantity in the spring and summer of 1962. 
Another part of the Vela Program envisaged the construction 
of seven seismological stations in the United States designed ex-
plicitly to detect nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union, and an 
analysis center, resembling in some ways the center which, accord-
ing to American plans, would be established at the headquarters of 
the control system in Vienna. The first of the seismological sta-
tions, a prototype of the stations recommended by the Geneva Con-
ference of Experts, was constructed at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and 
became operational in October 1960. As early as July 1961 it was 
reported that this station appeared to be capable of detecting most 
seismic events of down to magnitude 4 at distances of 2,000 miles 
and more. At that time, American scientists thought that this meant 
that with this station they could locate events as small as about 1 
kiloton from distances greater than 2,000 miles, but they could not 
begin to identify such events until they began to approach 5 kilo-
tons. 20 Nonetheless, the capabilities of the station exceeded Ameri-
can expectations. The reason for this was the demonstration of the 
possibility of detection and identification of seismic events in what 
is called the "third zone"; that is, the zone at very large distances 
beyond "the shadow" or second zone in which detection is very dif-
ficult. Eventually the possibility would be completely substantiated. 
Three more seismological stations would become operational during 
1962, and a fifth in April 1963. These stations would have the 
equipment recommended by the Conference of Experts, and would 
also incorporate improvements in seismological techniques developed 
20See the testimony of Dr. Carl Romney, Assistant Director, Air Force 
Technical Applications Center: U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, Hearings: Developments in the Field of Detection and Identification 
of Nuclear Explosions (Project Vela) and Relationship to Test Ban Negotia-
tions, 87th Congress, 1st Session (1962), pp. 123-24. 
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since that time. These improvements were also subsequently added 
to the Fort Sill Station. 
Research with respect to decoupling proved to be the slowest 
in getting underway. The so-called Dribble experimental program to 
test the theory of decoupling was established by the Atomic Energy 
Commission in early 1960. The program envisaged a series of six 
events, involving both tamped and decoupled shots. In early 1962, 
because of lack of funds, the program had to be suspended. At that 
point only certain exploratory drilling and engineering work had 
been completed. When the program was resumed in September 
1962, then being supported by the Department of Defense, the 
earliest possible date for a decoupled shot would be June 1963. 
Construction for the first cavity for the Dribble series, a cavity 
which would accommodate a 100 ton detonation, would ultimately 
cost $3,200,000 and would require almost a year.21 By rnid-1964 
more than that had been spent and construction had not yet started 
for this cavity. As of September 1965 a nuclear decoupled shot had 
not yet been fired. 
Much of the work conducted under the Vela Program operated 
under one basic constraint. It was generally felt that it would be 
impossible to achieve more access to the Soviet Union than would 
be allowed under the control system which had been recommended 
in the report of the Conference of Experts. Thus the research was 
always designed to find improvements which might be applied within 
the framework of that system, rather than those which might re-
quire a major political reorientation. At least some scientists felt 
that this constraint was a major handicap.22 
Another constraint-perhaps felt more universally among the 
scientists participating in the program-was the prohibition prior 
to September 1961 on conducting any further underground nuclear 
explosions. This meant that all of the directly relevant work had to 
be done on the basis of theoretical calculations, and on the basis 
of the scanty empirical data gathered prior to 1959. When the 
21See U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings: 
Developments in Technical Capabilities for Detecting and Identifying Nuclear 
Weapons Tests, 88th Congress, 1st Session (1963), p. 312. 
22See the testimony of Dr. Richard Latter, Hearings: Developments 
in the Field of Detection and Identification of Nuclear Explosions, supra 
note 20, p. 19. 
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United States resumed underground testing in the fall of 1961, 
after the Soviet abrogation of the moratorium, this situation changed 
radically. The United States conducted nine underground tests in the 
fall of 1961. By mid-1962 this total would be increased to forty-
three. Thus a relatively vast amount of new empirical data would 
become available simultaneously with improved instrumentation at 
seismological stations throughout the world. Theoretical enquiries 
launched under Vela were also beginning to bear fruit at about this 
time. 
II 
The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee: 
A New Forum 
The Composition of the Committee: Enter the New Eight 
All of these factors came into play when the formal negotiations on 
a nuclear test ban resumed on March 11, 1962, with the opening 
session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). 
This Committee had been created as a result of bilateral talks 
between the United States and the Soviet Union in the summer and 
fall of 1961, and its composition had been endorsed in General 
Assembly Resolution 1722 (XVI). In the same resolution, the 
Assembly requested that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should 
report to it, and directed the Secretary General to facilitate the 
Committee's work by supplying the necessary services. The Eight-
een-Nation Committee therefore met, as the Conference on the 
Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests had previously, in the 
Palais des Nations, in Geneva. By virtue of Assembly Resolution 
1722 (XVI), however, the Eighteen-Nation Committee had a some-
what more definite link with the United Nations than the previous 
conference, and this was underscored during the subsequent nego-
tiations. 
Reaching agreement on the composition of the Eighteen-Nation 
Committee had been the most difficult aspect of the bilateral 
negotiations. Negotiations on this point were complicated not only 
because of differences between the USSR and the United States, but 
also because of controversies among the other members of the 
United Nations who wished or did not wish to serve on the Com-
mittee. In the end, what was agreed to was an expansion of the 
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old Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, by adding eight countries 
belonging neither to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization nor to 
the Warsaw Pact. The Ten-Nation Committee bad consisted of 
Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
on one side and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and 
the USSR on the other. The eight states which were added to make 
the new Committee were: Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic. 
The question of expanding the membership of the Ten-Nation 
Committee bad actually been under consideration almost since the 
collapse of the negotiations on general disarmament in the summer 
of 1960, when the five Communist states withdrew from the 
Committee.23 As early as September 1960, Chairman Khrushchev, 
acting as the bead of the Soviet Union's delegation to the United 
Nations, had suggested that the Committee should be enlarged by 
adding: Ghana, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and the United Arab 
Republic.24 The Western powers rejected this suggestion, principally 
because adding five nonaligned nations would give the appearance of 
accepting t.'le Soviet "troika" concept. The following year, however, 
in bilateral discussions with the USSR in June and July, the United 
States proposed as alternatives adding either a chairman and two 
vice-chairmen or ten new members. In either case the new members 
would be chosen from the group of UN Member States that did 
not belong to NATO or the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union re-
sponded by repeating its suggestion of a fifteen-member committee. 
These moves to expand the Ten-Nation Committee were given 
added impetus in September 1961 when the Conference of Heads 
of State and Government of Nonaligned Countries meeting in Bel-
grade recommended that the nonaligned states should be represented 
in all disarmament talks. 25 The final agreement on the composition 
of the new Committee was not achieved, however, until December 
1961. 
The figure of eighteen and the specific countries named were 
23For an account of the collapse of the negotiations within the Ten-
Nation Committee see Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for 
Arms Control, pp. 551-52. 
24UN Document A/ 4509. 
25See the declaration and communique, Documents on Disarmament, 
1961, supra note 5, pp. 374-83, at 381. 
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both clearly compromises. Since the membership of the new Com-
mittee could not be divided into equal thirds, the West felt that it 
had avoided creating a precedent in favor of the "troika" principle. 
On the other hand, the Committee did consist of the three groups 
which figured in that principle. The eight new members of the 
Committee included three of the five originally suggested by Chair-
man Khrushchev: India, Mexico, and the United Arab Republic. 
They also included one European state, Sweden, following a United 
States suggestion. As the United States insisted, Latin America was 
given more representation than it had in the original Soviet 
proposal in that Brazil was added, along with Mexico, which had 
figured in the Soviet suggestion. Burma, Ethiopia, and Nigeria com-
prised the final element of the compromise. They were less anti-
Western than Indonesia and Ghana, the other two states originally 
proposed by the USSR. 
The composition of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Com-
mittee meant, among other things, that when the test ban negotia-
tions were resumed within the framework of the Committee, for the 
first time states would be intimately involved which did not possess 
nuclear weapons themselves and which were not aligned with any 
of the nuclear powers. This experience would be quite different 
from the fleeting exposure of the annual General Assembly debates. 
Conceivably it could have an impact both on the policies of these 
states-for it could be a significant learning experience-and on 
the course of the negotiations. 
The Views of the New Members 
Significantly, all of the eight countries which were added to the 
Committee had voted for General Assembly Resolution 1648 
(XVI) urging the states concerned to refrain from further nuclear 
weapons tests pending the conclusion of an international agreement 
banning such tests. All five members of the Warsaw Pact repre-
sented on the Eighteen-Nation Committee had voted against this 
resolution, as had France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. Canada, in contrast, had voted for the resolution, 
and during the sessions of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in 1962 
and early 1963 it often took a position closer to that of the eight 
new members than to that of its NATO partners.26 Since France 
boycotted the Eighteen-Nation Committee, this meant that NATO 
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representation was effectively reduced to three. On the other hand, 
the five members of the Warsaw Pact acted as a solid unit. 
Consisting of two states each from Latin America and Asia, 
three from Africa, and one from the neutral states of Europe, the 
eight new members of the committee roughly reflected the member-
ship of the United Nations exclusive of those states belonging to 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Although this was never explicitly 
stated, it was widely assumed, both within the Eighteen-Nation 
Committee and in the United Nations, that the eight would represent 
this broad group of the UN's membership. In any case, by the 
nature of the situation, by their own inclination, and by the actions 
of East and West, the eight would introduce a new and independent 
element into the negotiations, and they would become, as it were, 
critics of the positions advanced by the two sides. 27 Beyond that, 
they could also obviously perform the range of functions tradition-
ally performed by third parties in pacific settlement. 
Of the eight, Sweden was the only state to have technical 
advisers continuously attached to its delegation. It was the most 
advanced state of the new members in terms of technological 
development and the only one which had figured in the various pro-
jections of possible nuclear powers in the foreseeable future. 
Whether or not Sweden should seek to acquire nuclear capability 
had been a matter of political discussion within the country. 
Throughout the negotiations on a nuclear test ban the Swedish 
delegation included two technical advisers. It also included military 
advisers. One of the technical advisers was a specialist in the 
mechanical effects of nuclear explosions, the other was a specialist 
in nuclear chemistry. Both of them were research organizers in 
26Jn his account of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the former Indian 
representative has noted that Canada "is jokingly referred to at Geneva as 
the ninth nonaligned country." (Arthur S. Lall, Negotiating Disarmament: 
The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference: The First Two Years, 1962-
1964 (1964), p. 12.) Sir Michael Wright expressed the same view when he 
wrote that some of the moves which the Diefenbaker government made in 
the nuclear field served only to cause "embarrassment to Canadian delegates, 
disarray within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in their negotiations 
with others, and irritation in Washington." (Disarm and Verify, p. 132). 
27See the interesting self-analysis of the role of the eight by a repre-
sentative of one of the states, M. Samir Ahmed, "The Role of the Neutrals 
in the Geneva Negotiations," Disarmament and Arms Control, Vol. I, No. 
2 (Summer 1963), pp. 20-32. 
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their own fields for the Defense Research Organization in Stock-
holm. In addition, the Swedish delegation relied heavily on advice 
from the seismological station at Uppsala University. Because of 
its technical competence, the Swedish delegation played a special 
role among the eight new members of the Disarmament Committee. 
It should perhaps also be noted that one of the Swedish specialists 
on disarmament, Colonel Stig Wennerstrom, who worked in Stock-
holm, was arrested in June 1963 on a charge of spying for the 
Soviet Union and was subsequently convicted. 
Several of the delegations of the other new members included 
diplomats who had had considerable experience in the United 
Nations, and even some who had participated in past disarmament 
negotiations. Ambassador Luis Padilla Nervo of Mexico was the 
delegate who had had the most experience of this nature. He had 
also been President of the General Assembly. James Barrington of 
Burma was another diplomat who had represented his country in the 
United Nations for several years, as had Arthur S. Lall of India. 
The Opening of the Eighteen-Nation Committee 
For the first few days of the meetings of the Eighteen-Nation 
Disarmament Committee, because of the acceptance of the Western 
proposal, most of the states were represented at the Ministerial 
level. In all instances but one, this meant that the delegation was 
temporarily headed by the foreign minister. The Indian delegation, 
however, was headed by V. K. Krishna Menon, Minister of Defense. 
This reflected the unique role Krishna Menon played for India 
flowing from his personal relationship with Nehru. 
At the second meeting of the Committee on March 15, 1962, 
the Soviet Union sought to gain the initiative by tabling an entire draft 
treaty on General and Complete Disarmament. A month would 
elapse before the United States would take similar action. Tabling 
this draft treaty could be viewed as a tactic designed to show the 
reasonableness of Soviet policy; Chairman Khrushchev underscored 
Soviet power the following day. In a widely publicized address at 
a Moscow election rally on March 16, he asserted that Soviet 
scientists had created a new "global" intercontinental missile, which 
was "invulnerable to antimissile weapons."28 He claimed that 
2BDocuments on Disarmament, 1962, supra note 10, Vol. I, p. 152. 
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United States warning systems were now worthless because this 
missile could approach the United States from altogether different 
directions than those toward which these systems were aimed. The 
implication in his view was "that the most realistic way to prevent 
mass extermination of people in flames of a nuclear war is an 
agreement on disarmament. . . . " He laid the failure to achieve 
disarmament solely and squarely to the West. He repeated his 
threat that if the United States resumed testing nuclear weapons in 
the atmosphere, the Soviet Union would be forced to respond in 
kind. 
With respect to the test ban negotiations, Chairman Khrushchev 
asserted, as Foreign Minister Gromyko had the day before in Ge-
neva, that national means of detection provided an adequate basis 
for a treaty. He said: 
. . . what secret tests of nuclear weapons can one speak 
about when each one's explosions are practically under the 
control not only of the two countries but also of other 
states, including neutral ones, many of which also possess 
equipment for detection of nuclear explosions?29 
In the past the USSR had only argued that tests in the atmosphere, 
in outer space, and underwater could be detected by national sys-
tems. Now Chairman Khrushchev extended that claim to cover un-
derground tests as well. The inclusion of the detection capabilities 
of neutral states was also an interesting and perhaps significant de-
viation from past Soviet pronouncements on this matter. 
To substantiate his point that national detection systems were 
adequate, Chairman Khrushchev mentioned the detection and an-
nouncement of the Soviet underground test of February 2, 1962, by 
the United States government. He declared that this test had been 
conducted to trap the United States into disproving its contention that 
underground tests could not be detected by national systems. Soviet 
negotiators would recount this incident often in the subsequent ne-
gotiations. 
The American opening gambits in the Eighteen-Nation Dis-
armament Committee were much less dramatic. On the same day that 
Foreign Minister Gromyko tabled the Soviet draft treaty on General 
29Jbid., p. 155. 
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and Complete Disarmament, Secretary of State Dean Rusk outlined 
a number of proposals-which the United States would advance in 
the coming negotiations in concrete form-relating to general and 
complete disarmament and to partial measures. Somewhat later that 
day in a private conversation among the United States, United 
Kingdom, and USSR representatives, Ambassador Dean presented 
an aide memoire to Ambassador Tsarapkin proposing modifications 
in the Western position with respect to a test ban. The aide memoire 
proposed four modifications to the basic Western position as ex-
pressed in the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty of April 
18, 1961, and the three amendments of May 29, 1961 and August 
30, 1961.30 
The first modification concerned provisions for safeguarding 
other states against a surprise abrogation. Two specific measures 
were envisaged: periodic declarations on the part of heads of state 
that there were no preparations for testing; and provision for limited 
and agreed rights to inspect declared test sites a certain number of 
times each year. 
The second modification related to shortening the time spent 
before the inauguration of the inspection process. This involved prin-
cipally the functioning of the Preparatory Commission and the 
scheduling of the establishment of control posts. 
The third revision was more designed to appeal to the Soviet 
Union. The Western powers were willing to eliminate the 4.75 seismic 
magnitude threshold from the outset and to make the treaty compre-
hensive. Ambassador Dean, Jerome B. Wiesner, and others had long 
urged that the threshold be dropped. They felt that given the uncer-
tainty about the determination of seismic magnitude there would be 
endless arguments about whether or not an underground event had 
generated a seismic sigral that was over the threshold. Moreover, 
since in previous Westen proposals there could be no inspections be-
neath the threshold, they were convinced that the USSR would have 
a magnificent opportunity to engage in clandestine testing. British 
policy-makers also shared these views.31 Finally, Secretary Rusk and 
President Kennedy were persuaded and the threshold was dropped. 
30U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, International Negotia-
tions on Ending Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1961-September 1962, 
pp. 200-201. 
31Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, p. 471. 
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The final modification was also designed as a compromise to 
the USSR. According to it, the Western powers were willing to con-
template, within the framework of an overall quota on on-site in-
spections, a further limitation on the number of inspections in nor-
mally aseismic areas. Thus the greater number of inspections in the 
Soviet Union would be confined to an extremely limited area, mainly 
in East Siberia and South Central Siberia, and only a few would be 
allowed in the heart of the country. 
In the informal meeting, the Soviet Union rejected these pro-
posals immediately. The United States offered as an alternative sug-
gestion the possibility of immediately signing the United States-
United Kingdom draft treaty of April18, 1961, with the three amend-
ments. This was also unacceptable to the Soviet Union. 
Deadlock in the Subcommittee 
Obviously the two sides were no nearer agreement, and perhaps 
were even farther apart, than they had been when the Geneva Con-
ference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests ended on Jan-
uary 29, 1962. This became glaringly apparent in the meetings of 
the Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear 
Weapon Tests. The Eighteen-Nation Committee created this Sub-
committee, consisting of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and 
the United States, on March 21. The fact that the negotiations on a 
nuclear test ban were resumed under physical arrangements which 
were practically identical to those which had previously existed-the 
representatives of the three states met in private again in the Palais 
des Nations-should not obscure the important psychological dif-
ference. The three representatives now comprised a Subcommittee, 
responsible to the larger ENDC. As a consequence of this, new pres-
sures would become operative, even though they were not immediately 
apparent. 
In the first meeting of the Subcommittee, on March 21, the 
United States formally presented the new Western proposals, and 
the Soviet Union in tum formally rejected them. Mr. Tsarapkin 
bluntly asserted that no agreement would be possible "on such an 
utterly discredited basis."32 He went on to assert that the USSR 
would only agree to a test ban which would rely solely on national 
32ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 1, p. 9. 
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systems for control. He argued that the only reason for the Western 
insistence on international control was the desire to obtain oppor-
tunities to engage in espionage. The Western powers, on the other 
hand, maintained that they could only have confidence that a treaty 
banning nuclear weapon tests was being fulfilled if there were an 
international control mechanism. They were, however, willing to 
consider various possibilities: their new proposals, the draft treaty 
of April 18, 1961, with amendments, or any suggestion that the 
Soviet Union might offer as long as it met their criterion of effective 
control. 
The Soviet position, as developed in this meeting and the next, 
was that it was common knowledge that all atmospheric tests could 
be detected by national systems. Mr. Tsarapkin cited as evidence 
the offer which President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan 
made on September 3, 1961. He argued that national systems were: 
. . . equally if not more applicable in the case of nuclear 
explosions set off underwater or at high altitudes. And now 
that the techniques of detecting and identifying nuclear ex-
plosions have made considerable progress, they are also 
applicable to underground nuclear explosions. 33 
Nevertheless, he continued to stand by the Soviet proposal of Novem-
ber 28, 1961, which implied that some international control measures 
would ultimately be established for monitoring underground tests. 
The Western position did not distinguish the problems of de-
tecting nuclear weapons tests in the various environments, but merely 
asserted that the report of the Conference of Experts had demon-
strated the necessity for an international control system. Thus the 
situation was almost the reverse of what it had previously been when 
the Soviet Union had argued that the negotiations had to be based 
on the report of the Conference of Experts and the Western powers 
had maintained that new information had to be introduced. Ambas-
sador Dean stated that the proposal to eliminate the threshold in the 
treaty was advanced despite the fact that the United States did not 
think that there had been "any great advance in the ability to detect 
events underground below 4.75."34 Curiously, in the plenary session 
33ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 2, p. 10. 
84Jbid., p. 22. 
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the following day Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated that the pro-
posal to eliminate the threshold was based on "increased experience 
and increased scientific knowledge."85 
The confusion which could result from these conflicting pro-
nouncements and from the Western failure to specify the problems 
of detection in the various environments was exacerbated by fre-
quent statements of Western scientists, which were widely reported 
in the Western press, concerning the problems of detecting nuclear 
weapons tests. Many of these claimed that the problems were not as 
difficult as the diplomats of the United States and the United King-
dom claimed. The Soviet Union used these statements to buttress its 
case in the Subcommittee. But other than such statements, it could 
offer little proof that the scientific situation had in fact changed. The 
position of both sides, therefore, looked somewhat murky. 
In addition to stating their respective positions concerning what 
arrangements for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests would 
be acceptable to them, the two sides engaged in a bitter debate about 
the Western decision to resume atmospheric tests and the Soviet 
abrogation of the moratorium. Each blamed the other for increased 
tensions. 
The Debate in the Full Committee 
After two fruitless sessions, the Subcommittee reported the 
impasse to the full Eighteen-Nation Committee. This occasioned a 
full dress debate. By and large the foreign ministers of the three 
nuclear powers merely reiterated the positions which their representa-
tives had voiced in the Subcommittee. There was, however, one im-
portant exception. Foreign Minister Gromyko stated that an inter-
national agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests 
would only be possible if it were signed by "the Governments of all 
the nuclear Powers. "36 He then made it clear that this meant that 
France would have to sign a test ban treaty. 
The only representative of the new members of the Eighteen-
Nation Disarmament Committee to offer a positive suggestion at this 
meeting was F. C. de San Thiago Dantas of Brazil. He said: 
35ENDC/PV. 8, p. 17. 
36Jbid., p. 25. 
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It is very obvious that all inspection depends, in the 
first place, on very accurate knowledge of the technical 
means available for verifying the implementation of the 
clauses of a treaty. An exchange of scientific information is 
essential, in order that States may have the same stock of 
knowledge and technical means for verifying the implemen-
tation of the agreements concluded. At the same time, it is 
clear that means of inspection must be provided, insofar 
as our common need requires. 37 
Although in some ways this statement could be considered an en-
dorsement of the Western position, it also reflected the doubts among 
the new members about the arguments advanced by both sides caused 
by the conflicting claims with respect to the technical possibilities of 
detection. Several of them alluded to this in earlier discussions. 
Prior to this debate, several of the members of the Eighteen-
Nation Disarmament Committee, including many of the new mem-
bers, had from time to time discussed the question of the test ban 
negotiations in the plenary sessions. All of the Communist countries 
and all eight of the new members and Canada had expressed their 
opposition to nuclear tests. Many of them referred to General As-
sembly resolution 1648 (XVI) requesting states to refrain from 
further testing of nuclear weapons, and several expressed the hope 
that the United States would not conduct the planned series of 
atmospheric explosions. In the view of all of the members of the 
Committee, the imminence of this test series made the problem of 
achieving an agreed treaty especially urgent. President Kennedy, 
after all, had pledged not to conduct the tests if an agreement could 
be achieved. 
In addition to expressing their opposition to nuclear tests in 
general and to the forthcoming American series in particular, some 
of the eight new members introduced, always in a most tentative 
fashion, a number of new ideas in these early discussions. As early 
as the third session, F. C. de San Thiago Dantas of Brazil argued 
that since it was generally agreed that nuclear weapons tests under-
water and in the atmosphere and in the biosphere could be detected 
and identified without on-site inspection or the establishment of an 
37Jbid., p. 33. 
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elaborate control mechanism, these tests should be suspended im-
mediately.38 
Two sessions later, V. K. Krishna Menon made the same point 
and added that tests in the atmosphere and biosphere were the main 
tests that people were worried about at the moment. 39 He also argued 
that, short of the establishment of a world state, all that could be 
done in the event of a violation of an arms control agreement would 
be to establish proof of the violation. In his view, in the case of an 
atmospheric test such proof could easily be obtained. Finally, the 
Indian Defense Minister pointed out that several stations for data 
collection, for instance, for measuring radiation, already existed in 
the world, and using these stations as an example, he suggested the 
possibility of establishing other "scientific detection stations" by both 
national and international efforts. As he put it, ''The more people 
who watch, the less avoidance there will be."40 In many ways his 
suggestion built upon a resolution which the General Assembly had 
adopted the previous fall, 1629 (XVI), which had urged the col-
laboration of national efforts and those of the World Meteorological 
Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency in ex-· 
tending the present meteorological reporting system to include meas-
urement of atmospheric radioactivity. 
Ato Ketema Yifru, Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, introduced a 
final new idea at the sixth session. He asked whether or not it would 
be possible "to devise an international scientific system of verification 
where an appeal could be lodged to resolve differences in results of 
national detection systems?"41 
At this point, however, these were only isolated individual 'sug-
gestions. They were not advanced as proposals, and they did not 
appear to elicit any significant response. They did, though, constitute 
a nucleus around which proposals could be formulated. They also set 
a precedent, and a pattern was established in these early talks which 
was to prevail throughout 1962. It was a pattern of parallel talks. 
Specific negotiations would be conducted in the Subcommittee of the 
three nuclear powers. Meanwhile, the other members of the Eighteen-
Nation Committee would scrutinize the record of these detailed talks 
38ENDC/PV. 3, p. 9. 
39ENDC/PV. 5, p. 39. 
40Jbid., p. 40. 
41ENDC/PV. 6, p. 20. 
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and raise questions and introduce suggestions in the plenary sessions. 
These parallel talks would be punctuated by periodic reports from 
the Subcommittee to the full Committee and full dress debates. Si-
multaneously with these talks on the record, there would also be a 
series of informal discussions, both among the three nuclear powers 
and the entire membership of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. 
The Subcommittee Resumes and American Scientists Return 
to Geneva 
On March 28, the tripartite Subcommittee resumed its negotia-
tions. The two sides clung adamantly to their positions. The Soviet 
Union continued to insist that it would only agree to a treaty based 
on national detection systems, while the Western powers, on the 
other hand, insisted that an international control system would be 
necessary. 
Both sides elaborated the technical situation as they understood 
it. The Soviet Union repeated and expanded the arguments that it 
had developed in the first two sessions of the Subcommittee. Ambas-
sador Tsarapkin boasted that the predictions of the Soviet scientists 
in 1958 had been borne out, that the situation with respect to the 
detection of nuclear weapons tests had improved, even more than 
had been expected.42 However, he continued to differentiate slightly 
between the situation with respect to nuclear weapons tests in the 
atmosphere, in outer space, underwater, and those underground.43 
He asserted that tests in all environments could be detected by 
national systems, but was somewhat less positive in the latter instance. 
To prove his point about underground tests, he cited those which had 
been detected, and claimed that the detection of the Gnome shot by 
distant stations had disproved the decoupling theory. 44 
The two Western powers took much greater care to refute the 
Soviet arguments than they had during the opening sessions of the 
Eighteen-Nation Committee. This effort started when the interim 
report of the Subcommittee was presented to the full Eighteen-Nation 
Committee. At that time, Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, Special Assistant 
to the President for Science and Technology, and other American 
scientists came to Geneva and made themselves available-especially 
42ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 4, p. 8. 
43See ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 8, pp. 22-23. 
44ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 4, pp. 4-5. 
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to the eight new members of the Committee-to explain the technical 
situation as the United States understood it. Dr. Wiesner, in par-
ticular, was widely known among the representatives of the neutral 
nations and greatly respected. He and the other American scientists 
came to play an important teaching role in the Conference. 
In the Subcommittee and in plenary sessions both Ambassador 
Dean and Mr. Godber developed the Western position for the record. 
Now they began to distinguish between the various environments and 
to acknowledge that most, or as they sometimes put it, "the larger," 
tests in the atmosphere could be detected by national systems. They 
maintained that although it was conceivable that tests in outer space 
and underwater could be detected by national systems, at present no 
national systems for such purposes were in existence. 45 
The Western representatives stated that they felt that the major-
ity of underground events could be detected, but that in many cases 
it would be difficult to distinguish whether they were caused by earth-
quakes or nuclear explosions, and that in any case, the only way 
positively to identify an underground nuclear explosion was through 
obtaining radioactive debris by means of an on-site inspection. At a 
news conference in Washington, President Kennedy also sought to 
establish the difference between the detection and identification of 
underground events. 46 It was difficult to get many of the delegates 
of the eight new members of the Committee to make this distinction. 
Even the Swedish scientists, including those at Uppsala, were some-
what careless in this respect. 
To illustrate the limitations on the distant detection of under-
ground nuclear explosions, Ambassador Dean pointed out that of 
the current United States series of underground tests the Gnome shot 
had been the only one to be detected in Sweden. He also said that 
during the moratorium on nuclear testing, from the late fall of 1958 
until its abrogation by the Soviet Union in 1961, United States 
scientists had recorded "hundreds of seismic or acoustic signals ... 
and some of them may have looked as if they could have been caused 
by a secret underground nuclear detonation."47 The United States 
did not raise questions because of its fear of upsetting the negotiations. 
45ENDC/PV. 19, p. 38, and ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 8, p. 6. 
46See Documents on Disarmament, 1962, supra note 10, Vol. I, pp. 
215-17. 
47ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 4, p. 23. 
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Concerning the Gnome shot, Ambassador Dean agreed that it 
had confounded the predictions of American scientists with respect to 
the effects of various media on the transmission of seismic signals. 48 
However, he pointed out that since it was tamped the Gnome shot 
was irrelevant to the question of decoupling. 
It was not long before the presence in Geneva of the American 
scientists began to have an impact. As early as April 2, the Swedish 
delegate, R. Edberg, stated that to the best of his knowledge there 
was "no real or marked discrepancy between the view of American 
scientists and our own as to the detectability and possibility of 
identifying seismic events."49 The Western representatives sought to 
press this advantage by suggesting that there should be a meeting of 
scientists from East and West to go over the technical situation. The 
Soviet rebuttal was to cast aspersions on the motives of the scientists 
that the Western governments had sent to Geneva in the past. 50 
Simultaneously with their efforts concerning the technical situa-
tion, the Western representatives sought to prove that the Soviet fears 
with respect to espionage were groundless. They pointed out the 
elaborate safeguards that they were willing to have the host country 
establish and the minute portion of the Soviet Union which would be 
subjected to on-site inspection in any year. 
The Eight-Nation Memorandum: A Synthesis with Deliberate 
Ambiguity 
Despite the fact that the West might have had the better of 
the oral presentations during this period, it was the side that was 
about to open a series of atmospheric tests, and thus was in many 
ways the more vulnerable to criticism. Even as early as the interim 
report of the Subcommittee, though, it was apparent to many that 
the Soviet Union was at least equally, if not more, determined than 
the West to hold another round of atmospheric tests. 51 In the plenary 
sessions, several of the delegates of the eight new members stated 
their belief that both East and West were determined to carry out 
new series of atmospheric tests. Since the American tests were im-
minent (and perhaps for other reasons as well), however, they con-
48ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 6, p. 18. 
49ENDC/PV. 13, p. 47. 
50See ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 4, p. 32. 
51New York Times, March 25, 1962, p. 1. 
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centrated their pressure on the United States. On April 12, Ambas-
sador Lall of India, on the instruction of his government, appealed 
to the governments of the nuclear powers "not to resume nuclear 
tests during the pendency of this Conference. . . . "52 It should be 
noted parenthetically that on this occasion and on each subsequent 
occasion when he asked the nuclear powers to forego testing, he 
stressed the "nth country" problem as a primary reason, arguing 
that if the nuclear powers continued to test, other powers would do 
so also. Obviously India was perturbed by a particular "nth country" 
problem, the People's Republic of China. In October of 1962 heavy 
fighting would break out on the Sino-Soviet border. The Soviet 
response to Ambassador Lall's appeal was to reiterate its stand that 
it would pledge not to conduct tests during the meetings of the 
Eighteen-Nation Committee if the Western powers did also.53 The 
Western powers retorted that they could not again agree to an on-
policed moratorium; they would only agree to forego their planned 
tests if a treaty with effective control were sigued in the interim. 54 
An exchange of statements and correspondence between Prime 
Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy on the one hand and 
Chairman Khrushchev on the other produced virtually the same re-
sult. 55 It also gave Chairman Khrushchev an opportunity to restate 
his threat that the Soviet Union would resume testing if the United 
States inaugurated its planned atmospheric series. 
As the days went by, the eight new members of the Committee 
became increasingly concerned about the imminence of resumed at-
mospheric testing. Several of them thought that they should break 
off the Conference if the United States executed its plans, and some 
members of the United Nations Secretariat who were providing the 
supporting services for the Conference also took this position. 
Meanwhile, in the discussions in the plenary sessions, individual 
representatives of the eight had added their suggestions to those which 
some of them had already made. James Barrington, of Burma, sug-
gested the creation of an international scientific commission, though 
not as elaborate as the organization envisaged in the Western plans, 
52ENDC/PV. 19, p. 7. 
53Jbid., p. 21. 
54Jbid., pp. 21-23. 
55Documents on Disarmament, 1962, supra note 10, Vol. I, pp. 292-94, 
318-28. 
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which could settle disputes which might arise from conflicting in-
terpretations of data derived from national detection systems. 56 He 
thought that such a commission would probably have to have the 
right to conduct an agreed number of on-site inspections. Other dele-
gates further developed this and the previous suggestions. 
Eventually, the delegations of the eight nations decided that 
they should combine their efforts in a concerted attempt to break the 
deadlock in the negotiations. Actually, the origins of this move can 
be traced to the reactions of some of the eight delegates to the initial 
report of the Subcommittee, which made the impasse plainly ap-
parent. Sweden and India played a leading role in formulating the 
concerted action for the eight. India mainly contributed ideas of a 
constitutional and legal character. The Swedish delegation brought 
to the task considerable technical knowledge, as well as definite 
ideas about the political and legal arrangements that could be im-
plemented in an arms control agreement. Swedish scientists were 
convinced that the chances of an on-site inspection's actually obtaining 
radioactive debris were not very great and this diminished the im-
portance of such inspections in their view. (As time went on, Ameri-
can scientists would increasingly share this pessimism with respect 
to the results of on-site inspections.) Moreover, the Indian and the 
Swedish delegations concluded that in the event of a violation of 
a nuclear test ban agreement, the only recourse and sanction would 
be for the other side to resume testing. Finally, the Swedish delega-
tion felt that control mechanisms should be constructed as far as 
possible as appendages to other more normal activities of scientific 
installations. 57 The Swedish delegation thought that General As-
sembly Resolution 1629 (XVI) which dealt with increasing the 
capacity of the existing world meteorological network to measure 
radioactivity was an example of the kind of thing that should be done. 
In developing this notion, the Swedish delegation was in close touch 
with the head of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics. 
This group was actively promoting the creation of an international 
center for seismology, and international cooperation in this field was 
56ENDC/PV. 13, p. 7. 
57Many of these thoughts are summarized in a speech given by R. 
Edberg on April 2, 1962: ENDC/PV. 13, pp. 47-49. 
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an item on the agenda of the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council in 1962. 
After considerable deliberation, the representatives of the eight 
new members of the Committee ultimately formulated a memoran-
dum, a process which took several weeks. Many of the speeches of 
the representatives of the eight, mentioned above, in which sugges-
tions were tentatively broached, reflected this process. The actual 
drafting of the memorandum was done by the representatives of 
Ethiopia, India, and Sweden, and the Indian delegate, Arthur S. Lall, 
was particularly influential in preparing the final version of the pro-
posal. 58 In the American view Ambassador Lall's influence was not 
helpful; it resulted in a "less intelligent document." Ambassador Lall 
himself, who was particularly close to Krishna Menon and resigned 
his post after Mr. Menon resigned as Defense Minister, felt that his 
contribution was to make the proposal more equidistant between the 
positions of East and West. 
The Eight-Nation Memorandum was presented to the plenary 
meeting on April 16, ten days before the United States atmospheric 
tests were scheduled to begin. It was, however, shown to the Soviet 
and American representatives prior to its formal presentation, and 
had been shown to the Canadian delegation even earlier. The mem-
orandum was an amalgam of the views of the eight, especially 
those of India and Sweden. In this memorandum, the eight urged the 
nuclear powers to persist in their efforts to achieve a test ban treaty. 59 
After noting that despite the differences that existed among the nu-
clear powers concerning a test ban treaty there were "also certain 
areas of agreement," the memorandum proclaimed their belief that 
"possibilities exist of establishing by agreement a system for con-
tinuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and 
nonpolitical basis." 
Such a system might be based and built upon already ex-
isting national networks of observation posts and institu-
tions, or if more appropriate, on certain of the existing 
posts designated by agreement for the purpose together, if 
necessary, with new posts established by agreement. The 
existing networks already include in their scientific en-
58Arthur S. Lall, Negotiating Disarmament, pp. 20-21. 
59£NDC/28. The following quotations are taken from that document. 
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deavors the detection and identification of man-made ex-
plosions. Improvements could no doubt be achieved by 
furnishing posts with more advanced instrumentation. 
In addition, the memorandum suggested that "the feasibility of con-
stituting an International Commission, consisting of a limited num-
ber of highly qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries 
together with the appropriate staff might be considered." It then went 
on to outline the functions of such a commission. 
This Commission should be entrusted with the tasks of 
processing all data received from the agreed system of ob-
servation posts and of reporting on any nuclear explosion 
or suspicious event on the basis of thorough and objective 
examination of all the available data. All parties to the treaty 
should accept the obligation to furnish the Commission 
with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any sus-
picious and significant event. Pursuant to this obligation the 
parties to the treaty could invite the Commission to visit 
their territories and/ or the site of the event the nature of 
which was in doubt. 
5. Should the Commission find that it was unable to reach 
a conclusion on the nature of a significant event it would so 
inform the party on whose territory that event had occurred, 
and simultaneously inform it of the points on which urgent 
clarification seemed necessary. The party and the Commis-
sion should consult as to what further measures of clari-
fication, including verification in loco, would facilitate the 
assessment. The party concerned would, in accordance with 
its obligation referred to in paragraph 4 above, give speedy 
and full cooperation to facilitate the assessment. 
After the International Commission had made a full examination of 
the facts, according to the Eight-Nation Memorandum, it would in-
form all of the parties of the treaty of the circumstances of the case 
and of its assessment. The parties to the treaty would be free to 
determine their reaction after receiving this report. The eight nations 
offered their suggestions, in their words, "so as to save humanity 
from the evil of further nuclear tests." 
As would soon become apparent, the two paragraphs quoted 
above could be subject to varying interpretations. An earlier draft 
had more clearly stated an obligation to accept on-site inspections, 
but this had been obfuscated at the insistence of Ambassador Lall. 
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The Response to the Eight-Nation Memorandum 
The nuclear powers responded to the Eight-Nation Memoran-
dum in rather different ways. The day after it was presented, both the 
American and the British representatives raised a series of detailed 
questions, seeking clarification so that they could better inform their 
governments.60 Essentially these questions were designed to probe 
the scientific, technical, and political implications of the general 
propositions in the memorandum. One of the most important was 
whether on-site inspections would be obligatory or voluntary. The 
delegates of the eight nations did not give an immediate answer, but 
the Burmese delegate did suggest that the question should be sub-
mitted in writing.61 Two days later, speaking for the eight, P. Sahlou 
stated that the memorandum would have to stand by itself; they 
would not interpret it. 62 He said that the memorandum had been put 
forward in the hope of facilitating a new approach and that only the 
nuclear powers themselves could negotiate a treaty. Mr. Sahlou 
added, though, that the eight nations would be willing to cooperate 
with the nuclear powers in any or all aspects of the new negotiations 
and that they were prepared to offer whatever scientific collabora-
tion they could. In addition some of the eight did discuss their views 
in private. 
There were several reasons for the eight taking the position that 
they did. In the first place, Ambassador Lall was adamant that they 
should. Secondly, the memorandum represented several compromises 
among the eight. To eliminate the ambiguities and to elaborate the 
general provisions would have risked destroying these compromises. 
It probably would have been impossible to draft a joint explanation, 
and individual explanations would have been divergent. Thirdly, had 
the eight been more explicit in their memorandum, they would have 
been drawn into the heart of the controversy between the two nuclear 
sides. The eight were firmly convinced that a test ban treaty could 
only be achieved by agreement among the nuclear powers, and that 
they would not facilitate such an agreement by seeming to favor one 
or the other side. Finally, several of the delegates of the eight states 
felt that if they were to be more explicit than they had been in the 
60See ENDC/PV. 22, pp. 20-26. 
61Jbid., p. 26. 
62ENDC/PV. 24, pp. 5-7. 
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memorandum, they would risk going far beyond their technical 
depth. 
Immediately after Mr. Sahlou spoke, Ambassador Zorin read 
a prepared statement which praised the memorandum and stated that 
the Soviet Government accepted it as a basis for the continuing nego-
tiations. 63 Ambassador Dean was more cautious. 64 Although he de-
clared that his delegation was prepared and willing "to give the most 
serious consideration" to the Eight-Nation Memorandum, he said that 
he was concerned that there was an element of voluntariness with 
respect to on-site inspections. He stated that the United States could 
not sign a treaty in which there was any ambiguity about the com-
mitment of each party to agree to effective international control and to 
objective, scientific on-site inspection's taking place under certain spec-
ified conditions. He went on to say that the United States never 
expected that an inspection team could force its way onto the ter-
ritory of a state where an unidentified event had occurred to conduct 
an inspection, but that the United States wanted it to be clear which 
side was guilty of breaking international law. If a state legitimately 
could refuse an on-site inspection, then the onus of breaking a treaty 
would fall, not on the state which might have violated the treaty, but 
on the other side. 
Continued Deadlock: An Exercise in Exegesis 
From that point until the Eighteen-Nation Committee recessed 
on June 14, 1962, the Eight-Nation Memorandum in fact became 
the basis for the negotiations. All of the discussions in the tripartite 
Subcommittee were based on it, and it served as the focal point in 
those plenary meetings when the nuclear test ban issue was discussed. 
Despite this new element, however, the negotiations continued to 
flounder. 
Since the eight new members of the Committee refused to in-
terpret their memorandum, each side was free to place whatever 
construction it chose on the document. Both tended to interpret it in 
terms of their past proposals.65 As early as April 24, 1962, the 
Western powers were arguing that the Eight-Nation Memorandum 
63Jbid., pp. 7-11. 
64Jbid., pp. 15-21. 
65See, for example, the speeches of Dean and Tsarapkin: ENDC/SC. 
1/PV. 10, pp. 12-19, and ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 12, pp. 3-6. 
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provided for obligatory on-site inspection. The Soviet Union, of 
course, staunchly denied this. Of all the points of difference, this was 
the most crucial. As the days wore on, the speeches of the two sides 
became increasingly complicated by divergent exegeses of the memo-
randum. 
From the outset, the United States had suggested that it might 
be helpful to have one or more of the eight nations sponsoring the 
memorandum participate in the work of the Subcommittee. 66 But 
the USSR rebuffed this suggestion, arguing that the matter should 
either be discussed among the states principally concerned, that is 
the nuclear powers, or in the full Committee. Since this was the orig-
inal pattern, no change in organizational structure was made. When 
the test ban was discussed in the meetings of the plenary Committee, 
the eight nations continually refused to be drawn into an interpreta-
tion of their memorandum to resolve the conflicting interpretations 
that had developed. 67 Thus the schism grew in the fashion of medieval 
theological controversies. 
III 
The Sign and Poignance of Failure 
The United States Resumes Atmospheric Testing 
Meanwhile, on April 26, 1962, the United States resumed atmo-
spheric testing. Two days previously, Ambassador Lall, on behalf 
of the government of India, had made a last minute appeal to the 
nuclear powers "not to undertake any testing of nuclear weapons" 
during the period that the Eight-Nation Memorandum was being 
considered.68 That same day, President Kennedy authorized the 
Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense to 
proceed with the planned tests. 69 
On the day of the United States' resumption of atmospheric test-
ing, only the delegates of Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States supported the American action in the Eighteen-Nation Disarm-
ament Committee. All of the other delegates expressed regret, and 
varying degrees of sorrow, dismay, and recrimination. The fact that 
66ENDC/PV. 24, p. 15. 
67ENDC/PV. 34, p. 5. 
68ENDC/PV. 26, p. 14. 
69New York Times, April 25, 1962, p. 1. 
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as recently as April 24 the Soviet Union had proclaimed its intention 
to reply in kind, 70 increased the distress of many of the delegates, but 
also made some of them slightly less harsh in their criticisms of the 
West. 
Within the United States, even after the decision to resume 
atmospheric testing was a foregone conclusion, the debate about this 
policy continued. Now it was phrased exclusively in terms of the 
extent to which the test series should be limited. 71 The Department of 
Defense wanted the series to be enlarged to include proof testing of 
existing weapons systems in the American stockpile to test their 
actual effectiveness as systems and to measure the extent of deteriora-
tion. 72 This was opposed by the Atomic Energy Commission and the 
President's science advisers who wanted to minimize the number of 
tests. Although the President ultimately allowed some proof tests, he 
insisted that the overall number of tests and their yield should be 
kept to an absolute minimum. As a consequence, the total series had 
a yield of approximately twenty megatons. The Soviet series in the 
fall of 1961 had had a yield of almost ten times as much. When the 
Soviet, American and British, and French test programs were totaled, 
more nuclear weapons had been tested in 1962 than in any other 
year, and the megatonnage of the tests conducted from September 
1961 until December 1962 surpassed that of all previous years. 
Efforts to Break the Stalemate 
Several members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee vainly 
sought to break the stalemate. Some of these efforts again sought to 
use science and scientists as a means of achieving agreement. At a 
very early stage, Italy suggested convening a meeting of scientists 
from the three nuclear powers and the eight new members of the 
Committee to go over the implications of the Eight-Nation Memo-
randum.73 Somewhat later, in the Subcommittee, the United King-
dom suggested the convocation of a meeting of technical experts to 
70See the speech of Foreign Minister Gromyko to the Supreme Soviet, 
Documents on Disarmament, 1962, supra note 10, Vol. I, pp. 423-46. 
71See New York Times, April 17, 1962, pp. 1, 2, and May 1, 1962, 
pp. 1, 20. 
72£arl H. Voss has stated that the repeated false starts in the 1962 
program appeared to confirm the need for proof testing (Nuclear Ambush, 
p. 474). 
73£NDC/PV. 27, p. 37. 
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assess national systems of detection so that their adequacy could be 
evaluated and the extent to which they needed to be supplemented 
could be estimated. 74 As the prompt and cursory rebuff which the 
Soviet Union gave these proposals indicated, they were partially 
designed to embarrass the USSR. At the same time, they also seem 
to have stemmed from a genuine belief that there must be a "sci-
entific" and objective solution to these problems. This is attested to 
by the fact that one of the eight new members of the Committee, 
Sweden, suggested that a scientific inventory of the existing facilities 
and a blueprint of how they might be brought into more effective 
cooperation would be useful as a starting point for more fruitful 
negotiations. 75 
As another way of attempting to induce agreement, Ambassador 
Padilla Nervo of Mexico suggested the establishment of a cut-off 
date for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. 76 As he ex-
plained it, this would be a way of ending the seemingly endless spiral 
of tests and answering tests and it would also be a means of putting 
some pressure on the negotiators. After making these comments, he 
went on to single out atmospheric tests as being "the greatest stimulus 
to the arms race" and also the most harmful to public health. They 
also could "be recorded and identified without any doubt." There-
fore, in his view, these tests especially should obviously be discon-
tinued. Sweden backed the Mexican suggestion in a later public meet-
ing, and several other of the eight new members also did so in private. 
In the Subcommittee, the United Kingdom sought to indicate 
flexibility-a tactic which occasionally caused some concern within 
the United States delegation and in broader American circles-and 
to emphasize areas of agreement. Some among the eight new mem-
bers of the Committee also stressed the extent of agreement. By 
June the delegates of Sweden and India proclaimed that the gap be-
tween the sides had been narrowed somewhat.77 
Despondency Among the Eight 
Ambassador Padilla Nervo, on the other hand, felt that the nu-
clear powers were no nearer to agreement than they had been in 
74ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 14, p. 6. 
75ENDC/PV. 52, p. 29. 
76ENDC/PV. 34, pp. 13-19. 
77See ENDC/PV. 52, pp. 27-29; and ENDC/PV. 53, pp. 15-18. 
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March when the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee opened.78 
He spoke bitterly of the continued nuclear testing, especially the plans 
to conduct shots in outer space, an environment which he felt was res 
communis. In his view this demonstrated how the nuclear powers 
ignored the wishes and interests of other states. The Brazilian dele-
gate echoed his sentiments: 
There is an understanding between the two great powers 
that they will use their power, their strength, their determin-
ation, and their will to carry out these tests, taking ad-
vantage of their technical abilities in order to use universal 
property, the property of all the peoples of the world-
space, the seas and all the possibilities of nature-and that 
in the exercise of this will and taking advantage of this 
property, they will commit acts which are obviously in 
their own interest, but are against the interests of all the 
other Powers. 79 
He, and others from the delegations of the eight new members of 
the Committee, protested but with a sense of futility. He feared the 
historical situation would not be favorable for a resumption of real 
negotiations on a nuclear test ban until the end of the following year, 
after both sides had conducted tests, and the results had been col-
lected, examined, and studied. 
Perhaps history would prove the correctness of his views. Mean-
while, transferring the test ban negotiations to a new forum and inter-
jecting the views of the non-nuclear powers appeared to have had no 
effect toward advancing an agreement. 
78ENDC/PV. 53, pp. 23-26. 
79Jbid., p. 28. 
Chapter XI 
Another New Western Position 
I 
A Reformulation in Washington 
Even though it was not immediately visible in Geneva, the West was 
again in the process of reformulating its position. This began formally 
in late April when an ad hoc committee was formed within the United 
States Administration. The Committee was sponsored by the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), which had been estab-
lished in September 1961. The Committee was chaired either by 
ACDA's Deputy Director, Adrian S. Fisher, or by Franklin Long, 
the Assistant Director, who was in charge of the Bureau of Science 
and Technology. The other agencies represented were the Depart-
ment of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Atomic 
Energy Commission, the Department of State, the Executive Office 
of the President, and the Central Intelligence Agency. This group 
met periodically during the succeeding two months; its last regular 
meeting was held on July 3, 1962. By that time a tentative version 
of a new United States position had been evolved. 
Contributing Factors 
Several factors contributed to the reformulation of the American 
position. Perhaps what did most to trigger the reexamination was the 
reaction in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, among world leaders, 
and within the United States to the resumption of atmospheric test-
ing. The widespread opposition to atmospheric testing made Ameri-
can leaders hesitant to order its resumption and also compelled them 
to search for ways of avoiding such action in the future. 
A related point was the fact that during the spring of 1962, as a 
consequence of the Soviet and American test series, the level of radio-
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activity resulting from fallout increased significantly.1 Later that year 
it would reach its highest levels. Some scientists felt that the con-
centration of certain elements, especially Iodine 131, reached dan-
gerous heights, and suggested that, if atmospheric testing continued 
at existing rates, some protective measures might have to be taken 
to guard against contaminated foodstuffs, particularly milk for chil-
dren. 
Simultaneously with these developments, American strategic 
doctrine was changing. The United States was, to some extent, be-
coming disenchanted with nuclear weapons. This was partly a prod-
uct of their very abundance. Since 1958 the United States' stockpile 
of nuclear weapons had increased tremendously, so that by 1962 
nuclear weapons were readily available not only for American stra-
tegic forces, but also down to the company level in ground forma-
tions. This proliferation of nuclear weapons caused serious problems 
of command and control and led to deep concern about the triggering 
of accidental war. In addition, the Kennedy Administration was 
much less sanguine than its predecessor had been about the possi-
bilities of fighting limited nuclear war and of using nuclear weapons 
in tactical situations. Moreover, it became increasingly clear to the 
Administration that a neutron bomb was still technologically a long 
way off and that arguments for it were dubious; that a pure radiation 
weapon would have very little value in tactical situations involving 
close engagements. And as the situation in Southeast Asia demon-
strated, limited and guerrilla actions seemed to be those which the 
United States would be most likely to face, and for which it was 
least adequately prepared. The changing pattern of strategic thought 
was reflected in President Kennedy's ordering the Department of 
Defense in the spring of 1962 to cut back its orders for nuclear war-
heads by several thousand. 2 
Secretary of Defense Robert S. MeN amara sought to develop 
some aspects of this new strategic doctrine in his commencement 
address at The University of Michigan on June 16, 1962.3 Review-
1U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Subcommittee on 
Research, Development, and Radiation, Hearings: Radiation Standards, In-
cluding Fallout, 87th Congress, 2d Session (1962). 
2New York Times, May 4, 1962, p. 1. 
S"Defense Arrangements of the North Atlantic Community," U.S. 
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLVII, No. 1202 (July 9, 1962), pp. 
64-69. 
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ing the defense arrangements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion, he stressed the necessity of building up NATO's conventional 
forces so that the Alliance would be capable of action other than 
simply a nuclear response in the event of a limited attack. He pointed 
out that the United States had taken steps to build up its conven-
tional forces and that it expected its NATO allies to follow a similar 
course. 
In the event of a general nuclear war, Mr. McNamara said that 
the Administration had concluded that basic military strategy: 
... should be approached in much the same way that more 
conventional military operations have been regarded in the 
past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the 
event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the 
alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military 
forces, not of his civilian population. 4 
The implications of this statement for nuclear weapons policy were 
far-reaching. It meant that the Administration rejected the notion of 
a "finite deterrent" According to this doctrine, a state could deter 
possible opponents by merely having sufficient nuclear capacity to 
inflict serious harm on them. Presumably, with such a doctrine 
centers of population would be the major targets. By choosing other 
targets, the Administration hoped to give an opponent a strong 
incentive to refrain from attacking American cities. Under the evolv-
ing Administration doctrine, the number of nuclear weapons which 
the United States would require would be related to the numbers of 
enemy military installations rather than to the more constant number 
of population centers. Another implication of such a strategic doc-
trine was that extremely high-yield weapons would have relatively 
little attraction since they could be used most effectively against 
population centers. Moreover, such weapons went against the whole 
trend of the new doctrine, which was that only the minimum force 
necessary to achieve the stated military objectives should be used. 
While the new doctrine therefore required more nuclear weapons 
than would be needed under the ''finite deterrent" concept, since it 
was essentially responsive in character, and since the Administration 
recognized that there was no feasible way that the United States 
4fbid., p. 67. 
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could prevent an opponent from causing serious harm to American 
society, the Administration did not see an unlimited, or infinite need 
for more and more nuclear weapons. The number required could be 
gauged by the situation at hand. Because of the build-up of American 
strategic power then in progress, the Kennedy Administration was 
beginning to feel that American nuclear strength was adequate. 
Therefore, as a consequence both of changes in its strategic 
doctrine and the shifting military balance, the United States was al-
ready becoming much less interested in the possible gains that it 
could achieve from further nuclear testing. 
A final element entering into the reformulation of the Ameri-
can position was the changing appreciation of the difficulty of the 
problem of detecting underground nuclear explosions. This was partly 
attributable to the fact that the research of the Vela project was be-
ginning to produce results. It was also attributable to a fortuitous 
circumstance, which will be dealt with first since it served as a focal 
point. 
On May 1, 1962, France carried out an underground nuclear 
explosion with an estimated yield of about 30 to 50 kilotons in a 
desolate region of Algeria in the Sahara near the Haggar Mountains. 
Although it was not announced immediately, this shot was detected 
in the United States and also by a number of seismological stations 
throughout the world which had been equipped by the Coast and 
Geodetic Survey.5 It was the first relatively low-yield shot conducted 
at a long distance from the United States and detected in the United 
States, and consequently drew attention to the possibilities of long-
range detection, underscoring again the possibility of detection in the 
so-called "third zone." 
The Vela Program was also beginning to produce significant 
results at about this time. Although, as is often the case, the in-
creased knowledge pointed in several directions, the overall effect 
was to make the problem of the detection of underground nuclear 
explosions seem easier. 
First, it was discovered that the number of shallow earthquakes 
in the Soviet Union was substantially less than American scientists 
had previously thought. The previous estimate had been that there 
would be about 100 shallow earthquakes above seismic magnitude 
5See New York Times, July 24, 1962, p. 1. 
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4.75, or the presumed equivalent of a 19 kiloton nuclear explosion 
in tufi, and about 600 above seismic magnitude 4.00, or the equiva-
lent of a 2 kiloton nuclear explosion in tuff. Now it was estimated 
that there would be only 40 shallow earthquakes above seismic mag-
nitude 4.75 and 170 above seismic magnitude 4.00.6 Previously the 
United States had based its calculations of the number of earthquakes 
in the Soviet Union on extrapolations from records collected in 1932 
and 1936. With more recent and a greater total supply of data, the 
earlier estimates proved to be much too large. 
Secondly, it was discovered that the sensitivity of seismographs 
could be increased by a factor of five or ten by placing them in deep 
holes rather than at the surface. 7 In addition, on the basis of experi-
mentation with surface arrays of seismic instruments, it was discov-
ered that improvements greater than previously considered possible 
could be obtained through the use of special filtering techniques. 
Also, some useful experimentation was being done with ocean-bottom 
seismometers, which offered promise of increased capabilities. All of 
these developments indicated that the capability for the detection of 
underground seismic events was better than had previously been 
estimated. 
On the other hand, certain data indicated unforeseen difficulties. 
The problem of travel time anomalies first discovered as a result of 
the Gnome experiments has already been mentioned. It was also 
discovered, on the basis of the Gnome and subsequent experiments, 
that there were pronounced differences in the strength of seismic 
signals when measured in different directions from an underground 
explosion. Having conducted underground nuclear explosions in a 
variety of mediums, American scientists had now learned that the 
size of the seismic signal depended greatly upon the medium and that 
a shot conducted in alluvium would generate a signal about 7 times 
6See the testimony of William C. Foster, Director of the United States 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee 
on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Hearings: Renewed 
Geneva Disarmament Negotiations, 87th Congress, 2d Session (1963), p. 12. 
Mr. Foster testified on July 25, 1962; however, the hearings were not pub-
lished until the following year. 
7See "Department of Defense Statement on Project Vela, July 7, 1962," 
in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Publication 9), International 
Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1961-September 
1962, pp. 246-48. 
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smaller than it would have had it been conducted in tuff, or 14 times 
smaller than if it had been conducted in granite. 8 It was also dis-
covered, however, that underground shots in alluvium were likely to 
produce a cavity on the surface of the ground which could be seen. 
In the spring of 1962, for the first time, the United States was 
beginning to have adequate technical information on which to base 
its negotiating position. On balance this information indicated that 
the task of detecting underground nuclear explosions would be some-
what easier than most American scientists had thought in 1958, and 
certainly easier than they had thought from early 1959 through rnid-
1962. Simultaneously with this development, the Administration had 
become less interested in the further development of nuclear weapons 
and more concerned about the general reaction against continued nu-
clear testing, particularly in the atmosphere. It was the confluence of 
these factors that produced the new Western proposals. 
The Range of Choices 
In formulating these proposals, the ad hoc group explored in 
depth four possible courses. 9 The first course which they considered 
was that of continuing to advance the Anglo-American draft treaty of 
April 18, 1961, and refusing to make any changes in that proposal. 
The Administration concluded that this course was unsatisfactory first 
because standing firm would do little to increase the prospects of 
obtaining a treaty since the Soviet Union obviously would not accept 
the 1961 draft. Standing firm would also make the United States 
seem unresponsive to the Eight-Nation Memorandum. Finally, it 
would make the United States seem to ignore the progress of science. 
The second course considered was that of presenting a simplified 
treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, and also in 
outer space and underwater. Such a treaty would not necessitate con-
trol posts or on-site inspections on Soviet territory. As has been 
mentioned earlier, Ambassador Thompson, John McNaughton, and 
others within the Administration had argued for this course for some 
time, and Arthur Dean had become converted to their view, after 
initially opposing it. Of course others, for example Senator Gore, had 
8Hearings: Renewed Geneva Negotiations, supra note 6, p. 11. 
9See the testimony of William C. Foster before the Subcommittee on 
Disarmament: Hearings: Renewed Geneva Negotiations, supra note 6, pp. 
2-38. 
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proposed that the United States take such action as early as 1958. 
William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, explained the situation with respect to detection under such 
a treaty to the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament in this manner: 
Except for small atmospheric tests, tests in the atmosphere 
can be detected from outside the territory of the Soviet 
Union. Underwater tests are also reasonably easy to detect. 
Tests in outer space are difficult to detect at some altitudes, 
but an inspection system on Soviet territory increases the 
capability of detection in outer space only modestly over 
that of a U.S. unilateral system.10 
Such a treaty would stop those tests which produced radioactive 
fallout and caused the greatest public concern, and in the view of 
ACDA, this would be an important achievement. It would also do 
something to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons among the 
non-nuclear powers and to slow down the nuclear arms race. It 
would be a simple treaty and would not require the t:stablishment of 
an elaborate and expensive international control system. It would 
also permit the United States to continue testing and thereby to make 
advances in its weapons program. Furthermore, since the weapons 
laboratories would be kept active, the United States "would be in a 
better position to resume full-scale testing should the Soviets breach 
or abrogate the treaty and begin testing themselves."11 
On the other hand, the Arms Control Agency also felt that a 
partial ban would have serious disadvantages. As it would not stop 
all nuclear weapons tests, it would not be as effective a restraint on 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities as a comprehensive 
ban. A second disadvantage in ACDA's view was that it "would 
make very little, if any, advance in the principle of inspection and 
control."12 Also, ACDA felt that to propose a partial treaty might 
result in a failure to take full advantage of the technological im-
provements that had been made. The Agency also feared that the 
USSR would attack the proposal as a device to insure that the United 
States could continue testing, and that the Soviet Union would insist 
that such a treaty be accompanied by an unpoliced moratorium on 
lOJbid., p. 5. 
llfbid., p. 6. 
12Jbid. 
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underground testing. Finally, the Agency thought that the eight new 
members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee would feel that the 
United States had ignored their efforts to find a compromise basis 
for a comprehensive test ban. 
The third course considered was for the United States to propose 
a modified comprehensive treaty responding "as closely as technical 
knowledge will permit to the eight-nation proposal of April 16."18 
Such a proposal would continue to insist on the necessity of some on-
site inspections on the territory of the USSR, but it would rely on 
"internationally coordinated and standardized national control posts." 
The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency estimated that a system 
based on national seismic stations would be able to detect seismic 
events equivalent to nuclear explosions of down to 1 kiloton in 
granite, 2 kilotons in tuff, and 14 kilotons in alluvium. Such a system 
would obviously cost much less than it would to establish an inter-
national system de novo. It could also begin operations immediately. 
In the view of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, an im-
portant reason for making such a proposal would be that it "would 
continue to place pressure on the Soviet Union to agree to open up 
its territory to some inspection and control."14 The Arms Control 
Agency admitted that a country that was willing to run the risk of 
detection might be able to violate the treaty clandestinely and to 
do some weapons development by testing underground devices with 
yields in the low kiloton range. 
A fourth course considered was simply for the United States to 
present to the Eighteen-Nation Committee a technical evaluation of 
the capability of the system provided for in the eight-nation proposal, 
and not to present any new draft treaty. The rationale for doing this 
would be that it was a way of being responsive to the Eight-Nation 
Memorandum. The United States could explain its unwillingness to 
offer a new draft treaty on the ground that the Soviet Union had re-
jected out of hand suggestions reported in the press that the United 
States might modify its position. 
These four possibilities were discussed in the ad hoc committee 
and preliminary draft treaties were prepared to implement the second 
and third possible courses of action. After the final meeting of this 
13fbid., p. 10. 
14fbid. 
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group on July 3, the two drafts were sent to the relevant agencies for 
formal comment. On July 20, the Committee of Deputies (composed 
of deputies to the members of the Committee of Principals) met to 
discuss the formal comments. Following this meeting two new drafts 
were prepared, and these were submitted to the Committee of Prin-
cipals on July 26. This Committee met that day with the President, 
and it also met with the President again the following day, on July 30, 
and on August 1. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff accom-
panied the Department of Defense Representative at each of the 
four sessions. Ambassador Dean was recalled from Geneva to par-
ticipate in these meetings of the Committee of Principals; and two 
members of the General Advisory Committee of the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, Mr. John J. McCloy and Mr. Robert 
Lovett, also took part. After these meetings some consultations con-
tinued on a lower level and additional drafts were circulated for com-
ment. There were also meetings with key members of Congress, in-
cluding members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The 
result of this intragovernmental consultation was that on August 27, 
1962, the United States submitted two new draft treaties to the 
ENDC. 
II 
A Preview in Geneva 
While these deliberations were in progress in Washington, the Eigh-
teen-Nation Disarmament Committee had reconvened in Geneva. As a 
consequence of this simultaneity, the negotiations in Geneva had some 
impact on the reformulation that was going on in Washington, and 
the new Western position was revealed in a piecemeal and somewhat 
confusing fashion. 
Initial Confusion 
Some of the confusion surrounding the introduction of the new 
Western position probably could have been averted. Returning from 
Washington to Geneva on July 14, 1962, two days before the Con-
ference resumed, Ambassador Dean stated, at a press conference 
held at the airport, that because of new scientific discoveries the 
United States might be able to modify its position with respect to a 
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nuclear test ban.U; He said that it might be possible for the United 
States to accept a system of nationally manned, internationally super-
vised control posts, and that control posts in the Soviet Union might 
not be necessary. However, he declared that on-site inspections would 
still be needed. Two days previously, also at a news conference, Sec-
retary of State Rusk had said that he did not think that the new 
scientific information would make it possible to do without control 
posts in large countries such as the Soviet Union.l6 Immediately after 
word of Ambassador Dean's remarks reached Washington, the De-
partment of State felt compelled to issue a statement asserting that 
the results of the Vela Program did "not demonstrate the possibility 
of doing away with control posts and on-site inspections to determine 
the precise nature of suspicious events."17 Although the Department 
of State statement was issued as a denial of Ambassador Dean's 
comments, and was treated as such by the press, 18 it of course was 
not, since no one had talked about the possibility of doing away 
with control posts altogether or with on-site inspections. It was not 
until August 1 that President Kennedy announced-again at a press 
conference-that the United States could accept internationally super-
vised, nationally manned control stations.19 His remarks were pref-
aced by a negative response to a question concerning whether or 
not the United States position had changed. 
Both the delegates in Geneva, who carefully analyzed pro-
nouncements from officials of the nuclear powers, and readers of the 
world press were befuddled by this succession of statements. The prob-
lem was partly attributable to the personality traits of the individuals 
involved. In a more general sense it was attributable to the pressure 
placed on busy officials by an inquiring and insistent press corps. 
This pressure forced policy-makers to speak for the public record 
when their own minds may have been made up, but official United 
States policy had not yet been determined. Dean may also have 
15See the transcript of the Press Conference: Hearing: Renewed Geneva 
Negotiations, supra note 6, pp. 22-23. 
16International Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon Tests, Septem-
ber 1961-September 1962, supra note 7, pp. 249-50. 
17Hearing: Renewed Geneva Disarmament Negotiations, supra note 6, 
p. 25. 
18See New York Times, July 16, 1962, p. 1; and July 17, 1962, p. 1. 
19Documents on Disarmament, 1962, Vol. II, pp. 709-13. 
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attempted to use his press conferences to force a decision within the 
Administration. The press corps further exacerbated the problem by 
reading their own meaning into the statements and exaggerating their 
differences. 
Another aspect of the problem was the fact that the Administra-
tion had to explain the change in its policy to several different audi-
ences. When dealing with the world at large and particularly with the 
representatives of the eight new members of the Disarmament Com-
mittee, the Administration wished to emphasize its flexibility, the 
extent to which its policy had changed, and the ways in which it had 
been responsive to new suggestions. At home, when facing critics of 
its policies and those who feared that the Administration might make 
concessions which could endanger United States' security, the Ad-
ministration sought to emphasize continuity and to underplay the 
changes. Thus different things were said to different groups. Since 
the statements to each group were almost immediately available to 
the other, however, the differences in emphasis were apparent to all 
and both confusion and cynicism were the result. 
Another complication arose from the fact that the new scientific 
information appeared to support the opponents of the American 
position rather than that position. A final difficulty was that the 
Administration, following the rules of careful bargaining, did not 
wish fully to reveal the extent of the concessions which it might 
offer until it had time to judge its opponent's intentions. 
Vela Data and Changes in Western Position Introduced 
At the first meeting of the resumed session on July 16, Ambas-
sador Dean introduced the Department of Defense announcement out-
lining the results of the Vela Program, and said that the United States 
would develop these findings in detail in the near future. Interestingly, 
he said that the United States did "not envisage the establishment of 
a technical working group in the pattern of those previously estab-
lished, nor any formal report of recommendations and conclusions 
on the scientific aspects of the question."20 As he put it, the Com-
mittee's negotiating time and efforts should be devoted toward agree-
ment on a nuclear test ban, not scientific conclusions. 
This position was in sharp contrast to that which the Western 
20£NDC/PV. 57, p. 13. 
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powers had taken during the winter of 1958-59 when the question 
of new data had first arisen. There were several explanations for 
this change in attitude, which went farther in the case of the 
United States than that of the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom, 
as a matter of principle, continued to look with favor upon meetings 
of technical experts, and its delegates to the Geneva talks continued 
to suggest from time to time that experts from all sides should meet 
together. The United States, on the other hand, had become rather 
disenchanted with the idea of separate meetings of scientists. The 
experience of Technical Working Group II had left a profound 
impact in Washington, and American policy-makers now seriously 
doubted that scientists could function apolitically in a highly political 
situation. They were also aware of the costs of forcing scientists to 
become public participants in political conflicts. The Administration 
decided that what was essential was first to have a clear understand-
ing of the technical situation within the American government itself, 
and then to convince others of the correctness of the United States' 
position. The Administration felt that the best way to achieve the 
latter goal was again to bring distinguished American scientists to 
Geneva to explain the technical situation as it was now understood 
in the light of the results of the Vela Program to all interested 
listeners at informal sessions. And this is what was done. Finally, it 
should be recalled that an important reason for the United States' 
preference for technical meetings during the Eisenhower Administra-
tion was that this was a neutral device to which both those who 
favored and opposed a test ban treaty could agree. The Kennedy 
Administration was not plagued with this division of opinion; it was 
much more unanimously in favor of a test ban treaty. 
In this particular instance, both the United States and the 
United Kingdom recognized that the Soviet Union would not be 
likely to agree to the er.tablishment of another technical working 
group. The experience of the Seismic Research Program Advisory 
Group wherein Soviet diplomats had had to retract positions taken 
by Soviet scientists had proved especially embarrassing for the 
USSR. Moreover, Western policy-makers reasoned that if the Soviet 
Union felt that its scientists could effectively support its negotiating 
position, it would have brought them to Geneva to attempt to con-
vince the eight new members of the Committee, as the United States 
had done. The two Western powers also realized that the representa-
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tives of the eight nations generally felt that the problem of obtaining 
a nuclear test ban was preeminently political and were somewhat im-
patient with the Western emphasis on the technical aspects of the 
question. 
The Soviet Union and other Communist states on the Eighteen-
Nation Committee greeted the introduction of the results of the Vela 
Program with derision. A number of delegates representing the eight 
new members of the Committee also expressed scepticism. 21 Gradu-
ally, however, in the six weeks between the resumption of the Con-
ference and August 27, the day that the United States introduced 
the two new draft treaties, it was able to win the confidence of this 
latter group. The presentations by the American and British scien-
tists, including Dr. Wiesner, who returned to Geneva, were quite 
effective. The Western case was also helped by the fact that on July 
21, 1962, the Soviet Union announced that it would resume nuclear 
tests. The first blast in the new series was detonated on August 5. 
With an estimated yield of 30 megatons, it was the second largest 
nuclear explosion, the Soviet Union having detonated the largest the 
previous fall. Although the Soviet action was not criticized in the 
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee nearly as much as the 
American decision to resume atmospheric testing earlier in 1962 
had been, it made it impossible for pressure to be directed solely 
against the United States. 
On August 5, immediately after his return from a hasty trip 
to Washington to participate in the meetings of the Committee of Prin-
cipals, Ambassador Dean began to outline in more specific terms 
what changes might be forthcoming in the Western position. He did 
this in an informal meeting with Ambassador Zorin that day, in a 
meeting of the tripartite subcommittee four days later, and before 
the plenary sessions of the ENDC several days after that. 22 Ambas-
sador Dean stated that the United States felt that the new scientific 
developments did not eliminate the necessity of on-site inspections. 
On the other hand, they would make it possible for the United States 
to consider a reduction in the number of on-site inspections and also 
to consider a network of detection stations that would be consider-
ably smaller than that which had previously been envisaged and which 
21See for example Ambassador Lall's comments: ENDC/ 58, pp. 29-30. 
22See ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 23, pp. 3-30, and ENDC/PV. 69, pp. 6-21. 
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would be nationally manned, though internationally supervised, rather 
than internationally operated. If such changes were made, the area 
open to an on-site inspection might have to be increased. Negotiation 
on these issues, he explained, would be contingent on the USSR's 
acceptance of the principle of obligatory on-site inspection. 
The Soviet Union's reaction, expressed each time Ambassador 
Dean outlined the new Western position, was that it represented no 
change. The chief factor cited to support this charge was the fact that 
the West still continued to insist on obligatory on-site inspection. 
Soviet representatives dismissed the offer to reduce the number of 
on-site inspections and to have a smaller number of control stations 
which would be manned by national rather than international person-
nel as mere details. They also asserted that by continuing to demand 
obligatory on-site inspections the Western powers were ignoring the 
Eight-Nation Memorandum. 
Suggestions of the Eight Nations 
Representatives of the eight new members of the Committee were 
more impressed with Ambassador Dean's presentations, and by this 
time the work of the American scientists in Geneva had had an im-
portant effect. However, it was also apparent to the delegations of 
the eight nations that the nuclear powers continued to be at logger-
heads. They therefore continued their efforts to break the impasse. 
For some, this meant hortatory appeals to both East and West. Others 
attempted to achieve the desired results by going over the remarks of 
the representatives of the nuclear powers and giving glosses on 
them, which in their view proved that the two sides were moving 
closer together. 
In the realm of practical suggestions, on July 25, the Brazilian 
delegate noted that the divergencies between the two nuclear sides 
concerned underground tests, and that the control required for atmos-
pheric and outer space tests did not appear to present as many 
difficulties. 23 He therefore suggested that the Committee might con-
centrate its efforts on stopping tests in the latter two environments, 
which he said "are the most dangerous, actually and potentially, 
and the ones which have a most disturbing effect on mind, body and 
nerves." This notion of a partial ban had been mentioned previously, 
23ENDC/PV. 61, p. 36. 
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and after its reintroduction by Brazil, several other delegations from 
the eight nations supported it. By early August all of the eight had, 
with varying degrees of enthusiasm, given their support to the idea 
of a partial ban, and on August 15, Italy did this also.24 Some felt 
that a partial ban should cover atmospheric tests. Others added those 
in outer space and underwater as well. In most cases, approval of a 
partial ban was coupled with approval of the Mexican suggestion for 
a cut-off date on nuclear testing. Gradually there came to be a con-
sensus among the eight that this date should be January 1, 1963. 
Another practical attempt to break the stalemate was made by 
Sweden on August 1, 1962. Mrs. Myrdal presented a fairly detailed 
analysis of the existing facilities for meteorological and seismological 
observation, which could be used for the detection of nuclear detona-
tions, and the present extent of international collaboration among 
them. She suggested that the nuclear powers carry this inventory 
further, and that they make plans for the immediate creation of the 
international commission which would be responsible for processing 
the data from the observation stations, and that they also make plans 
for sharing the financial burdens associated with exchanging the 
data.25 
Even her rather superficial inventory was impressive. The 
Swedish delegation had discovered from public sources that there 
were 7,800 land stations making meteorological observations and 12 
anchored weather ships. In addition some 3,000 ships had agreed 
to make observations while crossing the oceans. At that time the 
United States also had at least two satellites in orbit making meteor-
ological observations. Under arrangements for the transmission of 
data then in effect, data gathered at one of the stations would be 
available throughout the world in about one hour. Not all of the 
stations were equipped to monitor nuclear tests, but such equip-
ment could be provided at a modest cost. The General Assembly 
of the United Nations had asked the World Meteorological Organiza-
tion, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the United Na-
tions Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation to 
study the feasibility of such a move. 26 
24ENDC/PV. 70, p. 20. 
25ENDC/PV. 64, pp. 5-18. 
26General Assembly Resolution 1629 (XVI). 
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So far as seismology was concerned, the Swedish delegation had 
discovered that there were approximately 800 stations in operation 
and that about half of them had participated actively in the Interna-
tional Geophysical Year in 1957. Mrs. Myrdal mentioned the collabo-
ration of many of the stations with the United States Coast and 
Geodetic Survey and stated that 65 nations throughout the world 
bad reported the French underground nuclear test of May 1 to the 
Coast and Geodetic Survey within six weeks of its occurrence. She 
singled out twenty-four countries or territories, stations in which had 
reported most rapidly. These were Bolivia, Canada, the Congo, 
Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Eastern Germany, Greece, Greenland, Iran, Israel, 
Italy, Morocco, Norway, Peru, Puerto Rico, Spain, Sweden, Southern 
Rhodesia, Turkey, the United States, and Yugoslavia. The combina-
tion of countries, representing East and West as well as North and 
South was indeed impressive. Mrs. Myrdal's broad point was that a 
substantial measure of international collaboration already existed in 
these matters. 
In the course of her presentation, Mrs. Myrdal gave what to her 
was the most imperative reason for preferring to utilize existing ob-
servation stations rather than creating a new international network. 
She felt that only in this way could one be certain "that scientists, 
attracted as they are by the full freedom of research, being sub-
servient to nothing but truth will feel a lasting propensity for playing 
an additional role in this international scheme for promoting peace-
making."27 Under such circumstances scientists would be free to 
continue their normal work. On the other band, Mrs. Myrdal doubted 
that scientists would have much enthusiasm for participating in a 
system which had as its exclusive task policing a nuclear test ban. 
She also emphasized how much less expensive it would be to rely on 
existing stations. 
As the month of August passed by and September 18, the date 
of the opening of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, 
drew near, the pleas of eight new members of the Disarmament Com-
mittee became increasingly urgent. They strongly desired to be able 
to present some tangible evidence of progress to the General As-
sembly, which the previous fall bad sanctioned their participation. 
21Jbid., p. 15. 
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They seemed to be encouraged by the knowledge that a new Western 
position would be forthcoming, but at the same time it was fairly 
obvious from the Western outline of the changes and the USSR's 
advance reaction to them that the deadlock would remain. 
III 
The Two Draft Treaties of August 27, 1962 
Partly because of the anticipated Soviet rejection, and partly because 
so much of its contents had been foretold, the new draft compre-
hensive treaty which the United Kingdom and the United States 
tabled on August 27, 1962, did not receive much acclaim in Geneva. 
However, the United Kingdom and the United States also tabled, at 
the same time, a draft partial treaty outlawing nuclear weapons tests 
in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater. This treaty did not 
require the creation of any international control features. Prior to late 
August, the Western powers had given no indication that they would 
make such a move, although the United States had not reacted ad-
versely when Italy endorsed the Brazilian suggestion for a partial 
ban.28 Actually, the Italian delegate had seen Ambassador Dean's 
instructions. 
As mentioned previously, the idea of proposing a partial ban 
had been under consideration in Washington for some time. The 
draft treaty for a partial ban had been approved in the meetings of 
the Committee of Principals during the last days of July and August 
1. It was approved then, though only as a fall-back position. The 
decision to introduce it on the same day as the new comprehensive 
treaty was tabled was based on the negative Soviet reaction to the 
outline of what the new Western position would be and on the posi-
tive endorsement of the idea of a partial ban by the eight new mem-
bers of the Disarmament Committee. Because it was unexpected 
(except for the indiscretion of the Italian delegate) , and because it 
fitted in with the developing current of thought in the ENDC, the 
draft partial treaty received more attention in the Committee than 
the draft comprehensive treaty. Before considering this reaction, 
however, the main features of the two new draft treaties should be 
analyzed. 
28See New York Times, August 19, 1962, p. 1; August 22, 1962, p. 3; 
and August 26, 1962, p. 1. 
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The Draft Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Obligations and Organs 
Although the new draft comprehensive treaty was considerably 
shorter than that which the United Kingdom and the United States had 
tabled more than a year before on April 18, 1961, it was still a 
complicated document. 29 Essentially, the new draft treaty was a 
simplified version of the earlier one, modified in the light of the 
Eight-Nation Memorandum and the new appraisal of the technical 
situation. 
The first article stated the obligations of signatories. It was taken 
directly from the first article of the 1961 draft. According to it, 
signatory states would undertake: 
(a) to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of nuclear 
weapon test explosions at any place under its juris-
diction or controi; and 
(b) to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way 
participating in, the carrying out of nuclear weapon 
test explosions anywhere. 
As in the previous proposal, all of the surveillance machinery pro-
vided for in the treaty was designed to check compliance with the 
first obligation; there was no machinery to oversee the second. 
The surveillance machinery consisted of these elements: an In-
ternational Scientific Commission, an International Staff, and a 
Verification System. 
The International Scientific Commission was the principal or-
gan. This body would consist of fifteen members. The USSR, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States would be permanent mem-
bers. The other twelve members would be elected for three-year 
terms by a majority vote in a conference of all of the signatories. Of 
the twelve, three would have to be elected from among states, parties 
to the treaty, nominated by the Soviet Union, two from states nomi-
nated jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom, and the 
remaining seven, from states nominated jointly by the three nuclear 
powers. The division of the Commission among East, West, and 
nonaligned states therefore presumably would be four-four-seven. 
The 1961 draft treaty had provided for an eleven-member commis-
29For the text see International Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon 
Tests, September /96/-September 1962, supra note 7, pp .. 286-97. The draft 
was circulated as document ENDC/ 58. 
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sion, with a presumed distribution of 4-4-3. The eight new members 
of the Disarmament Committee had raised the possibility that all 
members of the Commission might come from nonaligned states. 
Although the Western powers were willing to increase the representa-
tion of this group, they strongly felt that the nuclear powers must 
have permanent representation on an organ dealing with such a 
vital matter as compliance with a test ban. The eight new members 
had also suggested that the Commission should be composed of 
scientists. The Western powers virtually disregarded this suggestion, 
except for the inclusion of the word "scientific" in the title of the 
organization. Their draft provided for membership by states, not 
individuals, and there were no restrictions in the draft on the right 
of states to select their own representatives. By taking this position, 
the Western powers clearly indicated their feeling that the issues 
which would come before the International Scientific Commission 
would be political and diplomatic, not technical. 
According to the new draft comprehensive treaty, the Commis-
sion would be organized so that it could meet on twenty-four hours' 
notice. Each state would have one vote, and all except a few specified 
decisions would be by majority vote. Those specified decisions which 
would require the concurring votes of the permanent members were 
essentially the same as in the 1961 draft treaty and will be treated 
topically in the appropriate section of the following description. 
The Commission would be the keystone of the organization. It 
would approve the total amount of the annual budget, and it would 
also appoint the Executive Officer, who would recruit, organize, and 
oversee the functioning of the International Staff. As in the earlier 
draft treaty, both of these decisions would require the concurring 
votes of the permanent members. 
The Commission would supervise all elements of the Verifica-
tion System. In fulfilling this function it would "establish and monitor 
adherence to standards for the operation, calibration, and coordina-
tion of all elements of the [Verification] System." Since the perform-
ance of this function was not one of the stated exceptions to the 
normal voting procedure, standards would be established by a simple 
majority vote. These would then be imposed on the various elements 
of the Verification System, including the nationally owned and nation-
ally manned stations. In this sense the rights of the nuclear powers 
were less than they had been in the previous draft, for there the 
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nature of the international Verification System. was specified in the 
draft treaty and by reference to the reports of the Conference of 
Experts and the various technical working groups, and changes in 
these specifications would have required the concurring votes of the 
nuclear powers. The new draft treaty stated that: 
The Commission shall arrange for observers to be per-
manently stationed at, and to make periodic visits to, ele-
ments of the System in order to ensure that established 
procedures for the rapid, coordinated and reliable collection 
of data are being followed. 
In many ways this resembled the old Soviet proposal for controllers, 
except that the nationality of the permanent observers was not 
specified. 
The Commission could consult with parties to the treaty con-
cerning the nature of unidentified events reported to it by the Staff 
and it could issue reports to all parties to the treaty concerning the 
nature and origins of such events. 
The Commission would also be charged with the responsibility 
of establishing such laboratories as might be necessary and of facilitat-
ing the participation of the International Staff in research. Until the 
first elections to the Commission, the three nuclear powers, acting by 
unanimous agreement, would exercise the functions of the Com-
mission. 
The new draft, as the previous one, provided for a conference 
of all of the parties; however, its status and functions were con-
siderably reduced. It would meet only triennially, rather than an-
nually, and on the call of the Commission. Its sole functions would 
be to elect members of the Commission, "discuss matters pertaining 
to the treaty," and "examine the facts and assess the significance of 
the situation" in a special session in the event of a party's desiring 
to withdraw from the treaty. 
Similarly, the Executive Officer was a somewhat shrunken 
version of the Chief Executive Officer or Administrator of the 1961 
draft treaty. In the earlier version he was listed as one of the principal 
elements of the control system, but in the new version he was not 
given this status. The Executive Officer's functions were reduced 
because international elements of the Verification System were sub-
stantially diluted as compared with the earlier Detection and Identi-
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fication System. Other than differences necessitated by this, the pro-
visions of the two treaties were virtually identical. The new draft 
treaty also contained a provision, similar to the amendment which 
Ambassador Dean had tabled on August 30, 1961, for the removal 
of the Executive Officer. Such a decision would require the affirma-
tive votes of eleven members of the Commission; in other words, all 
of the members of one side and all of the nonaligned members. 
(The amendment which Ambassador Dean tabled on August 30 
would have required seven affirmative votes, which, with the com-
position of the Commission then envisaged, would have bad the same 
political effect.) Under the new draft the Executive Officer would 
serve for a term of four years, one year longer than provided in the 
1961 draft. 
The functions of the International Staff would be to man such 
elements of the system as might be established by the Commission 
and to analyze the data collected by the Verification System. The 
Executive Officer and the International Staff would be international 
civil servants and the new draft treaty contained the usual provision 
found in the constitutions of international organizations attempting 
to insure their independence from national governments and policies. 
Unlike the 1961 version, the new draft treaty contained no provisions 
specifying the nationality distribution of the International Staff. 
The Verification System 
The biggest difference between the old and new draft concerned 
the Verification System. In the earlier treaty the Detection and Identi-
fication System was patterned on the rather elaborate recommenda-
tions of the Conference of Experts and the various technical working 
groups, and all elements would be established and operated on an 
international basis. In the new draft the Verification System would 
consist of three elements: 
1) Stations constructed at sites listed in an annex to the treaty. 
Although the Commission would finance the construction of these 
stations and would train the personnel to operate them, they would 
be maintained and manned by nationals of the state or the territory 
on which they were located. These stations would have observers 
from the International Commission. 
2) Existing stations provided, maintained and manned by sig-
natories to the treaty. 
402 DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS 
3) "Stations to be constructed, maintained and manned by the 
Commission in agreement with individual Parties if the Commission 
deems such stations desirable." Ambassador Dean explained that this 
last category would apply principally to states which felt that they 
could not afford to maintain and operate stations themselves or 
which felt that they did not have sufficient trained manpower for 
this purpose. 
Stations in the first category would have to be in operation 
within twelve months from the entry into force of the treaty and 
those in the second category, within six months. 
Although these provisions showed considerable movement in 
the direction of the suggestions embodied in the Eight-Nation Mem-
orandum, the Western powers obviously were much less confident 
of the facilities of existing stations than the eight were. The Western 
powers wanted new stations so that they would be spaced appropriate 
distances apart, so that they would be located on sites with relatively 
low background noise, and so that they would have the most modern 
equipment. The requirement for an observer from the Commission 
was designed as a means of checking on the operation of the stations 
and the prompt and complete transmission of data to the international 
headquarters. No figures were listed for the numbers of such new 
stations, although the Western representatives indicated that they 
would be willing to accept fewer than the 19 previously envisaged for 
the USSR. In one oral presentation, Mr. Godber mentioned the 
figure of "only a handful."ao 
The new treaty gave the Commission broad freedom to include 
in the Verification System any detection instruments that it desired 
in outer space, on and beneath the surface of the earth, and under-
water. These could either be provided, maintained, and manned by 
the Commission or by signatories to the treaty, the choice being 
left to the Commission. The treaty did not include any provision for 
routine or special air sampling flights. 
On-Site Inspections 
The criteria stated in the new draft for determining eligibility for 
on-site inspection were the same as those which had been contained in 
the 1961 draft, except that the 4.75 seismic magnitude threshold 
30ENDC/PV. 75, p. 23. 
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was eliminated. As a special safeguard, the new draft stated that data 
from stations on the territory of the state in which the unidentified 
event occurred could not be used to render an event ineligible for 
inspection, but could be used to establish its eligibility. The Execu-
tive Officer would certify the unidentified events which according to 
the standards specified in the treaty would be eligible for on-site 
inspection. As in the case of the earlier draft, quotas for on-site 
inspections on the territory of the USSR, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States would be fixed in the treaty, and they would be 
identical. Incorporating the proposal which the Western powers 
made at the opening of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Commit-
tee, only a limited percentage of this quota-the specific figure was 
left open to negotiation--could be applied to the aseismic areas of 
the nuclear powers, thus there would be very few inspections in 
European Russia. Also as in the earlier version, the United States or 
the United Kingdom would have the right to select which of the 
unidentified events in the Soviet Union should be inspected and the 
Soviet Union would have the right to select which of the unidentified 
events in the United Kingdom and the United States should be in-
spected. 
Although the quota number for the nuclear powers was left 
blank, subject to negotiations, both the American and British dele-
gates said that it would be less than the 12 to 20 previously re-
quested, and in one speech Mr. Godber said it would be "a double 
handful at most. "31 If there were no unidentified events, there would 
be no on-site inspections. Ambassador Dean stated that the United 
States now estimated that there would be from 50 to 75 unidentified 
events each year in the Soviet Union, most of which would be 
concentrated in a small area of the USSR, the area of Kamchatka 
Peninsula. 32 
Previously the United States had thought that there would be 
roughly two and a half times as many unidentified seismic events in 
the Soviet Union. However, until the opening of the Eighteen-Nation 
Disarmament Committee in March 1962, the United States' position 
had been that only those events which generated a seismic signal of 
4.75 or more would have been eligible for on-site inspection. No one 
31ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 24, p. 16. 
32ENDC/PV. 71, p. 18. 
404 DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS 
knew exactly how many unidentified events there would have been in 
the USSR above this threshold; the usual estimate was from 60 to 
100. On the basis of the Vela Program American scientists discovered 
that the figure probably would be from 1 0 to 15.33 It is to this figure 
that the pre-March 1962 quota proposal of 12 to 20 on-site inspec-
tions would have been applied. 
Ambassador Dean admitted that the number of unidentified 
seismic events in the United States would be somewhat larger than 
in the Soviet Union;34 however, the provision contained in both the 
new and old Western draft treaties was that the quota for the United 
States and the Soviet Union should be equal. Of course, the United 
Kingdom would also be subject to an equal number of on-site in-
spections, and this quota could be used in any territory under that 
country's jurisdiction or control. 
The new draft treaty provided that the maximum number of 
inspections annually on the territory of states other than the USSR, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States would be three "or such 
higher number as the Commission, after consultation with the Party, 
may determine by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting." 
In the 1961 draft the Commission's prerogatives were the same; how-
ever, the standard quota figure was two unless the signatory had 
more than 1 ,000,000 square kilometers of territory under its juris-
diction, in which case there would be one inspection for each 
500,000 square kilometers or fraction thereof. The Western Powers 
decided that two was too small a number to constitute a practical 
safeguard. In cases involving inspections on the territories of states 
other than the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
the Commission would decide whether or not to exercise the option 
of an on-site inspection. In the 1961 draft, the Commission could 
only take such a decision if it were requested by a party to the 
treaty. 
The new draft treaty differed from the previous Western pro-
posal in that the Executive Officer was given complete freedom in 
staffing on-site inspection teams, except that nationals of the state 
which was being inspected could not be included. Thus the previous 
33See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hear-
ing: Test Ban Negotiations and Disarmament, 88th Congress, 1st Session 
(1963)' p. 15. 
34£NDC/PV. 71, p. 18. 
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requirement that in the case of on-site inspections involving the 
nuclear powers or permanent members of the Commission the team 
should be comprised of nationals of the other nuclear side was 
dropped. Such individuals could or could not be included as the 
Executive Officer chose. 
The area to be subject to on-site inspection was left blank in 
the new draft treaty, reflecting the Western desire to have a larger 
area eligible than had been provided for in the 1961 draft. The area 
normally eligible for on-site inspection under that treaty would have 
been 200 square kilometers. In certain instances, however, it would 
have been 500 square kilometers. 
Other Modifications 
The August 27, 1962, draft treaty allowed nuclear detonations 
for peaceful purposes only if the permanent members of the Commis-
sion unanimously agreed, or if they were carried out in accordance 
with provisions to be specified in an annex. This annex was not tabled. 
As will be recalled, the 1961 draft treaty contained an elaborate 
series of safeguards for peaceful detonations. 
Unlike its predecessor, the new Western draft treaty provided 
that the Commission could make appropriate arrangements for the 
Commission, the International Staff, and the Verification System "to 
become part of, or to enter into an appropriate relationship with, an 
international disarmament organization, or any international organiza-
tion which may in the future be established among any of the Parties 
to this Treaty to supervise disarmament or related measures." 
The earlier version of the article on finance had stated that the 
financial contributions of the Soviet Union and the United States 
should be equal. In the new draft the contributions for the three 
permanent members would be fixed in percentages, as they would 
for all signatories, but the specific figures were left for negotiation. 
The amendment procedure differed somewhat in the new draft 
treaty in that the consent of the three permanent members of the 
Commission was necessary to approve an amendment as well as for 
its entry into force. 
The new draft stated that all parties to the treaty would have 
the right to inspect the data gathered by the Verification System and 
reports prepared on these data by the International Staff. The absence 
of such a provision in the 1961 draft had been felt to be a weakness 
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by some Western analysts on the ground that vital information might 
be withheld.35 
The new draft treaty also contained a provision in which a date 
could be inserted specifying when the treaty would come into effect. 
The Western powers asserted that this provision was included in 
response to the Mexican suggestion for a cut-off date on which 
nuclear testing would cease. 
The Withdrawal Article 
The withdrawal article-which must be compared with the dura­
tion article of the 1961 draft-was a final and important modification. 
The duration article had stated that the treaty would remain in 
force indefinitely subject to the inherent right of parties to with­
draw if the provisions of the treaty, including those relating to the 
installation of the Detection and Identification System, were not 
being fulfilled. This provision would have meant that the failure of 
certain states such as France and Communist China to cooperate 
with the control system would have constituted grounds for with­
drawal. The new draft treaty contained a complicated withdrawal 
provision. The first step was the determination by a signatory that 
( 1 )  another signatory had violated its obligations under the treaty; 
(2) another signatory was not fulfilling its obligations under the 
treaty including those relating to on-site inspection and that such 
nonfulfillment might jeopardize the national security of the determin­
ing party; (3) nuclear explosions had been conducted by a state 
not a signatory to the treaty under circumstances which might 
jeopardize the national security of the determining party; or ( 4) 
nuclear explosions had been conducted under circumstances in which 
it was not possible to determine the responsible state and that such 
explosions would either constitute a violation of the treaty if con­
ducted by a signatory or if conducted by a state not a party to the 
treaty might jeopardize the national security of the determining party. 
After a state had made such a determination, it could request a 
conference of all of the parties to the treaty. The conference would 
take into account the evidence and "examine the facts and assess the 
significance of the situation." After the conclusion of the conference 
35See Fred C. Ikle and others, A lternative Approaches to the Inter­
national Organization of Disarmament, pp. 36-37. 
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or after sixty days from the date of the request for the conference, 
whichever was earlier, the state concerned could give notice of with­
drawal from the treaty, if it decided this course was necessary for 
its national security. The withdrawal would take effect on a date 
specified in the notice, which in any event could not be sooner than 
sixty days from the receipt of the notice by the Depositary Govern­
ment. 
Under the procedure outlined in the treaty, to withdraw legally 
would probably take from ninety to a maximum of one hundred and 
twenty days. Western policy-makers assumed that it would take 
approximately this long to ready the most likely sanction that a state 
might choose to invoke, a retaliatory testing program. 
The withdrawal procedure represented an effort to devise a 
response to a violation within the limitations of the present world 
order, including three types of sanctions: ( 1 )  world publicity of the 
violation through the conference debate, hopefully with an authori­
tative political determination of the facts and consequent public 
opinion pressures upon the violator; (2) termination of the agree­
ment by the opposite nuclear power which would regain freedom of 
action; and (3) prompt retaliatory testing by such power which 
could not be delayed by procedural maneuvers at the conference 
beyond the minimum time which would be required for the prepara­
tion for testing. 
The Americans who prepared the draft sought to make the 
withdrawal procedure as "sticky" as possible, and yet to retain a 
high incentive for a signatory state to withdraw legally. They wanted 
the Soviet Union to have practice in and to develop the habit of 
complying with international accords. 
It is very possible, however, that the procedure would have 
seriously complicated American and Western policy in the con­
tingency which most concerned American policy-makers; that is, the 
situation which would result if the Soviet Union were to engage in a 
clandestine testing program but the West could produce at best 
ambiguous evidence of a treaty violation. In such an instance, hav­
ing to prove a violation before an audience of all of the signatory 
states, many of whom might be more interested in preserving the 
framework of the treaty than in Western security, might have been 
both embarrassing and cumbersome. 
Whil.;! the new Western draft comprehensive treaty may not 
408 DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS 
have been much of a concession to the Eight-Nation Memorandum, 
it did reflect a much greater willingness to have nonaligned states 
participate in the control system and greater confidence in their im­
partiality. This can be seen in the increased number of seats on the 
Commission allotted to this group; in the acceptance of national staff­
ing of control posts; and in the dropping of the requirement that the 
nuclear powers participate in on-site inspections. In this sense, the 
Western powers moved away from the reciprocal inspection features 
that had been built into the April 1 8, 196 1 ,  draft as a result of the 
negotiating process and back toward their original concept of an 
impartial system. 
Some of the changes in the new draft treaty were obviously 
designed to eliminate perceived faults in the previous treaty and to 
make the proposed control system more effective from the Western 
point of view. Thus it is difficult to describe the entire draft as a con­
cession to the Soviet point of view, although it certainly contained 
important compromises in this direction. 
The Capability of the New System 
Shortly after the new Western comprehensive treaty was tabled, 
Paul H. Nitze, who at that time was Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for International Security Affairs, attempted to evaluate for the 
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee 
on Armed Services the capability of the system which the Western 
powers had just proposed. He estimated that the system would be 
capable of detecting underground nuclear explosions down to from 
10 to 20 kilotons if the shots were in alluvium. 36 The system's 
capability with respect to underground explosions in tuff and granite 
would be respectively seven and fourteen times greater. There are 
only two small areas in the Soviet Union where deep deposits of dry 
alluvium are known to exist. Both are near the Aral Sea, one close 
to the border of Iran and the other about 500 miles inland. Mr. 
Nitze said that such a detection system would permit "clandestine 
shots up to 2 or 3 kilotons with some confidence that they will not 
be detected by seismic means. "37 This of course assumed that such 
36U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness 
Investigating Subcommittee, Hearings: Arms Control and Disarmament, 
87th Congress, 2d Session ( 1962 ) ,  p. 13 .  
37fbid. 
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shots were conducted in alluvium. If the shots were decoupled by 
being detonated in a large cavity, Mr. Nitze estimated that this 
"would allow yields well in excess of 10 kilotons to take place below 
the detection threshold. "38 Earlier he had stated that "most of the 
important scientific principles can be effectively studied below 3 
kilotons including what, if anything, might be done about all fusion 
weapons; and development of improved weapons of greater efficiency 
and lowered cost are attainable under this 3-kiloton threshold."39 
By compa�ison, in the light of the new scientific information, he 
appraised the capability of the system proposed in the 1961 draft 
treaty as 7 kilotons in alluvium. Again this system's capability with 
respect to underground explosions in tuff and granite would have 
been respectively seven and fourteen times greater. 
On balance, the new draft comprehensive treaty was probably 
influenced more by the new scientific information than it was by 
the Eight-Nation Memorandum. The new draft treaty reflected in­
creased confidence in the ability to detect underground explosions at 
long distances rather than a new appraisal of the utility of using 
existing national seismic stations. Since the capability of the new 
system was roughly what the capability of the old system had been 
estimated to be prior to the reappraisal of the technical situation 
resulting from the Vela Project, it meant that the Western powers 
were willing to accept virtually the same risks that they thought they 
were taking in March 1962 when they announced their willingness 
to drop the threshold from the 1961 draft treaty. Had the West stuck 
to its earlier negotiating position it would have faced even less risk 
than it had thought in 1 958 that it would face with the system recom­
mended by the Conference of Experts. The system proposed in the 
1 961  draft treaty would have been able to detect underground explo­
sions down to 1 kiloton in tuff. The Experts, on the other hand, had 
felt that the system which they proposed (the same system) would 
have been relatively ineffective in the range from 1 to 5 kilotons in 
tuff. 
The Draft Partial Test Ban Treaty 
The draft partial treaty which the Western powers also tabled 
on August 27, 1962, was much simpler than the alternative com-
88[bid. 
89[bid. 
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prehensive proposal. 40 It was brief, consisting merely of a preamble 
and six articles. It did not involve the creation of an international 
organization or control system. 
The preamble was like that of the draft comprehensive treaty, 
except that it expressed confidence that a partial test ban would 
facilitate progress toward a comprehensive agreement. The obliga­
tions of the treaty were also identical with those of the other draft 
treaty except that they were confined to tests: 
(a) in the atmosphere, above the atmosphere, or in terri­
torial or high seas; or 
(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes 
radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial 
limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control 
such explosion is conducted. 
In accepting these obligations states would agree not to conduct 
tests in the prohibited environments at any place under their juris­
diction or control and also "to refrain from causing, encouraging, or 
in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon 
test explosion anywhere" in the prohibited environments. Subsection 
(b) was phrased as it was for several reasons. One was that, in the 
absence of any provision for aircraft sampling flights over the ter­
ritories of signatory states, nuclear weapons tests could only reliably 
be detected and identified if radioactive debris escaped beyond the 
territorial limits of the state where the tests were conducted. Sec­
ondly, this subsection was designed to prevent a state from throwing 
a shovelful of dirt over a nuclear device and saying that it was 
underground. Finally, it took account of the fact that many nuclear 
devices which were completely sealed underground caused some 
venting when they were detonated; for example, this had occurred 
with the Gnome shot. 
The article on peaceful explosions was like that in the compre­
hensive draft except that the obligation was limited to the prohibited 
environments. The withdrawal articles in the two treaties were iden-
40For the text of the treaty see International Negotiations on Ending 
Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1961-September 1962, supra note 7, pp. 
297-300. The draft was circulated as document ENDC/ 59. 
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tical, as were the articles on signature, ratification and entry into 
force, and authentic texts. The basic process for amending the two 
treaties was the same: an amendment would require the approval 
and ratification of two-thirds of the signatories including the USSR, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. However, since there 
was no provision in the draft partial treaty for regular meetings of a 
conference of all of the parties, if a state desired to propose an 
amendment it would circulate it to all of the signatories; and then, 
if one-third or more of the parties so requested, a conference would 
be convened. 
In presenting the draft treaty for a partial ban, Ambassador 
Dean asserted that such a treaty could and should be accepted im­
mediately.41 He argued such a treaty would exercise something of a 
brake on the arms race, would to some extent inhibit non-nuclear 
powers from attempting to develop independent nuclear capacities, 
and would stop the radioactive pollution of the atmosphere, outer 
space, and the oceans. He emphasized, however, that the United 
States could not agree that a partial ban should be accompanied by 
a moratorium on underground testing, and his British colleague un­
derscored this position. 42 In the latter's words, "Once bitten, twice 
shy." With a moratorium, of course, the draft treaty for a partial 
test ban would be almost equivalent to the USSR's proposal of 
November 28, 1961 .  
In discussing the draft treaty for a partial test ban, before both 
domestic and international audiences, Administration officials em­
phasized that the West had twice before suggested such a move; in 
President Eisenhower's letter to Chairman Khrushchev of April 1 3, 
1 959, and in the joint offer which President Kennedy and Prime 
Minister Macmillan made on September 3 ,  196 1 .  There were, how­
ever, some important differences between these proposals and the 
draft treaty. The partial ban suggested by President Eisenhower 
would have applied only to tests in the atmosphere up to 50 kil­
ometers. This ban would have been the first step in the phased 
achievement of a comprehensive treaty, and there would have been 
some international control features. The offer made by President 
Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan would not have involved 
41See his remarks: ENDC/PV. 75, pp. 1 0-1 8. 
42See ibid., p. 26. 
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any international control features. Like President Eisenhower's sug­
gestion, however, it was confined to tests in the atmosphere. 
Interestingly, neither new draft treaty contained provisions 
attempting to prevent the signatories from preparing to engage in 
nuclear weapon tests, a provision which President Kennedy had 
demanded immediately after the Soviet Union broke the moratorium 
in the fall of 1961.  Indeed, Ambassador Dean proclaimed that the 
United States intended to keep itself in a state of readiness. 43 The 
Administration had decided that being ready to respond quickly with 
a retaliatory series of tests would be a better deterrent to a violation 
than any formal treaty provisions. 
The Capability Under the Partial Treaty 
In the same hearing before the Preparedness Investigating Sub­
committee in which Paul Nitze appraised the capability of the new 
draft comprehensive treaty, he and other officials also appraised the 
capability of the partial treaty. Since the draft treaty would rely 
exclusively on national detection systems, this was essentially an 
appraisal of the United States' unilateral detection system. Mr. Nitze 
stated that the United States had "a very limited and unevaluated 
capability of detecting nuclear explosions in outer space," but that 
it had a program to further develop this capacity.44 This program was 
the Vela Hotel Program. The first detection satellites developed under 
this program would not be launched until the fall of 1963. Mean­
while, Mr. Nitze admitted that the United States had no way of 
knowing whether or not the USSR was testing in deep outer space. 
Dr. Franklin Long, Assistant Director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency in charge of the Bureau of Science and Tech­
nology, stated that the United States had a reasonable ability to 
detect underwater tests by its seismic system, but that on the basis 
of an evaluation of the likelihood of underwater tests by the USSR 
and of the cost of a hydrophone system, which would be the best 
for detecting and locating underwater tests, the United States had 
decided not to install such a system. 45 Thus for the present, the 
United States' ability to detect and identify underwater tests was also 
43Jbid., p. 1 6. 
44Hearings: Arms Control and Disarmament, supra note 36, p. 27. 
45Jbid., p. 6 1 ,  also, pp. 62-63. 
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limited. So far a s  tests in inland waters were concerned, there would 
be no means for the United States to establish positive identification 
through the collection of radioactive debris short of an on-site in­
spection. Since there was no provision for on-site inspections in the 
partial ban there was no way of enforcing this particular prohibition. 
However, it was decided that since the United States itself would not 
wish to test nuclear weapons in any of its inland waters such as Lake 
Michigan this environment might just as well be included in the 
proposal in the hope that the USSR would abide by the treaty and 
feel constrained. No one questioned the capability of the United 
States' system to detect atmospheric tests; however, it was clear 
that small atmospheric tests in the USSR-those with yields less 
than 1 kiloton-could not be detected without monitoring stations in 
that country. 
IV 
The Response to the Western Draft Treaties 
Soviet Rejection 
In Geneva, the Soviet Union immediately gave a firm negative 
reaction to both of the new Western draft proposals. 46 The USSR 
rejected the comprehensive treaty, alleging that it was merely a re­
statement of the previous Western position and that it contained no 
qualitative changes. As could be expected, the feature to which the 
Soviet Union objected most was that concerning obligatory on-site 
inspection. Soviet delegates repeated their contention that national 
instruments were adequate for the detection of underground nuclear 
explosions, and that the only reason for the Western powers' insist­
ence on obligatory on-site inspection was their desire to obtain 
military and especially targeting information concerning the USSR. 
Although the Western delegates did not change the USSR's position, 
they at least scored a debating point in the Eighteen-Nation Com­
mittee when they pointed out that under the new proposals inspection 
teams could consist exclusively of nationals of nonaligned states. 
The Western powers balked, however, when Ambassador Bar­
rington of Burma carried this line of reasoning a step further and 
suggested that the Commission should be entrusted with the decision 
46For samples of the Soviet reaction, see ENDC/PV. 76, pp. 14-23, 
and ENDC/ SC. 1 / PV. 24, pp. 18-25. 
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as to which unidentified events on the territories of the nuclear 
powers should be investigated. 47 This increase in the Commission's 
authority at the expense of the nuclear powers would strengthen 
the "impartial" features of the system at the expense of its reciprocal 
aspects. But the Western powers insisted that for maximum deter­
rent effects, this choice would have to be left to the opposite nu­
clear side. Obviously they were counting on using their unilateral 
intelligence as a fundamental aid in the selection of the events for 
inspection within their quota. 
The USSR rejected the partial treaty because it was not compre­
hensive, or, as Soviet delegates put it, because it "legalized" under­
ground nuclear tests. The USSR's representatives denied that a par­
tial ban would do much to stop the proliferation of independent 
nuclear capabilities or that it would put a brake on weapons de­
velopment. With repect to the Western argument that a partial ban 
would end the peril of radioactive fallout, Soviet delegates took 
the line that nuclear war was a far more dangerous and serious 
threat than fallout and that a partial ban would be likely to increase 
the threat of nuclear war because it would lead to an intensification 
of the arms race. Mr. Kuznetsov alleged that in proposing a partial 
ban the United Kingdom and the United States were 
. . .  striving to retain for themselves a loophole for the pur­
pose of continuing the nuclear weapon race and at the 
same time they want to pinion the arms of the Soviet Union 
in regard to ensuring its own defensive capacity, although 
they attempt to hide this fact, and, of course, deny it. In 
such circumstances the Soviet Union would be compelled to 
conduct nuclear tests likewise in order to improve its weap­
ons and create new types. 48 
He seemed to be saying that, if the Western powers were to con­
tinue testing underground, the Soviet Union would continue atmos­
pheric tests. 
The Reaction of the Eight Nations 
The reaction of the eight new members of the Disarmament 
47ENDC/PV. 78, p. 9. 
48ENDC/ SC. 1 / PV. 24, p. 22. 
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Committee was n o  doubt colored b y  the Soviet Union's quick and 
blunt rejection. In view of this, and committed as they were to main­
taining a neutral position between the two nuclear sides, they could 
not have been overly enthusiastic even if they had wanted to be. 
All of those that spoke, like the Western powers, asserted that their 
real goal was a comprehensive test ban, but having said this, they 
expressed varying degrees of enthusiasm for a partial ban as an 
initial step. 
The representatives of the eight new members continued to 
try to find ways of bringing the two nuclear sides together. For the 
most part, their efforts consisted of attempts to link a moratorium on 
underground testing with the Western proposal for a partial ban so 
as to bring the proposal closer to the Soviet position. In deference 
to the Western position, however, they avoided the word morato­
rium, using such euphemisms as "a voluntary restraint." They also 
groped for safeguards which might accompany a moratorium, such 
as declarations by heads of states, the immediate establishment of 
an international scientific commission, and fixing time limits for 
the duration of the moratorium. The Western powers, though, were 
adamant. Some of the representatives of the eight new members 
themselves were troubled by the idea of a moratorium. Ambassador 
Barrington of Burma spoke of it as a "double-edged weapon."49 
After acknowledging that a moratorium might facilitate-and even 
be a necessary component of-an agreement, he expressed the con­
cern that a moratorium which did not last· would lead to the failure 
of the treaty and expressed doubt that in the present tensions a 
moratorium would last. 
January 1 ,  1963, continued to receive prominent mention as the 
target date for a cut-off for nuclear weapon tests. Soviet delegates 
mentioned this date, saying that it deserved consideration; then, on 
August 29, at his news conference, President Kennedy said that the 
United States would regard this "as a reasonable target date."110 He 
added, however, that the negotiations would have to proceed quickly 
so that the Senate would have time to ratify a treaty containing such 
a date. 
49ENDC/PV. 78, p. 7. 
IIO[nternational Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon Tests, Septem­
ber 1961-September 1962, supra note 7, p. 3 12. 
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On September 7, 1962, when the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament 
Committee recessed for the seventeenth session of the General As­
sembly, it was debatable whether after seven months of discussions 
in a new forum and all of the efforts of the eight new members the 
positions of the two nuclear powers were in reality any closer to­
gether. In one of the final sessions of the Committee, Mexican 
Ambassador Padilla Nervo expressed some of the frustrations of 
the new members when he said that although on the surface the 
explanation for the lack of progress seemed to be the difference 
between the two sides concerning on-site inspection, this was not 
the basic explanation. He continued by saying that: 
The cause is complex and many-sided. It seems to consist 
of considerations of internal politics and international pres­
tige which for the moment the Powers cannot or do not 
know how to overcome. It also consists of suspicion and 
the tempting dream of obtaining, by further nuclear tests, 
some military advantage or an important lead from possible 
discoveries in that field. 51 
Accepting this analysis, the representatives of several of the eight 
new members of the Committee were frustrated because they felt 
that at the Conference table in Geneva they could only deal with 
the apparent and surface sources of disagreement. Thus many of them 
were not unhappy to move to New York, where in the widely 
publicized meetings of the General Assembly they might have a 
better instrument for bringing pressure to bear on the nuclear 
powers. 
Meanwhile, in response to an American proposal, the tripartite 
Subcommittee would continue to meet in Geneva. No one, though, 
predicted success. A test ban agreement seemed as distant as it 
had before the tabling of the new Western proposals. 
51ENDC/PV. 80, p. 33. 
Chapter XII 
False Hopes 
I 
A Debate, an Inventory, a Showdown, a Schism 
The next period in the nuclear test ban negotiations brought certain 
significant changes. Although it started inauspiciously, suddenly both 
sides-but particularly the Soviet Union-demonstrated greater flexi­
bility, and some observers felt that an agreement might be in sight. 
Hopes soared, but by the end of the period this optimism had been 
dashed. 
The Seventeenth General Assembly 
While the Subcommittee of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament 
Committee continued to meet in Geneva-an American suggestion 
which the USSR reluctantly accepted-the spotlight of attention 
turned to New York and the United Nations General Assembly, 
where all three groups within the ENDC hoped to gain support for 
their positions. The Soviet Union, though, may well have had certain 
special expectations. Soviet leaders may have expected that the series 
of nuclear tests which the USSR was then conducting could be 
completed in sufficient time to enable them to make some dramatic 
move, such as announcing another unilateral suspension. Making 
such a move during the Assembly session would put great pressure 
on the Western states to take similar action. The USSR's assertions 
that the date set for the reopening of the full Eighteen-Nation Com­
mittee, November 12, could easily be adjusted and set back so that 
there need be no deadline on the Assembly's deliberations and its 
insistence that the subcommittee's sessions in Geneva should not in 
any way inhibit the Assembly,! support the suspicion that Soviet 
leaders may have considered such a move. 
The item, "The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and 
thermonuclear tests," had been placed on the Assembly's agenda at 
lENDC/SC. 1/PV. 26, p. 24. 
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the request of India. When the Assembly opened, the First Commit­
tee decided to make it the first order of business. The debate in the 
Committee lasted from October 10 through November 5, and the two 
resolutions recommended by the Committee were adopted on Novem­
ber 6. For the most part the debate consisted of an expanded version 
of that which had occurred previously in the ENDC. The addition of 
ninety-three more states to the debate brought little that was quali­
tatively new. 
The introduction of so many states which had not had previous 
detailed contact with the negotiations, however, complicated the 
Western position. In the Eighteen-Nation Committee the United States 
and the United Kingdom had attempted to build an elaborate tech­
nical case to substantiate their position, and had devoted considerable 
effort to explaining their views to the eight new members of the 
Committee. 
To undertake a comparable effort in the Assembly would have 
been impossible. Immediately after the debate opened in the First 
Committee, the United States submitted two memoranda: the first 
outlining the technical aspects of the detection and identification of 
underground nuclear explosions and the second explaining the find­
ings of the Vela Program as they related to a nuclear test ban.2 Ob­
viously, though, these memoranda were not as effective as the briefings 
with top Western scientists held in Geneva. Nevertheless the Soviet 
Union, for the first time in 1962, felt constrained to issue a technical 
reply, though it did not do so until November 1 1  after the Assembly 
debate on a nuclear test ban had been concluded, and did so then 
only in the form of an article by three Russian scientists in Izvestia. 3 
Subsequently the Soviet article was circulated as a document of the 
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.4 
During the course of the debate, speakers from several Latin 
American states (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru), states 
belonging to the Western alliance system (Australia, Canada, China, 
Denmark, Greece, Iran, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and 
2UN Document A/C. l / 873. 
3For the text of the article, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, 
Vol. II, pp. 1 042-46. The article was signed by Mikhail A. Sadovsky, V. 
Keilis-Borok, and N. Kondorskaya. The first two individuals had participated 
in some of the meetings of scientists connected with the Conference on the 
Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. 
4£NDC/ 67. 
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the Philippines), a s  well a s  from the Federation o f  Malaya, Spain, 
Ireland, and Somalia, supported the idea of a partial test ban treaty 
as a first step toward a comprehensive ban. On the other hand, 
spokesmen from Communist states (Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czech­
oslovakia, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the USSR), certain 
African and Asian states (Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Ceylon, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Saudi 
Arabia, and Syria) and Austria emphasized the importance of hav­
ing a test ban treaty apply to all environments. 
Two draft resolutions were introduced, both on October 19. 
The first was proposed by thirty African, Asian, and Latin American 
states, including the eight new members of the Disarmament Com• 
rnittee. 5 Seven other states from the same geographic regions later 
became additional cosponsors. The other resolution was proposed by 
the United Kingdom and the United States. 6 
The thirty-seven power resolution condemned all nuclear tests, 
asked that all such tests should cease immediately and in any event 
not later than January 1 ,  1963, endorsed the Eight-Nation Memo­
randum "as a basis for negotiations," called upon the parties con­
cerned "to negotiate in a spirit of mutual understanding and concession 
in order to reach agreement urgently," and asked the ENDC to 
pursue the matter and to report to the General Assembly on or be­
fore December 10, 1962. With the exception of certain preambular 
paragraphs, the Soviet Union supported this proposal. 
The Western resolution urged the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament 
Committee to work toward the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty 
"with effective and prompt international verification," but asserted 
that if this proved impossible, the ENDC should 
. . . seek the conclusion of an interim treaty prohibiting 
nuclear weapon tests in those environments where radio­
active fall-out is a matter of international concern and 
where nuclear weapon tests can be detected and identified 
without international controls, namely, the atmosphere, the 
oceans, and space. 
It also urged the negotiating powers to agree on a date on which a 
treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests should enter into force, noted 
5UN Document A/C. 1/L. 3 1 0. 
6UN Document A/ C. 1/L. 3 1 1. 
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the reports of the Committee, and requested the Secretary General 
to bring the records of the Assembly debate to the attention of the 
Committee. Essentially, it was an endorsement of the Western posi­
tion. 
Canada submitted a number of amendments to the thirty-seven 
power proposal. 7 The most important of these involved the addition 
of a paragraph recommending that if agreement were not reached on 
a comprehensive ban by January 1 ,  1963, the parties concerned 
should enter into an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear tests in 
the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space. Subsequently, Can­
ada modified this, incorporating a Ghanian subamendment, so that 
the paragraph recommended that a partial ban be accompanied by 
an interim arrangement, limited in time, suspending underground 
tests, on the basis of the Eight-Nation Memorandum.8 The United 
States and the United Kingdom proposed to add to this: 
Such limited interim agreement shall include adequate 
assurances for effective detection and identification of 
seismic events by an international scientific commission. 9 
At the suggestion of Ambassador Arthur Lall of India, who again 
as on many previous occasions manifested concern for the position 
of the USSR, the two Western powers agreed to delete the word 
"limited." As revised, the United Kingdom and United States sub­
amendment was adopted by a vote of 65 to 1 1 , with 28 abstentions. 
The Soviet bloc states and Cuba voted against the proposal. All of 
the eight new members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee except the 
United Arab Republic, which abstained, voted affirmatively. The 
alignment on the vote on the paragraph as a whole was similar, al­
though there were minor differences. The vote was 62 to 1 1 , with 3 1  
abstentions. 
The First Committee then turned to the thirty-seven power 
resolution itself.10 The condemnation of all nuclear tests in the first 
operative paragraph was adopted by 8 1  votes to 0, with 25 absten­
tions. The major states of both East and West abstained. The second 
7UN Document A/C. 1/L. 3 1 3. 
SFor the Ghanian subamendment, see UN Document A/C. 1 / L. 314. 
9UN Document A/C. 1 /L. 3 1 6. 
lOFor the record of the voting see UN, General Assembly, First Com­
mittee, Official Records, 1 7th Session, pp. 1 10-13.  
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operative paragraph establishing the cut-off date of January 1 ,  1963, 
was adopted, 88 to 1 0, with 8 abstentions. Only Australia, Belgium, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, United King­
dom, and the United States voted against the paragraph. China, 
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the 
Philippines, and Thailand abstained. The states voting for the para­
graph even included three members of NATO, Canada, Denmark, 
and Iceland. The disarray within the ranks of the Western alliance 
demonstrated, among other things, the strength of support for an 
immediate, unconditional cessation of nuclear testing. 
The thirty-seven power resolution as a whole was adopted in 
the First Committee by a vote of 8 1  to 0, with 25 abstentions, and 
in the plenary session, 75 to 0, with 2 1  abstentions.11 The major 
states of both East and West abstained, though as can be seen from 
the votes on the parts of the resolution, for different reasons: those 
from the East because of the condemnation of all nuclear tests and 
those from the West for the same reason and also because of the 
cut-off date. 
Just before the vote on their resolution, the United States and 
the United Kingdom dropped the paragraph endorsing a partial ban. 
With this change, the resolution was adopted in the First Committee 
by a vote of 50 to 12, with 42 abstentions, and later in the plenary 
session, 5 1  to 1 0, with 40 abstentions.12 In the Committee vote, Mali 
and Cuba joined the Soviet bloc in opposing the resolution. In the 
plenary session, Mali did not participate and Cuba was absent. The 
eight new members of the Disarmament Committee split evenly: 
Brazil, India, Mexico, and Sweden voted for the resolution; and 
Burma, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and the United Arab Republic abstained. 
The results of the General Assembly's consideration of the 
nuclear test ban issue were therefore somewhat contradictory. Be­
cause of the adoption of their resolution, the Western powers could 
claim something of a victory, although in their efforts to muster a 
majority they had had to abandon the idea of obtaining an endorse­
ment for their partial ban proposal. Even after this concession was 
made, less than half of the UN's membership had actually voted for 
their resolution. The Soviet Union was pleased with the establishment 
llGeneral Assembly Resolution 1762 A (XVII) .  
12General Assembly Resolution 1762 B (XVII) .  
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of the cut-off date and the endorsement of the Eight-Nation Memo­
randum in the thirty-seven power resolution which had been adopted 
by substantial majority of all members. However, the USSR strongly 
opposed the Canadian amendment referring to verification arrange­
ments. The meaning of this amendment as it was finally adopted was 
not very clear. The Western powers would have to exercise their 
interpretative skills to see it as supporting their position. Those who 
fared best in the Assembly were the eight new members of the Dis­
armament Committee, to the extent that their Memorandum was 
endorsed without qualification. Perhaps this could be explained by 
the very ambiguity of the Memorandum! In any case, the two As­
sembly resolutions constituted a charge of sorts for the ENDC, 
which now had to report back to the Assembly by December 10, 
1962. 
The other actions of the General Assembly at its seventeenth 
session with respect to disarmament and arms control were also 
rather ambiguous. It decided not to take any decision on the sug­
gestion of certain Latin American states that Latin America should 
be established as a denuclearized zone. It also did not take a decision 
on the Soviet-sponsored item relating to propaganda favoring preven­
tive nuclear war, accepting instead the Soviet recommendation that 
the matter be referred to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Com­
mittee. The resolution which the Assembly adopted on General and 
Complete Disarmament was procedural and hortatory. It was adopted 
unanimously, except for the vote of France, which abstained. In an­
other resolution, the Assembly postponed the question of convening 
a conference to sign a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear and 
thermonuclear weapons by asking the Secretary General to carry on 
further consultations with the governments of Member States. At 
that point, 59 states had replied to the Secretary General's inquiries. 
Thirty-three, including the USSR had favored the convocation of such 
a conference, and 26, including the United States and the United 
Kingdom, had expressed negative views or doubts. 
Continued Testing 
Although the General Assembly debate and the resolutions 
which were adopted may have had some influence on the nuclear 
test ban negotiations, events which occurred outside the meeting halls 
in Geneva and New York had a much more significant impact. 
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Both sides continued their test programs. The Kennedy Admin­
istration authorized an extension of the United States atmospheric 
and high altitude testing program, so that the series, originally 
scheduled to end in July, was continued into the fall. The extension 
was made partly to allow shots which had originally been scheduled, 
but for various reasons had not been conducted. It was also made to 
allow American scientists to follow up leads gained during the spring 
and summer. Finally, on November 4, President Kennedy announced 
that the atmospheric and high altitude series had been concluded. 
Underground shots, however, would continue in Nevada. By the end 
of the year, including both series, the United States would have con­
ducted over ninety tests. 
The Soviet series, which started in early August, was in full 
operation during the Assembly debate. Both within and outside of 
the United Nations, Soviet officials continued to assert the right of 
the USSR to test last. On November 7, Chairman Khrushchev pre­
dicted that the current Soviet test series would end on November 20. 
By the end of the year, the Soviet Union would have conducted some 
40 explosions. In all there would have been more nuclear detonations 
in 1962 than in any other year. 
What was perhaps more significant than the conclusion--or 
prospective conclusion--of the two test series was the fact that both 
sides appeared to be losing interest in testing nuclear weapons in the 
atmosphere, at high altitudes, and in outer space. Even when the de­
cision to start the 1962 series of tests was taken that spring, there was 
some discussion in the United States that that series would be the last 
in these environments. In their 1962 test series, both sides appeared 
to be approaching the theoretical limits of development which had 
been postulated by nuclear scientists. This meant that there was less 
and less to learn through further testing, and also that each gain be­
came more and more difficult. The two sides, though, appear to have 
emphasized and to have learned different things. The Soviet Union 
had detonated more high-yield weapons and appeared to know more 
in this area, while the United States had detonated a larger number 
of lower yield weapons and seemed to have the lead here. 
Military Crises 
Another event, or series of events, external to the negotiations 
which would have an important impact on them was the Cuban crisis, 
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which came to a climax in late October 1962. In this crisis, the United 
States and the USSR faced the grim possibility of nuclear war more 
directly than ever before. Apparently this had a profound impact on 
the leadership of both states, and led them to seek a detente. Most 
analysts think that this crisis was an important-if not the most im­
portant-factor explaining the subsequent change in Soviet policy 
which ultimately led to the signature of the Moscow Treaty.18 In 
withdrawing its nuclear tipped missiles from Cuba, the USSR ac­
cepted a resounding defeat and also abandoned the hopes that it 
seemed to have harbored of overcoming or at least counterbalancing 
American strategic superiority through this move.14 Moreover, in the 
process the USSR accepted the idea of international verification, 
though not on Soviet soil. Finally, Soviet actions in this instance 
added fuel to the already smouldering Sino-Soviet dispute. 
Almost simultaneously with the Cuban crisis, heavy fighting 
broke out on the Chinese-Indian border. As a result, India was 
forced to explore the possibility of obtaining defense assistance from 
the West, and its entire relationship with the major Western powers 
became more cordial. One repercussion of this development was the 
dismissal of Krishna Menon as the Indian Minister of Defense and 
this in tum led to the replacement in Geneva of Arthur Lall, who 
left the diplomatic service. The Sino-Indian dispute created a dilemma 
for the Soviet Union. Allied with China, but also interested in re­
taining good relations with India, the USSR was forced to choose 
between the two. By seeking to avoid this choice, it weakened its 
ties with both parties. 
While these important events were taking place and the As­
sembly debate was in progress representatives of the three nuclear 
powers continued to meet in the tripartite Subcommittee in Geneva. 
Yet their instructions obviously were unchanged, for their efforts in 
eighteen sessions were repetitive and sterile. Outside events were 
hardly mentioned. 
13See, for example, Marshall D. Shulman's testimony: U.S. Congress, 
Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 
88th Congress, 1 st Session ( 1 963), pp. 792-81 3 .  
14For an excellent analysis i n  these terms see Arnold L .  Horelick, 
"The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Be­
havior," World Politics, Vol. XVI, No. 3 (April 1 964 ) ,  pp. 363-89. 
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II 
Will the Deadlock Dissolve or Endure? 
Signs of Change 
The pace of the negotiations, however, would soon quicken. In 
one of the final exchanges of correspondence between Chairman 
Khrushchev and President Kennedy relating to the Cuban crisis, both 
leaders expressed the hope that the nuclear test ban issue could be 
solved.15 In early November there were hints in New York, Moscow, 
and Geneva that the USSR might change its position.16 Specifically, it 
was indicated that the USSR might propose the adoption of a sug­
gestion which had been raised by three American and three Soviet 
scientists at the Tenth Pugwash Conference on Science and World 
Affairs, which had been held in London in early September. In a 
signed published statement, the six scientists suggested that the use 
of sealed, automatic recording stations, later dubbed "black boxes," 
might provide a way out of the test ban impasse.17 The scientists 
concluded their statement by saying that a system designed along the 
lines they suggested would produce enough objective data so that an 
International Control Commission would "need to request very few 
on-site inspections." They thereby implicitly acknowledged that some 
on-site inspections would be necessary. In private conversations dur­
ing the Pugwash meetings some American scientists suggested that 
they thought that the West would be satisfied with very few on-site 
inspections. 
At the same time that there were indications that the Soviet 
position might change, the West began to make new efforts. For 
the first time since the revelation of the new data it disclosed the 
number of on-site inspections and control stations in the USSR that 
it would be willing to accept. In a private meeting in New York on 
November 7, the day after the General Assembly adopted the two 
15See Chairman Khrushchev's Jetter of October 27 and President Ken­
nedy's letter of October 28, Documents on Disarmament, 1962, Vol. II, pp. 
99 1-94, 1000- 1 001.  
16See New York Times, November 2, 1 962; November 1 1 , 1 962; and 
ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 43, pp. 1 7-3 1 .  
17For the text of  their statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 
1962, Vol. II, pp. 863-65. The statement was signed by D. R. Inglis, R. S. 
Leghorn, and A. Rich of the United States and L. A. Artsimovitcb, Y. V. 
Riznichenko, and I. Y. Tamm of the Soviet Union. 
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resolutions concerning a nuclear test ban, Ambassador Dean re­
vealed to Ambassador Kuznetsov that the United States might be 
willing to accept as few as from 8 to 10 on-site inspections annually 
in the Soviet Union, and from 8 to 10 nationally manned control posts 
on Soviet territory. In an earlier meeting, on October 30, Ambassador 
Dean had said that he thought that a mutually satisfactory arrange­
ment covering all tests could be arranged, and that the United States 
had in mind a small number of on-site inspections. 
At about the same time, in late October 1962, Jerome B. 
Wiesner, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technol­
ogy, had occasion to meet privately with Soviet scientist Fedorov in 
Washington, D.C., a friend from his Pugwash days. Trying to get 
the USSR to modify its position so that negotiations would again be 
possible, Wiesner told Fedorov that if the Soviet Union would come 
back to its earlier position and accept a small number of inspections, 
he felt confident that the United States would be able to reduce the 
number which it would ask for. Till that point the minimum American 
demand had been for 12. Wiesner continued saying that once the 
principle of on-site inspection had been established he would hope 
that the two sides could arrive at some satisfactory number. Dr. 
Wiesner did not intend to mislead Fedorov, nor to create the impres­
sion that the United States could accept as few as 3 or 4 on-site 
inspections, but merely sought to take action that would get the 
negotiations started again. 
Apparently, however, Chairman Khrushchev interpreted the re­
ports of the Dean and Wiesner conversations as indicating that the 
United States would be willing to agree to a comprehensive test ban 
treaty if the USSR would merely accept 3 on-site inspections an­
nually. According to hi.s own account (as relayed by Norman 
Cousins), Khrushchev p�·esented this information to the Council of 
Ministers and got the Council to agree to reinstate the Soviet offer of 
3 on-site inspections annually.1s 
The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee Reconvenes 
When the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee reconvened 
on November 26, 1962, it was faced with two imminent deadlines. 
18Norman Cousins, "Notes on a 1 963 Visit with Khrushchev," Saturday 
Review, Vol. XLVII, No. 45 (November 7, 1964 ) ,  pp. 1 6-21, 58-60. 
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First, it had to report its progress on the test ban issue to the 
General Assembly by December 10. Secondly, there was the cut-off 
date of January 1, 1963, established by Assembly Resolution 1 762 A 
(XVII). According to the schedule originally established the Com­
mittee would have had more time, but to accommodate Soviet desires 
the opening date of the Committee had been moved back two weeks 
from November 12, the date set at the time of the recess and written 
into the General Assembly resolution. As it was, the Soviet Union 
had just completed its series of aboveground tests when the Committee 
reconvened, although it, like the United States, was still conducting 
tests underground. 
Since it was obvious that the nuclear powers would not be able 
to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty within the 
specified time, and since at the conference table the USSR continued 
to reject the alternative of a partial ban, the eight new members of 
the Committee concentrated their efforts on the solution suggested in 
paragraph 6 of General Assembly Resolution 1 762 A (XVII), a 
partial ban accompanied by an interim arrangement suspending under­
ground explosions. Canada, continuing to follow a course somewhat 
independent of its NATO allies, also participated in these efforts. 
A number of concrete suggestions emerged. Sweden again raised 
its suggestion that the international scientific commission proposed in 
the Eight-Nation Memorandum should be constituted immediately.19 
In the Swedish view this body could act as an interim commission 
and it could ( 1 ) provide the conference with scientific information 
and undertake certain scientific investigations, (2) assist in elaborat­
ing the detection and data exchange system, and ( 3) perform the 
functions which the Eight-Nation Memorandum envisaged for the 
permanent commission. The Swedish delegate even suggested that it 
might be helpful if it were possible for this interim commission to 
undertake an on-site inspection. Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ethiopia, 
Mexico, and the United Arab Republic supported this suggestion. 
Canada maintained that an interim arrangement would have to be of 
limited duration, perhaps a year or six months.20 Various delegations 
also echoed this sentiment. Others, however, such as Ethiopia, argued 
that an interim arrangement should not be bound by a time limit 
19ENDC/PV. 84, pp. 1 1-23. 
20ENDC/PV. 85, p. 17. 
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and that to impose a time limit would violate the sense of the Assem­
bly resolution. This was also the USSR's position. 
Ambassador Lall of India suggested that it might be possible for 
the states concerned to agree to an annual quota of invitations for 
on-site inspections. 21 In the course of his remarks about on-site 
inspection, he also said that the Eight-Nation Memorandum put "an 
obligation upon all countries to supply all that is required in order 
to establish the nature of an event."22 He went on to say that "under 
the normal rules governing equity and responsibility a country which 
was in breach in this respect would in fact have broken the agreement, 
which would no longer subsist." Although these remarks seemed to 
favor the Western position, they had been submitted to Ambassador 
Zorin seventy-two hours before they were delivered, and he appar­
ently raised no objection to them. Furthermore, in response to later 
questioning, Ambassador Lall admitted that his formula ·did not in­
volve an obligation. 
On the same day that Ambassador Lall spoke, Ambassador 
Padilla Nervo made a similar point. He maintained that "refusal by 
one of the parties to invite scientific groups would have the same 
consequences as the violation of a provision for compulsory inspec­
tion."23 The consequence, he felt, in both cases would be to release 
the injured party from its political and legal obligations-to terminate 
the treaty. 
The "Black Boxes" 
The first sign of loosening in the Soviet position came on De­
cember 3, 1962. The USSR proposed, although somewhat obliquely, 
that control over underground nuclear explosions could be established 
through the use of automatic seismic recording stations in the terri­
tory of the nuclear powers and in adjacent countries. 24 In subsequent 
discussions it emerged that the USSR felt that the use of "black 
boxes" would obviate the need for internationally supervised, nation­
ally manned control stations and also for on-site inspections. The 
Western powers were willing to consider the use of "black boxes"­
indeed, the United States had made such a suggestion to the Soviet 
21ENDC/PV. 85, p. 24. 
22Jbid., p. 25. 
23Jbid., p. 37. 
24ENDC/PV. 86, p. 33. 
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Union in private meetings in New York before the Eighteen-Nation 
Committee resumed-but felt that at most they would merely reduce 
the number of manned stations and on-site inspections required. 
Moreover, the Western powers wanted to explore the technical details 
of the "black boxes." The United Kingdom proposed that a group of 
experts should be convened for this purpose. 25 Later the United States 
joined the British in urging a technical meeting. Western experts were 
confident that scientific evidence could not be marshalled to support 
the Soviet stance. This probably explains why the United States was 
again willing to support a proposal for technical talks. The USSR, in 
contrast to the Western powers, insisted that the concept bad to be 
accepted in principle first, then the relevant technical details could 
be elaborated jointly. Thus the deadlock remained on December 7, 
1962, when the Eighteen-Nation Committee filed its required report 
with the General Assembly. 26 
In the almost two weeks before the Committee recessed on 
December 20, there were three more meetings of the tripartite sub­
committee on nuclear testing and six-plenary sessions. On December 
10  the USSR expanded its "black box" proposal by listing three 
sites where such installations could be located: near Yakutsk for the 
Far Eastern zone, near Kokchetav for the Central Asian zone, and 
near Badaibo for the Altai zone. 27 The United States felt that a larger 
number of "black boxes" would be required and thought that only 
one of the three suggested sites would be acceptable. Nevertheless it 
welcomed this Soviet move as providing at least some details.28 In 
the same statement, the USSR also announced that it would be willing 
to have foreign personnel from the international center participate in 
the delivery and replacement of the "black boxes," it being under­
stood that the USSR could establish appropriate precautionary meas­
ures and that Soviet personnel and aircraft would be involved. This 
was a significant step, for it was the first time since November 28, 
1961, that the USSR had been willing to commit itself to allowing 
some foreigners to enter Soviet territory in connection with a nuclear 
test ban. For this reason, even though it was not directly related, it 
had some bearing on the controversial question of on-site inspections. 
25ENDC/PV. 87, p. 13.  
26ENDC/ 68. 
27ENDC/PV. 90, p. 1 5. 
28ENDC/ SC. 1/ PV. 49, pp. 7-9. 
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It certainly did not solve this conflict, however; and, when the 
ENDC recessed, the deadlock on nuclear testing persisted. Moreover, 
on December 13,  1962, the USSR resumed atmospheric testing, and 
there was some speculation in the West that it might have engaged 
in atmospheric testing before that date. 
The Khrushchev-Kennedy Correspondence: Back to On-Site 
Inspections 
The next moves of the negotiations occurred outside the Eigh­
teen-Nation Committee. This was partly because of the recess. More 
importantly, however, at this point the two parties principally in­
volved, the Soviet Union and the United States, appear to have desired 
privacy. 
On December 19, 1962, as a part of the private correspondence 
between the two heads of government inaugurated during the Cuban 
crisis, Chairman Khrushchev sent President Kennedy a letter which 
dealt exclusively with the nuclear test ban issue. 29 The most notable 
feature of the letter was the statement that the USSR would be 
prepared to agree that two to three on-site inspections should be 
carried out each year "when it was considered necessary," in seismic 
areas on the territory of the nuclear powers. The effect of this was 
almost to bring the Soviet position back to what it had been prior to 
November 28, 1961. At that time, however, the USSR had not limited 
the inspections to seismic areas. The offer was cleverly phrased so 
as not to denigrate the Soviet claim that on-site inspections were 
unnecessary. Khrushchev stated that he understood from the President 
and his representatives that the United States Senate would not ratify 
a nuclear test ban which did not provide for a minimum number of 
on-site inspections and that this was preventing an agreement. The 
offer was made, Khrushchev stated, to overcome this obstacle. The 
Chairman also stated that precautions, such as the use of Soviet 
aircraft flown by Soviet crews to transport inspection teams on Soviet 
territory, the screening of windows on the aircraft, and a prohibition 
on members of inspection teams carrying cameras, would have to be 
taken to preclude the misuse of inspections for intelligence purposes. 
Khrushchev finally repeated the Soviet offer with respect to the 
three automatic recording stations, and stated that if the sites which 
29Documents on Disarmament, 1962, Vol. II, pp. 1 239-42. 
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had been proposed were not acceptable, the Soviet Union would be 
willing to discuss the matter and "to seek a mutually acceptable 
solution." 
Western policy-makers were puzzled by two of what they con­
sidered to be outright misstatements of fact. First, Khrushchev's 
letter asserted that at the recent Pugwash meeting, English scientists 
had proposed the use of automatic seismic recording devices. It was 
the Western understanding that the idea had been introduced by 
Soviet scientists, and the public recommendation had been signed by 
three American and three Soviet scientists. Secondly, the letter de­
clared that in his meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov 
on October 30, Ambassador Dean had stated "that in the opinion of 
the United States Government 2-4 on-site inspections a year in the 
territory of the Soviet Union would be sufficient." That meeting was 
conducted in English. During it, Kuznetsov read a draft of the letter 
which Chairman Khrushchev would send to President Kennedy. Am­
bassador Dean claims that he told Kuznetsov, both at that meeting 
and at the one on November 7, that 2 or 3 on-site inspections would 
not be sufficient. He mentioned a figure from 8 to 1 0  as being the one 
which the West would accept. At this point, no mention was made of 
the Wiesner-Fedorov conversation. For the moment Western policy­
makers attributed these two-from their point of view--errors to 
hasty composition, of which there was other evidence in the letter. 
Despite this puzzlement Western policy-makers thought that the 
letter advanced the negotiations considerably. President Kennedy 
himself was "exhilarated" on receiving it. 29a Now at least both sides 
agreed on the principle of on-site inspections. 
President Kennedy replied on December 28, 1 962.30 The Presi­
dent welcomed the change in the Soviet position. He repeated that 
the United States would be willing to allow "reasonable" security 
provisions relating to on-site inspection, so long as the inspectors 
could assure themselves that they were taken to the intended area and 
had the necessary freedom within the designated inspection area. He 
also said that an effective test ban treaty was of such importance to 
him that he "would not permit such international arrangements to 
become mixed up with our or any other national desire to seek other 
29aArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 896, 
30Documents on Disarmament, 1962, Vol. II, pp. 1277-79. 
432 DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS 
types of information about the Soviet Union." Thus he gave his 
personal pledge not to use on-site inspections for intelligence pur­
poses. 
Elsewhere in his letter, the President corrected what he con­
sidered the factual errors in Chairman Khrushchev's message. He 
gave the American version of the Dean-Kuznetsov conversations and 
stated that the only figures that Ambassador Dean had mentioned 
were from 8 to 10. He also stated his understanding that the proposal 
for the use of automatic recording stations had been introduced by 
Soviet scientists, not British. In passing, he noted that none of the 
three American scientists who had signed the recommendation were 
seismologists and that they had been acting as private citizens, not 
as governmental officials. He also refuted the suggestion that Congress 
was the sole reason for the American insistence on on-site inspections, 
asserting that this issue went to the "heart of a reliable agreement." 
The President argued that on-site inspections should be allowed 
in aseismic as well as in seismic areas. He maintained that the auto­
matic recording stations should be established in the areas of greatest 
seismicity, and thus that there "would be a need for a number of 
stations in the vicinity of the Kamchatka area and a number in the 
Tashkent area." 
At last the differences between the two sides appeared to be 
susceptible to negotiation. With this in mind, President Kennedy 
suggested that a Soviet representative meet with William C. Foster, 
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to attempt 
to resolve the differences. 
The Washington and New York Talks 
Chairman Khrushchev agreed to this course in a letter dated 
January 7, 1 963, and talks between Mr. Foster and Soviet representa­
tives began in Washington one week later. After several days the 
talks were moved to New York, and British representatives were 
added. On Januitry 26, President Kennedy ordered the Atomic Energy 
Commission to postpone the underground nuclear tests which were 
scheduled to occur in Nevada. (The United States had continued its 
underground testing program despite the exhortation contained in 
General Assembly Resolution 1 762 A (XVII ) .  However, no tests 
had as yet been conducted since January 1 . )  Many thought that a 
nuclear test ban treaty was finally in sight, but as so often in the past, 
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these hopes were dashed. Questions relating to on-site inspections 
continued to be at the center of the most important disagreements.31 
In his letter of January 7 Chairman Khrushchev bad agreed that 
inspections should occur in aseismic as well as seismic areas. The 
Western powers now wanted to probe the technical details relating 
to on-site inspections. The United States made proposals concerning 
the criteria to be used in locating suspicious seismic events; the 
method of choice for exercise of the quota; the size and shape of the 
area to be inspected; the personnel and techniques to be utilized in 
the inspections ;  and the safeguards to be established surrounding 
inspections. The Western powers indicated that they would be willing 
to allow procedures whereby sensitive defense installations could be 
excluded from on-site inspections, provided that there would also 
be a remedy for abuse of this privilege. While the Western powers 
stuck to their position that they would require a quota of from 8 to 
10 on-site inspections annually on the territory of the Soviet Union, 
they indicated that they might be willing to reduce this figure some­
what if they were satisfied that the arrangements would ensure the 
effectiveness of on-site inspections. The Soviet Union argued that 
the Western powers were attempting to put off the conclusion of a 
treaty by the discussion of technical detail, and that these technical 
matters could be discussed after the quota figure of from 2 to 3 on-site 
inspections on the territory of the nuclear powers had been accepted. 
Thus there was once more a deadlock. 
Again according to his own account, Chairman Khrushchev felt 
betrayed by the Western powers, since be had thought that they would 
accept his offer of 3 on-site inspections annually. Because of domestic 
opposition to his policy of detente with the West, and because of the 
opposition of Communist China, he has claimed that he felt that he 
could not ask that the USSR make still one more concession to the 
West, since he bad asserted that the first would be sufficient.32 Both 
the domestic and international forces opposing his policies would 
3IAithough there are no public records of the talks, the major partici­
pants all gave detailed accounts before the ENDC. See the remarks by 
Foster (ENDC/PV. 96, pp. 9-14; ENDC/PV. 1 04, pp. 1 5-2 1 ) ;  Stelle 
(ENDC/ PV. 1 16, pp. 1 0-16) ; Godber (ENDC/PV. 96, pp. 30-33) ;  and 
Kuznetsov (ENDC/PV. 96, pp. 20-23) .  
32See Norman Cousins, "Notes o n  a 1 963 Visit With Khrushchev," 
supra note 18 ,  pp. 2 1 ,  58. 
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argue, he has said that he felt, that if another concession were made, 
the West would merely raise its demands again. 
In the private talks the Western powers agreed with the Soviet 
Union that the control system should consist of nationally owned and 
operated control stations which would subinit data regularly and in a 
uniform manner to an international data-collection center. The Soviet 
Union and the United States exchanged preliininary lists of seismo­
graphic stations from which a control network Inight be formed (the 
United States subinitted a list of 76 stations and the USSR, 73 sta­
tions ) ,  and the United States gave the Soviet Union a general descrip­
tion of the instrumentation at each of the United States' stations. The 
Western powers also agreed that the nationally owned and operated 
stations would be supplemented by automatic recording stations. The 
United States suggested ten sites in the United States where automatic 
recorders might be installed and furnished information on the average 
seisinic noise levels at each site. The Soviet Union accepted one of 
these, declined the other nine, and requested two additional sites. The 
United States did not object to these two sites, and furnished seisinic 
noise-level data on them. The United States specified ten general 
areas within the Soviet Union where it felt automatic recorders might 
be located, and requested that the Soviet Union designate specific 
sites within those areas. The Soviet Union countered that there need 
only be three automatic recording stations on its territory. Ultimately, 
agreement was reached on three sites in both the USSR and the 
United States, and on January 3 1  the Soviet Union provided back­
ground noise information on these sites, but there continued to be a 
debate about whether or not more sites were necessary. The United 
States eventually stated that its requirements Inight be met by as few 
as seven stations, but the Soviet Union refused to agree to more than 
three. The United States made a number of specific proposals re­
lating to the installation, operation, and removal of the "black boxes," 
to which the Soviet Union made no response. Implicit in the discus­
sion of "black boxes" and nationally owned and operated stations was 
the fact that the West no longer insisted on internationally supervised 
stations. 
On the surface, and to much of the press, the disagreement 
seemed to be quantitative, about the numbers of stations and on-site 
inspections. In reality, it may well have been considerably broader 
since the Soviet Union refused to discuss the modalities of conducting 
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on-site inspections. This made many participants in the formulation of 
American policy pessimistic that negotiations on numbers would 
prove useful. On January 3 1 ,  1963, the Soviet Union requested that 
the private talks be ended, and that the negotiations be taken up again 
when the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee resumed. This 
was widely interpreted as an attempt to use that body as an instrument 
to bring pressure on the West to agree to Soviet terms. 
III 
Plans, Fears, Explanations, and Frustrations 
Plans for a NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force 
Meanwhile, other events had occurred which would have an im­
pact on the test ban negotiations. Prime Minister Macmillan and 
President Kennedy met at Nassau in the Bahamas from December 18  
to 2 1 ,  1962. Their discussions centered on matters relating to national 
security. The principal topic with which they had to deal was the 
American decision to abandon the development of the Skybolt 
medium-range air to surface missile, on which the United Kingdom 
had counted to maintain and extend the useful life of its bomber 
force. In searching for an alternative, the United States offered to 
provide the United Kingdom with a certain number of Polaris mis­
siles, without nuclear warheads, which could be installed on British 
submarines. A condition of this offer was that the British agree to 
employ the missiles not as an independent deterrent, but as part of a 
NATO nuclear force. 83 The United States agreed to make available 
equal forces for inclusion in such a multilateral force. The President 
and the Prime Minister took the occasion, therefore, to attempt to 
solve the strategic crisis in NATO, as well as to solve the immediate 
British problem. The creation o(new instrumentality, a NATO multi­
lateral nuclear force (MLF) was implicit in their resolution of the 
Skybolt controversy. By this move, which would mean giving a larger 
voice in nuclear strategy to their allies-although exactly how much 
larger was not clear-the two leaders hoped to head off the develop­
ment of further independent nuclear forces and to increase confidence 
in and the viability of NATO. As an immediate start on the creation 
of a multilateral nuclear force, the Prime Minister suggested, and 
sssee the communique, Documents on Disarmament, 1962, Vol. II, 
pp. 1 274-76. 
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the President agreed, that some elements of the United States Strategic 
Forces and the United Kingdom Bomber Command could be assigned 
to NATO and targeted in accordance with NATO plans. 
Whether or not the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear 
force would actually achieve the results for which the two leaders 
hoped was moot. The detailed plans for implementation, of course, 
would have to be worked out. However, it was clear that the United 
States had no intention of assigning more than a fraction of its Stra­
tegic Forces to NATO, thus it still would have the ability to inaugurate 
a nuclear war without the consent of its allies. On the other hand, it 
was fairly clear that the United States would insist that it would have 
to agree to any decision to employ the MLF. Therefore the defense 
of Europe through nuclear weapons would continue to be dependent 
upon an American decision. France indicated clearly that a multi­
lateral nuclear force would not solve the problems relating to NATO 
which concerned it. France turned down a United States offer similar 
to that which was made to the British to supply Polaris missiles and 
refused to participate in the discussions of plans for a multilateral 
nuclear force. Some other Western European members of NATO, 
especially Western Germany, were more receptive to the plan, which 
would give them greater access to nuclear weapons and a larger voice 
in NATO nuclear strategy than they had had previously. For this very 
reason the MLF had implications for the "nth country" problem, one 
of the issues at stake in the test ban negotiations. 
Rising Republican Opposition 
A second development during this period was the growth of 
serious opposition within the ranks of Republican Congressmen to 
American policy in the nuclear test ban negotiations. The two draft 
treaties which the United States tabled on August 27, 1962, had been 
cleared with the relevant congressional committees. At that time 
some members of Congress had not paid much attention to the shifts 
in United States policy because they were convinced that the Soviet 
Union would reject the new American proposals.34 When the negotia­
tions began to look more serious as a result of the Khrushchev­
Kennedy correspondence, some of these Congressmen began to have 
second thoughts. One, Representative Craig Hosmer, a Republican 
34See New York Times, August 3, 1 962, p. 3.  
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from California, the ranking minority member of the Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy, and the individual who as an Army officer had 
led the first United States occupation forces into Hiroshima in 1945, 
concluded that the Kennedy Administration might well agree to ar­
rangements which, in his view, would prejudice American security. 
He expressed his concerns in a speech in the House of Representatives 
on January 24, 1 963.35 What he appeared to fear most was that the 
United States would agree to the Soviet offer of three on-site inspec­
tions annually. He was also concerned that the United States would 
accept three "black boxes" in lieu of a much larger number of 
international control posts. He further worried that the Soviet Union 
had made significant gains through its atmospheric tests in December 
and that the United States was acting before these gains could be 
properly analyzed and their impact on the United States assessed. He 
recommended that President Kennedy restate the American 1958 
terms and that these be made nonnegotiable. By this he seemed to 
mean an international control system involving 20 on-site inspections 
and 1 9  internationally manned control posts on Soviet territory. 
After his speech the Republican leadership took the unusual 
step of establishing a Republican Conference Committee on Nuclear 
Testing, with Representative Hosmer as its head. Initially this Com­
mittee planned to arrange for the personal appearance by experts 
before a meeting of the Republican Conference on January 29. How­
ever, when President Kennedy announced the suspension of nuclear 
testing on January 26, Hosmer thought that an agreement was near, 
and changed his plans. He then decided to issue a series of papers 
prepared by experts. The first of these, written by Edward Teller, was 
issued on January 3 1 , 1 963. In it, Teller argued that acceptance of 
the current Soviet proposals would constitute acceptance of an un­
policed moratorium. Other scientists who prepared subsequent papers 
reiterated this position, and also argued that further tests were needed 
to explore and develop nuclear weapons and to create a pure fusion 
weapon. The Kennedy Administration attempted to answer these 
criticisms with a paper prepared for the Republican Conference 
Committee by William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, and also a lifelong Republican and former 
official in the Department of Defense. He argued that the United 
ar.congressional Record, Vol. CIX, Part 1 ,  pp. 950-5 1 .  
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States was ahead of the Soviet Union in many areas of nuclear 
weapons development and that a test ban would slow down or 
"freeze" Soviet efforts to catch up. He also maintained that as a first 
step toward other measures of arms control, a test ban would offer 
important advantages. Although he conceded that there would be 
risks in a test ban, he maintained that on balance the advantages 
would outweigh the disadvantages. 
With these developments, the domestic battle was joined. The 
Republican Conference Committee on Nuclear Testing would con­
tinue its attack throughout the spring of 1 963. 
The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee Resumes 
The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee reconvened on 
February 12, 1963, almost a month later than had been planned. 
Both East and West sought to gain the support of the eight new 
members of the Committee for their position. The Western repre­
sentatives gave a detailed explanation of their position, and attempted 
to indicate its reasonableness and flexibility, however, the British dele­
gates put considerably greater stress on the latter point than the 
Americans. Soviet representatives, on the other hand, argued that 
the USSR had made major concessions to the West and that it was 
the West which was blocking agreement. They also strongly criticized 
the current American underground tests, the first of which was con­
ducted on February 8, 1963-President Kennedy rescinded the 
suspension after the New York talks collapsed-underscoring that 
these tests violated General Assembly Resolution 1 762 A (XVII) .  In 
contrast, the Soviet Union, so far as could be determined, had not 
conducted any nuclear tests since the conclusion of its Arctic series 
in December 1 962. 
As in the January private talks, the principal differences between 
East and West involved on-site inspections. Soviet delegates argued 
that they had made a major concession in accepting obligatory on-site 
inspections. They maintained that this was a political concession, 
since the USSR did not feel that such inspections were necessary. 
They also developed the argument, touched upon in Chairman 
Khrushchev's letter of December 19,  that the USSR had been led to 
believe that if it accepted 2 or 3 on-site inspections, the West would 
agree to a treaty banning all nuclear tests. In seeking to substantiate 
this case, Soviet delegates reiterated their version of the Dean-Kuznet-
False Hopes 439 
sov conversations, and maintained thllt in the private conversations in 
January Mr. Foster had been very cautious in denying this, saying 
merely that Mr. Dean was not authorized to offer any figure other 
than 8-10.36 They also quoted a number of statements made in the 
Eighteen-Nation Committee and the seventeenth General Assembly 
by British and American representatives to the effect that all that was 
needed to achieve a comprehensive treaty was for the Soviet Union 
to accept the principle of obligatory on-site inspection, and to revert 
to the position which it had held prior to November 28, 1961. 
At that time the Soviet Union was willing to accept 2 to 3 on-site 
inspections. Soviet delegates also stated that in the second half of 
October, 1962, Jerome B. Wiesner, during two informal meetings in 
Washington and New York with Soviet academician Fedorov, had 
requested that the Soviet Union should agree to on-site inspections, 
and that a small quota of 2 to 3 inspections annually would open the 
way to an agreement.37 The USSR held that by now insisting on more 
than three on-site inspections the West was acting in bad faith. 
Western delegates denied most of the Soviet charges. As Presi­
dent Kennedy had in his letter of December 28, they refuted in 
unambiguous terms the Soviet version of the Dean-Kuznetsov talks. 
They argued that Soviet delegates were distorting the statements 
made in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and in the General Assembly. 
They also said that "no official representative of the United States" 
had ever said that 2 or 3 on-site inspections would be acceptable to 
the United States, and pointed out the number of occasions, including 
President Kennedy's letter of December 28, on which a higher figure 
had been named. However, they never denied the Soviet account of 
the Wiesner-Fedor(W conversation. Moreover, some American of­
ficials have conceded that the USSR may have "honestly misunder­
stood" some of the private meetings that preceded the December 
correspondence between the two heads of government. 88 
The American failure and inability to deny the Soviet accounts 
of the Wiesner-Fedorov conversations damaged its case before the 
eight new members of the Committee. Dr. Wiesner, beyond being an 
important administration official, had after all borne the burden of 
36ENDC/PV. 1 1 3 ,  p. 35. 
37See ENDC/PV. 101, p. 48; and ENDC/ PV. 1 1 3, p. 16. 
SBNew York Times, April 23, 1 963, p; 8. 
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explaining to them the technical situation as the United States 
understood it. 
In his initial presentations to the Eighteen-Nation Cominittee, 
Mr. Foster continued to maintain that the Ininimal number of on-site 
inspections annually on the territory of the USSR which the United 
States could accept would be from 8 to 10. In one session, he argued 
that in order adequately to deter a would-be violator, a country would 
have to save at least one or two of its quota of inspections until the 
end of the year. 39 If the annual quota were only three, this would 
mean that a country would only be able to call for one on-site inspec­
tion during most of the year. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, who was 
a member of the American delegation during the first days of the 
resumed session, emphasized in private conversations with other 
delegations that the United States Senate would not ratify a test-ban 
treaty which provided for only three on-site inspections in the USSR 
annually.40 According to the testimony of some of the representatives 
of the eight new members of the ENDC, he did state, however, that 
the Senate Inight accept a figure lower than 8-10. American negotia­
tors continued to maintain that before the United States would agree 
to any quota figure, the Soviet Union would have to specify its view 
concerning several aspects of the overall verification system. 
During the week of February 18,  Mr. Foster met privately with 
Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov. In this meeting he explained a 
new American position on several features of the inspection system, 
and then stated that in the context of the verification system which 
he had described, the United States could accept an annual quota of 
seven on-site inspections for each side.41 The Western press had 
widely forecast that the United States would reduce its demands, and 
some within the Kennedy Adininistration were arguing that the 
United States could go still further. Secretary McNamara was re­
portedly willing to settle for 6. 41a Jerome B. Wiesner maintained that 
5 inspections per year would provide adequate security against clan­
destine testing.42 Five is the number which the representatives of the 
S9ENDC/ PV. 99, p. 2 1 .  
40Washington Post, February 2 1 ,  1963, February 22, 1963. 
41ENDC/ PV. 102, pp. 23-24. 
41aArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 897. 
42Jerome B. Wiesner, Where Science and Politics Meet ( 1 965) ,  p. 1 67. 
Interestingly and perhaps significantly Wiesner states tllat the United States 
formally reduced its demand to 6 or 7 (ibid. ) .  
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eight new nations in the ENDC expected the United States to ask for. 
The other changes in the Western position which Mr. Foster described 
related to the conduct of on-site inspections. Western delegates pre­
sented them in more detail to the ENDC at various times during the 
next month, and then summarized them in a memorandum submitted 
on April 1 ,  1963.43 As of mid-March, the United States actually had 
a new draft treaty prepared. However, it did not table anything more 
than the memorandum. 
These changes shifted the most important elements of the on-site 
inspection process in the case of the nuclear powers to representatives 
of the other side. Thus they moved away from the impartial concepts 
that had been written into the August 27, 1962, draft comprehensive 
treaty and in the direction of reciprocal or adversary inspection. The 
other nuclear side would not only have the right to select which 
events it chose to inspect (as in the 1962 draft treaty) but in addi­
tion it would supply the leader of the inspection team and over half 
of the team's technical personnel. Only the remainder of the person­
nel would be selected from the international staff. Beyond this, the 
Western position specified various time limits. The most important of 
these were that the other nuclear side would have up to sixty days 
after a seismic event to request an on-site inspection, and, unless 
drilling were required or mutual agreement for an extension obtained, 
an on-site inspection team would have only six weeks in which to 
complete an inspection. The inspection area would consist of an 
ellipse with a semi-major axis of no more than 1 5  kilometers, with a 
maximum area of 500 square kilometers. The country on whose terri­
tory the inspection was to take place would be responsible for trans­
porting the team to the inspection area. It could use its own aircraft 
and pilots, and could select the flight routes. It could have its own 
personnel including observers accompany the team. The number of 
such personnel could equal the team. The Western powers also 
spelled out their concept of the use of the "black boxes." 
Despite repeated requests in private and plenary sessions, Soviet 
delegates refused to comment on these matters. They argued that the 
Western powers were seeking to block an agreement by having the 
negotiations become involved in a morass of technical details. They 
43See ENDC/ PV. 108, pp. 5-1 0; ENDC/PV. 1 1 0, pp. 1 9-26; ENDC/ ­
PV. 1 1 3,  pp. 5-9; and ENDC/ 78. 
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continually asserted that if the West would agree to the number of 
"black boxes" and on-site inspections proposed by the Soviet Union, 
there would be no difficulty reaching agreement on the details. Since 
the Western powers would not do this, the deadlock continued. 
The eight new members of the Committee were perplexed and 
irritated by the situation. Because of the Washington and New York 
talks, they had returned to Geneva in an optimistic mood. When their 
expectations were not fulfilled, they became irked, yet they did not 
know what to do. Some of them made rather halting attempts at sug­
gesting compromise solutions, and they were even encouraged to do 
this by the United Kingdom, but these attempts were virtually ignored 
by the United States and the USSR. The two states even discouraged 
the eight new members of the Committee from submitting compromise 
proposals which they had formulated but not tabled. While the eight 
agreed not to act-apparently because of pressure applied by both 
Soviet and American diplomats in their national capitals44-some of 
them warned that if agreement were not forthcoming soon, they might 
submit their proposals even if these proposals met the displeasure of 
both powers. 45 The United Kingdom suggested that the tripartite 
Subcommittee of the three nuclear powers should be revived, and the 
United States and other countries supported this proposal, but the 
Soviet Union refused, insisting that the discussion should be conducted 
in the plenary sessions. 
IV 
For the Moment: Pianissimo 
In mid-March the United States and the Soviet Union, as Co­
chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, suggested 
that the Committee should also discuss the other items on its agenda, 
and thereafter normally only one of the three weekly meetings of the 
Committee was devoted to discussion of the nuclear test ban. 
The Soviet Union appeared to be quite interested in the discus­
sion of other matters. When the Eighteen-Nation Committee had 
resumed in February, it had tabled two new proposals. The first was 
44Arthur S. Lall, Negotiating Disarmament, p. 25. Eventually, in a 
public address in Copenhagen, on May 9, 1 963, Mrs. Alva Myrdal exposed 
most of the details of the proposals ( ibid., pp. 27-28 ) .  
45£NDC/ PV. 123, pp. 48-49. 
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for a declaration on renunciation of use of foreign territories for 
stationing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons, and the 
second was for a nonaggression pact between the parties of the War­
saw and North Atlantic Treaties.46 In the debates Soviet delegates 
linked both of these proposals with the Western efforts now in prog­
ress to develop a NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force. They asserted 
that such a force would be dangerous, among other reasons, because 
it would give Western Germany access to nuclear weapons. These 
delegates argued that the MLF, in widening access to nuclear weap­
ons, would contradict one of the aims of a nuclear test ban. Western 
delegates, on the other hand, explained that the purpose of the MLF 
was to prevent the development of independent nuclear capabilities 
and that it was consonant with long-standing Western policies oppos­
ing the proliferation of nuclear weapons capability. The French nu­
clear test in the Sahara on March 1 8, 1 963, furnished Soviet delegates 
ammunition for their attack on Western policy. Obviously, all of these 
issues were linked with the test ban negotiations in Soviet strategy. 
What this new development in the test ban negotiations meant 
was the subject of speculation. Did it mean that these other issues 
would have to be solved before or simultaneously with the achieve­
ment of a test ban treaty? Various answers were given. Regardless 
of their answer to this question, many, both within and outside of the 
Committee, regarded the lower priority now accorded the test ban 
issue as a sign that the high hopes raised by the correspondence be­
tween the heads of government in December 1962 and the private 
talks the following month would not be fulfilled. 
46ENDC/ 75, and ENDC/ 77. 
Chapter XIII 
The Moscow Treaty 
I 
Prelude 
The Administration Moves to Rebut Domestic Criticisms 
While the negotiations in Geneva continued at a low key and 
reduced tempo, the domestic opposition to the Administration's 
efforts to achieve a nuclear test ban, which had begun to make itself 
felt in late January 1963, continued its attacks and appeared to gain 
strength. However, the Kennedy Administration also moved to rebut 
the criticisms and demonstrated that it would fight for its policies. 
On February 2 1 ,  1963, Senator Thomas J. Dodd, a Democrat 
from Connecticut, gave a long, critical analysis of the American 
position in the negotiations in a major address on the Senate floor.1 
He argued that the United States had made a number of unwarranted 
concessions, and that it should return to its "original Geneva formula." 
On February 28, Senators Richard B. Russell, Stuart Symington, and 
Henry Jackson, all Democrats especially influential in defense policy 
matters, sent a letter to President Kennedy advising him that they 
could not approve the 1962 draft comprehensive treaty in its present 
form.2 In early March, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy con­
ducted six days of hearings on the technical aspects of verification of 
a nuclear test ban. In these hearings, Dr. Carl Romney admitted that 
the seismic system currently being proposed by the United States 
would generally be unable to detect fully coupled underground nuclear 
explosions of below 1 kiloton if they were conducted in granite, below 
2 to 6 kilotons if they were conducted in tuff, and below 20 kilotons 
if they were conducted in alluvium.3 He added that some tests below 
lCongressional Record, Vol. CIX, Part 2, pp. 2798-2809. 
2See Washington Post, March 5, 1 963. 
3Hearings: Developments in Technical Capabilities for Detecting and 
Identifying Nuclear Weapons Tests, 88th Congress, 1st Session ( 1963 ) ,  p. 104. 
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that level might be detected and that the United States would of 
course have its unilateral intelligence capabilities. On the other hand, 
decoupling would raise the threshold even higher. The current esti­
mate was that decoupling would muffle a seismic signal by a factor of 
200 or more.4 
The most optimistic statement which the American scientists 
who had been working on the problem of on-site inspection under the 
Vela Program would make was that the system envisaged in the West­
em 1962 draft comprehensive treaty would give some probability, 
which they could not evaluate, of identifying an underground nuclear 
explosion. 5 They also admitted that with careful planning an under­
ground detonation could be executed so that proof of its occurrence 
would probably be lacking. Thus far there had been no field exercise 
involving on-site inspection techniques, because the scientists involved 
did not think that their techniques were "sufficiently advanced," and 
because the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was not con­
vinced that given the conditions in the United States-limited areas 
in which to test and limited abilities to maintain secrecy-such 
exercises would be useful. 6 
Representative Craig Hosmer played an active role in the hear­
ings, which provided ample material for the use of his Republican 
Conference Committee on Nuclear Testing. This group continued its 
assault on the Administration position. 
As the attacks against the Administration's efforts mounted, 
those who favored these efforts rallied to their support, and members 
of the Administration launched a major effort to justify their course. 
In early March, Adrian Fisher, Deputy Director of the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, took the unusual action of writing a letter 
to the Editor of the Washington Post, in reply to a letter which that 
paper had printed from Senator Dodd. 7 Senator Humphrey made a 
major speech in the Senate on March 7.8 Four days later, the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing which provided a 
4Jbid., pp. 71,  297. 
5See the statement of Theodore A. George, General Engineer, Ad­
vanced ReSearch Projects Agency, ibid., p. 257. 
6Jbid., pp. 251,  475. 
7Washington Post, March 1, 1963 ( Dodd ) ;  and, March 4, 1963, 
(Fisher) .  
scongressional Record, Vol. CIX, Part 3 ,  pp. 371 1-24. 
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platform from which Secretary of State Rusk could defend the Admin­
istration's efforts. Senator Pastore arranged it so that Messrs. Foster 
and Long of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency were the 
concluding witnesses before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. 
President Kennedy utilized his news conferences personally to defend 
the Administration's position. 
These individuals all argued that the ability to detect under­
ground explosions had substantially increased. They also pointed out 
that the thresholds of detectability were not absolute, that some 
events under the commonly assumed thresholds would be detected. 
They maintained that the possibility that an on-site inspection would 
discover incriminating evidence of a nuclear explosion would be a 
powerful deterrent to a would-be violator, and they pointed out that 
unilateral intelligence capabilities could be used in selecting events to 
be inspected. Presumably such intelligence capabilities would include 
agents, observation satellites, and other devices. In their view, this 
would substantially increase the probability of an on-site inspection's 
being successful. They also argued that the new United States' posi­
tion emphasizing reciprocal inspection would enhance the effective­
ness of inspections. Finally, they argued that the risks of a continued 
unfettered arms race would outweigh the acknowledged risks of a 
comprehensive test ban. President Kennedy, in his public remarks, 
seemed to be particularly impressed with the dangers which he felt 
would result ftom the proliferation of nuclear capabilities. 9 
Steps to Break the Deadlock 
Although there seemed to be major obstacles to a test ban treaty 
both in Geneva and Washington, more promising signs soon appeared. 
On April 5, 1 963, in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, 
toward the end of a somewhat polemical speech, Mr. Tsarapkin 
announced that the Soviet Union was ready to consider the Uilited 
States proposal, tabled the previous December, to establish a direct 
line of communication between the governments of the USSR and 
the United States.10 The difficulty of insuring reliable communications 
between the two states had become painfully evident during the Cuban 
crisis, and the United States had come to emphasize this proposal as 
an important means of preventing war arising through accident or 
9See his news conference remarks of March 2 1 ,  1963. 
IOENDC/PV. 1 1 8, p. 52. 
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miscalculation. After this announcement, talks began on the technical 
modalities of establishing a "hot line," as it was called. A memo­
randum of understanding on this subject was finally signed on June 20, 
1 963.11 Also in April, negotiations were begun between the Soviet 
Union and the United States to renew their agreement on cooperation 
in nuclear research. A new agreement was signed the following month. 
In late April, in an interview with an Italian newspaper editor, 
Chairman Khrushchev raised the possibility that if the Western 
powers did not soon agree to accept the Soviet offer of from two to 
three on-site inspections annually, the offer might be withdrawn.12 At 
about the same time the American and British Ambassadors in Mos­
cow jointly approached first Foreign Minister Gromyko and then, on 
April 24, Chairman Khrushchev on the test ban issue.13 The move was 
taken at British urging and without great American enthusiasm. The 
two ambassadors delivered a letter ,to Chairman Khrushchev from 
President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan. This "letter con­
cluded by saying that the writers would be ready in due course to send 
to Moscow very senior representatives empowered to speak for them 
directly with Khrushchev."13a Despite Chairman Khrushchev's un­
promising initial reply, this touched off another round of correspond­
ence between the heads of government in May and June. 
There were also developments within the United States. On 
May 8, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of De­
fense announced that they would detonate three low-yield nuclear 
explosions in Nevada later that month. Five days later the two 
agencies announced the cancellation of these shots.14 
On May 27, Senator Dodd submitted a resolution stating that it 
was the sense of the Senate "that the United States should again offer 
the Soviet Union an immediate agreement banning all tests that con­
taminate the atmosphere or the oceans, bearing in mind that such 
tests can already be monitored by the United States without on-si.te 
inspection on Soviet territory."15 The resolution suggested that if the 
Soviet Union should reject this offer, the United States should reiterate 
llENDC/ 97. 
12The transcript was published in New York Times, April 22, 1963, p. 1 .  
13New York Times, April 2 3 ,  1963, p .  1 ;  April 25, 1 963, p .  1 .  
13aArthur M .  Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p .  898. 
14New York Times, May 14, 1 963, p. 1 .  
15Congressional Record, Vol. CIX, Part 7 ,  p .  9483. 
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it, and seek the widest possible international support for it. If the 
Soviet Union should continue to refuse such an agreement, the resolu­
tion proposed that the United States should commit itself "before the 
world to conduct no nuclear tests in the atmosphere or under water so 
long as the Soviet Union abstains from them." As far as was known 
in the West, the USSR had not conducted any nuclear tests since its 
December 1 962 series. The resolution added that the United States 
should maintain its readiness so that it would not be unprepared if 
the Soviet Union suddenly resumed nuclear testing in the atmosphere 
or underwater. Senator Humphrey joined Senator Dodd as the princi­
pal cosponsor of the resolution. Thirty-two other senators from both 
parties also became cosponsors,16 making a total of thirty-four. Al­
though Senator Dodd informed the Administration of his proposal 
in advance, he did not act at its behest. Indeed, President Kennedy 
had some concern that it might undercut American efforts to achieve 
a comprehensive test ban.16a During the course of his speech intro­
ducing the resolution, Senator Dodd stated that although he felt that 
a comprehensive test ban would be preferable to a partial ban, he 
had serious reservations about the current American proposal for a 
comprehensive treaty, which he knew several Senators shared. 
Ten days earlier, Senator William Proxmire had asserted in a 
major address that it was unlikely that the Senate would ratify the 
comprehensive treaty currently being proposed by the Administra­
tion, 17 and after a private survey conducted by members of his staff 
during the month of May, Senator Joseph S. Clark concluded that, 
at that time, at most, fifty-seven Senators would support the current 
American proposal.18 This was ten less than the required two-thirds 
16They were Senators: Bartlett, Brewster, Burdick, Case, Church, Clark, 
Dominick, Douglas, Engle, Gruening, Hart, Hartke, Inouye, I avits, Keating, 
Kefauver, Lausche, McCarthy, McGee, McGovern, Metcalf, Morse, Moss, 
Muskie, Neuberger, Pell, Prouty, Randolph, Ribicoff, Scott, Sparkman, and 
Yarborough. 
16aArthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 899. 
17Congressional Record, Vol. CIX, Part 7, p. 8894. Jerome B. Wiesner 
has gone even farther. In his book, he wrote that "Many times during the 
bitter Senate hearings on the partial test ban treaty we [The Kennedy Admin­
istration] had reason to wonder whether a comprehensive treaty would indeed 
have been acceptable given any number of inspections." ( Where Science and 
Politics Meet, p. 1 67.) 
18Senator Joseph S. Clark, "Would the Senate Ratify a Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty?," War/ Peace Report, Vol. III, No. 6 (June 1 963 ) ,  p. 6. 
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majority. On the other hand, it was obvious that the resolution sub­
mitted by Senator Dodd commanded much wider support. 
The extent to which the Senate resolution affected the Soviet 
position cannot be known. It must have been obvious, though, if that 
many Senators had grave reservations about the American proposal 
involving 7 on-site inspections annually, to obtain Senatorial consent 
to a treaty involving only 3 on-site inspections annually would have 
been virtually impossible. 
On June 10, Harold Wilson, leader of the British Labour Party, 
stated, at a news conference in Moscow where he was visiting, that 
he had gained the impression in a three-hour interview with Chairman 
Khrushchev that the prospects for an immediate agreement on a 
comprehensive test ban were not very hopeful.19 Mr. Khrushchev ap­
parently implied that the Soviet Union had withdrawn its offer of two 
or three on-site inspections annually. Mr. Wilson also said, though, 
that he thought that prospects for a partial ban were fairly good. 
That same day President Kennedy delivered the commencement 
address at The American University. He titled his remarks "Toward 
a Strategy of Peace. "20 Earlier in the spring, the President had decided 
that he would make a speech about "peace."21 Norman Cousins con­
tributed to the timing of the speech by suggesting in a letter to Ken­
nedy on April 30 that such a step at this time might affect the course 
of Soviet policy and would certainly help the American image in the 
world. The letter was written just after Cousins' return from a trip to 
the Soviet Union, during which, among other things, he told Khrush­
chev-at Kennedy's request-that the President really did want a 
test ban treaty. 
In his address, President Kennedy called for a reexamination of 
American attitudes toward peace itself, toward the Soviet Union, and 
toward the Cold War, and called for a new context for world discus­
sions and increased understanding with the USSR. He announced-as 
Harold Wilson did also-that he, Prime Minister Macmillan, and 
Chairman Khrushchev had agreed that high level discussions would 
begin shortly in Moscow on a nuclear test ban treaty. Unlike Mr. Wil­
son, however, he stated that the negotiations would be "looking for-
19New York Times, June 1 1 , 1 963, p. 1 .  
20U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIX, No. 1253 (July 1 ,  
1 963 ) ,  pp. 2-6. 
21'fheodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 730. 
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ward toward early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty."21a 
The President apparently was determined to pursue the objective of a 
comprehensive ban despite the feeling in the Senate and the apparent 
retraction by the Kremlin.22 As evidence of American good faith, 
President Kennedy declared that "the United States does not propose 
to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as other states do 
not do so." His hand was strengthened in this regard by the resolution 
which Senator Dodd had introduced. Moreover, as far as is known, 
neither side had tested in the atmosphere since the end of December 
1962. Some within the Administration had proposed that the United 
States also suspend underground testing for a limited period, but the 
President rejected this suggestion. 22a 
Apparently, the agreement to hold the meeting resulted from 
the exchange of correspondence between the heads of government 
initiated in April, and more specifically from Chairman Khrushchev's 
response on June 8 to a joint proposal of Prime Minister Macmillan 
and President Kennedy, delivered on May 3 1 ,  1963. 
Prior to this there had been important developments on the 
Soviet scene. The quarrel between the Soviet and Chinese Communist 
parties had deepened, and a conference between the two groups on 
their ideological differences had been scheduled to meet on July 7. A 
plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union had also been scheduled to open on June 1 8. Thus it 
seemed that events on various fronts were moving toward a climax. 
II 
Drafting the Treaty 
American Preparations 
Even before President Kennedy's American University speech, the 
Administration had begun preparing for the forthcoming Moscow 
negotiations, The first steps consisted of the relevant agencies of the 
Administration reviewing current Western positions. Most of the 
American preparation concerned a comprehensive treaty. Almost 
simultaneously, the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the 
21a"Toward A Strategy of Peace," supra note 20, p. 6. 
22See New York Times, June 3, 1963, p. 1 .  
22aTheodore C .  Sorenson, Kennedy, p .  730. 
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Senate Committee on Armed Services began a series of executive 
session hearings. 
In the process of the review of American policy, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff concluded that the current W estero proposal for a 
comprehensive nuclear test ban was "not consistent with the national 
security," because it was "not adequate to prevent the Soviet Union 
from making important advances in nuclear weaponry that could alter 
the present military relationship in favor of the Soviets."23 There were 
several reasons for their decision. First, they concluded that the pres­
ent proposal would prohibit all tests, including those "which have 
essentially no probability of detection. "24 They felt that this would 
prevent the United States from testing while providing "the oppor­
tunity for the Soviets to test clandestinely." The Joint Chiefs felt that 
any test ban treaty should "permit testing below appropriately speci­
fied and realistic detection thresholds." The Joint Chiefs also con­
cluded that 7 on-site inspections "would not provide a reasonable 
deterrent considering the number of suspicious events likely to occur 
in the Soviet Union annually." They regarded the criteria for initiating 
an on-site inspection as too restrictive, and the area within which the 
inspection would be confined as being too small. They objected to 
the fact that the host country would provide the logistic support. They 
disliked the fact that the International Commission would have the 
sole right to order inspections on the territory of the nonnuclear 
powers. Finally, they felt the withdrawal provisions were too time 
consuming, and that at most 60 days should be required to complete a 
legal withdrawal. What the position of the Joint Chiefs was when the 
1962 draft treaty was formulated has never been satisfactorily ex­
plained. 
After the individual agency reviews, the American position was 
discussed in the Committee of Principals. Interesti.11gly, on May 22, 
1 963, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was made an official 
member of the Committee of Principals; prior to that time he had 
routinely attended the Committee, but as an advisor. The change was 
made to mollify Congressional criticism. On June 14 the Committee 
of Principals met, and decided that in the forthcoming Moscow nego-
23U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings: Military A s­
pects and Implications of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals and Related Matters, 
88th Congress, lst Session ( 1964),  2 vols., Vol. I, p. 305. 
24fbid., p. 303. 
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tiations the United States should continue to give priority to efforts to 
achieve a comprehensive treaty, essentially on the basis of the draft 
which had been prepared in March. The Joint Chiefs of Staff dis­
sented. The Secretary of Defense, however, concurred in this recom­
mendation, which the President accepted. It was in accord with his 
own thinking on the matter. 
Two days earlier it was announced that W. Averell Harriman, 
onetime Ambassador to Moscow and then the Under Secretary of 
State for Political Affairs, would head the American delegation to 
Moscow.25 Lord Hailsham, who was Minister of Science, was 
chosen to head the United Kingdom delegation. 26 He was known to 
take a passionate interest in achieving a nuclear test ban treaty. 
On June 1 8, the United Kingdom pledged that it would not be the 
first nation to resume atmospheric testing. 
President Kennedy visited Prime Minister Macmillan during his 
Western European trip on June 29 and 30. The two leaders co­
ordinated Western strategy for the forthcoming talks, and Kennedy 
arranged to have the American delegation take the lead in the negoti­
ations. He had much more confidence in Harriman than in Hailsham. 
Before the American delegation departed for Moscow, according 
to Theodore C. Sorenson, President Kennedy 
. . . made clear his belief ( 1 )  that this was the last clear 
chance to stop the diffusion of nuclear tests and poisons and 
to start building mutual confidence with the Russians; (2) 
that the delegation should keep in daily contact with him; 
and (3)  that extreme precautions should be taken to pre­
vent their prospects of success from being ruined by any 
premature leak of their position. 26" 
25The other members of the American negotiating team were: Adrian 
W. Fisher, Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; 
Carl Kaysen, Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs; William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; 
John T. McNaughton, General Counsel, Department of Defense; Frank E. 
Cash, Department of State; Alexander Akalovsky, Franklin A. Long, and 
Nedville E. Nordness, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and Frank 
Press, a seismologist at California Institute of Technology. 
26The other members of the British delegation were Duncan Wilson, 
Under Secretary of the Foreign Office, and Sir Sully Zuckerman and Sir 
William Penney, scientific advisors. 
26aTheodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 734. 
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Again according to the same source, "he made arrangements for only 
six top officials outside the White House (Rusk, Ball, McNamara, 
McCone, Thompson, and Foster) to read the cables from Moscow on 
a hand-delivered, 'for-your-eyes-only' basis." When the actual negoti­
ations were in progress, he would meet each evening with these six 
officials to discuss the progress of the talks, and he insisted that all 
communications to the delegation in Moscow be cleared through him. 
Soviet Preliminary Moves 
As these developments were in process, the USSR gave various 
indications of the position which it would take. On June 14, in an 
interview with a Pravda correspondent, Chairman Khrushchev stated 
that the USSR would not permit any on-site inspections as part of a 
nuclear test ban treaty.27 He also said, though, that President Ken­
nedy's American University speech had made "a favorable impres­
sion." Immediately after it was broadcast, Khrushchev had told 
Harold Wilson that it was "the greatest speech by any American 
President since Roosevelt."27a Moreover, Soviet jamming of the BBC 
and the Voice of America, which had begun to slacken off in May, 
was stopped completely shortly after the President's speech. When 
the speech itself was rebroadcast, the USSR did not jam a single 
passage. 
On July 2, in East Berlin, Chairman Khrushchev gave what 
could be considered a formal reply to the President's speech. Much 
of his address was devoted to an analysis of the past negotiations. He 
argued that underground nuclear tests could be monitored by national 
detection systems combined with automatic seismic stations, and that 
on-site inspections were not necessary. He reiterated the Soviet 
charge that the Western powers sought on-site inspection for intelli­
gence purposes, and then went on to say : 
. . . it is time for the imperialist gentlemen to know that 
the Soviet Government will never abandon the security 
interests of its country and of all the Socialist countries and 
will not open its doors to NATO intelligence agents. This is 
no subject for bargaining.28 
27New York Times, June 1 5, 1963, p. 1 .  
27aArthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p .  904. 
28U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 88th Congress, 1st Session ( 1963 ) ,  p. 1000. 
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After asserting that a treaty banning nuclear tests in all environments 
was impossible because of the Western position, he declared that the 
Soviet Government would be willing to conclude a treaty banning 
nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. He 
said that the USSR had "made this proposal before, but the Western 
Powers had frustrated an agreement by advancing supplementary 
conditions which envisaged large-scale inspection of our territory." 
The record of the negotiations contains no evidence to substantiate 
this claim of a prior Soviet offer. Until June 1963 the USSR had 
always refused to consider a partial ban without an unpoliced mora­
torium on underground testing. Now for the first time, the USSR 
did not insist that a moratorium on underground tests accompany a 
partial ban. At the conclusion of his speech, Khrushchev attempted 
to link the conclusion of a partial nuclear test ban with the signature 
of a nonaggression pact between the NATO countries and the War­
saw Pact states; however, it was not clear whether or not he intended 
the latter to be a condition of the former. 
On July 3, seemingly in response to Chairman Khrushchev's 
speech, Prime Minister Macmil!an declared in the House of Com­
mons that although the West ought to seek a comprehensive test 
ban, an agreement banning tests in the sea, the atmosphere, and space 
"would still be an advance." That same day the Administration of­
ficials in Washington also revealed that the United States would be 
willing to accept a partial test ban. 
The Moscow Negotiations 
Negotiations between the three nuclear powers opened in Mos­
cow on July 15 ,  1963. The day before, in the midst of the Sino-Soviet 
ideological talks, the Soviet Communist Party chose to make public 
a full statement of its grievances against the Chinese Communist 
Party. The Moscow test ban talks thus would be held in the context of 
seriously deteriorating Sino-Soviet relationships. 
Chairman Khrushchev opened the first meeting of the treaty 
negotiations, and during the course of this meeting he tabled a draft 
treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and 
under water. Except for the fact that it provided for a partial ban, it 
bore a strong resemblance to the treaty which the USSR had tabled 
on October 3 1 , 1958, the opening day of the Conference for the Dis­
continuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests and to the USSR's draft treaty 
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of November 28, 1 961 .  It was simple and brief. It merely stated 
that the three governments agreed to ban nuclear tests in the three 
environments. There was no withdrawal clause or provision for peace­
ful detonations. Significantly, however, there was provision for the 
accession of other states. 
In response the Western powers tabled their draft partial test ban 
treaty of August 27, 1 962. The Western delegates also attempted to 
engage the Soviet Union in negotiations on a comprehensive ban but 
without avail. They even were unsuccessful in their attempts to ar­
range meetings between Professor Press, the seismologist member of 
the American delegation, and Soviet seismologists, all of whom were 
said either to be out of town or otherwise engaged. After a few days, 
the Western delegates abandoned their efforts to achieve a compre­
hensive treaty, and by mutual agreement discussion was based on the 
Western draft partial test ban treaty of August 27, 1962. Even after 
accepting this draft as a basis for discussions, however, Soviet dele­
gates continued to argue for the title from their draft, "Treaty Ban­
ning Nuclear Weapon Tests." They finally agreed, but with great re­
luctance, to the more accurate but more cumbersome Western title 
-"Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in 
Outer Space, and Under Water. " 
There was some talk of the "nth country" problem, both 
with respect to France and Communist China, and for a while the 
USSR maintained that France would have to be brought into the 
treaty. However, it soon dropped this condition. On the other hand, 
the USSR, despite Western queries, refused to be drawn into a dis­
cussion of the problem of the adherence of Communist China. 
The USSR pushed, although not too hard, for the signature of 
a nonaggression pact between the governments of the North Atlantic 
Treaty and the Warsaw Pact. The Western delegations made it clear 
that they were not authorized to negotiate such a treaty. Eventually 
the matter was disposed of by a sentence in the final communique 
stating that the three delegations had discussed the matter and had 
agreed "fully to inform their respective allies in the two organizations 
concerning these talks and to consult with them about continuing 
discussions on this question with the purpose of achieving agreement 
satisfactory to all participants. "29 This met the contention of the 
29U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIX, No. 1 259 (August 
12, 1 963 ) '  p. 239. 
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Western powers that they could not negotiate on such an issue without 
involving all of the NATO allies. 
On July 25, 1 963, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, Lord 
Hailsham, and Mr. Harriman initialed a treaty, which was formally 
signed, again in Moscow, on August 5 by Mr. Gromyko, Foreign 
Secretary Lord Home, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Prime 
Minister Macmillan had wanted to convene a summit meeting to 
sign the treaty. 29a President Kennedy had thought this unwise, but he 
had told Harriman that he would go to a summit meeting if neces­
sary. Happily from his point of view, it was not. The President 
regretted that because it would be politically inexpedient he could 
not include Adlai Stevenson in the delegation which accompanied 
Secretary of State Rusk when he signed the treaty. Stevenson, of 
course, regarded the treaty as a vindication of his proposal made in 
the midst of the 1956 Presidential election campaign. 
The Moscow Treaty 
The Moscow Treaty closely resembled the Western August 27, 
1 962, draft proposal. There were two principal differences. The first 
was that the 1962 draft contained a provision allowing nuclear 
detonations for peaceful purposes if the original parties agreed, or if 
the detonations were carried out in accordance with the provisions 
outlined in an annex. The Moscow Treaty did not include such a 
provision. The Soviet Union took the attitude that it was already " 
allowing the West to conduct nuclear explosions underground and that 
it did not want to extend this right to explosions in other environ­
ments. The Western delegates argued for retention of the provision. 
They had an annex partially worked out, although there were some 
uncertainties concerning the degree of disclosure which the United 
States would insist upon and accept. The USSR was adamant, how­
ever, and President Kennedy eventually ruled that the American 
delegates should agree to the Soviet position, even though he knew 
that the Atomic Energy Commission would oppose this and that the 
absence of such a provision would create certain difficulties for the 
Plowshare peaceful uses program. The necessary change in the text 
was effected by including the phrase "or any other nuclear explosion," 
in the first paragraph of the first article immediately after the state-
29aTheodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 735. 
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ment that the parties were not to carry out any nuclear weapon test 
explosion, and again prior to the listing of the environments in which 
nuclear explosions are prohibited. This same phrase was also included 
in the second paragraph of this article, which imposed the obligation 
to "refrain from causing, encouraging or participating in" nuclear 
weapon tests in the prohibited environments. In other words, the 
broadened provisions prohibited the signatories to the treaty both 
from conducting peaceful nuclear explosions in the prohibited en­
vironments themselves and also from assisting others to conduct such 
explosions. As a consequence of agreeing to drop the provision al­
lowing nuclear detonations for peaceful purposes, the Western Powers 
insisted on reducing the number of ratifications required for amending 
the treaty from that of two-thirds of the parties, including the 
original parties, to that of a majority, including the original parties. 
They hoped that this would make it easier in the future to obtain an 
amendment allowing such explosions. 
The second principal difference concerned the withdrawal clause. 
As will be recalled, the 1 962 draft treaty embodied a complicated 
procedure for withdrawal, which would have taken up to 120 days 
and would have involved the convocation of a conference of all 
signatory states. In addition, the permissible grounds for withdrawal 
were specified in a fairly detailed fashion. The Moscow Treaty simply 
stated : 
This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party shall 
in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to with­
draw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, 
related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized 
the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of 
such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three 
months in advance. 
At first, Foreign Minister Gromyko argued that there was no need 
for a withdrawal clause; that the right to withdraw was an inherent 
right of sovereignty. The Western negotiators insisted that the treaty 
had to have a withdrawal clause because they felt that the absence 
of such a clause would be a more severe restraint on the Western 
powers than on the Soviet Union. In all, two days were spent on this 
issue. One of the complicating problems was that the Western dele­
gates wanted to specify the grounds for withdrawal in as much detail 
as possible. These would have included testing by "nth countries." 
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Soviet delegates, in contrast, apparently wanted to avoid pointing too 
directly at Communist China, which obviously was not going to sign 
the treaty. The compromise, ultimately suggested by the United 
States and accepted by the other parties, was to insert the qualifying 
phrase "related to the subject matter of this Treaty," after the words 
"extraordinary events." Thus a conference as a possible forum for 
discussion of violations of the treaty and an instrument for mobilizing 
political pressure, as well as the enumeration of specific grounds for 
withdrawal were dropped from the treaty. Both features had been 
designed by American policy-makers to make withdrawal as difficult 
as possible. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs, it will be recalled, they 
would have made it too difficult. 
A third change involved listing all three of the Original Parties 
as depository governments, instead of naming just one government 
as is the normal practice. The reason for this was to ease the embar­
rassing problems which might arise from the attempted accession of 
governments which an Original Party did not recognize, such as East 
Germany and Nationalist China. Because of this change, there is no 
single agreed list of the parties to the treaty, since each depository 
government keeps its own list. The only circumstances in which this 
conceivably could cause a problem would be in determining whether 
or not a majority of parties had ratified an amendment. 
A final change consisted of the addition of a hortatory paragraph 
in the preamble which proclaimed the objective of an agreement on 
general and complete disarmament under strict international control. 
During the negotiations the delegates had ample time to go over 
the Treaty word by word and to achieve a consensus on the meaning 
to be attached to each. Among other things, they agreed that the 
Treaty in no way inhibited the use of nuclear weapons in time of war. 
Chairman Khrushchev publicly confirmed this understanding in reply­
ing to written questions from Soviet correspondents the day after the 
Treaty was initialed. 
III 
The Epilogue to the Negotiations 
Ratification of the Treaty 
President Kennedy submitted the Treaty to the Senate for its advice 
and consent to ratification on August 8, 1963. Hearings in the 
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Committee on Foreign Relations began on August 12 and lasted 
through August 27. The Committee had, however, been shown the 
Treaty as early as July 23, before it was initialed, and a bipartisan 
group of Senators had been included in the delegation for the official 
treaty-signing ceremony. The hearings before the Preparedness In­
vestigating Subcommittee, which had started in May, also continued 
through this period. Administration witnesses before both commit­
tees appeared to be quite candid in their appraisal of the Treaty. All of 
the civilian officials, though with varying degrees of enthusiasm, argued 
that on balance the admitted risks of the Treaty-which they assessed 
in much the same terms as Paul Nitze had the previous September­
were outweighed by its advantages. The Joint Chiefs of Staff indi­
vidually and collectively recommended ratification, though somewhat 
ambiguously. They concluded that while there were military disad­
vantages to the Treaty, they were "not so serious as to render it 
unacceptable."30 Because of its "broader advantages," they felt that 
the Treaty was "compatible with the security interests of the United 
States," and consequently supported its ratification. The Joint Chiefs 
insisted that if the Treaty were ratified, certain safeguards would have 
to be implemented to protect the security interests of the United 
States. 
It transpired that General Curtis LeMay, Chief of Staff of the 
Air Force, probably would have been against the Treaty if it had not 
already been signed. 31 Appearing before the Preparedness Investigat­
ing Subcommittee, General Thomas S. Power, Commander in Chief of 
the United States Strategic Air Command, stated that he did not feel 
that the Treaty was "in the best interest of the United States. "32 In 
somewhat oversimplified form, his position was that the United States 
could only maintain its security through the further development of 
nuclear weapons. 
Edward Teller also opposed the Treaty before both committees.33 
His arguments essentially were that the United States needed to know 
' 
30Hearings: Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, supra note 28, p. 275. 
31Jbid., p. 372. 
32Hearings: Military Aspects and Implications of Nuclear Test Ban 
Proposals and Related Matters, supra note 23, p. 790. 
33Hearings: Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, supra note 28, pp. 417-506, and 
Hearings: Military Aspects and Implications of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals 
and Related Matters, supra note 23, pp. 542-84. 
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more about the effects of nuclear weapons and this information could 
be gained only through atmospheric testing. He also wanted more 
proof tests and more work on the development of a defense against 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. Dr. John Foster, Director of the 
Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Livermore, California, did not go 
quite as far as Dr. Teller, but he concluded that "from purely techni­
cal-military considerations," the Treaty appeared to him to be 
"disadvantageous. "34 
Interestingly, one of the principal witnesses from the Adminis­
tration was Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering, Department of Defense. He had been on the staff of 
the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory from 1952 through 1961,  ulti­
mately serving as Director from 1960 through June of 196 1 .  He was 
also one of the two American scientists who did the basic work in 
Geneva on the system recommended by the Conference of Experts. 
In supporting the Treaty, he was in effect arguing against his former 
colleagues. One might speculate that one of the reasons for this was 
that as the Defense Department's Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering, the position which he then occupied, Dr. Brown had to 
face daily choices of trying to assess value in making decisions on 
expenditures for military purposes. In such a role, taking the position 
that cost did not matter when national defense was at stake, as many 
Livermore scientists were prone to, was simply not feasible. Dr. 
Norris E. Bradbury, Director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 
the other center for nuclear weapons development in the United 
States, speaking for himself and for the majority of his staff, also 
supported the Treaty.35 He acknowledged that it had risks, but felt 
that they could be minimized through a vigorous program of under­
ground testing. Throughout the negotiations the scientists at Los 
Alamos had generally been more sympathetic toward efforts to achieve 
a nuclear test ban than their counterparts at Livermore. 
Among those who had been associated with the test ban nego­
tiating over the years, Harold E. Stassen and Arthur H. Dean, John 
J. McCloy, Hans Bethe, and Dr. Herbert York, the first director of 
the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory and Director of Defense Re­
search and Engineering in the Eisenhower Administration, Professors 
34Hearings: Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, supra note 28, p. 6 1 6. 
35fbid., p. 583. 
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I. I. Rabi, Linus C. Pauling, and Edward M. Purcel supported the 
Treaty. Dr. Willard F. Libby and Dr. George B.  Kistiakowsky did 
also, though somewhat less enthusiastically. 
Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, although he did not oppose the 
Treaty, gave essentially negative testimony. Former members of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admirals Burke and Radford and General 
Twining, went somewhat further and expressed grave misgivings 
about the treaty. 
Former President Eisenhower ultimately gave the Treaty a 
qualified endorsement. 36 He said that his recommendation that the 
Treaty should be ratified was conditional upon the safeguards recom­
mended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff being implemented. He also 
suggested that a reservation might be added to the Treaty specifying 
"that in the event of any armed aggression endangering a vital interest 
of the United States this Nation would be the sole judge of the kind 
and type of weaponry and equipment it would employ, as well as the 
timing of their use." Later, he said that he did not have in mind a 
formal reservation. 
In the course of their testimony Administration officials, who 
included Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, 
and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Seaborg, empha­
sized that the Treaty did not affect the use of nuclear weapons during 
war. They also emphasized that the Administration intended to do 
all that it could to maintain American readiness, including increasing 
the underground testing program. As if to underscore this point, on 
the day that the hearings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela­
tions opened, the Atomic Energy Commission detonated a nuclear 
device with intermediate yield underground in Nevada. Administration 
officials also declared that in their view the Treaty would not inter­
fere with the development of a NATO Multilateral Force. Finally, 
Secretary of State Rusk asserted that, in the event of a Soviet abroga­
tion of the Treaty, the United States would not feel itself bound by 
the Treaty and would feel free to resume testing whether or not it had 
complied with the withdrawal provision.a7 
On September 3, 1 963, the Committee on Foreign Relations 
filed its report on the Moscow Treaty. By a vote of 1 6  to 1 ,  the 
36fbid., pp. 846-48. 
31fbid., p. 37. 
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Committee recommended that the Senate give its advice and consent 
to ratification. The lone dissenter was Senator Russell B. Long, of 
Louisiana. 
Six days later, the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee filed 
its report. Although this committee did not make a recommendation, 
it concluded that the Treaty would "result in serious, and perhaps 
formidable, military and technical disadvantages. "38 It also concluded 
that it was not convinced that comparable military disadvantages 
would accrue to the USSR. Senator Symington signed the report, al­
though in a separate statement he said that he would vote for the 
Treaty, because of its other advantages. Senator Saltonstall filed a 
dissenting statement in which he said that he felt that the conclusions 
drawn were "overly adverse."39 The other five members of the Sub­
committee presumably approved the report without reservation. 
Floor debate in the Senate opened on September 9, 1963. On 
September 1 1 ,  President Kennedy sent a letter to Senators Mansfield 
and Dirksen, the majority and minority leaders respectively, giving 
them several "unqualified and unequivocal assurances."40 These were 
( 1 )  that the underground testing program would be "vigorously and 
diligently carried forward";  (2) that the United States would maintain 
its readiness to test in the prohibited environments, and that it would 
"resume atmospheric testing 'forthwith' if the Soviet Union violated 
the treaty" ; ( 3 )  that the United States facilities to detect nuclear 
weapons tests "will be expanded and improved as required" ; ( 4) that 
the Treaty in no way limited the "authority of the Commander-in­
Chief to use nuclear weapons for the defense of the United States or 
its allies"; ( 5 )  that if the Island of Cuba should be used to circum­
vent or nullify the Treaty, the United States would take all necessary 
action in response; ( 6) that the Treaty in no way changed the status 
of East Germany; (7) that the government would "maintain strong 
weapons laboratories in a vigorous program of weapons develop­
ment," and that it would "maintain strategic forces fully ensuring that 
this Nation will continue to be in a position to destroy any aggressor, 
even after absorbing a first strike by a surprise attack";  and ( 8)  the 
asu.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness 
Investigating Subcommittee, Interim Report on the Military Implications of 
the Proposed Limited Nuclear Test Ban ( 1 963 ) ,  p. 1 1 .  
39Jbid., p .  14. 
40Congressional Record, Vol. CIX, Part 12, pp. 1 6790-9 1 .  
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United States would continue to pursue the development of nuclear 
explosives for peaceful purposes underground, and when develop­
ments made possible constructive uses for peaceful shots in the atmos­
phere, the United States would seek international agreements to permit 
this. The President also gave assurances that any amendments to the 
Treaty would be submitted to the Senate for its approval. 
Again, as if to underline the President's assurances; on Septem­
ber 1 3, the Atomic Energy Commission detonated two. underground 
explosions in Nevada. One of these was reported to have a yield 
equivalent to 1 megaton. 
President Kennedy intervened in the Senatorial debate in other 
ways too.40" He was concerned that a sufficient number of Southern 
Democrats might join with Republicans and prevent the necessary 
two-thirds majority. He wanted a large majority, and he wanted to 
ward off possible formal reservations. He spoke individually with key 
Senators. He encouraged the creation of a private "Citizens Com­
mittee for a Nuclear Test Ban," a group of leaders from both parties 
organized to gain support for the Treaty. He "advised them which 
Senators should hear from their constituents, . . . counseled them on 
their approach to the unconvinced, and suggested particular business 
and other leaders for them to contact. "40b Kennedy felt so strongly 
that he remarked to his associates on one occasion "that he would 
gladly forfeit his re-election, if necessary, for the sake of the Test Ban 
Treaty. "40c 
On September 24, the Senate, by a vote of 80 to 19 gave its 
advice and consent to ratification of the Moscow Treaty. According 
to Theodore C.  Sorenson, President Kennedy called the vote " 'a 
welcome culmination.' No other single accomplishment in the White 
House ever gave him greater satisfaction."40d The 19 who voted 
against the treaty included 1 1  Democrats and 8 Republicans.41  
The list included Senator Goldwater, who would become the Re-
40aSee Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 737-40. 
40bfbid., p. 739. 
40cfbid., p. 745. 
40d[bid., p. 740. 
4lThey were Senators: Bennett (Utah) , H. F. Byrd (Va. ) ,  R. C. Byrd 
(W. Va. ) ,  Curtis (Neb. ) ,  Eastland (Miss.), Goldwater (Ariz. ) ,  Jordan 
(Idaho) ,  Lausche (Ohio) ,  Long (La. ),  McClellan (Ark. ) ,  Mechem (N.M. ) ,  
Robertson (Va.), Russell (Ga. ) ,  Simpson (Wyo. ) ,  Smith (Me. ) ,  Stennis 
(Miss. ) ,  Talmadge (Ga. ) ,  Thurmond (S.C. ) ,  and Tower (Tex. ) .  
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publican presidential nominee in 1964. Four of the 1 9  were members 
of the 7-man Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, and 2 more 
were members of the parent Committee on Armed Services. The 19 
included 1 member of  the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and 2 
members of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Senator Lausche, in 
keeping with his maverick style, voted against the Treaty, even though 
as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations he had voted 
for the report recommending that the Senate give its advice and 
consent to ratification. Of the 19, all but 4 (Senators Byrd [W.Va.], 
Curtis [Neb.], Lausche [Ohio], and Smith [Me.]) were from the con­
servative strongholds of their parties in Southern or Western states. 
Some of the Senators who voted for the Treaty-most notably Sena­
tor Jackson, another member of the Preparedness Investigating Sub­
committee-indicated that they did so reluctantly and with some 
misgivings. 
President Kennedy signed the Moscow Treaty on October 7,  
completing the United States ratification. The Presidium of the Su­
preme Soviet unanimously voted to ratify the Treaty for the USSR on 
September 25, the day after the Senate completed its action. The 
Treaty formally entered into effect at 1 : 00 p.m. on October 1 1 ,  1 963. 
That same day, it was announced in Oslo that the Nobel Peace Prize 
for 1 962 had been awarded to Linus C. Pauling. Among American 
scientists, he had clearly been the most outspoken critic of nuclear 
testing. 
"Nth" and Potential "Nth Countries" 
While the nuclear powers were completing their ratification, 
more than 100 other countries signed the Moscow Treaty. By the end 
of the year this total, so far as those states which signed or acceded 
to the Treaty in Washington, D.C., were concerned, rose to 1 16. 
There were, however, certain notable exceptions. The day after the 
Treaty was initialed in Moscow, a leading Chinese Communist official 
flatly asserted that China would have nuclear weapons in the not-too­
distant future, and he condemned the efforts of a small number of 
nuclear powers to restrict nuclear capabilities. 42 As the days wore on, 
Chinese denunciation of the Moscow Treaty increased. Of course it 
did not sign, and on October 16, 1964, Communist China detonated 
42New York Times, July 27, 1964, p. 1 .  
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its first nuclear explosion, in the atmosphere. Both Albania, China's 
ally in the ideological struggle within the Soviet camp, and Cuba also 
refused to sign the Treaty. 
President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan made a 
personal appeal to President de Gaulle for France's adherence. They 
even offered some assistance with the development of the French 
nuclear weapons program as an inducement. President Kennedy was 
prepared to declare that France had achieved a nuclear capability 
within the meaning of the 1958 amendment of the Atomic Energy 
Act, thereby rendering it eligible for the same assistance that the 
United Kingdom received from the United States.42a However, at 
a news conference on July 29, President de Gaulle definitely ruled out 
the possibility that France would sign, restating the position that 
France had maintained during the negotiations. 
The Eighteenth General Assembly 
When the eighteenth session of the General Assembly opened 
in September 1963, the Moscow Treaty was widely welcomed. How­
ever, there was also a fairly general feeling that it should be extended 
to cover all environments, which, according to the preamble to the 
Treaty, was the objective of the three nuclear powers too. The eight 
new members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee 
wanted the Assembly to adopt a resolution which would pledge the 
Committee to continue to seek an accord banning all nuclear tests 
with adequate provision for inspection. Both the USSR and the 
United States balked at such specific instructions and would agree to 
no more than a paragraph instructing the Committee to continue its 
efforts "to achieve the objectives set forth in the preamble of the 
partial test ban treaty."43 Both the USSR and the United States ap­
parently wanted to avoid reopening the controversial question of 
monitoring a ban on underground tests, and the USSR gave no indica­
tion that it was willing to renew its offer of a limited number of on-site 
inspections on Soviet territory annually.44 Only Albania opposed the 
resolution, which the Assembly adopted in November, and which was 
tailored to the nuclear powers' specifications. 
42aArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 9 14, and Theodore 
C. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 573. 
43General Assembly Resolution 1910 (XVIII) .  
44See New York Times, October 24, 1 962, p. 1 ;  October 29, 1962, p .  1 .  
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Since then there have been no serious negotiations on a ban on 
underground tests. It may well be accurate to say, as Jerome B. 
Wiesner has said, that political and military conservatism on the part 
of both sides prevented the achievement of a comprehensive test 
ban. 45 Important groups within the Soviet Union appear to have been 
most reluctant to agree to a treaty which would involve lifting the 
USSR's veil of secrecy beyond the most miniscule amount. Important 
groups within the United States, on the other hand, were unwilling 
to agree to a treaty which might involve significant risks of the 
Soviet Union's being able to engage in clandestine testing. Some of 
these same individuals were also strongly desirous, for a variety of 
reasons, of being able to continue testing nuclear weapons. The 
leaders in both camps, Chairman Khrushchev and President Ken­
nedy, both appear to have been willing to go farther than several 
other policy-makers within their respective countries. But achieving 
an international agreement in an age of mass and bureaucratic gov­
ernment requires a broader coalescence of forces than agreement 
merely between two heads of state. There was this broader coales­
cence for a partial test ban treaty, but not for a comprehensive one. 
45Jerome B. Wiesner, Where Science and Politics Meet, pp. 1 67-68. 
PART IV 
SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Chapter XN 
The Test Ban Negotiations and Treaty 
in Retrospect 
I 
Introduction 
Did the signature of the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon 
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water mark a 
turning point in the nuclear era? Obviously it is too early to answer 
this question. Only in the future will it be possible accurately to 
assess the significance of the Moscow Treaty. Unfortunately though, 
except for the purposes of historical analysis, it is impossible to wait 
to make judgments. To act rationally in formulating policy the out­
come of each step must be scrutinized with care and analyzed before 
a choice is made among the possible courses for the next move. An 
assessment must be made, however tentative it may be and subject 
to reevaluation. Similarly, although a single case study is hardly an 
adequate basis for formulating answers to the questions raised in the 
introductory chapter concerning the processes by which United 
States security policy was formulated and executed, the nature of 
these policies, and the characteristics and modalities of the con­
temporary international system, these too demand immediate answers. 
Fortunately, the nuclear test ban negotiations probably provide 
as good a basis for generalizations as any single set of diplomatic 
talks that have occurred since the end of the Second World War. 
The nuclear test ban talks involved, in one way or another, most of 
the actors in the contemporary international system, and the most 
important states-the super-powers-were deeply engaged. There 
were significant differences among the political systems of the three 
states principally involved. The negotiations covered a long time 
period. During this period, the distribution of military power in the 
international system shifted. Again as a result of their length, the 
469 
470 DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS 
negotations spanned two administrations within the United States. 
Among other things, the change in administrations brought changes 
in personnel, in administrative organization and procedures, and in 
presidential-legislative relationships. The nuclear test ban negotiations 
were conducted in a variety of forums, ranging from bilateral talks, 
through a tripartite conference and a larger committee, to the general 
international organization with the broadest membership, the United 
Nations. In several respects, therefore, the negotiations offer the 
opportunity of comparative analysis. And as an unique series of 
events, because of their importance, the negotiations had sufficient 
salience to permit at least some conclusions to be drawn. 
II 
The Formulation and Execution of American 
Security Policy 
With respect to the formulation and execution of American security 
policy, analysis of the test ban negotiations yields not so much new 
insights as confirmation and refinement of the consensus-building 
model. The circle of participants in the consensus-building process 
widened or narrowed depending upon issues and circumstances. In 
most instances during the course of the negotiations decisions concern­
ing what American policy should be, or how it should be executed, 
could be made by the executive branch acting alone. Since the end 
product of the negotiations was envisaged as being an international 
treaty, however, the Senate always had a potential role; and, because 
certain inspection procedures could have required modifications in 
American legislation concerning atomic energy, the House of Repre­
sentatives also had such a role. 
Except for a few brief periods, such as when the USSR abro­
gated the moratorium on nuclear testing or immediately before and 
after the signature of the Moscow Treaty, the test ban negotiations 
elicited little public interest. Certain segments of the public, how­
ever, followed the negotiations very carefully and were deeply and 
often emotionally interested. These groups included large numbers of 
scientists. Those scientists who worked on weapons development 
obviously had a direct professional interest. Other scientists were 
involved through their feeling of personal or collective responsibility 
for the consequences of the development of nuclear weapons. Among 
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the lay public, attentiveness was largely confined to those especially 
concerned about peace on the one hand and the United States mil­
itary posture on the other. Members of SANE and the Women's 
Strike for Peace provide examples of the former; members of vet­
erans' organizations the latter. Given the nature of the issues and 
the limited extent of Congressional involvement, the interested mem­
bers of the public had few means at their disposal, other than pub­
licity, to give effect to their views. 
Consensus-Building in the Eisenhower Administration 
In these circumstances the process of consensus-building was 
more often than not confined to the executive branch. This did not 
necessarily make the process smoother or easier. The Eisenhower 
Administration was deeply divided on several questions relating to 
the nuclear test ban negotiations, including even the wisdom of at­
tempting to negotiate on this issue. President Eisenhower himself 
saw little advantage from the viewpoint of American security policy 
in a test ban as such, and-responding to the advice of the Atomic 
Energy Commission-he was not convinced of the great danger of 
the radioactive fallout that would result from continued testing. 
Fundamentally, he was doubtful that when the chips were down the 
Soviet Union would agree to a treaty acceptable to the United States, 
or that a treaty, even if agreed upon, would be followed by a 
substantial slowdown in the arms race. Although it entails great 
oversimplification and some distortion of their detailed positions, the 
various interested agencies in the Eisenhower Administration can be 
ranked along a continuum.1 The Atomic Energy Commission, which 
had the greatest doubts about the wisdom of a nuclear test ban, 
would be at one extreme. The Department of Defense would be 
next to the AEC. It tended to be somewhat more favorably inclined 
toward a test ban than the Commission. Next, in a center, although 
slightly positive position, would be the Central Intelligence Agency. 
The Department of State would come next, and then the President's 
Science Advisory Committee, at the opposite extreme from the AEC. 
Both on balance were favorably inclined toward a nuclear test ban. 
As a consequence of these divisions, when policy was made by 
1Compare this ranking with that given by Sir Michael Wright, Disarm 
and Verify, p. 1 20. 
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committee, as it usually was, the result tended to be a compromise 
which straddled the issues and occassionally contained contradictory 
elements. The position which the United States adopted at the outset 
of the political negotiations in the fall of 1958 is an example. The 
United States was willing to agree to a nuclear test ban, but it in­
sisted that after a specified period, the continuance in force of the 
ban would be dependent upon satisfactory progress being made in 
other areas of arms control and disarmament. This "link" with other 
measures of arms control and disarmament was eventually dropped, 
but it was dropped only at the time when the "new seismic data" 
had raised serious obstacles to achieving a nuclear test ban. Thus one 
set of obstacles replaced another. The American insistence on tech­
nical conferences in 1 959 can be seen as a neutral policy, acceptable 
both to those who were enamored with the prospects of obtaining a 
nuclear test ban and to those who seriously doubted the wisdom of 
such a measure. When the United States did hint at the possibility of 
a partial ban in 1 959 as a first step toward a comprehensive ban, it 
failed to specify in detail what control measures it would demand, but 
in any case made it clear that they would be fairly extensive. Yet a 
year earlier Senator Gore had stated that an atmospheric ban could 
be policed by control instruments under the unilateral control of the 
United States, and this is what the United States eventually proposed 
in 1961 ,  and in 1 962, and it is what was finally accepted in 1 963. 
In addition, under the Eisenhower Administration largely be­
cause of the deep divisions of opinion, decisions were taken at an 
extremely slow pace. Countless examples can be recalled. To cite 
only one, although Technical Working Group I accepted virtually 
all of the American proposals, a month and a half elapsed before 
the American Ambassador could even accept "the report as a correct 
technical assessment . . . in the light of presently available scientific 
knowledge. "2 It was not until after the Kennedy Administration had 
assumed power that the United States would finally submit treaty 
language based on the report. 
Under the Eisenhower Administration, consensus-building also 
tended to exercise a gyroscopic effect on policy. In the period from 
1958 through 1 960, once negotiations were underway, it proved 
2QEN/DNT/PV. 1 27, p. 4. 
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almost impossible for the United States to break them off, or to 
radically alter their course. 
This is not to imply that all of the agencies which participated 
in these decisions did not have vital interest in them and an im­
portant contribution to make, nor that American policy necessarily 
would have been better had it been formulated exclusively by one 
agency. At least one major decision during this period was not 
made within an elaborate committee structure. This was the proposal 
for a conference of experts. In this instance President Eisenhower 
acted solely on the advice of Secretary of State Dulles. This meant 
that the participants in the decision were confined to the White 
House Staff and the Secretary of State with a few of his advisors. 
This decision has been and can be criticized. In proposing a con­
ference of experts, the United States committed itself to a course of 
action with potentially far-reaching consequences without having 
fully explored the consequences and without having formulated ap­
propriate and adequate contingency policies. Of course, proposing a 
conference of experts solved certain immediate tactical problems, 
and provided a needed response to a Soviet initiative. Two questions, 
however, can be raised. The first is whether or not the short-range 
gains outweighed the longer-range difficulties. The second is whether 
or not the short-range gains could not have been obtained without 
also incurring the longer-range difficulties. 
The Advent of the Kennedy Administration 
From 1961  on decisions within the executive branch concerning 
a nuclear test ban flowed more rapidly and smoothly.3 This was 
partly because different personnel headed the relevent agencies, and 
the new men held more homogeneous views concerning the wisdom 
of a nuclear test ban. However, the change in administrations did not 
bring a complete change in personnel. Allen W. Dulles continued to 
serve as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency until September 
27, 1961,  when he was replaced by John A. McCone. Mr. McCone 
had also been a member of the Committee of Principals during the 
Eisenhower Administration, in which he had served as Chairman of 
the Atomic Energy Commission. Moreover, the extent to which 
3See Sir Michael Wright, Disarm and Verify, pp. 1 2 1 ,  127. 
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prinicipal officers are bound to the collective viewpoints of their 
agencies should not be underestimated. 
A second factor explaining the smoother flow of decisions after 
the advent of the Kennedy Administration was that the institutional 
balance was altered. In September 196 1 ,  the United States Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency was established. The Director of 
ACDA immediately became a member of the Committee of Prin­
cipals, and even before ACDA was established, President Kennedy's 
adviser on disarmament, John J. McCloy, met with the Committee. 
Thus, starting in 1961 the balance on the Committee of Principals 
was altered by the addition of an individual more or less institution­
ally committed to advocate measures of arms control and disarma­
ment. The creation of ACDA also meant that many more resources 
within government were devoted to analyzing issues of atms control. 
Positions could be explored more thoroughly before being advocated 
and the analyses would be done from the point of view of trying to 
achieve agreements. Furthermore, there were many more people 
available for consensus-building efforts. Unlike the State Department 
in the past, ACDA had its own scientific advisers. 
On balance, however, the fact that the quest for a test ban was 
approached with a new intensity and drive in the Kennedy Adminis­
tration seems to have been more important than the institutional 
changes. The advent of a new Administration brought the appoint­
ment of a new principal negotiator in Geneva, Arthur Dean. Al­
though his predecessor held a strong personal conviction of the de­
sirability of a test ban and was an experienced and skillful negotiator, 
it is demonstrable that Ambassador Dean made a greater effort to 
understand the technical issues involved in the negotiations, devoted 
more energy toward trying to stimulate new policies, and at least 
partially as a consequence was more actively involved in the formu­
lation of American policy. More importantly, President Kennedy 
himself seems to have devoted more attention and energy to this issue 
than President Eisenhower. President Kennedy appears to have been 
more interested in achieving a nuclear test ban that President Eisen­
hower was. He certainly was more willing to take risks, in terms of 
both domestic and international politics, to gain such an agreement 
than President Eisenhower. This was in large measure a reflection of 
President Kennedy's general policy of seeking to engage the Soviet 
Union in a continuing realistic dialogue designed primarily to clarify 
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positions and remove misunderstandings and also to explore avenues 
toward possible agreements. The test ban negotiations offered an 
obvious opportunity in this respect. President Kennedy also made a 
greater effort to understand the technical intricacies involved in the 
test ban negotiations. Jerome B. Wiesner, the President's science ad­
viser, has written that President Kennedy "made himself an expert 
on these subjects."4 It was only by becoming an expert that he could 
successfully cope with the expert advice which he received. President 
Kennedy gave his Administration a greater sense of direction on this 
issue, and his Administration responded with a more forthcoming 
process of decision-making. 
It was only after President Kennedy assumed office that the 
United States tabled an entire draft treaty for a nuclear test ban. 
Such a draft had been in existence for some time, but it had been 
impossible to obtain agreement among the relevant interested agencies 
to table it, and President Eisenhower had not insisted that agreement 
be achieved. It was only during the Kennedy Administration that the 
United States submitted alternative draft treaties. All of these steps 
were at least partly attributable to the President's leadership. Without 
this leadership, a test ban might never had been achieved. In a 
decision-making structure as decentralized as that of the American 
government, Presidential leadership is necessary for action to be taken. 
The Contribution of Congress 
Much has been written about the decline of the legislative 
branch of government in the modern era. On the surface the test ban 
negotiations might be viewed as another case supporting this general 
thesis. Yet full examination reveals that Congress played an im­
portant role in the shaping of United States policy. 
In the first place, the record indicates that Congress had ample 
opportunity to obtain information relevant to the test ban negotia­
tions. Congressional hearings produced a wealth of technical and 
political data. It is true that different Congressional committees 
tended to develop different kinds of data. The Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy tended to rely mainly for its information on the 
Atomic Energy Commission and sources provided or sponsored by 
that agency. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and its 
4Jerome B. Wiesner, Where Science and Politics Meet, p. 1 1 . 
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Subcommittee on Disarmament, on the other hand, · tended to rely 
mainly on the Department of State and later on the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency. Partly as a consequence, the policy posi­
tions of the two committees tended to reflect the differences between 
the executive agencies. However, any individual Congressman, if he 
had the inclination and the time, could read the records of both 
committees. Moreover, some Congressmen, notably Senator Albert 
Gore and Bourke B. Hickenlooper, served on both committees, thus 
providing a bridge and an element of continuity. These two men also 
served as Congressional advisers to the American delegation in 
Geneva and were able to gain additional data through this means. 
In sum, so far as obtaining data, Congress was not at a serious dis­
advantage in relation to the executive branch. It could not engage 
in research itself, it is true, but almost all of the governmental experts 
and all of the private experts within the United States were available 
to it. Careful staff work on the part of the staffs of the committees 
made it possible to utilize the expertise rationally and wisely. The 
only group of experts within the administrative branch not available 
to Congressional committees were those within the Executive Office 
of the White House, namely the Special Assistant to the President 
for Science and Technology and his immediate staff. In this in­
stance, the inability to question these individuals does not appear to 
have been a serious obstacle to obtaining relevant information. In 
broad terms, Congress appears to have been as well informed as the 
executive branch was on this issue. 
In the formal or procedural sense, the initiative in formulating 
policy, of course, always rested with the executive. However, Congress 
and Congressmen were able to influence in important ways the man­
ner and purposes for which the executive branch utilized its powers. 
At the very outset, the hearings of Senator Humphrey's Subcom­
mittee on Disarmament clearly contributed to the pressure on the 
executive to separate the test ban issue from other measures of dis­
armament and to enter negotiations on this issue alone. On the other 
hand, during the course of the next several years the frequent hear­
ings of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy kept before the 
public the difficulty of controlling underground nuclear explosions 
and no doubt this inhibited the executive's freedom. Whether or not 
the executive branch would have followed a more flexible policy 
had it not been for this is naturally an unanswerable question. At 
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least prior to 1961  it probably would not have; however, even if the 
executive had wanted to make concessions, it would have found it 
difficult to do so in view of the activities of the Committee. Indeed 
there can be serious doubt that the Senate would have ratified the 
comprehensive treaty which the United States proposed in 1962 and 
1963 had the USSR accepted it. 
In October 1 959, Senator Humphrey suggested in a public 
speech, that the United States should propose that a partial ban 
should be accompanied by a moratorium of limited duration on test­
ing in those environments where control techniques were not at the 
moment adequate, the hope being that by the end of the moratorium 
adequate control measures would have been discovered so that the 
ban could be extended to cover all environments. The following 
spring the United States made such a proposal. 
Toward the end of the negotiations, the resolution sponsored 
by Senator Dodd and others and adopted by the Senate clearly 
strengthened President Kennedy's hand. Although the content of the 
President's American University speech might have been the same 
even without this resolution, clearly it was easier for him to an­
nounce that the United States would forego further testing of nuclear 
weapons in the atmosphere after the Senate had recommended that 
this country should take such action. 
The test ban negotiations also indicate the limits of Congres­
sional influence on the formulation of policy by the executive. As 
early as November 1 958, Senator Albert Gore proposed that the 
United States should abandon the attempt to negotiate a compre­
hensive ban on nuclear weapons tests and concentrate its efforts on 
attempting to achieve a partial ban. Several other Congressmen 
repeated this suggestion in the following years. Despite this, it was 
not until August 1 962 that the United States seriously proposed a 
partial treaty; and as late as the Moscow talks in July 1 963, Ameri­
can negotiators were still instructed to give priority to a compre­
hensive ban. But even here, Congressmen can be said to have shaped 
the environment in which a partial ban became the most feasible 
outcome. 
Science and Security Policy 
Implicit in the foregoing discussion of the formulation of United 
States policy is the assumption that judgments on scientific issues 
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played a crucial role. It is self-evident that any rational decision on 
the wisdom of attempting to negotiate a nuclear test ban would 
postulate in the first place some judgment about the danger to human 
life resulting from the fallout and other by-products of past and 
continued testing of nuclear weapons both with respect to immediate 
and long-range genetic effects, if any. Again, one would have to 
form some estimate of the gains that could be achieved in weapons 
technology through further testing, and of the gains that could be 
made without testing. Finally, one would have to assess the tech­
nological feasibility of establishing control measures to insure the 
observance of a test ban. Each of these is almost a purely scientific 
question. 
In addition, there are several questions which, although not as 
purely scientific, involve, in varying degrees, important scientific 
elements. One would want to have an estimate of the types and 
qualities of nuclear weapons presently held by other states and a 
sense of how these compared with one's own nuclear arsenal. One 
would also want to have some sense of the possibilities of the dis­
persion of nuclear weapons capabilities among the presently non­
nuclear countries and of the consequences of this. It would finally 
be necessary to make judgments about the role of nuclear weapons 
in military strategy in the light of all the available knowledge of their 
effects. 
Finally, there are essentially nonscientific questions containing 
nevertheless a limited scientific component. Thus a decision-maker 
would want to make some estimate about the likelihood of the op­
ponent state violating the treaty. In part this would involve the 
scientific issue of the risk of detection through available technical 
devices that a potential violator would have to face. But it would 
also involve a perhaps more important judgment concerning the 
general attitude and willingness of the potential violator to run such 
a risk. Again a decision-maker would also have to have some notions 
about the dangers arising from the nuclear arms race, such as the 
possibility of war by accident, which would have to reflect, among 
other things, an evaluation of the technical safeguards. Finally, he 
would have to make an estimate of what kind of treaty the Senate, 
the American people, and other states would be likely to accept. 
While this would call for an exercise of political judgment, the 
scientific component is readily identifiable. 
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To take a position on a nuclear test ban, any policy-maker 
would have to deal in some fashion with all of these questions. He 
could of course choose to ignore one or more of them, but even 
that would be dealing with them. Moreover, a policy-maker's task 
is complicated by the fact that many of these questions involve 
issues concerning which there is great scientific uncertainty. It is 
highly unlikely that any given forecast of future scientific develop­
ments would prove to be completely accurate. Nor are the first answers 
formulated in any scientific inquiry always the best, and many tech­
nical questions were raised in the test ban negotiations for the first 
time. Again, the scientific element is often so closely intertwined 
with nonscientific factors that it would require great restraint and 
discipline to limit a judgment to the scientific element. Concerning 
all such questions a scientist can give a wide range of answers without 
violating his scientific integrity. The answer that a scientist gives will 
depend partly upon his personal preferences and predilections, in­
cluding his concept of international relations and his political 
orientation, and on his experience and maturity. It will also depend 
on the way in which the question is phrased and asked and the 
form and type of answer permitted. 
Scientists as Policy Advisers 
In a theoretical model of rational decision-making, it might be 
desirable for the decision-maker to permit each of his advisers to 
speak only on matters affecting his special area of expertise. In such 
a scheme scientists would confine their observations to scientific ques­
tions, economists to economic questions, lawyers to legal questions, 
military experts to military questions, and political experts to political 
questions. 
There is a great deal to be said for keeping this model as an 
ideal goal that participants in the American system ought to strive 
to approximate. Much has been written demonstrating what poor 
advisers specialists are when they stray beyond their areas of special 
competence, and Albert Wohlstetter has persuasively demonstrated 
the weaknesses of some scientists when they have ventured into the 
realm of military strategy. 5 Clearly certain scientists such as Linus 
Pauling and Edward Teller blatantly violated the precepts of this 
5See "Strategy and the Natural Scientists," pp. 1 74-239 in Robert Gilpin 
and Christopher Wright (eds. ) ,  Scientists and National Policy-Making ( 1964) .  
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ideal model in their public comments on the nuclear test ban issue. 
To say that the risk from radioactive fallout caused by continued 
testing in the atmosphere was intolerable or could be ignored, or to 
maintain that the control system devised by the Geneva Conference 
of Experts was adequate or inadequate, implicitly involved judgments 
on a number of issues, some of which were not at all scientific in 
character. On the other hand, other scientists, Wolfgang K. H. 
Panofsky, for example, phrased their pronouncements very care­
fully, distinguishing as well as they could between the scientific and 
nonscientific elements which were involved. 
It is difficult to estimate with any degree of accuracy the effect 
in this instance of the tendency of scientists like Linus Pauling and 
Edward Teller to stray beyond the areas of their expertise. Probably 
public and perhaps even official understanding would have been 
easier had these individuals distinguished more clearly between their 
role as scientists and their role as citizens. Unquestionably, the 
policy-maker had to scrutinize their scientific advice and judgments 
with greater care, and their standing in this respect was impaired. 
However, to ask them to refrain from speaking freely on any issue 
risks robbing the American system of one of its most dynamic ele­
ments. These men played important roles in the test ban negotiations 
because they had deep convictions extending far beyond their scien­
tific expertise. There is little question that they contributed to the 
motive force without which policy might have atrophied on dead 
center. Moreover, the admixture of nonscientific elements in the 
pronouncements of individuals such as Teller and Pauling was often 
so obvious that its discovery was not a task of inordinate intellectual 
difficulty. Admittedly, there has been a tendency in American society 
to transfer authority earned in one field to other fields ; but if this is 
a problem, a better corrective might be to strive to develop greater 
official understanding and more sophisticated public attitudes, than 
to harness the scientists. 
In the nuclear test ban negotiations the subtle mixing of scien­
tific and nonscientific elements in judgments offered by scientists 
was much more bothersome than the blatant mixing mentioned 
above. As has been shown, when a scientist was asked to give advice 
on certain seemingly scientific questions, his personal, nonscientific 
views almost inevitably intruded. In these instances, it could be 
extremely difficult for the nonscientist decision-maker to detect the 
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nonscientific elements implicitly interwoven into the answer. How 
could the decision-maker know whether his scientist adviser had 
been, within the range of scientific uncertainty, excessively optimistic 
or excessively pessimistic? The problem was complicated by the fact 
that, despite their uncertainty, the scientists could answer questions 
in quantitative terms, which could give a misleading impression of 
precision. 
In retrospect, it would seem that the scientists advising the 
President and the Secretary of State prior to and during the time 
of the Conference of Experts may well have allowed their hopes for 
a more orderly international political system to interfere with their 
giving as properly qualified technical answers concerning control 
possibilities as they should have on the basis of the scientific evidence 
then available to them. 
At the same time, the scientists did not have an unlimited op­
portunity to present their views. Issues concerning a nuclear test ban 
were only a few of countless numbers facing top decision-makers. 
The amount of attention that the decision-makers could devote to 
any individual issue was inevitably limited. Furthermore, even con­
cerning a nuclear test ban, there were several technical issues which 
had to be considered. In this case, a second factor explaining why 
the principal decision-makers perhaps did not understand the tech­
nical complexities relating to the control of nuclear explosions as 
fully as they might have during most of 1958 is simply that they did 
not spend enough time on these issues. Within the limited amount of 
time that they could spend considering what position the United 
States should adopt with respect to a nuclear test ban, most of their 
attention-perhaps rightly-was devoted to considering issues other 
than control. They were particularly concerned about comparing 
American and Soviet nuclear strength and about the possibilities for 
future developments in the realm of weapons technology. The point 
is not to question the allocation of their attention, for these may 
well have been the most important questions, but merely to point 
out that little time was left for considering the technical aspects of 
control. 
The Need for "Scientific Literacy" Among Nonscientists 
A final, more subtle, factor also seems to have been involved in 
the communications difficulties which were apparent in American 
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policy-making during the earliest stages of the negotiations. To un­
derstand fully what a scientist means when he says, "On the basis of 
one experiment, we think that . . .  ," one must have some notions 
about the way in which science progresses from initial tentative 
estimates to more fully documented and more definitive judgments. 
Similarly, if one is to understand all of the ramifications of the 
scientists' report that the seismic magnitude of the Rainier explosion 
appears to be 4. 1 on the Richter scale rather than 4.25 as had pre­
viously been thought, one must know something about how many 
more earthquakes there are at the smaller seismic magnitude. It 
would also be helpful to know something about the way in which 
these figures are calculated, and that measurements in this area of 
the Richter scale are usually given with the understanding that the 
margin of enor may be plus or minus .4. 
Understandably, the individuals who were the principal decision­
makers in the United States during the earliest stages of the negotia­
tions seem to have known little about modern science. They had 
received their education prior to the First World War, and thus prior 
to the great expansion in scientific activity which has occurred after 
that time. During most of their earlier careers both President Eisen­
hower and Secretary of State Dulles had not been deeply involved 
in science. Their background for fully comprehending scientific ad­
vice was not especially strong. Of course, one could use intelligent 
questioning to make up for an inadequate background. Often, how­
ever, the ability to ask intelligent questions is dependent upon having 
at least a minimal background. Moreover, questioning takes time, 
which was in extremely short supply in this instance, and probably 
will be in similar cases. 
Thus it is clear that the first prerequisite to adequately coping 
with the problems posed by the growth of the role of science in 
security policy is the development of more "scientific literacy" 
among policy-makers, both politicians and diplomats. Only then 
will the nonscientists be able to make the best use of their scientist 
colleagues. In this connection, it should be noted that at least some 
of the scientists found the higher level policy-makers more willing 
to be concerned with and to make an effort to understand the tech­
nical details which were involved in the nuclear test ban negotiations 
than the professional diplomats, members of the Foreign Service. 
These scientists felt that many of the latter group tended to take 
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the attitude that what was important was the technique of negotiation, 
that a personal knowledge of the substance was secondary and might 
in fact be disturbing toward reaching an agreement Obviously, the 
need for "scientific literacy" is as great among the diplomats as it is 
among the politicians. Just as the process of formulating policy can­
not be divided into rigid compartments horizontally, and experts 
confined to their area of expertise, it also cannot be divided vertic­
ally. Improper understanding of technical issues at a lower level may 
be equally as damaging as improper understanding at a higher level; 
among other possibilities it could prevent important questions from 
ever reaching the higher level. 
Scientific Advice at the Highest Levels of American Government 
The experience in the nuclear test ban negotiations suggests 
that for communications between scientists and nonscientist decision­
makers at the highest levels of American government to be as effec­
tive as possible, policy-makers must receive advice from several 
scientists rather than one. This appears to be the most effective 
means of guarding against the tendency for advice on scientific mat­
ters to be colored by personal predispositions. The President's Science 
Advisory Committee, with about twenty members and additional 
scientists who serve as regular consultants, can adequately meet the 
need for divergent viewpoints. If the Committee is to meet this need, 
however, it must develop adequate techniques for transmitting di­
vergent views. The President and other top decision-makers must 
also be willing to receive conflicting advice and to assume the 
responsibility for deciding which advice they should accept as bases 
for policy. Ideally the top policy-makers should have the oppor­
tunity to witness in some manner a confrontation between scientists 
who hold divergent views. If a scientist is to remain true to the train­
ing and to the canons of his work, he must acknowledge certain 
facts. The test ban negotiations supply evidence that scientists will 
behave in this manner. Thus Hans Bethe readily acknowledged the 
correctness of Albert Latter's decoupling theory even though it pre­
sented a new obstacle on the road to a test ban agreement which 
Bethe strongly favored in principle. One of the virtues of the Congres­
sional hearings was that they provided forums for confrontation 
among scientists holding divergent viewpoints. Such confrontations, 
by clearly developing the points concerning which the scientists 
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agree and disagree, can significantly clarify the issues and thereby 
ease the policy-makers' problem of choosing among divergent advice. 
There is also another reason why policy-makers at the highest 
level should receive advice from several scientific sources if they are 
to act as rationally as possible. Most problems with which policy­
makers must deal have several facets. Their scientific segments alone 
often involve not one but several academic disciplines. In the light 
of the difficulties concerning the detection of underground nuclear 
explosions which plagued American policy during the test ban nego­
tiations, it may have been significant that there was no seismologist 
on the President's Science Advisory Committee until 1962. The Com­
mittee headed by Hans Bethe which conducted an overall appraisal 
of the situation with respect to the nuclear test ban in early 1 958, 
and on which initial American policies were based, did not include a 
seismologist either. The President's Science Advisory Committee has 
generally been dominated by scientists who specialized in aspects of 
nuclear energy, particularly physicists. It can be argued that PSAC 
might have been a more effective source of advice if its membership 
had included a wider spectrum of disciplines. The counter-argument 
that scientists in all disciplines are employed by the government and 
therefore available to PSAC does not completely meet the problem, 
because having the proper mixture of disciplines is as important in 
the final stages involving evaluation of data and drafting of recom­
mendations as it is in early stages involving data collection. 
Sdentific Expertise Within the Bureaucracy 
Providing advice for policy-makers at the highest level is only 
one aspect of the problem of integrating scientists into the procedures 
for formulating American security policy. Obviously, decisions which 
are taken at a lower level also involve scientific questions. In addi­
tion, frequently scientific and technical research must be conducted 
in order to develop necessary data. An overwhelming number of 
the scientists who have been involved in the formulation of American 
security policy thus far have been employed by the Atomic Energy 
Commission and the Department of Defense. There can be no doubt 
that these two agencies have had the greatest need for scientists. 
However, the experience during the test ban negotiations illustrates 
that other agencies, such as the Department of State, also deal with 
questions which have scientific elements, and it can be argued that 
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American policy would have been better had scientific expertise been 
interspersed more widely throughout .all of the agencies working in 
the area of security policy. It is not sufficient merely to have access 
to scientists in another agency. For one thing, having to go to another 
agency immediately raises all of the physical and psychological 
problems involved in inter-agency coordination. For another, as was 
apparent during the test ban negotiations, there are what can be 
called "agency viewpoints" on policy questions, and the views of 
most individuals are affected more or less strongly by the milieu in 
which they work. Moreover, an individual's tasks and responsibilities 
are bound to be defined in terms of the priorities of the agency for 
which he works. 
It is easy to argue that governmental agencies which have only 
peripheral responsibilities in scientific fields ought to have more 
scientists on their payroll. Unfortunately, implementing this recom­
mendation is extremely difficult. A scientist long in the employ of 
an agency such as the Department of State will soon lose his ex­
pertise. On the other hand, short term service involves considerable 
waste in terms of time lost in gaining familiarity with problems and 
procedures of the agency and in preparing to leave government 
service. Furthermore, employment in a nonscientific government 
agency has few attractions for a promising young scientist, deeply 
interested in and committed to his discipline. Joining the Depart­
ment of State, for example, means substantial risk of losing contact 
with his discipline. 
With respect to getting research done and investigating tech­
nical problems, the typical pattern, much in evidence during the test 
ban negotiations, has been either to assign the tasks to scientists 
employed by the government or to let contracts to institutions out­
side the federal government, and then to have the results reviewed 
by panels of governmental and nongovernmental scientists convened 
on an ad hoc basis. This system has much to recommend it. It in­
volves independent checks and is in accord with the pluralistic pat­
tern and structure of American life. However, it is cumbersome and 
time-consuming. For this reason, it is not responsive to the needs 
of modern diplomacy. In addition, it has meant that within the 
government the only agencies dealing with security policy equipped 
to conduct scientific research themselves have been those which have 
had as their primary responsibility maintaining the nation's military 
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strength or developing uses of nuclear energy. Since the Vela Pro­
gram has always been administered by the Department of Defense, 
even after the establishment of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, it seems that these are also the only agencies deemed 
capable of administering large-scale scientific research programs, re­
gardless of their purpose. Inevitably, the approach of these agencies 
to security problems has been colored by their primary responsi­
bilities. 
A possible and perhaps the best way of overcoming the diffi­
culties involved in getting high quality scientists to serve in non­
scientific government agencies at the lower and middle ranks, and 
also easing those connected with the conduct of research, might be 
to establish a national scientific institute or to expand some existing 
facility, such as the Bureau of Standards. Such an institute would 
have to allow scientists great freedom to pursue their own interests, 
but it might also be capable of responding to some of the govern­
ment's needs. If a promising young scientist could look forward to 
a career in such an institute, the prospect of a brief assignment with 
a nonscientific government agency might not seem so unpalatable. 
Presumably the scientific staff of the institute would be chosen so 
that their interests would have some relevance to governmental needs. 
Given this concurrence of interests, the institute might be able to 
conduct certain research itself and to monitor projects entrusted to 
institutions outside the government which would be of immediate use 
to the government. 
Scientists in Negotiations and as Negotiators 
During the nuclear test ban negotiations, scientists were not 
only involved in the formulation of American policy, they also 
served at various times and in various capacities as negotiators. 
There were four conferences conducted primarily by scientists : the 
Conference of Experts, Technical Working Groups I and II, and 
the Seismic Research Program Advisory Group. During the Geneva 
Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, at least 
one scientist was always assigned to the American negotiating team. 
Later, during the meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 
Disarmament, several senior American scientists went to Geneva 
and presented briefings to members of other delegations. Finally, 
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scientists accompanied diplomats to Moscow when the partial test 
ban treaty was drafted and initialed. 
Evaluating the wisdom of the decisions to assign scientists to 
these roles and appraising their performance depends upon assump­
tions about the purposes of the tasks which they were given. In 
negotiating, any specific move may be made for a variety of reasons, 
some of which may have little intrinsic relationship to that par­
ticular move. Given the decentralized system of formulating security 
policy within the United States, the probability is high that any move 
will reflect a variety of motives, and it is by no means inconceivable 
that these motives might conflict. Thus, any move may at the same 
time successfully fulfill certain motives and fail to fulfill others. More­
over, a move which satisfied certain short-range motivations of 
policy-makers may prove to be disfunctional in terms of their longer­
range goals or other criteria. 
No one can question the use of scientists as advisers to diplo­
matic negotiators during the test ban negotiations. This was ob­
viously necessary, and as far as can be determined from the public 
record, the scientists assigned to these missions performed their tasks 
creditably. The use of scientists as negotiators, however, was more 
controversial. Robert Gilpin, for one, has been quite critical of the 
performance of the American scientists as negotiators. His analysis 
of the 1958 Conference of Experts led him to conclude that the 
American scientists "lacking sufficient political guidance, fell into 
a number of regrettable errors. "6 It might be fairer, though, to include 
in an evaluation an assessment of the tasks assigned to the scientists 
and of the motives for these assignments. 
One of the motives behind the original American proposal to 
hold a meeting of experts was a desire to neutralize the public pres­
sures against testing so that the United States could conduct its 
planned series of nuclear weapons tests in the summer of 1 958. A 
second motive was a desire to test Soviet intentions; it was thought 
that this would offer a means of establishing whether or not the 
Soviet Union would really accept control. The third motive was to 
provide a tactical response in a diplomatic situation where some 
Western move was considered advisable. In terms of the first and 
third motives, the Conference of Experts was undoubtedly a sue-
6American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, p. 2 1 9. 
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cess, and it probably was also successful in terms of the second. If 
other criteria are used, however, the Conference of Experts appears 
in a less favorable light. 
After the new seismic data was discovered and the theory of 
decoupling developed, some writers criticized the American scien­
tists at the Conference of Experts because they had agreed to a 
report which then appeared to be excessively optimistic about the 
possibility of detecting and identifying underground nuclear ex­
plosions.7 Now that there have been further experiments, this criti­
cism no longer appears valid. So far as the technical work of the 
American scientists at the Conference of Experts including their part 
in the drafting of the report, it was probably as good as could be 
done, given the existing state of knowledge. 
Other criticisms, though, can be made of the Conference of 
Experts. By their report the Experts virtually committed the United 
States to engage in negotiations, and-what was perhaps even more 
crucial-to negotiate on the basis of the particular control system 
which they recommended. As a strategy for getting the United 
States to take positive action, this course may have been wise. With­
out some such development, because of the difficulty of formulating 
an agreed policy within the American government, the United States 
might never have engaged in the negotiations. 
On the other hand, practical as this course may have been, it 
fell far short of criteria for rational decision-making. Entering nego­
tiations in this manner meant that the threshold of detectability 
which would be acceptable to the United States was determined in 
Geneva by a group of scientists temporarily serving as negotiators, 
with very skimpy instructions, not through a deliberate decision at 
the highest levels of government. It also meant that until the acces­
sion of the Kennedy Administration, the government was not united 
in support of the negotiations. Thus the United States often seemed 
to be pulling back; reluctant to accept what its scientists had pro­
posed. 
The wisdom of committing the United States to a particular 
control system at an early stage in the negotiations can also be 
7See, for example, Freeman Dyson, "The Future Development of Nu­
clear Weapons," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 3 (April 1 960) , pp. 
457-64. 
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questioned. Doing so severely limited American flexibility. Any 
control system is composed of variable elements, some predominantly 
technical, others predominantly nontechnical. All of these elements 
are interrelated, and changes in one area can be compensated for by 
adjustments in another. For example, one can compensate for a 
smaller number of on-site inspections by having a greater number 
of control posts. Similarly, one might also compensate for less effi­
cient or trustworthy operating personnel by having a greater number 
of control posts. The ability to make such trade-otis, however, was 
greatly reduced as long as the Report of the Conference of Experts 
remained the immutable basis for the nuclear test ban negotiations, 
and the Soviet Union certainly viewed the report in this light for 
several years. 
The American motivation for insisting on convoking Technical 
Working Groups I and II was always rather ambiguous. Calling for 
additional technical conferences was a course which was acceptable 
within the American government, both to those who wanted to 
abandon and to those who wanted to continue the negotiations. 
Since it could be viewed as a means of testing Soviet intentions, it 
was also agreeable to those who wanted a nuclear test ban treaty, 
but only under "acceptable" conditions. 
From the point of view of the utilization of scientists as negoti­
ators, Technical Working Group I appears to have been by far the 
more sensible of the two. In TWG I the scientists were given a nar­
rowly defined task-to elaborate a control system for high altitudes 
and outer space-on which there was substantial agreement among 
the negotiating partners. The American scientists obviously had 
profited from their earlier experience at the Conference of Experts : 
they insisted on much more careful phraseok•gy and on recommend­
ing alternative systems rather than a single one. 
In Technical Working Group II, the scientists were in effect 
asked to solve the deep controversies which plagued the negotiations, 
an obviously impossible task. Moreover, they were asked to do this 
at a time when the United States was in the process of empirically 
testing the theory of decoupling, the development of which had done 
the most to dampen American enthusiasm for a test ban. In addi­
tion to failing to accomplish their mission, the scientists participating 
in Technical Working Group II jeopardized the intricate and delicate 
network of their personal relationships extending across national 
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frontiers, which they had so carefully nurtured. One cannot but ques­
tion whether this was a sensible assignment. 
The Seismic Research Program Advisory Group was another 
matter. It is hard to conceive of any way of planning a joint or 
coordinated research program other than to have scientists them­
selves meet and produce agreed elements of a program. 
After this meeting, American policy placed less emphasis on 
formal meetings of scientists, and probably wisely. If the purpose of 
bringing scientists into the negotiations was either to convince the 
opposite side or neutrals of the legitimacy of the Western position, 
there was no inherent reason why this could not be done as well, if 
not better, through informal sessions rather than through formally 
constituted meetings of scientists. The use of scientists after 1960 
for elucidating and buttressing Western positions seems to have 
accomplished these goals, to the extent that they could be accom­
plished, and yet avoided the difficulties of the formal meetings of 
scientists. 
In this connection, the Kennedy Administration had a distinct 
advantage over its predecessor-and this must be kept in mind in any 
evaluation or comparison of the conduct and contributions of the 
two administrations. It was under the Eisenhower Administration 
that the decision-makers were faced for the first time with the novel 
and complex scientific issues involved in the test ban and with the 
difficult task of finding the proper men and devising organizational 
patterns and procedures through which scientific advice could be 
integrated in the governmental process. By the time the Kennedy 
Administration took office a number of career diplomats and other 
governmental officials had acquired basic background in these prob­
lems and some lessons could be drawn from earlier experience. 
This was necessarily reflected in both the policy formation and in 
the later shapes of the negotiations. 
III 
The Substance of American Security Policy 
Vacillation and Ambiguity 
Much of what has already been said concerning formulation and 
execution of American security policy obviously has implications for 
the substance of that policy. Because the Eisenhower Administration 
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was deeply divided concerning the wisdom of a nuclear test ban, and 
because President Eisenhower did not take decisive steps to end 
this division, until 1961 American policy toward the nuclear test ban 
negotiations was characterized by ambiguity and vacillation. The 
United States often appeared not to know whether or not it wanted 
a test ban or what the minimum conditions were that it would accept. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to say whether this situation was due 
primarily to President Eisenhower's basic belief that the Soviet Union 
was not prepared to accept any agreement except on terms disad­
vantageous to the United States or to his reluctance to resolve dif­
ferences within the Administration. In fact, he remained skeptical of 
the wisdom of the Moscow Treaty even after it was negotiated. 
Inadequate Technical Preparation 
A second major problem was that throughout the negotiations 
the level of the United States technical preparation left much to be 
desired. During the Conference of Experts, the United States based 
its calculations for elaborating control measures over underground 
nuclear explosions on one experiment. Subsequent experience proved 
that this base was too narrow. Several times American scientists 
discussed and agreed to control devices which did not exist and the 
real operational capacities of which therefore could not fully be 
known. An operating prototype of the control station recommended 
by the Conference of Experts in 19 58 did not exist until October 
1 960. The satellites recommended by Technical Working Group I 
for the detection of nuclear explosions in outer space were not put 
into orbit until the fall of 1963, three years before an entire system 
would be operational. Twice during the negotiations the United 
States attempted to settle technical issues despite the foreknowledge 
that relevant experiments would be conducted during the technical 
discussions or after their conclusion. This occurred, as will be re­
called, in the case of the Conference of Experts. It also occurred 
with respect to Technical Working Group II. The first major ex­
periment in Operation Cowboy, a series of chemical explosions de­
signed to test Albert Latter's decoupling theory, was conducted on 
December 1 7, 1 959, the day before the Working Group recessed. 
The tests in this series would continue until mid-March 1 960. 
This is not to suggest that the level of American technical 
preparation was inferior to that of the Soviet Union, for the record 
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certainly does not indicate this. On the contrary, the United States 
scientists provided by far the largest proportion of the technical 
data. Given the asymmetrical interest in control, which regardless of 
whether or not it is desirable will probably continue as long as 
Western societies maintain a higher degree of openness than Com­
munist regimes, the situation requires that the West be better pre­
pared technically than the East. Nor is it to attempt to set absolute 
and ideal standards by which to judge the American performance. 
It is merely to state that the United States' level of technical prepara­
tion was not adequate to the seriousness of the task. This criticism 
of course applies with even greater force to the Soviet Union. Ad­
mittedly, it is impossible always to foresee or control the pace of 
negotiations, but in 1958 a test ban was an issue of long-standing, 
and the United States was unprepared despite its salience. 
In part, technical preparation is a function of administrative 
and financial support. The United States' position in 1958, among 
other things, reflected the relatively low priority accorded to arms 
control and disarmament matters within the government then. Pre­
sumably the situation has at least been improved with the establish­
ment of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Clearly more 
human and physical resources within the government are now de­
voted to tasks in this area. Whether or not sufficient resources are 
allocated to these matters, though, is an unanswered question. And 
one curious effect of the establishment of ACDA has been that be­
cause there has now been amassed a wealth of technical detail it 
has become progressively more difficult for creative outsiders to 
get a foothold in this field, and therefore the number of technical 
people not in government employ who are willing to concern them­
selves actively with trying to find radical solutions has been reduced. 
Technical preparation is also a function of the linkage between 
political intelligence and technical research. Forthcoming technical 
issues have to be defined far enough in advance so that scientists have 
ample time to probe their complexities. Again, establishment of the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should help to create and 
maintain this linkage. Moreover, the office of the Special Assistant to 
the President for Science and Technology and the President's Science 
Advisory Committee-both created as responses to the Sputnik crisis 
of the fall of 1957-are now much more firmly established as parts 
of the governmental structure than they were in 1958. Representa-
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tives of the scientific community now have an unquestioned place in 
the nation's highest policy councils. Perhaps as much has been done 
as is possible in terms of institutional arrangements. The questions 
which remain-and which by their nature are presently unanswerable 
-center on whether sufficient thought is given to future problems. 
As far as the role of ACDA is concerned, there is also a question 
whether-in the absence of arms control agreements that would give 
it operating responsibilities-the Agency will be able to retain high 
quality personnel and assert its place in the mainstream of policy­
making in Washington. 
The Linkage Between Controlling the Arms Race and Altering the 
State System 
A third substantive problem was the linking of the nuclear test 
ban issue with American schemes for and concepts of world order. 
The United States originally proposed and argued that a grandiose 
organization would be required to monitor a nuclear test ban. This 
body would have dwarfed all existing international organizations. 
Interestingly, few of the American participants in the negotiations 
felt that such a huge organization could long stand with such a 
limited function; they felt that it would either have to assume addi­
tional functions in the field of arms control or collapse. Of course 
one reason for the extent of the American proposals in this realm 
was that those within the United States government who questioned 
the wisdom of a nuclear test ban treaty found this a convenient way 
of working against a test ban without engaging in a frontal attack. 
However, more fundamental factors were also responsible. American 
concepts of world order ultimately looked forward to the hierarchical 
organization of the world. In considering the organizational require­
ments of a nuclear test ban the United States drew from past ex­
perience with such organizations as the United Nations and also tried 
to insure that whatever new organizational developments were im­
plemented in connection with the nuclear test ban would fit in with 
the general long-range goal. Little thought was given to the relation­
ship between the limited arms control functions to be performed 
and the organizational requirements. As a result, in many ways the 
United States was as unprepared for serious arms control negotia­
tions when it came to determining the appropriate organizational 
arrangements as it was lacking in the essential technical data. 
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Inferring from the American proposals, it appears that little 
thought had been given in the earlier years of the negotiations to 
the problem of how to reduce the possibility of nuclear holocaust 
without at the same time reforming the world political system. Re­
ciprocal or adversary control (more accurately in this instance 
unilateral control) ,  the technique eventually embodied in the Mos­
cow Treaty, was one obvious response to this problem, but the United 
States did not even suggest this possibility until 1962. It is apparent 
from the record that the Soviet Union was equally if not more de­
ficient in thinking about these problems. Throughout the negotiations 
there was no evidence that within the Soviet government the organiza­
tional aspects of disarmament were being considered separate from 
other policy questions. 
The Consequences of the American Position 
An assessment of the consequences of the policies pursued by the 
United States may be made on several levels. It seems clear that 
these policies caused certain difficulties for the United States in the 
realm of propaganda, and on these grounds it can be argued that the 
United States would have been in a better position had it main­
tained its original position of clearly insisting on linking a nuclear 
test ban with other measures of arms control and disarmament 
rather than taking the positions that it did. At least then the United 
States could not have been accused of negotiating in a disingenuous 
fashion. 
A more fundamental consequence was that Soviet intentions 
were never fully explored. It may well be that the Soviet Union 
would not have agreed to any formally binding commitment prior to 
1963, nor at any time to a treaty that would have involved on-site 
inspection. The point is that since American policies were not flexible 
and generous enough to allow ultimate testing of Soviet motivation 
these assertions cannot be made with certainty and without fear of 
contradiction. As the record stands, it is always possible to argue 
that if only American policies had been framed in terms a bit more 
acceptable to the Soviet Union, a more far-reaching agreement would 
have been possible earlier. 8 
8Both American and British negotiators have implicitly stated this. 
See James I. Wadsworth, The Price of Peace, p. 73, and Sir Michael Wright, 
Disarm and Verify, p. 1 09. 
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On the level of negotiating tactics, the decision to proclaim a 
one-year moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons at the outset of 
the diplomatic negotiations has been seriously questioned. Many have 
argued that this deprived the United States of one of its most import­
ant means of bringing pressure on the Soviet Union to reach an 
agreement. It is clear that regardless of the course of the negotiations 
it became very difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to 
end the moratorium. On the other hand, whether or not the Soviet 
Union would have consented to engage in negotiations had the 
United States insisted on continuing its testing is problematical. 
Furthermore, had it chosen to pursue this course, the United States 
government would have had to have been willing to face serious pres­
sures from both internal and external sources, the latter especially in 
the United Nations. 
IV 
The International System 
Open and Closed Societies 
The way in which the two sides handled the important issue of the 
moratorium on testing brings out as clearly as any example drawn 
from the nuclear test ban negotiations the tactical advantages that a 
closed society enjoys over an open society in international negotia­
tions. The former can shift course quickly and radically, and can 
plan its moves in secrecy, thus maintaining the advantage of sur­
prise. Open societies, in contrast, except during crises, tend to move 
more slowly and to give ample forewarning of their moves. Thus the 
Soviet Union could break the moratorium suddenly, while the West 
could not. 
A somewhat different disadvantage but stemming from the 
same cause was that the open and pluralistic societies of the West 
gave off ambiguous signals. Some in the West spoke in more severe 
terms than the official policy, others in more lenient terms. Those 
who took lines which diverged from official policy sometimes even 
included individuals with policy-making responsibilities. The Kremlin 
could read these divergent signs as indicating on the one hand that 
the official policy might be only a cover for a harsher line, or, on 
the other, as indicating that further concessions would be forthcom­
ing, and that to gain these one need only wait. Of course, the open-
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ness of Western society could also be an advantage to the extent 
that it allowed the West to introduce "feelers" into the negotiations. 
To make use of this advantage requires skill and care, and also 
greater control over circumstances than sometimes exists in reality. 
Policy-makers in a closed society are less subject to external 
and internal pressures than their counterparts in an open society. 
The test ban negotiations indicate that the Western states tended to 
take such matters as UN resolutions and pronouncements of neutrals 
more seriously than did the Soviet Union. However, they also show 
that both sides were affected by such matters to some extent, and 
that both would ignore them if they felt that their vital interests were 
at stake. Thus both sides tried to have their position endorsed by 
the UN, and both also did things that UN resolutions exhorted them 
not to. 
A related difference is that the USSR could appeal to segments 
of the Western public, over the heads of the Western governments, 
while the Western states could not as easily engage in similar opera­
tions with respect to the Soviet people. 
The differences in the nature of Soviet and Western societies, 
however, affected the negotiations in more fundamental ways than 
simply with respect to the tactics and relative freedom of action on 
the part of the negotiators of the two sides. At least partly because 
of its closed society, the USSR's attitude toward the establishment 
of control measures was significantly different from that of the 
United States and the United Kingdom. To the end of the negotia­
tions, the Soviet Union firmly resisted any outside intrusions that it 
could not control. For a while the Soviet Union appears to have 
been willing to accept the intrusions connected with the establishment 
of a limited number of fixed control posts manned by at least some 
non-Soviet personnel. This position was in a sense an unprecedented 
step but it was retracted in November 1961 and never reinstated. 
The Soviet position toward on-site inspection was always so hedged, 
that-partly for reasons suggested earlier in connection with the 
United States policies-it is impossible to say that the USSR was 
ever entirely willing to accept such intrusions. The rationale for the 
Soviet Union's penchant for secrecy has been amply analyzed else­
where;9 it is only necessary here to note how deeply it affected the 
9See especially Alexander Dallin and others, The Soviet Union, Arms 
Control and Disarmament, pp. 142-58. 
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USSR's policy in this instance. No doubt the Soviet Union's secrecy 
contributes something to its military security, though it is also clear 
that this secrecy is an important part of the regime in its own right, 
and as such has a vital effect on arms control negotiations. These 
remarks are of course not intended to suggest an absence of secrecy 
and concern with secrecy in the West, but rather to indicate an 
important difference. 
A related point is that the USSR never consented to the estab­
lishment of a control organization in connection with a nuclear test 
ban which could take significant action against its wishes. No doubt 
the positions of East and West are colored by the experience of the 
two sides in and with existing and past international arrangements 
and institutions such as the United Nations, an experience which thus 
far has been much more favorable to the West in East-West confronta­
tions. But the more important explanation of the differences in the 
attitudes toward control and inspection probably lies in the differ­
ences between the two societies. 
The Effects of Technology 
The record of the test ban negotiations is interesting in this 
respect for it showed how these fundamental differences between the 
two societies-and particularly the closed character of the Soviet 
society-were being altered among other factors by the growth of 
modern technology. In 1963 the United States felt that it could do as 
good a job of detecting underground nuclear explosions within the 
Soviet Union with stations outside of the territory of the USSR as it 
had felt in 1 958 that it could do with a significant number of sta­
tions within the USSR. The development of observation satellites 
also sharply inhibited the ability of any society to act in secret. 
Thus the Soviet system has become more open, not necessarily by 
its own conscious design, but simply because technology has made 
it easier for others to observe Soviet territory, regardless of Soviet 
wishes. In the long run, this factor should reduce at least to some 
extent the difficulty of negotiating arms control agreements, par­
ticularly if it is reinforced by the conscious efforts toward greater 
openness such as increased exchange of persons and scientific co­
operation between East and West. As a result, the USSR should be­
come less reluctant to accept intrusions, and the West less insistent 
on their necessity. 
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The Role of Nonnuclear States 
The proposition that other powers can affect the policies of the 
superpowers is implicit in what has already been said. The United 
Nations was one forum available to virtually all states during the test 
ban negotiations, and many of them sought to and did exercise in­
fluence through it. The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee 
was a more effective instrument for those states which were mem­
bers; there can be no doubt that both the USSR and the United 
States were more sensitive to pressures brought to bear and sug­
gestions raised in this organ than in the more diffuse General As­
sembly. It is also demonstrable, as many British leaders have claimed, 
that the United Kingdom had influence far greater than that of other 
states of equivalent size, mainly, in this case, because of its possession 
of nuclear weapons.10 It is further clear, though, that ultimately the 
superpowers, the USSR and the United States, or more accurately 
political configurations within them, determined whether or not there 
should be a nuclear test ban treaty. Other states and international 
organizations could influence the superpowers, and their internal 
political configurations, but they could not determine the course of 
events. 
Power and Agreements 
The record of the test ban negotiations also has relevance for 
long-debated questions about the relationship between the distribution 
of power and the achievement of agreements. When the Moscow 
Treaty was signed, the relative position of the Soviet Union and the 
United States with respect to the development of nuclear weapons 
was very different from what it had been when the negotiations began 
in 1958. In 1958 the United States apparently held the technological 
lead with respect to all areas and levels of nuclear weapons develop­
ment. By 1963 the Soviet Union had detonated larger weapons than 
the United States, and the test ban treaty would make it difficult if 
not impossible for the United States to develop weapons of such 
magnitude. In more general terms, the USSR appeared to have be­
come technologically more advanced than the United States in the 
development of high-yield weapons; that is, weapons with a yield of 
5 or 10  megatons or larger. The situation with respect to weapons 
lOSee Sir Michael Wright, Disarm and Verify, p. 1 4 1 .  
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with intermediate yield was indeterminate. The United States defin­
itely held the lead in low-yield weapons; that is, weapons with a 
yield of less than one megaton. However, since continued under­
ground testing was permitted under the treaty, and since weapons 
with such yields can be tested underground, presumably the Soviet 
Union could attempt to equal or surpass the United States level of 
achievement. This consideration might have made the treaty more 
attractive for the Soviet Union in 1963. It should be noted though 
that since the signature of the treaty the frequency of underground 
tests conducted by the United States has exceeded that of tests con­
ducted by the Soviet Union by almost a factor of ten. Whether 
this is due to a lack of preparation on the part of the USSR, to a 
low opinion of the value of such tests, or to their high cost and 
complexity, it is impossible to know. 
What was perhaps equally as significant as the exact state of 
the technological race was that both sides appeared to have neared 
the theoretical limits of nuclear weapons development in their last 
series of tests, and also to have discovered most or all that was 
"interesting" to them in terms of their concepts of military strategy. 
The Soviet Union, having apparently decided under Khrushchev to 
put great emphasis on deterrence, had developed the counter-city 
weapons that it needed for this strategy. The United States under 
President Kennedy, on the other hand, moved to deemphasize the 
role of nuclear weapons in its strategy, and in particular became less 
interested in the development of tactical nuclear weapons. 
The changes in positions of the two sides with respect to the 
development of nuclear weapons should be viewed against the 
changes concerning total military strength. In 1963 the United States' 
margin of superiority was significantly greater than it had been five 
years earlier. 
In sum, with respect to military power, in 1963 there were 
reasons for both sides to have greater confidence in their own 
abilities to achieve the missions that they might assign to their military 
establishments than they had in 1958. This bears on the question of 
whether in an arms race an increase in one side's security neces­
sarily decreases that of the other side, and also on the degree of 
confidence necessary to achieve arms control agreements. P. M. S. 
Blackett's argument, though, that the Western superiority in missile 
strength made the USSR unwilling to accept an international control 
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system for a test ban on the ground that such a system would detract 
from Soviet security by possibly revealing the location of Soviet 
missile sites, should be noted.11 He feels that the USSR counted on 
the secrecy of these sites to offset the Western numerical superiority. 
Many strategists disagree with his argument, and in any case observa­
tion satellites have to some extent made it obsolete. 
The Decline of Bipolarity 
At the same time that both the United States and the Soviet 
Union became more confident concerning their own military capa­
bilities vis-a-vis one another, they each became more worried about 
other problems on the world scene. In the first place, both appear 
to have become more concerned about the consequences of the 
dispersion of nuclear weapons capabilities, and this has marked 
the emergence of a common interest of the two nuclear superpowers 
in the status quo. More specifically, for their own reasons both the 
Soviet Union and the United States became interested in inhibiting 
increases in Communist China's military power. Again, the Soviet 
Union had always been concerned about the spread of nuclear 
weapons capabilities in the West, and especially to Western Germany. 
Although the United States was never as concerned about the spread 
of nuclear weapons capabilities within the West as it was within other 
areas, it foresaw a connection between the spread within the West 
and elsewhere and increasingly came to oppose the spread within 
the West also. One purpose behind the American proposal for a 
multilateral nuclear force under NATO was to foreclose pressures 
for new national nuclear forces in the West and particularly in 
Germany although the Soviet Union has refused to view the pro­
posal in this light. 
To say that both the Soviet Union and the United States be­
came increasingly interested in a nuclear test ban because they 
became increasingly interested in inhibiting the nuclear capabilities 
of other states, implies that this arms control agreement was partially 
a consequence of decreasing bipolarity. Paradoxically, signing the 
agreement hastened the dilution of bipolarity, for it meant that each 
coalition leader had to oppose the wishes of a major ally : the Soviet 
11P. M. S. Blackett, Studies of War: Nuclear and Conventional (Edin­
burgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1 962) ,  p. 160. 
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Union, those of Communist China and the United States, those of 
France. 
The Problem of Controlling Modern Technology 
The experience with the nuclear test ban negotiations confirms 
the immense difficulty inherent in the task of controlling modern 
technology in an environment of the multi-state system. The negotia­
tions brought out how hard it was to arrange matters so that the 
interests of just two sides (and three states) coincided enough to 
allow for an agreement. The refusal of Communist China and France 
to adhere to the Moscow Treaty, although anticipated, reduced the 
value of the treaty for the two sides and showed that bargains made 
essentially bilaterally cannot easily be extended to other parties. 
The makeup and interests of states are not identical and agree­
ments affect them differently. Constructing an agreement that has an 
equal range of benefits and disadvantages for many disparate partners 
is a task of great intellectual difficulty, and one which is made even 
more laborious if it must be worked out through the mechanisms of 
multi-governmental bargaining and complex intragovemmental pro­
cesses such as those existing in the United States. 
The fact that modern technology is subject to swift changes­
as was amply evidenced during the nuclear test ban negotiations­
makes this task even more complicated. The insistence by the West 
in 1959 that "new data" be brought into the negotiations after the 
scientists had agreed on the relevant technological basis in 1958-
and the refusal by the Soviet Union to agree to this proved a major 
stumbling block in the negotiations. 
If it is difficult to strike a bargain among several disparate parties 
for a static situation, it is even more difficult to strike one that will 
accommodate technological change and yet any agreement without 
such accommodation would be of limited value. Sovereign states are 
most unlikely to accept agreements which have a built-in potentiality 
for unpredictable alterations. Thus the Soviet Union would be very 
unlikely to accept a treaty that would at the outset provide for 20 
on-site inspections on its territory annually but might under certain 
circumstances require several hundred. 
The conceivable solutions for this problem are limited. The 
participating states could give broad powers to a panel of scientists 
to modify the control system in accordance with new technology, 
502 DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS 
but during the test ban negotiations neither side seemed very eager 
or willing to accept such a solution. If the panel of scientists were 
given such powers the states would be exposed to the danger that 
the distribution of benefits and disadvantages built into the treaty 
could be radically altered by a group beyond their control. Moreover, 
the test ban negotiations show how many different interpretations of 
some data are scientifically plausible. Thus the margin of discretion 
would be quite wide and the scientists could not be expected to 
achieve universally accepted decisions. Another possibility would be 
to require a periodic review of the control provisions, but what this 
actually would amount to is a provision for periodic renegotiation, 
if significant technological changes occurred which vitally affected 
the subject matter of the treaty. That this renegotiation would be 
conducted within the framework of the treaty might provide some 
guidelines and an additional incentive for agreement, but little be­
yond that. Of course, if an adversary or reciprocal control system 
were used, as it was in the Moscow Treaty, accommodating tech­
nological change could be accomplished on the basis of unilateral 
decisions by interested parties. Of the various ways of treating the 
problem, this is clearly the easiest to negotiate and the least cumber­
some, but whether or not it can be applied to other than essentially 
bilateral relationships is open to serious question. 
Although it does not show in the terms of the Moscow Treaty, 
the nuclear test ban negotiations made it apparent that some control 
measures can be developed as a by-product of peaceful activities. 
The use of weather stations to collect information on radioactive 
fallout and of seismological stations to collect information on under­
ground nuclear detonations are examples. Interestingly, as the level 
of technology has risen, effective exploitation of such developments 
has often required increased international collaboration. The terri­
tories of states are often just too small to exploit new technological 
developments. The position of the United States in the test ban 
negotiations concerning the use of already existing stations shows 
the doubts that many states would have about the reliability of in­
formation from such national sources, but perhaps this problem 
could partially be overcome by having redundant systems for gath­
ering information. Moreover, it is possible that there may be more 
sources that a state could trust in a multipolar world than in a bi­
polar world, and for this reason the movement of the world from 
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bipolarity may make it increasingly possible to rely on information 
gained from such sources. One can envisage a relatively high degree 
of control over technology resulting from overlaying the world with 
multiple networks based on international arrangements for scientific 
collaboration, established principally to facilitate other purposes such 
as weather prediction and high-speed, long-distance communication. 
As the nuclear test ban negotiations so clearly demonstrate 
though, the questions of whether or not such control will be estab­
lished, and the extent of this control, are preeminently political and 
diplomatic, not technical. Science and scientific research can con­
tribute to the solution of arms control and disarmament problems; 
it cannot solve them. 
It is obviously impossible to give a definitive answer at this stage 
to the crucial question of whether or not the signature of the Moscow 
Treaty marked a turning point in the nuclear era. What can be 
said, though, is that the Treaty represented an attempt to create a 
turning point; that the attempt has been made is important and it has 
had an impact on international atmosphere. Furthermore, what has 
been learned in the process of making the attempt may have been as 
important as the actual Treaty, for mankind now knows a good bit 
more about how to proceed in efforts to create a more peaceful 
world. Finally, the record of the test ban negotiations also shows 
that the growth of technology may contain within itself important 
potentialities for control. 
Chapter II 
1957: La Mise en Scene 
I 
What Beginning? 
Neither October 31, 1958, the opening date of the Conference on 
the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, nor July 1, 1958, when 
the Conference of Experts began-the conference which formu-
lated the technical basis for the subsequent diplomatic talks-
is an appropriate starting point for an analysis of the nuclear test 
ban negotiations. The negotiations, and American policy in them, 
can be properly understood only when put in the context of earlier 
events, particularly several occurrinJ!; during 1957. For one thing, 
the 1957 London session of the Subcommittee of the Disarmament 
Commission of the United Nations was clearly a prelude to the 
nuclear test ban negotiations; there is an important connection be-
tween the two, and the latter was in many ways a consequence of 
the former. For another, certain conflicting international and domes-
tic forces vitally affected American policy on the question of a test 
ban; and, although it is difficult to fix a point in time when these 
forces first emerged, their impact was strongly felt by 1957. Finally, 
the formal arrangements for the participation of scientists in the 
policy process within the United States government were signficantly 
altered in 1957. 
II 
The Status of International Negotiations 
The Confrontation at Lancaster House 
The Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission composed of 
Canada, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, held its most significant, and also its last, session at the 
Lancaster House in London from March to September of 1957. As 
14 
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a consequence of major policy reviews, both East and West came to 
the meeting with new proposals, and during the course of the ses-
sion, they revised their policies still further. 1 Three developments 
during the London meetings in effect set the stage for the Geneva 
test ban negotiations. 
The first of these developments was the announcement by the 
USSR on June 14 that it would agree to the establishment of a 
control system, including control posts on its own territory, on that 
of the United Kingdom and the United States, and in the Pacific 
Ocean, to monitor an agreement for the cessation ·of nuclear weapon 
tests. 2 Until that date the Soviet Union had always argued that no 
international control mechanism was necessary for this purpose. In 
the same announcement, the USSR also declared its willingness to 
accept a temporary suspension of tests for a period of two to three 
years. Previously the Soviet position had been that any agreement 
on suspension must be of unlimited duration. Both aspects of the 
announcement represented an important change from past Soviet 
positions. Ever since 1954 when the testing of nuclear weapons had 
become a matter of widespread public concern, the Soviet Union 
had sought to place itself in the forefront of the movement to pro-
hibit further testing, although it had continued its own test program 
without interruption.3 Starting in May 1955, the USSR had advanced 
a variety of proposals on the subject, and because of its insistence, 
this issue had been placed at the head of the agenda for the London 
session of the disarmament Subcommittee. In the Western view, 
however, prior to June 14 the Soviet positions. offered no basis for 
constructive negotiations. 
The West also altered its position on a test ban during the 
course of the London session, and this was the second development 
which contributed to the subsequent Geneva negotiations. Pre-
viously, the cessation of nuclear tests had been accorded relatively 
lFor detailed descriptions of the London session see Bernhard G. 
Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, pp. 241-439, and Ciro 
E. Zoppo, The Issue of Nuclear Test Cessation at the London Disarmament 
Conference of I957: A Study in East-West Negotiation (The RAND Corp., 
RM-2821-ARPA, 1961). 
2UN Document DC/SC. l/60. 
3See Joseph L. Nogee, Soviet Policy Towards International Control of 
Atomic Energy, pp. 211-13. 
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low priority in Western proposals, and the Western states had taken 
the position that they could accept a ban on tests only if an adequate 
control mechanism was operative and the ban was part of a broader 
agreement covering other measures of disarmament as well. There 
were several reasons for the Western position. The most important 
was that Western military strategy depended on nuclear weapons to 
counter Soviet superiority in conventional forces. In addition, France, 
which was just beginning to develop nuclear weapons, was unwilling 
to have a test ban block its progress in this area, unless it were 
confident that the three nuclear powers were actually going to re-
duce their nuclear arsenals and perhaps also other components of 
their military power. The insistence on the establishment of a con-
trol system was, of course, an integral part of the Western position 
on disarmament. 
At London, three changes were made in the Western position. 
First, the United States indicated at the outset that it was willing to 
accord a new priority to a test cessation; this measure could become 
an integral part of the initial stage of a disarmament agreement. 4 
Secondly, on July 2, after the Soviet Union announced its willing-
ness to accept an international control system, the four Western 
members of the Subcommittee stated that they would agree to a 
temporary suspension of testing while the control system was being 
established. 5 The following day, Harold Stassen, the American 
representative, mentioned ten months as the duration of the tempo-
rary suspension. Later, he offered to extend this period to twelve 
months, and to agree that there might be an additional suspension 
of another year. Thirdly, the Western powers hinted that they might 
accept a loosening of the tie between the test ban issue and other 
measures of disarmament, although the extent of this concession 
was not clear. In the end, the Western powers presented all of their 
first stage measures as an indivisible package, thus reducing the 
scope of the concession. 6 
This package-the provisions of which significantly would have 
allowed the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear powers-
included measures for numerical limitation of armed forces and 
fixed reductions in armaments, safeguards against surprise attack, 
4See UN Document DC/SC. 1/PV. 89, pp. 2-14. 
5UN Document DC/SC. 1/59. 
6UN Document DC/SC. l/66. 
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limiting entry into outer space exclusively to objects designed for 
peaceful and scientific purposes, a cut-off on the production of 
fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and a test cessation. 
However, during the London session there were various indications 
in the press (especially following the review of American policy in 
May) that the United States was willing to treat questions relating 
to the production and testing of nuclear weapons as a separate 
issue.'1 Moreover, the only condition that Mr. Stassen listed for 
extending the temporary suspension of testing for a second year 
was that there should be progress "in relation to the cessation of 
production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. "8 In addi-
tion, he implied that the suspension would become permanent if a 
cut-off on production were achieved during the second year. 
Thus, the gap between East and West on the question of a 
cessation of nuclear weapon tests bad been narrowed considerably. 
However, important differences still remained. The Soviet Union 
was opposed to formally linking a test cessation with any other 
measure of disarmament. It was also unwilling to accept the ex-
tensive controls which the Western proposal would have required 
for supervising a cut-off on the production of fissionable materials 
for weapons. 9 In fairness, it should be pointed out that other states, 
such as Canada, also had some reservations about the extent of the 
proposed controls.1o 
The final development during the London session of the dis-
armament Subcommittee which had a bearing on the Geneva test 
ban negotiations was the introduction by the Western delegates of 
the idea of holding technical talks on control systems. As early as 
the opening meeting, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, 
suggested that the Subcommittee consider appointing technical work-
ing groups which would meet concurrently with the Subcommittee 
and explore the technical aspects of the various agenda items. This 
idea of having technical experts meet was an old favorite of Mr. 
7See New York Times, June 1, 1957, p. 1. 
SUN Document DC/SC. 1/PV. 149, p. 24. 
DSee Ambassador Zorin's statements in the Subcommittee on July 8 and 
August 27, 1957, UN Document DC/SC. 1/PV. 132, pp. 2-26; and DC/SC. 
1/65/RPV. 1. 
lOSee Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, 
p. 342. 
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Uoyd's, which he had raised several times previously in other con-
texts. On May 6, the United Kingdom formally proposed "that a 
Committee of technical experts be established within the framework 
of the disarmament Sub-Committee, to consider possible methods of 
limiting nuclear test explosions and to investigate the requirements 
of effective supervision over an Agreement to limit such explo-
sions."11 This same suggestion was repeated in the July 2 response 
of the Western powers to the Soviet acceptance of the principle of 
international control, again by Selwyn Uoyd on July 17, and finally 
by Harold Stassen on August 21 when he announced the willingness 
of the United States to agree that the temporary suspension could 
be extended for a second year. The motivation for this suggestion 
was never made explicit. The British may have hoped that the 
proposed technical talks might precipitate broader political agree-
ment. For the Americans, it was most likely a way of testing the 
reality of an essential aspect of the new Soviet position; that is, the 
declared Soviet willingness to accept a control system. The USSR, 
however, refused to consent to technical talks unless there were 
first an agreement on the period and the conditions of a test cessa-
tion.12 From the point of view of the Geneva negotiations, the im-
portant thing was that the idea of technical talks was introduced and 
gained currency. 
III 
Conflicting Forces in Test Ban Policy Formulation 
International Pressures 
The encounter between the East and West at the conference table 
in London was only one factor in the formation of the American 
policy leading to the nuclear test ban negotiations. In diplomatic 
negotiations, the point and counterpoint· of proposal and response 
often force adjustments of policy, but as a rule factors external to 
the negotiations play a greater role. Facts as understood by the 
policy-makers; their assumptions, philosophies and idiosyncrasies; 
the general policy framework; the working of national institutions 
as well as the many complex pressures exerted upon the policy-
llUN Document DC/SC. 1/56, p. 1. 
t2See Ambassador Zorin's statement, UN Document DC/SC. 1/PV. 
136, pp. 2-15. 
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makers by individuals and groups in and outside the government, 
privately and through the mass media of communications; interven-
tions of friendly governments in and outside international organiza-
tions; estimates of reactions of unfriendly governments-all these 
affect the content of a policy. Exact weighting of the relative in-
fluence of these factors is impossible in the case of the American 
test ban policy-as it is in most cases. For the purpose of this 
background, however, it may suffice to identify certain salient 
international and domestic forces which had a crucial impact on the 
policies pursued by the United States in the London session of the 
disarmament Subcommittee and thereafter. The principal issue for 
the American policy-maker during and after the London confronta-
tion was whether and on what conditions the United States could 
accede to the Soviet demand and agree to taking the test ban negoti-
ations out of the disarmament package with the resulting possibility 
that a test ban could come into effect without any assurance of 
nuclear or other disarmament. 
One of the most important of the external pressures was the 
widespread public feeling against the testing of nuclear weapons. 
The motives for this worldwide attitude were mixed. For some, the 
issue provided a dramatic focal point for expressing their pacifist 
beliefs. Others, recalling Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were horrified by 
the frightful devastation which modem weapons could cause and 
feared the consequences of further technological developments. The 
fact that nuclear weapons had been used first and only against a 
nonwhite population linked the test ban issue with antiwhite and 
anticolonial attitudes. The problem of fallout, though, was probably 
the principal reason for the issue's arousing such a broad public 
response. 
Public concern about radioactive fallout began to mount in 
1954. On March 1 of that year the United States detonated a 15 
megaton hydrogen bomb over the Bikini Atoll in the Marshall 
Islands.1a The fallout from this explosion covered an unexpectedly 
t8For a detailed analysis of the public reaction to this shot see Earl H. 
Voss, Nuclear Ambush: The Test Ban Trap (1963), pp. 37-50. In general, 
Voss tends to belittle the danger from fallout. The United States' testing of 
nuclear weapons in a UN Trust Territory raised several political and legal 
issues. For analyses of these points see Harold Karan Jacobson, "Our 'Colon-
ial' Problem in the Pacific," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1 (October 
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large area of approximately 7,000 square miles. Some of the in-
habitants of the American Trust Territory were endangered, and a 
Japanese fishing vessel, the Fukurya Maru, was contaminated. 
Shortly thereafter, a radioactive rain fell on Japan as a consequence 
of a Soviet hydrogen bomb test. People throughout the world were 
alarmed by these incidents and by the increasing quantity of radio-
active material in the atmosphere. Later in March, 104 British 
Labor Members of Parliament signed a motion asking the United 
Nations to proclaim a ban on testing hydrogen weapons. The fol-
lowing month Prime Minister Nehru addressed a personal plea to 
the United States to end such tests. A few days after that, in a 
speech before the Indian Parliament, he proposed that the three 
nuclear powers should accept a "standstill agreement" on nuclear 
testing. 
The limited extent of knowledge about fallout and its con-
sequences-particularly the genetic effects-allowed a wide variety 
of estimates of the danger, and this in itself probably made the 
public alarm greater than it would have been had the dangers of 
fallout been known exactly. The United States government moved 
to quell these fears, but with little success. In February 1955, the 
Atomic Energy Commission published a report on this subject, but 
many discounted it on the ground that the source was an interested 
party. Later that year the United States and the United Kingdom 
proposed that the United Nations establish a scientific committee to 
study the effects of atomic radiation. This proposal was adopted 
unanimously, and the Committee was appointed in December 1955. 
However, it did not publish its first findings until June 1958.14 
Meanwhile, public concern about the effects of fallout grew, and 
Soviet tactics played on these fears. 
During 1957 international opposition to the continued testing 
of nuclear weapons reached a high point. In March the Japanese 
1960), pp. 56-66, at 59; Myers S. McDougal and Norbert A. Schlei, "The 
Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security," The 
Yale Law Journal, Vol. LXIV, No. 5 (April 1955), pp. 648-710; and, 
Emanuel Margolis, ''The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and International 
Law," The Yale Law Journal, Vol. LXIV, No. 5 (April 1955), pp. 629-47. 
14UN, General Assembly, Official Records (13th Session), Supplement 
No. 17, "Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of 
Atomic Radiation." 
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government decided to send Professor Masateshi Matsushita, an 
eminent scientist, on a special mission to the USSR, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, to urge a cessation of nuclear 
weapons tests. The following month, in a major address, Prime 
Minister Nehru renewed his appeal for a test ban, and he continued 
to urge such action throughout the year. Again in April the Labor 
Party in Britain, during a Parliamentary debate on the 1957 White 
Paper on Defense, moved that the government should be requested 
to take immediate initiative and put forward effective proposals for 
the abolition of hydrogen weapon tests through effective inter-
national agreement.15 Later that month, eighteen of West Germany's 
leading nuclear physicists, including Professor Otto Hahn, the first 
to split the atom, signed a declaration that they would not participate 
in the construction or testing of nuclear weapons. On April 23 Dr. 
Albert Schweitzer issued an appeal through the Norwegian Nobel 
Committee which was broadcast in fifty countries, and received 
wide coverage elsewhere, asking that public opinion demand an 
end to nuclear tests. Within a few days his appeal was endorsed 
by the Pope, and on May 10 the West German Bundestag adopted 
a resolution, sponsored by the governing Christian Democratic 
Coalition, urging the three nuclear powers to temporarily suspend 
their tests, pending the negotiation of an arms control agreement.16 
During the most active phase of the London session of the UN 
disarmament Subcommittee, these pressures subsided somewhat, but 
even then they remained at a high level. During June and July the 
Soviet Union gained some support in its efforts to have the Inter-
national Labor Organization and the Economic and Social Council 
of the United Nations recommend a test ban, and in August the 
World Council of Churches urged an international accord to stop 
further testing, or if that proved impossible, unilateral action. 
"The Disarmament General Assembly" 
When the Subcommittee's failure became apparent, the pres-
sures rose again, and they came to a head at the twelfth session of 
the UN General Assembly in the fall of 1957. It is significant that 
15See U.K. House of Commons, Debates, April 16, 1957, 5th ser. vol. 
568, col. 1758-1878; and, ibid., 1929-2060. 
16German Federal Republic, Der Deutsche Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 
209. Sitzung, Mai 10, 1957, pp. 12051D-12138A. 
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that session has been dubbed the "Disarmament General Assembly." 
In all, eleven different resolutions dealing with disarmament were 
considered, as well as several amendments to them. Most of the 
proposals, in one way or another, dealt with the question of test-
ing. The USSR led off by proposing-along the lines of its London 
announcement-that further tests of nuclear weapons be suspended 
for a two to three year period starting January 1, 1958,17 It also 
proposed-as it had at the London meeting-that an international 
commission should b6 created to supervise the test suspension, and 
that control posts should be established on a basis of reciprocity 
in the USSR, in the United Kingdom and its possessions, in the 
United States, and in the Pacific Ocean areas, including Australia. 
However, the Soviet Union eventually withdrew its draft in favor 
of an Indian proposal. The Indian resolution would have asked the 
nuclear powers to agree immediately to suspend tests and also 
would have provided for the creation of a commission of experts 
to recommend an adequate control system.18 This resolution was 
rejected by a vote of 24 to 34, with 20 abstentions. Pakistan and 
Tunisia were the only countries from the Mrican and Asian group 
to vote with the West. The Assembly also rejected a Japanese pro-
posal which was somewhat closer to the Western position. In the 
end, the Assembly adopted, by a vote of 56 to 9, with 15 absten-
tions, a resolution sponsored hy twenty-four powers, which in effect 
endorsed the package proposal for a first stage disarmament agree-
ment which the Western powers had presented during the closing 
days of the London session.19 This proposal included a test cessa-
tion as only one of several measures which presumably would occur 
simultaneously.20 In addition, as a consequence of an amendment 
proposed by Norway and Pakistan, the resolution requested that the 
disarmament Subcominittee appoint groups of experts to study the 
technical aspects of monitoring disarmament agreements-an idea 
also aired at London. 
After the twenty-four power resolution had been introduced 
in the Political Cominittee, and it was evident that it would prob-
ably be adopted there and in the plenary session, the Soviet Union 
17UN Document A/3674 and Rev. 1. 
lSUN Document A/C. 1/L. 176 and Revs. 1, 2, and 4. 
19General Assembly Resolution 1148 (XII). 
20See ibid. §1(a). 
1957: La Mise en Scene 23 
announced that it would no longer participate in the Disarmament 
Commission or its Subcommittee. 21 The reason which the Soviet 
delegation gave for this position was that both bodies were com-
posed in a one-sided fashion. The USSR was the only Communist 
country represented on the two organs. Nine of the twelve states on 
the Commission were members of the Western alliance system, and 
four of the five states on the Subcommittee were members of NATO. 
The fact that the twelfth Assembly was the first occasion, with one 
minor exception, since 1948 that the West-reportedly in response 
to a personal decision by Secretary Dulles-had insisted on the 
endorsement of its position on arms control despite Soviet opposi-
tion, may also have affected the Soviet stand. Generally, the practice 
had been to refer both sides' proposals to the Commission or the 
Subcommittee for further negotiations. The Western action in ob-
taining the backing for its position in the Assembly underscored 
the importance of the composition of the negotiating forum. How-
ever, it should be noted that the USSR had criticized the composi-
tion of the Commission and the Subcommittee from the opening of 
the Assembly session. 
The Soviet Union proposed that the Disarmament Commission 
should be expanded to include the entire membership of the UN; 
and, although the Soviet representatives did not state this explicitly, 
they implied that such a body should conduct its affairs in pub-
lic.22 Alternatively, the USSR was willing to support proposals 
which would alter the composition of the Commission in the direc-
tion of parity between East and West. The West, on the other 
hand, even though it was willing to enlarge the Disarmament Com-
mission, was unwilling to accept either solution favored ~y the 
Soviet Union. The net result was an impasse-although the As-
sembly voted to increase the membership of the Disarmament Com-
mission, it did not significantly alter the disparity between East and 
West (sixteen of the twenty-five members belonged to Western alli-
ances), and the Soviet Union stated that it would not participate in 
the new body either. 
21UN, General Assembly, First Committee, Official Records (12th Ses-
sion), p. 117. 
22UN Document A/ L. 230. See the statements by A. A. Gromyko 
and V. V. Kuznetsov: UN, General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Official 
Records (12th Session), p. 34, and pp. 469-70. 
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The denouement was susceptible to varying interpretations. 
Bernhard Bechhoefer, in his authoritative account of the post-
Second World War arms control negotiations, called the Assembly 
resolution endorsing the Western package proposal a "hollow vic-
tory" for the West.23 
He asserted that: 
The Soviet refusal to participate further in the work of the 
Disarmament Commission was a logical and foreseeable 
consequence of the Western insistence on securing the 
United Nations endorsement of their August 29 pro-
posals.24 
It is also possible to argue, however, that the dispute about the 
composition of the Commission was independent of this action; 
that the USSR would not have agreed to participate in any body 
which would have been acceptable to the West at that time. In the 
narrow context of the test cessation issue, although the West en-
joyed a temporary triumph, the resolution did not reduce the pres-
sure for a nuclear test ban in any lasting way. In addition, the West 
found itself without any forum for continuing the negotiations, 
since Hamlet cannot be performed without the Prince of Denmark. 
The Presidential Campaign 
For those who had to set the course of American policy, par-
ticularly the Secretary of State and the President, this pressure was 
not merely an international phenomenon but a domestic one as 
well. Within the United States, discontinuing nuclear weapon tests 
became an important issue in the public debate in 1956, when dur-
ing the Presidential campagin the Democratic nominee, Adlai E. 
Stevenson, suggested that the United States might unilaterally stop 
testing as the first step toward obtaining an agreement with the 
Soviet Union on this subject. Apparently the question of ceasing 
the testing of at least the largest nuclear weapons had been under 
study within the Administration since the spring of 1954 or per-
23Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, p. 418. 
MJbid., p. 425. 
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haps even earlier.25 Mr. Stevenson's proposal therefore was not a 
totally new suggestion. President Eisenhower's response to the pro-
posal was that to take such action outside of the context of a 
comprehensive, enforceable disarmament agreement would endanger 
the security of the United States. At the time, in the public image, 
the twin crises of Hungary and Suez seemed to support his position. 
The fact that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the 
USSR, Nikolai A. Bulganin, publicly endorsed Mr. Stevenson's 
suggestion probably did little to enhance its attractiveness, either to 
the Administration or to the American public.26 However, as the 
Soviet posture became less bellicose in 1957, there was a resurgence 
of public concern about the effects of further testing. 
Mr. Stevenson continued to press his position, and others 
joined him. The American Friends Service Committee and the 
American Unitarian Association both formally urged a test cessa-
tion, and they were joined by other religious groups. In several 
public appearances, Norman Thomas called for a monitored mora-
torium on further testing. Individual scientists and groups of scien-
tists also took a stand. In February 1957, the Council of the 
Federation of American Scientists recommended that the Adminis-
tration should "seek worldwide cessation of nuclear weapons tests 
without making this contingent on achieving more far-reaching goals 
in arms limitation."27 In May and June over two thousand American 
scientists signed Linus Pauling's petition urging an immediate inter-
national agreement to stop the testing of nuclear bombs. 28 In public 
pronouncements, Dr. Pauling, winner of the 1954 Nobel prize for 
research in molecular chemistry, stressed the dangers of radioactive 
fallout resulting from nuclear testing. 
Voices in the Congress 
Various congressmen also urged that the United States should 
seek a test ban of some sort. In June Senator Mike Mansfield, a 
25See Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, 
p. 154; Thomas E. Murray, Nuclear Policy for War and Peace (1960), 
pp. 86-89; and Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, pp. 31-34. 
26For the reaction of one Administration official see Lewis L. Strauss, 
Men and Decisions (1962), pp. 416-17. 
27Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (April 1957), p. 
138. 
28See ibid., Vol. XIII, No. 7 (September 1957), pp. 264-66. 
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member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, proposed that a 
summit conference should be held on halting tests of large nuclear 
weapons. That same month, Representative Chet Holifield, Chair-
man of the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy, recommended that the United States might 
unilaterally halt such tests to alleviate the problem of fallout. In July, 
Representative Sterling Cole, another member of the Special Sub-
committee, made a similar proposal. The recommendations by 
Representatives Holifield and Cole-Democrat and Republican re-
spectively-were especially noteworthy because they were made 
immediately after their Subcommittee had conducted an extensive 
public hearing on the dangers of radioactive fallout. 29 During the 
year, the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations explored the issue of a test ban, and in Novem-
ber, the Chairman, Hubert H. Humphrey, suggested in a letter to 
President Eisenhower that the United States should: 
. . . declare its willingness to negotiate separately on a 
ban on nuclear weapons tests for a 2-year period with the 
only condition being agreement on an effective inspection 
system with United Nations supervision to insure that the 
ban is being scrupulously observed. 30 
Although President Eisenhower's reply was noncommittal,81 he 
obviously had to take these pressures into account. Thus, the Ad-
ministration was being pushed by powerful international and domes-
tic forces toward agreeing to some limited accord for the cessation 
of nuclear weapon tests. 
New Tasks for Nuclear Weapons 
However, other influential factors worked in a different direc-
tion. Although by this time the United States had abandoned "mas-
sive retaliation" as a conceptual basis for its military doctrine-if 
29U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Special Subcom-
mittee on Radiation, Hearings: The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its 
Effects on Man, 3 parts, 85th Congress, 1st Session (1958). 
sou.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommit-
tee on Disarmament, Control and Reduction of Armaments: Final Report, 
85th Congress, 2d Session (1958), p. 34. 
31Jbid. 
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it indeed had ever accepted this concept in its bald outline32-it 
still relied heavily on nuclear weapons to deter Soviet expansionist 
moves. The Air Force, and within it the Strategic Air Command, 
continued to receive the largest share of the defense budget. More-
over, by 1957 nuclear weapons were also being thought of as im-
portant elements in the armament of American tactical forces. 
Thus, a test ban might inhibit developments of potential importance 
for both the strategic and tactical forces of the United States. This 
raised the fundamental issue of the effects of a nuclear test ban on 
the distribution of military power. 
At the time, American scientists were working on the develop-
ment of so-called "clean" weapons, which would produce little or no 
radioactive fallout. In general terms, since fission (the splitting of 
atoms) results in the release of radioactive products, while fusion 
(the joining together of atoms) does not, other things being equal, 
the radioactive fallout resulting from a nuclear weapon depends 
upon the relative extent to which fission and fusion processes con-
tribute to the energy of the weapon. 88 Making a "clean" bomb there-
fore depends upon minimizing the proportion of the energy of the 
weapon derived from fission and maximizing that derived from 
fusion. Such weapons could be of special importance in defense 
against a nuclear-missile attack and in tactical situations. In addi-
tion, the scientists were attempting to improve the yield-to-weight 
ratio of nuclear weapons, a development which would have general 
utility, but which would probably have greater significance for the 
United States than for the Soviet Union, since in the immediate 
future Soviet missiles would have greater thrust and therefore 
greater carrying capacity. 
This work was outlined in secret testimony before the Military 
Applications Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, which was headed by Senator Henry M. Jackson, on June 
82Jnsufficient attention has been paid to the differences between John 
Foster Dulles' speech before the New York Council on Foreign Relations 
and his subsequent article, "Policy for Security and Peace," Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. XXXII, No. 3 (April 1954), pp. 353-64. In the latter, he stated a posi-
tion which was not too different from that of many of his limited war or 
graduated deterrence critics, see especially pp. 358-59. 
sasee U.S. Department of Defense, Samuel Glasstone (ed.), The 
Effects of Nuclear Weapons (1962, revised edition), pp. 414 ff. 
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24, 1957, by three scientists from the Livermore Radiation Labora-
tory of the University of California, Ernest 0. Lawrence, Mark M. 
Mills, and Edward Teller.34 The members of the Subcommittee were 
particularly impressed with the concept of a neutron bomb which 
the scientists advanced. This weapon would have a relatively low 
yield and would have its greatest use in battlefield situations. It 
would be produced by tailoring the energy of a fusion explosion so 
that its primary product would be a burst of neutrons, instead of 
heat and blast. This burst would operate as a kind of death ray, 
doing almost no physical damage and leaving no contamination, 
but immediately destroying all life in the target area. Since this 
weapon would not produce fallout, there was no contradiction be-
tween the interest which certain Congressmen, such as Representa-
tive Holifield, displayed in it, and their position with reference to 
discontinuing tests of high yield, "dirty" weapons. The Subcommittee 
members arranged for the scientists to present their concept to 
President Eisenhower the following day. That the President was 
impressed can be seen by comparing his remarks on a test ban at 
his news conferences on June 19 and June 26.35 On the latter occa-
sion his support of an agreed cessation of further tests was a bit 
more cautious and qualified. 
In addition to these factors, several policy-makers had the 
suspicion that the Soviet Union's demand that further testing be 
stopped was merely a continuation of its "ban the bomb" campaign. 
They thought that the Soviet Union would regard a test ban as a 
prelude to a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and that the 
whole campaign was merely an effort to render ineffective the 
American superiority in nuclear weapons while preserving Soviet 
preponderance in conventional arms. There was sufficient evidence 
to give this interpretation some plausibility. During his opening 
statement in the General Assembly in September 1957, Soviet 
Foreign Minister, Andrei A. Gromyko, in listing the advantages of 
a temporary cessation of nuclear weapons tests, asserted that it 
would constitute "a first practical step towards the main goal-the 
absolute and unconditional prohibition of atomic and hydrogen 
34See Charles J. V. Murphy, "Nuclear Inspection: A Near Miss," 
Fortune, Vol. LIX, No. 3 (March 1959), pp. 122-25, 155-62, at 156, and 
New York Times, June 25, 1957, p. 1, June 25, 1961, p. 1. 
35See New York Times, June 20, 1957, p. 18, and June 27, 1957, p. 10. 
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weapons. "36 The same thought, in almost identical phraseology, was 
contained in the preamble to the draft resolution on this issue which 
the USSR submitted to the twelfth Assembly.37 
For all of these reasons a number of high officials, such as 
Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, several members of the Commission, and Secretary of Defense 
Charles E. Wilson, argued that a test cessation without other meas-
ures of arms control would be harmful to American security in-
terests. However, some individuals in this group, for instance 
Commissioner Thomas E. Murray, would have been willing to have 
the United States forego testing high yield nuclear weapons in the 
interest of reducing the effects of fallout. The argument that no test 
ban could be considered unless it were linked with other measures 
of arms control was pressed forcefully within the Administration, 
and carried the day, but curiously it was not articulated clearly or 
effectively in public until a later time. 
The NATO Interest 
Significant international factors were pressing in a similar direc-
tion. The attitude of France has already been mentioned. On a 
more general level, the Western alliance was just as dependent upon 
American strategic nuclear power as was the United States. More-
over, in 1957 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was in the 
midst of what proved to be a series of crises concerning its stra-
tegic doctrine. NATO strategy had always been based on the con-
cept of the "sword" and the "shield"; the "sword" being the 
strategic forces of the United Kingdom and the United States, and 
the "shield," local forces within Europe. Although the local forces 
had never been brought up to a level which military planners con-
sidered adequate to counter the opposing Eastern forces, until the 
middle nineteen-fifties there had been general confidence that the 
superior strategic capability of the United States would deter an 
attack. With the growth of the USSR's strategic capacity, this 
confidence gradually began to wane. Many felt that the USSR could 
36UN, General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Official Records (12th 
Session), p. 33. See also V. V. Kuznetsov's statements in the Politic1tl Com-
mittee, UN, General Assembly, First Committee, Official Records (12th 
Session), pp. 97, 135. 
37UN Document A/3674 and Rev. 1. 
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neutralize NATO's "sword," and that then Europe would be left 
with only a flimsy "shield." 
Since the NATO powers, for a variety of reasons, appeared 
to be unwilling to raise the level of local forces-indeed, in 1957 
there were even cutbacks-there was considerable groping for some 
method of restoring confidence. One idea was that arming the local 
forces with tactical nuclear weapons might make up for the gap in 
numbers, and the NATO Council authorized such action in Decem-
ber 1954. However, because the United States alone could make 
such weapons and because the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 pro-
hibited the transfer of such weapons from American control, only 
American troops in Europe received such armaments. Another prob-
lem was that the tactical nuclear weapons then in existence, if used, 
could well contaminate large areas of Europe; hence the attractive-
ness of a neutron bomb. 
A second idea for strengthening NATO was dispersing strategic 
capabilities among more NATO members.38 NATO began to move 
in this direction in December 1957 when the NATO Council, 
consisting, for this meeting, of the heads of governments, decided to 
establish stocks of nuclear warheads in Europe and to put inter-
mediate range ballistic missiles at the disposal of the Supreme Allied 
Commander. Again because of the provisions of the Atomic Energy 
Act, the warheads would remain in the control of American forces; 
the missiles, however, could be given to non-American troops. 
Neither solution was totally satisfactory. Both left Europeans 
dependent on American willingness to use nuclear weapons, and 
many doubted even at that time that, short of an attack on the 
United States, an American President would actually take such a 
decision, even though at the December meeting President Eisen-
hower promised that he would do so. Therefore, the crisis concern-
ing NATO strategy created pressures both for the development of 
clean weapons and for the dispersal of nuclear weapons, either by 
independent weapons programs, as in the case of France, or by 
transfer of knowledge or the actual weapons themselves. As early 
38For cogent expressions of this proposal see Hans Speier, German 
Rearmament and Atomic War (1957), pp. 227-34, and Hans Speier, "Soviet 
Atomic Blackmail and the North Atlantic Alliance," World Politics, Vol. 
IX, No. 3 (April 1957), pp. 307-28. 
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as April 1957, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer declared that Germany 
should be allowed to have tactical nuclear weapons for its own 
defense. 39 During the year other NATO political leaders stated that 
all NATO forces should be so armed, and there was some discussion 
of the creation of a NATO strategic force. Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles, in an article which was published in the October 
1957 issue of Foreign Affairs, indicated that he was considering 
these possibilities. 40 On the twenty-fifth of that month in a joint 
statement President Eisenhower promised Prime Minister Macmillan 
that he would ask Congress to amend the Atomic Energy Act so as 
to permit a "close and fruitful collaboration of scientists and engi-
neers of Great Britain, the United States, and other friendly coun-
tries."41 These developments explain why the Western powers 
included in their first stage package proposal submitted to the 
London Disarmament Subcommittee on August 29, 1957, provisions 
which would have allowed the transfer of nuclear weapons. 
To summarize the situation as it stood at the end of 1957, 
although there were powerful international and domestic pressures 
favoring an attempt to negotiate an arms control agreement covering 
only a cessation of nuclear weapons tests, there were also strong 
policy considerations pushing American policy-makers in a different 
direction. Presumably, the USSR's leaders were also subject to 
domestic and international pressures, but any analysis along these 
lines would be beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that 
during 1957 Nikita S. Khrushchev seemed to be moving toward the 
consolidation of his power, Messrs. Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov, 
and Shepilov were dropped from their party and governmental posts 
as a result of a meeting of the Central Committee in late June, and 
Marshall Zhukov suffered the same fate in October and November. 
It was impossible to know the actual meaning of these events, but 
in the West they were widely interpreted as heralding a victory for 
the advocates of a moderate policy. 
39Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1957 
(1957), p. 98. 
40"Challenge and Response in United States Policy," Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. XXXVI, No. I (October 1957), pp. 25-43, at 30-33. 
41U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVII, No. 959 (Novem-
ber 11, 1957), p. 740. 
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N 
A New Base for Scientists in the White House 
The Science Adviser and PSAC 
Government organizations and procedures also affect the substance 
of policy. Since key decision-makers cannot help but be influenced 
by their immediate advisers, the question of access is crucial. Sig-
nificantly, the formal arrangements for the participation of scientists 
in the policy process within the United States government were 
altered in late 1957, and a new group of scientists was given im-
mediate access to the President. This change is an important element 
of the background for the Geneva test ban negotiations. 
The change actually came about as a response to two spectacu-
lar Soviet scientific feats. On October 4, as a part of its participa-
tion in the International Geophysical Year, the USSR launched the 
first earth satellite, Sputnik I. About a month later, on November 3, 
the Soviet Union launched the half-ton, dog-carrying Sputnik II. 
These accomplishments were impressive evidence of Soviet scientific 
capabilities. They also had ominous connotations, for they indicated 
that the USSR led the West in the development of ballistic missiles. 
Westerners were hardly reassured when the Soviet Union announced 
on October 7 that it had successfully tested a powerful hydrogen 
warhead of a new design. Soviet leaders emphasized that their mis-
siles could easily carry such warheads. 
In an effort to restore confidence in American capabilities, 
President Eisenhower made a special telecast on November 7. After 
recounting American military strength and scientific prowess, the 
President admitted that there were certain deficiencies, and he pro-
claimed that science and technology would receive greater emphasis 
in the future governmental programs. As a first step, he appointed 
James R. Killian, Jr., President of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, as his Special Assistant for Science and Technology. 
Several days later, the President announced that the membership 
of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mo-
bilization (ODM) would be enlarged and that the Committee would 
become a part of the White House Office on December 1. This 
Committee, which consisted of nongovernment scientists sitting on 
a part-time basis with certain government administrators serving 
as consultants, had been appointed by President Truman in 19 51.42 
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Dr. Killian had been a member of the group, and with the ad-
ministrative change, he became its Chairman. In the past, however, 
the Committee had had access to the President only through the 
Director of ODM; now it was in a quite different position. 
The effect of these decisions was to introduce a new group of 
scientists into the highest levels of the policy-making process within 
the United States.43 Of course many scientists had had access to 
those levels previously, but in the mid-nineteen-fifties they had 
principally been those who were directly connected with the Atomic 
Energy Commission and the Department of Defense. Although the 
President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) contained a wide 
range of views, there were clearly some members who held opinions 
different from those which had previously been heard within the 
inner circles of the Eisenhower Administration. 
Thus, when the issue of further testing of nuclear weapons 
came up again, as it was certain to, given the course of the past 
negotiations and the current of international and domestic pres-
sures, the President would have scientists on his own staff to turn 
to for advice and would be confronted with new positions and 
viewpoints. With this development, the stage was set for the first 
act of the nuclear test ban negotiations. 
42For a general description of the evolution of the role of scientific 
advisers in the policy process in the United States see J. Stefan Dupre and 
Sanford A. Lakoff, Science and the Nation: Policy and Politics (1962), pp. 
64-77. 
43The initial members of PSAC were Dr. Robert F. Bacher, Dr. William 
0. Baker, Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner, Dr. Hans A. Bethe, Dr. Detlev W. Bronk, 
Dr. James H. Doolittle, Dr. James B. Fisk, Dr. Caryl P. Haskins, Dr. James 
R. Killian, Jr., Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, Dr. Edwin H. Land, Dr. Emanuel 
R. Piore, Dr. Edward M. Purcell, Dr. Isador I. Rabi, Dr. H. P. Robertson, 
Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, Dr. Herbert York, and Dr. Jerrold R. Zacharias. All 
but seven of the eighteen were physicists. The seven who were not were 
Baker (physical chemistry), Bronk (physiology, biophysics), Doolittle (avia-
tor), Haskins (physiology, genetics), Killian (administration), Kistiakowsky 
(chemistry), and Wiesner (electrical engineering). In Robert Gilpin's terms, the 
"finite containment school" scientists now had access to the Eisenhower Ad-
ministration comparable to that which those of the "infinite containment 
school" had had (American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, pp. 176-
77). Although his categorization can be criticized as oversimplified, the 
broad point in this case is certainly valid. For confirmation by a knowledge-
able and sensitive journalist see Saville R. Davis, "Recent Policy Making in 
the United States Government," in Donald G. Brennan (ed.) Arms Control, 
Disarmament and National Security (1961), pp. 379-90, at 384-85. 
Chapter III 
The Conference of Experts 
I 
The Context-1958 
The developments which began to take shape in 1957 continued 
their course with little change in the first half of 1958, and pre-
determined in large measure both the nature of the next negotiating 
forum and the subject matter for the negotiations. 
Due to the refusal by the Soviet Union to accept the new 
composition of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, there 
was no agreed forum for continuing arms control and disarmament 
negotiations. In mid-February the Japanese government began to 
explore with other governments the possibility of convening a 
meeting of the Disarmament Commission, but this initiative was 
abandoned when on March 14, the USSR reiterated its refusal to 
participate in the Commission as long as the majority of its mem-
bers belonged to Western military alliances. The impasse thus re-
mained and could not be broken within the context of the decisions 
of the twelfth Assembly. 
The pressure against the testing of nuclear weapons also con-
tinued unabated. Indeed, on the first day of 1958, the Afro-Asian 
Solidarity Conference, meeting in Cairo, adopted a declaration 
which among other things called for a cessation of further tests. 1 
On January 13, Linus Pauling presented his petition urging an 
immediate accord to halt tests, now signed by more than nine thou-
sand scientists from forty-three countries, to the Secretary General 
of the United Nations. On February 1, The Council of the Federa-
tion of American Scientists adopted a statement favoring a test ban 
which would cover even the smaller nuclear weapons and asserting 
that an appropriate control system could easily be established.2 
ISee New York Times, January 2, 1958, p. 2. 
2Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. XIV, No. 3 (March 1958), p. 
125. 
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From the point of view of the American Administration, per-
haps the most significant pressure was that engendered by Senator 
Hubert H. Humphrey's Subcommittee on Disarmament. This group 
held a series of hearings in February, March, and April, which will 
be considered in detail later, to explore the question of a nuclear 
test ban. Although the Subcommittee ostensibly approached the 
matter without a prior commitment to any position, at least some 
of the Senators clearly thought that the hearings should serve 
primarily to demonstrate the feasibility of developing a control 
mechanism for policing a test ban and also the wisdom of attempting 
to negotiate a separate agreement on this issue. The Chairman, 
Senator Humphrey, had, after all, written to the President urging 
such a course as early as November 1957. Senator Humphrey 
obtained strong support for his views in the hearings from Senators 
Stuart Symington, a former Secretary of the Air Force and a lead-
ing Congressional expert on military affairs, and Clinton Anderson, 
Vice-Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. 
On the other hand, the forces which operated in the opposite 
direction also continued unabated. Some scientists and policy-
makers asserted that further testing would result in breakthroughs 
for "defensive" weapons, and in discoveries that would lead to 
important peacetime uses of nuclear energy. In the latter connec-
tion, the Atomic Energy Commission, which was consistently con-
cerned lest a test ban impair weapons development, now also 
stressed the importance of its Project Plowshare, a continuing series 
of experiments designed to explore the peaceful uses of nuclear 
explosions for such purposes as building harbors or canals. It is 
important to realize that there has always been a significant link 
between the Plowshare experiments and the attempt to achieve 
"clean" bombs or neutron weapons, for using nuclear detonations 
as a means of excavation would be practical only if one could 
minimize the radioactivity resulting from the detonation. Planners 
in Project Plowshare have always counted on the availability of 
"clean" bombs. 3 Put in another fashion, the Plowshare experi-
ments could have been in the very forefront of nuclear weapons 
SSee Arnold Kramish, The Peaceful Atom in Foreign Policy (1963), 
p. 123. 
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research since they involved minimizing the amount of fission 
products in nuclear explosions. 
Edward Teller, at that time Associate Director of the Uni-
versity of California Radiation Laboratory, was the most forceful 
and articulate· exponent of the case for further testing. Although 
he expounded his views in various forums, his most complete ex-
position was in a book entitled Our Nuclear Future,4 which he wrote 
jointly with Albert Latter, a physicist employed by the RAND 
Corporation, an independent research organization supported prin-
cipally by contracts from the Air Force. In their book, the two 
men minimized the danger of radioactive fallout, and argued the 
need for continued testing. 
So far as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was con-
cerned, the events of early 1958 were a logical outgrowth of the 
decisions of the previous fall. In pursuance of these decisions 
atomic weapons were to be stocked on the territory of certain 
NATO countries, under the custody and control of United States 
military forces, to be turned over to NATO forces on the outbreak 
of hostilities at the direction of the President. Selected NATO 
countries were to be furnished missiles to which the atomic war-
heads might be attached, although the warheads would remain 
in American custody until the President authorized their transfer. 
Thus the actual use of the nuclear components of the weapon 
systems was to be dependent on an American decision. 
The implementation of this plan was impossible under existing 
United States legislation. Consequently, the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 was amended on July 2, 1958.5 The amended act authorized 
the · transfer of the non-nuclear parts of atomic weapon systems 
and the communication of sufficient information to enable non-
United States forces to handle atomic warheads, attach them to 
missiles, and monitor them prior to launching. The non-nuclear 
parts of atomic weapon systems could be transferred only to an 
individual nation and subject to the condition that "such transfer 
will not contribute significantly to that nation's atomic weapon 
design, development, or fabrication capability." Information could 
4Edward Teller and Albert L. Latter, Our Nuclear Future: Facts, 
Dangers, and Opportunities (1958). 
5J>ublic Law 479, 85th Cong.; 72 Stat. 276 (1958). 
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be communicated either to a nation or to a regional defense organi-
zation such as NATO. 
Another important innovation of the amended act was the au-
thorization to transfer nuclear material for use in atomic weapons and 
non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons, and to communicate design 
information required for the fabrication of the nuclear core and 
assembly of the weapon. However, such cooperation could be 
undertaken only if the recipient nation had "made substantial 
progress in the development of atomic weapons." 
Congress intended to limit the benefits of these provisions to 
the United Kingdom through this caveat. Although Congress clearly 
did not wish to encourage additional nations to achieve production 
capability, the caveat in a sense put a premium on developing in-
dependent production capability and may have served as a goad to 
the French nuclear weapons program. In addition, it probably 
added to General de Gaulle's bitterness toward the "Anglo-Saxons" 
at a time when, restored to power in the context of a military 
rebellion, the General began to shape a program for his Fifth 
Republic in which an independent force de frappe was to play a 
crucial role. 
On July 3, the day after the amended act came into effect, 
the United States and the United Kingdom signed an Agreement 
for Cooperation. 6 This agreement authorized the communication of 
information concerning non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems 
and information concerning nuclear reactors for military purposes. 
It also authorized the transfer of a nuclear submarine propulsion 
unit with its nuclear fuel. The following year the agreement was 
amended and the United Kingdom was in effect authorized to re-
ceive all of the component parts of an atomic weapon except its 
fabricated core. 7 Agreements for cooperation concerning military 
applications of nuclear energy as permitted under the 1958 amend-
ments were also signed with Canada, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Fr11nce, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey.8 
6U.S. Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts 
Series No. 4078 (1958). 
7U.S. Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts 
Series No. 4267 (1959). 
Bfbid., Nos. 4271, 4276, 4268, 4292, 4764, 4277, and 4278. A second 
agreement was signed with France in 1961: ibid., No. 4876. 
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While their provisions varied, none provided for an extensive col-
laboration as did the Anglo-American accord. 
During the spring of 1958, NATO planners laid the ground-
work for the employment on NATO bases of medium and inter-
mediate range ballistic missiles which would be equipped for nuclear 
warheads, and in June the first consignment of Redstone missiles 
was shipped to Europe for stationing in West Germany. 9 The first 
shipment of Thor missiles for delivery to the United Kingdom 
forces was received in September 1958. But these actions could 
hardly be called more than the implementation of the joint United 
States-United Kingdom communique of October 1957 and the 
NATO Council decision in December of that year. Moreover, they 
did not involve dispersing nuclear weapons capability to "nth coun-
tries." Whether or not they adequately anticipated the new role of 
continental Western Europe restored in its economic and political 
power, though, is another question. 
Because of the nature of these decisions NATO continued to 
be plagued by a crisis concerning its strategic doctrine. Nothing had 
been done to raise the level of the Alliance's conventional forces 
and thus to increase its capability to defend itself without resort to 
nuclear weapons; little had been done to increase the participation 
of the continental allies in the general policy-making within NATO; 
and the defense of Europe by nuclear weapons continued to de-
pend on either an American or a British decision to use such 
weapons-a situation which was to prove entirely unacceptable to 
France and which had already and would continue to cause con-
siderable concern elsewhere on the continent. Furthermore, the 
nuclear weapons then available if employed in Europe would cause 
so much contamination that they would have limited usefulness in 
tactical situations. The crisis in military planning in NATO there-
fore created two pressures against the cessation of nuclear weapons 
tests. First, it tended to provide an added argument for the French 
program to develop an independent nuclear capability, which, given 
the legal and other inhibitions against the transfer of nuclear wea-
pons, probably could not be achieved without testing. Secondly, it 
also provided an argument for the development of "clean" nuclear 
9See New York Times, June 4, 1958, p. 13. 
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weapons, and possibly a neutron bomb, which presumably would 
also require continued tests. 
In summary, in early 1958, American policy-makers were 
faced with roughly the same pressures and factors operating for 
and against the continued testing of nuclear weapons as they had 
been in 1957. 
II 
The Development of American Policy 
The Correspondence Between Heads of States 
In the months immediately preceding the Conference of Experts, 
American policy concerning the cessation of nuclear weapons tests 
was expressed principally in a series of exchanges of correspondence 
between President Eisenhower and the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers of the USSR, Nikolai A. Bulganin until March 1958 and 
Nikita S. Khrushchev thereafter. 
Within the United States government this exchange was treated 
primarily as an exercise in communications. The principal criterion 
determining what should be said appears to have been the esti-
mated impact of a given position on public opinion. In the process, 
decisions were made which resulted in quite far-reaching and per-
haps unforeseen consequences. American policy, as expressed in 
this exchange of letters, was not based on any considered and 
agreed position with respect to the interests of the United States, 
as was for instance the later decision to continue the 1958 Ameri-
can test series, nor was there any contingency planning concerning 
what the United States would do if certain of its proposals were 
adopted. 
The exchange began with a letter which Chairman Bulganin 
sent to President Eisenhower on December 10, 1957.1° In it, Bul-
ganin dwelt at length on the dangers which he felt would result 
from dispersing nuclear weapons, and especially those which he 
foresaw if West Germany were to be armed with nuclear weapons. 
His comments were clearly aimed at the agenda of the NATO 
Council meeting. After reviewing the state of disarmament negotia-
tions, he made a variety of proposals, of which the following were 
lOU.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 970 (January 
27, 1958), pp. 127-30. 
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the most important for the issue of nuclear testing. First he sug-
gested that the three nuclear powers should agree to stop further 
tests of nuclear weapons as of January 1, 1958, for a period of 
from two to three years. Secondly, he proposed that no nuclear 
weapons should be stationed in Germany, either the Eastern or the 
Western portion. He stated that if the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the Democratic Republic of Germany would agree neither to 
produce nuclear weapons nor to have them stationed on their ter-
ritory, Czechoslovakia and Poland would also take similar action. 
Finally, Chairman Bulganin suggested that these matters could all 
be resolved at a summit conference, and he stated his willingness 
to have a personal meeting with President Eisenhower. 
The President did not reply immediately, and his answer came 
in sections. Indirectly, he gave a partial answer through his pro-
posals at the NATO Council meeting, which, as we have seen, 
eventually involved stationing nuclear warheads for missiles in 
Europe, including Western Germany, although these would remain 
under American control. In addition, on December 15, he stated the 
American position on nuclear testing in a letter addressed to Prime 
Minister Nehru.11 The essence of his statement is contained in this 
excerpt: 
I do not believe that we can accept a proposal to 
stop nuclear experiments as an isolated step, unaccom-
panied by any assurances that other measures-which 
would go to the heart of the problem-would follow. We 
are at a stage when testing is required particularly for the 
development of important defensive uses of these weapons. 
To stop these tests at this time, in the absence of knowl-
edge that we can go on and achieve effective limitations 
on nuclear weapons production and other elements of 
armed strength, as well as a measure of assurance against 
surprise attack, is a sacrifice which we could not in pru-
dence accept. To do so could increase rather than dimin-
ish the threat of aggression and war. I believe that bolder 
and more far-reaching measures are required. Specifically, 
I believe that any government which declares its desire to 
agree not to use nuclear weapons should, if they are sin-
cere, be prepared to agree to bring an end to their pro-
11U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 967 (January 
6, 1958), pp. 17-18. 
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duction. Agreement to devote all future production of 
fissionable material to peaceful uses is, as I see it, the 
most important step that can be taken. Together with this 
we have proposed that we begin to transfer to peaceful 
uses, on a fair and equitable basis, fissionable material 
presently tied up in stocks of nuclear weapons. 
41 
It is difficult to measure the difference between President Eisen-
hower's statement and the Western position at the conclusion of 
the London session of the disarmament Subcommittee in August 
of the same year. The President implied in his letter that a test 
cessation might be a first step in a series of measures, but-as in the 
Western position in London-he clearly insisted on linking a test 
ban with an agreement for a cut-off on the production of weapons, 
and perhaps with an accord on transferring fissionable material 
from weapons stockpiles. The extent to which he contemplated 
links with other measures of disarmament was not clear. 
Finally, on January 12, 1958, President Eisenhower sent a 
formal reply to Chairman Bulganin.12 The only new element in 
this letter was the President's statement of his unwillingness to 
attend a summit meeting without proper preparatory work. He 
mentioned in particular the need for a meeting of Foreign Min-
isters, and repeated the suggestion that technical groups from East 
and West should meet together to discuss appropriate control 
mechanisms. 
This reply can be properly understood only in the context of 
earlier events. President Eisenhower had been greatly encouraged 
by his first summit meeting with the Soviet leaders in Geneva in 
1955. At least partly because of this euphoria, he was bitterly dis-
appointed when the agreements in principle reached at Geneva 
dissolved into thin air. As a result, he became even more skeptical 
of Soviet motivation in seeking agreement with the West, and was 
determined that the 1955 experience should not be repeated. 
Other letters were exchanged in February and March, but 
they were essentially restatements of points made in the original 
exchange. Perhaps the most important new element concerning the 
general positions of the two powers on arms control and disarma-
ment measures related to another aspect of military activities. In a 
12U.S. Department of State, Publication No. 7008, Historical Office, 
Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959. (1960), 2 vols., Vol. II, pp. 932-41. 
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letter of March 3, Chairman Bulganin stated that the questions of 
limiting the uses of outer space to peaceful purposes and the liqui-
dation of foreign military bases had to be considered together.13 
This point was also made in a proposal concerning outer space 
which the Soviet Union submitted on March 15 for consideration 
by the thirteenth General Assembly the following fall. In submitting 
this proposal, the Soviet Union stole a march on the United States, 
for although American spokesmen had said that some international 
action was necessary with respect to the use of outer space, the 
United States had not advanced any concrete proposal. Although 
these matters may seem rather remote from the issue of nuclear 
testing, they were relevant. 
In considering military policy, and in thinking about arms 
control or disarmament, it is necessary to consider the means of 
delivering explosives as well as the explosives themselves. The 
revolution that has taken place in military technology since the 
outbreak of the Second World War has involved both of these 
aspects. Not only has the explosive power of weapons been in-
creased vastly, but new carriers have also been invented which 
have greatly shortened the time that it takes for a weapon to reach 
its target. The developments with respect to carriers have had al-
most as frightening implications as those concerning explosives, for 
they have narrowed reaction times to dangerously short periods. 
The maximum warning time for a country under attack by inter-
continental ballistic missiles would be about fifteen minutes. In 
such circumstances there would be little time for rational con-
sideration. Decision-makers would have to respond quickly or risk 
the possibility of losing a substantial share of their forces. Since 
controlling the uses of outer space implied controlling the develop-
ment of missiles as carriers of explosives, this issue concerned the 
other part of the revolution in military technology, and thus was 
relevant to attempts to deal with nuclear explosives. 
The Debate About Linking a Test Ban with Other Measures of 
Arms Control 
In March 1958, then, it was obvious that if there were to 
be any progress in arms control negotiations, compromises would 
13U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 982 (April 
21, 1958), pp. 648-52. 
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have to be made. Soine agreement would have to be reached con-
cerning the negotiating forum, and the gap between the two sub-
stantive positions would have to be narrowed. So far as the 
American position was concerned, the question of linking a test 
ban agreement with an agreement on a production cut-off and 
other measures of arms control was subjected to intense scrutiny 
for the purpose of discovering whether some compromise might 
be possible. Although this debate occurred in many places, it was 
conducted in public principally before Senator Humphrey's Sub-
committee on Disarmament. 
On February 28, the opening day of the Subcommittee's hear-
ings, Harold Stassen, whose resignation as Special Assistant to the 
President for Disarmament had only recently been accepted, ad-
vocated a test ban as a separate measure.14 He argued that the 
control requirements for a test ban agreement were not very great 
and that such an agreement could therefore be negotiated with 
relative ease. He felt that a test ban agreement, in that it would do 
something to break the spiral of the arms race and would therefore 
hopefully have the effect of increasing confidence, might well be an 
important first step toward achieving other measures of arms con-
trol and disarmament. In subsequent sessions of the Subcommittee 
some of the problems of maintaining a link between a test ban and 
other measures of disarmament were brought out. 
On March 12, for example, in response to questioning, Dr. 
Spofford English of the Atomic Energy Commission stated that to 
police a cut-off on the production of nuclear weapons in the Soviet 
Union three thousand to thirty-five hundred inspectors would have 
to be stationed on Soviet territory, and he asserted that under a 
cut-off agreement there could be no secret information with respect 
to nuclear energy.15 In addition, the point was made several times 
in the hearings that there was no way of ascertaining with complete 
certainty the exact size and location of the stockpiles of nuclear 
weapons then in existence, since such weapons could be hidden 
14U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcom-
mittee on Disarmament, Hearings: Control and Reduction of Armaments, 
85th Congress, 2d Session (1958), pp. 1335-64. 
15Jbid., pp. 1420, 1423. Jules Moch presented a much smaller estimate 
to the United Nations Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission in 
1957. See UN Document DC/SC. 1/PV. 131, pp. 11-15. 
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with relative ease. Thus, it would be almost impossible to police 
an agreement concerning the transfer of fissionable materials from 
weapons stockpiles if the object of such an agreement were the re-
duction and ultimate elimination of the stockpiles. One would never 
know what the starting point was. 
On the other hand, the ease with which a test ban alone could 
be policed was brought out on several occasions. In his testimony, 
Harold Stassen estimated that eleven or twelve stations in the Soviet 
Union would be sufficient.l6 Later, Professor Harrison Brown, of 
the California Institute of Technology, estimated that only ten sta-
tions would be needed in the USSR, while Professor Jay Orear, of 
Columbia University, who had just completed a special study for 
Columbia University's Institute of War and Peace Studies,17 held 
that twenty-five would be required.18 
Whatever number one chose, it seemed clear that the control 
measures needed to police a test ban would not be very extensive. 
Thus the impression was given that linking a test ban with a produc-
tion cut-off and possibly a transfer from stockpiles was irrational, 
in that it meant joining a measure which did not require very 
much control with others which required extensive control and 
concerning which, therefore, agreement was unlikely. Clearly, this 
was the impression that Senator Humphrey at least had sought to 
create. 
In the hearings the various witnesses connected with the 
Atomic Energy Commission-the Chairman, Admiral Lewis L. 
Strauss; Commissioner W. F. Libby; Brigadier General Alfred D. 
Starbird; and Dr. Spofford G. English-all strongly defended the 
link. They argued that it was the production of nuclear weapons, 
not their testing that was dangerous for world peace. In addition, 
they held that the knowledge which would be derived from further 
testing would be of greater benefit to the defensive side in a future 
conflict and thus in their view would be more useful to the United 
States than to the Soviet Union. For some unexplained reason, 
they never made the obvious point that if a test ban were achieved 
without a production cut-off, the Soviet Union could continue to 
16Jbid., pp. 1351-52. 
17See Seymour Melman (ed.), Inspection for Disarmament (1958), 
pp. 85-99. 
IBHearings: Control and Reduction of Armaments, supra note 14, p. 1495. 
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enlarge its stockpile with the possibility that eventually it might 
equal or surpass that of the United States, thus wiping out this 
element of American superiority. Interestingly, no one from the 
Departments of State or Defense testified before the Subcommittee 
during these hearings. Therefore, the representatives of the Atomic 
Energy Commission were the only Administration witnesses. One 
could infer from the absence of the State Department spokesmen 
that Mr. Dulles was not very strongly interested in the issue at this 
time. 
The Soviet Cessation of Testing 
On balance, those who favored eliminating the link probably 
made the better case in public, but this was only one contributing 
factor in the evolution of American policy. A more important 
element-which, however, played on the same public sentiments-
was a step taken by the USSR. On March 22, the Soviet Union 
concluded an extensive test series which it had begun the previous 
fall. This series had been conducted at an unprecedented rate, 
with two or more nuclear explosions sometimes being detonated in 
a single day. Professor Hans A. Bethe, a physicist from Cornell 
University, who for some time had headed the Atomic Energy 
Commission's scientific panel which reviewed the effects of Soviet 
nuclear weapons tests, alleged that the pace was determined so 
that the series would be completed before the United States began 
its planned 1958 tests.19 As a consequence of the Soviet test series, 
radioactivity levels rose sharply in the spring of 1958. While the 
Soviet test series was in progress, it was largely kept secret within 
the USSR. After it was finished, however, on March 31, the Su-
preme Soviet adopted a decree resolving "to discontinue the testing 
of all types of atomic and hydrogen weapons in the Soviet Union. "20 
The decree also contained an appeal to the other nuclear powers to 
follow a similar course and the warning that if they did not, the 
Soviet Union would feel free to resume its own testing program. 
Chairman Khrushchev restated the appeal on April 4 in a personal 
letter to President Eisenhower. 
19Jbid., p. 1545. 
20U.S. Department of State, Documents on Disarmament, /945-1959, 
Vol. II, p. 979. 
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The USSR's action won worldwide public acclaim and put the 
United States in a difficult position, especially since it was just about 
to begin an extensive test series. President Eisenhower's dismissal 
of the Soviet move, in his press conference of April 2, as a "gim-
mick" that should not be "taken seriously," only served to corn-
pound the situation. 21 A day earlier Secretary of State Dulles had 
admitted that the USSR had at least scored a "certain propaganda 
victory. "22 
It was probably extremely difficult for Mr. Dulles to make 
this admission. No Secretary of State enjoys admitting a propaganda 
defeat, and in this case the unpleasantness was compounded by the 
fact that Mr. Dulles had seen the problem corning, and had sought 
to avoid it. Only a few days previously he had argued within the 
Administration that the United States should itself unilaterally stop 
testing, presumably because he had been forewarned that the Soviet 
Union might take this initiative.23 He argued his case principally in 
terms of the standing of the United States in world public opinion. 
His position was buttressed by his foreknowledge that a special 
panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee, which had 
been appointed in January 1958 and which was headed by Hans 
Bethe, would report its more or less unanimous view that a test 
ban could be policed and that to stop testing at some point in the 
near future would be in the best interests of the United States. 
The Bethe Panel 
The appointment of the so-called Bethe Panel was the result 
of a discussion of the question of nuclear testing at a National 
Security Council (NSC) meeting in early January. During the dis-
cussion Secretary of State Dulles made the point that the United 
States was suffering propaganda losses because of its nuclear test-
ing programs and expressed his fear that the United Nations 
General Assembly might soon adopt a resolution condemning fur-
ther testing, which he felt would prove extremely embarrassing to 
21New York Times, April 3, 1958, p. 1. 
22U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 982 (April 
21, 1958), p. 642. 
23Charles J. V. Murphy, "Nuclear Inspection: A Near Miss," Fortune, 
Vol. LIX, No. 3 (March 1959), p. 122, at 160. See also Secretary Dulles' 
own account: U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 982 
(April 21, 1958), p. 642. 
The Conference of Experts 47 
the United States. The President apparently shared his concerns. 
At this juncture, James R. Killian, Jr., the recently appointed 
Special Assistant for Science and Technology, whom the President 
had invited to attend the NSC meeting, offered to have the Presi-
dent's Science Advisory Committee conduct a study of the issues 
involved in banning nuclear weapon tests. In the late fall of 1957, 
at one of its first meetings in its new incarnation, PSAC had already 
begun a tentative exploration of some of the issues. 
A few days after the NSC meeting Mr. Killian was directed 
to appoint the Panel.24 In addition to Professor Bethe, the Panel 
contained one other member of PSAC, Dr. Herbert York, then 
Director of the University of California Radiation Laboratory at 
Livermore. The other members of the Panel. were military officers 
or civilian employees of the government. All members of the Panel 
were actively involved in either the nuclear weapons development 
or test detection programs. Although seismologists were available 
to the Panel, no seismologist was a member, nor did the member-
ship of PSAC include a seismologist. Ronald Spiers, a junior of-
ficer in Department of State, attended the sessions as an observer, 
but this was the only connection which the Department of State 
had. The Panel was asked to explore two questions: ( 1) what 
would be the effect of a nuclear test ban on American and Soviet 
weapons development programs; and (2) to what extent would it 
be possible to detect evasions of a nuclear test ban. 
In Professor Bethe's view, at the outset, the majority of the 
Panel was highly skeptical of the advantages to be gained from a 
nuclear test ban. Eventually, however, the members of the Panel 
became persuaded that continued testing would ultimately result 
in the Soviet Union's narrowing the United States' lead in the de-
velopment of more sophisticated nuclear weapons. 25 Professor Bethe 
probably held this view from the outset. In addition, unlike several 
24The members of the Bethe Panel were Dr. Hans Bethe, Chairman; 
Dr. Harold Brown; Major General Richard Coiner, USAF; General Herbert 
Loper; Dr. Carson Mark; Mr. Doyle Northrup; Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr.; 
Dr. Roderick Spence; Brig. General Alfred Starbird; Col. Lester Woodward, 
USAF; and Dr. Herbert York. 
25The findings of the Bethe Panel have never been made public. It 
seems reasonable to assume, however, that they are reflected in Professor 
Bethe's testimony before the Humphrey Subcommittee on April 17; see 
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other members of the Panel, he felt that the additional benefits to 
be gained from further testing were minimal. To put his views in 
proper perspective, it should be recalled that in 1950, at the time 
of President Truman's controversial decision to proceed with the 
development of the hydrogen bomb, Professor Bethe, along with 
several other scientists, had signed a statement recommending that 
the United States government pledge never to use hydrogen weapons 
first, and that he had strongly recommended that the government 
make every effort to reach an agreement with the USSR concerning 
the control of nuclear weapons. 26 This had ranged him in that 
debate opposite Edward Teller, perhaps the most ardent advocate 
within the scientific community of the development of the hydrogen 
bomb. 
Formulating the Initial American Response 
Within the counsels of the Administration, apparently Chair-
man Strauss and Donald Quarles countered Mr. Dulles' position 
by arguing that important military advantages would be gained 
from the forthcoming test series, a view shared by members of 
PSAC, including Professor Bethe. In the end then it was decided 
not to try to take preemptive action against a possible Soviet 
initiative in this matter. 
However, in the new setting the United States obviously had 
to make some response to the Soviet move, and to Chairman 
Khrushchev's letter of April 4. President Eisenhower's first reply, 
on April 8, was essentially a restatement of the general American 
position on arms control and disarmament issues, along with a 
repetition of the January 12 suggestion that technical experts from 
East and West should meet to discuss specific control measures. 27 
It neither advanced the negotiations nor detracted from the Soviet 
Union's propaganda advantage. 
Hearings, supra note 14, pp. 1526-47. In addition, the findings of the Bethe 
Panel have been analyzed in Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear 
Weapons Policy, pp. 179-82; and in Charles J. V. Murphy, "Nuclear Inspec-
tion: A Near Miss," supra note 23. 
26See "Let Us Pledge Not to Use the H-Bomb First," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, Vol. VI, No. 3 (March 1950), p. 75; and Hans A. Bethe, 
"The Hydrogen Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. VI, No. 4 
(April 1950), pp. 99-104, 125. 
27Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, pp. 982-85. 
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Apparently, Secretary Dulles drafted the letter himself. When 
the question was raised what would happen if the Soviet Union should 
accept the proposal for technical discussions, he averred that this 
was extremely unlikely, but that it was nevertheless a limited risk 
which he was willing to accept. He apparently felt that if the Soviet 
Union unexpectedly accepted the proposal, "the United States 
would have a fresh opportunity to pin the Kremlin down to either 
accepting an effective inspection system or rejecting it. The Ameri-
can propaganda position would benefit either way."28 
On April 22, Chairman Khrushchev sent another letter to 
President Eisenhower.29 The letter covered a range of points, but 
centered particularly on the issues of a test cessation and measures 
to guard against a surprise attack. With regard to the former, 
Khrushchev argued that no international controls would be neces-
sary to detect violations of a test ban, but that in any case the 
Soviet Union had already agreed in principle to the establishment 
of such controls. In response to the suggestion for a meeting of 
technical experts, he asserted that it would be impossible for the 
experts to contribute to the solution of the problem of disarma-
ment unless agreement had been reached between governments. To 
study the problem of control would simply delay matters. He also 
restated the Soviet positions concerning aerial inspection zones and 
controlling the uses of outer space. 
Meanwhile, Professor Bethe had reported the conclusions of his 
Panel to the President, and the President's Science Advisory Com-
mittee had retired to Ramey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico to 
reconsider the American position concerning a test cessation in 
the light of the unilateral suspension by the USSR. They returned 
with the recommendation that the planned test series should be 
completed, but that after that, the United States could risk a test 
suspension. 
President Eisenhower Suggests a Conference of Experts 
President Eisenhower's reply, dated April 28, to Chairman 
Khrushchev's most recent missive, appears to have reflected this 
advice and also the mounting pressure for a test suspension. 30 
28Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, p. 177. 
29Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, pp. 996-1004. 
30Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, pp. 1006-7. 
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Though quite brief, it clearly implied that United States policy was 
in transition. The President repeated the suggestion for technical 
studies, but this time in the specific context of an agreement to 
suspend testing. This significant sentence came immediately after 
the suggestion for technical studies: "Studies of this kind are the 
necessary preliminaries to putting political decisions actually into 
effect." Although this was followed by the caveat that technical 
studies would of course be without prejudice to the positions of 
the two sides, it should have been clear that if the USSR agreed to 
have a meeting of experts, and the experts reached an agreed con-
clusion on a control system, reservations or no, diplomatic negotia-
tions on a test ban agreement would be inevitable, and that these 
would be pursued separately from those on broader measures of 
arms control and disarmament. 
This letter was drafted in the Department of State and signed 
by the President and dispatched without consulting the Depart-
ment of Defense or the Atomic Energy Commission. Since the 
suggestion for technical talks had been a part of the American 
negotiating position since 1957, it was assumed-as it had been 
in the case of the April 8 letter-that there was no need for addi-
tional clearance. The immediate problem facing those who drafted 
the letter was to minimize the propaganda advantages which the 
Soviet Union had won, and at the same time, to permit the United 
States to continue its 1958 test series. The decision to continue 
this series of weapons tests was the only agreed decision within the 
Administration on the various issues involved. There were of course 
previous negotiating positions, but no formal consideration was 
given to the question of whether or not these were applicable to 
the current situation. The lack of consultation in the drafting of 
the President's reply prevented the development of an agreed 
position within the Administration about what the United States 
should and would do if the Soviet Union accepted his suggestion. 
The implications of the proposal were not thought through. 
Much to the surprise of most American policy-makers, Chair-
man Khrushchev in his next letter to the President on May 9, after 
belittling the need for technical discussions, nevertheless agreed to 
the proposal.31 Thus the Soviet Union now chose to accept a 
3IJbid., pp. 1036-41. 
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proposal which it had rejected or ignored ever since the London 
disarmament discussions and which reflected the Western emphasis 
on a control system as a prerequisite for any test ban agreement. 
American policy-makers could only speculate on the motivation 
for this step by the Soviet Union. As they viewed it, several factors 
conceivably could have had some infteunce. Having just completed 
the test series which had advanced the Soviet weapons art, Soviet 
leaders may have decided that a test ban agreement might be 
worth exploring because it would prevent further American testing 
and development of American weapons and because it might pro-
vide relief for the Soviet economy by slowing down the arms race 
and perhaps leading to further disarmament measures which in 
tum might reduce the chance of a nuclear war. The prospect of 
continuing American superiority in nuclear weapons perhaps was 
less objectionable in the light of Soviet advances in other weapons 
areas, especially missiles. Moreover, the Soviet military apparently 
displayed little interest in developing tactical nuclear weapons for 
which continued testing would be required. Again, a generally 
accepted test ban agreement might help to resolve the "nth 
country" problem: both Germany and China might be less likely to 
obtain a nuclear arsenal. In addition, a recognized US-USSR-UK 
monopoly in nuclear weapons might point toward broader settle-
ments among the three powers and a directorate-type sharing of 
power which has always seemed to appeal to the Soviet Union. 
The international pressures for a test ban mentioned earlier may 
have had some limited impact on the Soviet government, and the 
acceptance of President Eisenhower's proposal would obviously 
strengthen the image of the Soviet Union as being both reasonable 
and anxious to avoid further fallout pollution. To the extent that 
President Eisenhower's proposal may have indicated Western willing-
ness to take the test ban out of the disarmament package as a 
concession to the Soviet view, and considering the character of the 
proposed forum, it may have appeared worthwhile to test the West's 
price in terms of a control system, or perhaps to try for an un-
policed ban. It was also possible to believe, however, that the 
Soviet leaders merely hoped to maneuver the West into a temporary 
test suspension, which could be used to cut the Western lead in 
the development of nuclear weapons. 
A further exchange of letters between the two heads of states 
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ensued, and ultimately it was agreed that the Conference of Experts 
should open on July 1 in Geneva and that the Conference should 
consist of two panels of experts, one composed of specialists from 
the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada, and 
the other, of specialists from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, and Rumania. There was no consensus as to whether or 
not agreement at the Conference would automatically commit gov-
ernments to a test cessation; the USSR insisted that it would, but 
the United States insisted that it would not. 
Through the exchange of correspondence a new negotiating 
forum was created. Significantly, East and West received equal 
representation: the concept of parity for which the Soviet Union 
had striven unsuccessfully in the United Nations and which the 
Western powers had rejected in the twelfth Assembly only a few 
months before, was now established. The Soviet Union apparently 
viewed parity in representation as essential not only as an assurance 
against being "outvoted" but also as a recognition of what it claimed 
to be the new power relationship requiring equality in negotiations 
between East and West. 
Moreover, unlike the previous bodies for disarmament negotia-
tions, the new forum was outside of the framework of the United 
Nations, a development which caused Secretary General Hammar-
skjOld great concern. As recently as April 2, the Secretary General 
had argued that controlled disarmament would only be possible 
through the instrumentality of the United Nations,32 and as soon 
as the Conference of Experts appeared likely, he offered the United 
Nations' facilities and services. His offer was accepted and the 
Conference of Experts as well as the subsequent diplomatic negotia-
tions were held at the European headquarters of the UN and were 
serviced by the UN Secretariat personnel. A personal representative 
of the Secretary General attended all of the formal meetings. Al-
though the Secretary General's representative at times played an 
important role as an intermediary, there is no evidence that either 
he or the Secretary General influenced the basic course of the 
negotiations. 
The establishment of the new negotiating forum outside the 
United Nations was a logical consequence of the Soviet Union's 
32New York Times, April 3, 1958, p. 4. 
The Conference of Experts 53 
refusal to negotiate in the UN Disarmament Commission as en-
larged by the twelfth Assembly, and perhaps also of the endorse-
ment by the same Assembly of the general Western position on 
disarmament. It is also true, however, that moving outside the 
United Nations' framework had certain attractions for the West. 
Even in 1958 some in the West were beginning to be apprehensive 
about the implications of the UN's expanded membership. Also, 
serious negotiations usually require some privacy, which presumably 
it would be more difficult to ensure in the UN. Finally, the prob-
lem of nuclear testing primarily concerned the three nuclear powers. 
Although it may have been argued that the prestige of the United 
Nations was adversely affected, it is difficult to identify any tangible 
repercussions of the fact that the new forum was not created by the 
UN or specifically approved by it. The General Assembly continued 
to concern itself with the disarmament problem in its subsequent 
sessions, and to attempt to affect the course of the negotiations. 
One unique characteristic of the new negotiating forum de-
serves mention. International meetings of scientists arranged by 
scientific societies and institutions are, of course, a common oc-
currence. Another pattern is suggested by the 1955 and 1958 
international conferences on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 
organized by the United Nations in Geneva, at which scientists as 
members of governmental delegations exchanged and disseminated 
technical information. Again, scientists have frequently served as 
advisers to governmental delegations in the United Nations and 
other bodies and at times have ac~ed themselves as governmental 
delegates to technical international bodies and conferences. The 
1958 Conference of Experts, however, represented the first instance 
in which a group of scientists, under the rubric of a technical 
investigation, was given an independent, specific negotiating task 
which proved, as will be seen, of paramount importance as a link 
in a chain of vital diplomatic negotiations. 
Perhaps the implications of the new forum were not fully 
apparent to all persons concerned in the spring of 1958. But as a 
result of the modifications in the governmental positions mentioned 
earlier, the stage was set for the first phase of test ban negotiations. 
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Ill 
Preparations for the Conference 
The Western Panel of Experts 
After the preliminary arrangements were settled, or at least under-
way, it was necessary for the four Western governments to agree 
on the composition of the Western delegations. The Western panel 
of experts was announced on June 20. It included three Americans: 
Dr. James B. Fisk, then Vice-President of Bell Telephone Lab-
oratories and a member of the President's Science Advisory Com-
mittee; Dr. Robert F. Bacher, a professor of physics at the California 
Institute of Technology and a member of the President's Science 
Advisory Committee; and Dr. Ernest 0. Lawrence, the Director of 
the University of California Radiation Laboratory. The other mem-
bers of the panel were: Sir John Cockroft, a Fellow of the Royal 
Society; Sir William Penney, also a Fellow of the Royal Society; 
Professor Yves Rocard, the Director of the Laboratory of Physics, 
Ecole normale superieure de Paris; and Dr. Ormond Solandt, former 
chairman of the Defense Research Board of Canada. 
Dr. Fisk was appointed Chairman of the delegation. He was 
a prominent physicist, who, like many other American senior 
scientists, had had extensive administrative responsibilities for some 
time. Except for two brief teaching assignments, and a period in 
1947 and 1948 when he served as Director of Research for the 
Atomic Energy Commission, he had spent most of his active career 
with the Bell Telephone Laboratories, ·where he had been a Vice-
President since 1954. He had been a member of the Science Ad-
visory Committee since its formation. 
A number of advisers were also assigned to the Western delega-
tion. Among the Americans in this group were: university scientists 
including Professor Hans Bethe, who had headed the special PSAC 
panel, a number of scientists from government agencies and from 
the two laboratories which were involved in weapons develop-
ment (the University of California Radiation Laboratory in Liver-
more and the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory), and several of 
the scientists responsible· for the operation of the United States 
nuclear test detection system, which had been in existence since 
194 7. 33 The Atomic Energy Commission was kept informed of 
developments through Captain John H. Morse, Jr., who was a 
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Special Assistant to ABC's Chairman, Admiral Lewis L. Strauss. 
In addition, there were three officers from the Department of State: 
Donald Morris, a 28-year-old foreign affairs officer, who had joined 
the Department in June 1957; Ronald I. Spiers, the Officer in 
Charge of Disarmament Affairs, a Foreign Service Reserve Officer 
Class 4, who was 33, and who had joined the Department in 1955, 
after having spent five years with the Atomic Energy Commission; 
and Thomas B. Larson, 43, Chief of the Division of Research for 
the USSR and Eastern Europe, who as a Foreign Service Officer 
Class 3, held the highest rank. The fact that a person of as junior 
a rank as Class 4 was Officer in Charge of Disarmament Affairs 
reflects the scant attention given to such matters in the Department 
of State at that time. 
In the selection of American scientists for service on the 
delegation an attempt was made to maintain some balance between 
the differing views in the scientific community on the wisdom of a 
test ban agreement. However, this was largely a balance within the 
center, for the scientists who took extreme positions on either side 
were not represented. AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss had recom-
mended that Edward Teller be made a member of the Western 
delegation, but there was so much resistance to Dr. Teller that 
Strauss withdrew the suggestion, and instead recommended Dr. 
Lawrence. 34 James Killian recommended the other two American 
members of the Western delegation to President Eisenhower. Al-
though Dr. Bacher was somewhat favorably disposed toward a 
nuclear test ban, he was certainly not as ardent an advocate as 
33Jn addition to Professor Bethe, the other scientists were Harold 
Brown, Associate Director, Livermore Laboratory; Perry Byerly, Director, 
Seismographic Stations, University of California; Norman Haske!, Geophysics 
Research Directorate, Air Force, Cambridge Research Center; Spurgeon M. 
Keeny, Jr., Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and 
Technology; J. Carson Mark, Director, Theoretical Division, Los Alamos 
Scientific Laboratory; Doyle Northrup, Technical Director, Office of Atomic 
Energy, Department of Defense; George B. Olmstead, Assistant Technical 
Director, Office of Atomic Energy, Department of Defense; Carl F. Romney, 
Assistant Technical Director, Office of Atomic Energy, Department of De· 
fense; Herbert Scoville, Jr., Consultant, President's Science Advisory Com· 
mittee; and Anthony L. Turkevich, Enrico Fermi Institute for Nuclear 
Studies, University of Chicago. 
34Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, p. 182. 
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Hans Bethe, much less Linus Pauling. Dr. Fisk, the Chairman, 
was regarded as being "neutral" on the issue. 
This neatly contrived balance may have been upset somewhat 
by the fact that Dr. Lawrence became seriously ill during the course 
of the Conference. On the other hand, the other Livermore scientists 
on the delegation maintained frequent cable and telephonic con-
tact with Edward Teller in California. 
The effort to obtain a balanced representation may be taken 
in the first place as an indication of an awareness on the part of 
the American policy-makers that for a variety of factors, which 
will be discussed later, the technical investigation of the Conference 
would in fact require exercise of judgment which would or could 
be affected by the personal views of the scientists. In a delegation 
acting under governmental instructions the effect of personal views 
can be minimized if not eliminated. Not so in this "technical" 
delegation which was to function with minimal instructions, and 
which nevertheless was to grapple with problems that could not be 
resolved by resorting exclusively to scientific facts and knowledge. 
That the A9Jninistration felt it necessary to seek balanced member-
ship testified also to the deep division within the American scientific 
community regarding the wisdom of attempting to seek a test ban. 
Thirdly, the Administration may well have had in mind the need 
of ensuring widest possible support in the Congress and by the 
public generally for whatever conclusions would be reached by 
the Conference. 
Unlike the American members, the two British scientists, 
members of the Western delegation, as well as the British scientific 
advisors, all held official government positions. They were con-
nected with the Atomic Energy Authority, the United Kingdom 
counterpart of the US Atomic Energy Commission, and their selec-
tion does not appear to have been affected by their personal views 
on the desirability of a test ban. 
The Eastern Panel of Experts 
The Eastern panel of experts should be listed for purposes of 
comparison. It included Yevgeni K. Fedorov, a corresponding 
member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR; N. N. Semenov, 
an academician; I. Ye. Tamm, an academician; M. A. Sadovsky, 
a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR; 
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0. I. Leypunsky, a professor and doctor of physical-mathematical 
sciences; I. P. Pasechnik, a scientific collaborator of the Academy 
of Sciences of the USSR; K. Ye. Gubkin, a scientific collaborator 
of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR; and Semen K. Tsarapkin, 
chief of the section of international organizations, and member of 
the Collegium of the Soviet Ministry. of Foreign Affairs. In addi-
tion, scientists from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Rumania were 
also included. 
Dr. Fedorov, who served as Chairman and thus was Dr. Fisk's 
counterpart, was a geophysicist and had been a member of the 
Communist party since 1938. Since 1955 he had been Director of 
the Institute for Applied Geophysics of the Academy of Sciences 
of the USSR. He had been deeply involved in the Soviet sputnik 
program and had been a prominent Soviet representative in the 
International Geophysical Year. In 1958 he published a book 
entitled Rockets and Artificial Earth Satellites in Investigation 
of the Upper Atmosphere and the following year another entitled 
Weather Control. Interestingly, his earlier publications included 
The Red Army: An Army of the People (1944) and a novel, Con-
cerning the Russian Revolution, 1917-1921 (1939). 
His scientific colleagues on the panel were an impressive group. 
Dr. Semenov was the USSR's first Nobel prize winner. Tamm, the 
only Soviet delegate who was not a member of the Communist 
party, was a distinguished physicist; however, his actual role in the 
Conference was relatively slight. Dr. Sadovsky was a seismologist 
who apparently had been concerned for some time with the Soviet 
Union's nuclear test detection system. 
The inclusion of Mr. Tsarapkin, one of the USSR's leading 
diplomats, marked the most important difference from the composi-
tion of the American delegation, which had no diplomats among 
its members and included even among its advisors only junior 
diplomats. Fifty-two years of age, Tsarapkin had been a member 
of Soviet delegations to the United Nations since 1947, eventually 
becoming Secretary General of the delegation. During the Second 
World War, he had been Minister Counselor of the Soviet Embassy 
in Washington and he had represented the USSR at the Dumbarton 
Oaks and San Francisco Conferences. After the Conference of 
Experts he became the USSR's chief delegate in the test ban 
negotiations. He did not speak during the formal sessions of the 
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Conference of Experts, but it was obvious to the participants that 
he played a crucial role in determining the Eastern position. High 
ranking Polish and Czechoslovakian diplomats were also included 
in the Eastern panel. 
The Technical Preparation of the American Delegation 
Since the time between its appointment and the opening of 
the Conference of Experts was little more than five weeks, the 
American delegation had to rely for technical preparation prin-
cipally on their personal knowledge and experience, the work and 
conclusions of the Bethe Panel, and previous studies conducted by 
such groups as the task forces which Harold Stassen had assembled 
during his tenure of office. It is not clear, however, to what extent 
this earlier work was actually available and how much it was 
taken into account. Because the problem of detecting nuclear 
weapons tests involved a number of disciplines, several Western 
delegates had to spend part of their time prior to the conference 
merely in attempting to learn enough about disciplines other than 
their own so that they could understand their colleagues. 
Although the report of the Bethe Panel has never been made 
public, it is possible to make certain inferences concerning its 
nature. In general, it can be said the Panel concluded that large 
nuclear explosions on the surface of the earth and in the atmosphere 
and substratosphere could be detected fairly easily by the United 
States' own detection system, but that an international network of 
control stations and the use of airborne sampling techniques for 
the collection of radioactive debris would be necessary for the 
conclusive identification of such explosions and for the detection 
of low-yield tests. 
There were two possible environments for testing nuclear 
weapons in which the United States had little or no experience-,-
deep underground and at extremely high altitudes (above 30 to 50 
kilometers, or above approximately 19 to 31 miles). The United 
States had detonated only one nuclear explosion deep underground, 
the Rainier 1. 7 kiloton shot, fired in Nevada on September 10, 
1957. This shot had been designed as an experiment to explore 
whether certain kinds of weapons could be tested without creating 
radioactive fallout. It had been set up on a short time schedule, 
and was not highly instrumented. Thus, knowledge about the ex-
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plosion and its effects was limited. Although the purpose of the 
shot was not to measure detectability, because of the general 
interest in detectability the test had been announced in advance, 
and a number of seismological stations-seismic signals are the 
only known means for the ·detection of deep underground explo-
sions when no radioactive debris escapes the earth's s~rface-had 
voluntarily, and without financial .support from the government, 
attempted to detect it. The shot was detected by a number of 
seismological stations within a radius of approximately 650 miles 
and by two stations beyond that distance, the most distant of 
which was at College Station, Fairbanks, Alaska, approximately 
2,350 miles from the test site. However, it was somewhat debatable 
whether the signal which was received at that station would actually 
have been noticed there and distinguished from those created by 
minor earthquakes, had not the test been announced in advance. 85 
The direction of the first motion of the signal produced by a 
disturbance was probably the most important piece of diagnostic 
information-at least it was the one that most American seismolo-
gists felt should be used-in distinguishing between nuclear explo-
sions and minor earthquakes. In the case of an explosion the first 
motions in all directions from the event are compressions, which 
wiii be registered as outward movements, while in the case of an 
earthquake there are usually some rarefactions, which will be regis-
tered as inward movements. 
It is worth viewing the recording of the Rainier shot at College 
Station (Fig. 1), to see how difficult is the problem of distinguishing 
explosions from earthquakes. 
In any case, regardless of one's willingness to agree that ex-
plosions could be detected at great distances, it was clear that the 
Rainier shot had been detected at near stations and the tendency, 
at least in nonclassified studies, was to generalize and extrapolate 
from this single experiment. 36 Presumably, the Bethe Panel also 
followed this tendency. 
On the basis of the Rainier experiment, the general under-
:J5See the testimony of Admiral Lewis Strauss: Hearings: Control and 
Reduction of Armaments, supra note 14, pp. 1584-87. 
36See Seymour Melman (ed.), Inspection for Disarmament, pp. 88-
93. See also Jay Orear's testimony before the Humphrey Subcommittee: 
Hearings: Control and Reduction of Armaments, supra note 14, pp. 1496-
1500. 
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Fig. 1. Rainier seismic signal recorded at Fairbanks, Alaska. 
A Coast and Geodetic Survey photograph. 
standing was that even relatively small underground nuclear ex-
plosions could be detected, the exact magnitude depending upon 
the distance between control stations. The willingness of scientists 
to generalize on the basis of this one experiment varied greatly, 
depending on the individual's temperament, his basic predisposi-
tions, his office, and several other factors. Presumably, one factor 
was the way in which and persistence with which questions were 
asked. While a scientist in a laboratory might say that it was im-
possible to draw any general conclusion at this stage, the same 
individual might make some response when subjected to repeated 
questioning by government officials. 
The range of answers that was possible was brought out clearly 
in June 1958 when the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament pub-
lished the replies of thirty-five seismologists, geophysicists, and 
geologists to a questionnaire on the detection of and inspection for 
underground nuclear explosions. 37 The report contained a mass of 
contradictory information. Some of the scientists replied unam-
biguously that underground explosions could be detected, others 
thought that some such explosions could, while still others held that 
it was impossible to make any general statement on the basis of 
37U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommit-
tee on Disarmament, Control and Reduction of Armaments: Detection of 
and Inspection for Underground Explosions: Replies from Seismologists to 
Subcommittee Questionnaire: Staff Study No. 10 (Comm. Print 1958). 
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existing knowledge. There was no agreement concerning the size 
of signals produced by explosions of various yields. 
There was general agreement that on-site inspections would be 
necessary in some cases to determine whether an underground 
activity shown on a seismograph was an earthquake or a nuclear 
explosion, and in all cases to establish positive evidence that a 
nuclear explosion had taken place, since the only conclusive identi-
fication would be the discovery of radioactive debris. However, 
relatively little was known about the procedures which would be 
required in the case of an on-site inspection. Again, the Rainier 
shot was the only available experimental evidence. In that instance, 
even with foreknowledge of the location of the detonation, it had 
taken investigators more than two months to discover any radio-
active materials evidencing the explosion.38 Admittedly, this had 
been the first attempt of this nature, and the investigators had pro-
ceeded with great caution, but their experience was sufficient to 
indicate. that the task would be difficult. 
Prior to 1958, the United States had not detonated any 
nuclear weapons at high altitudes. (The Soviet Union may have.) 
Perhaps as a consequence, the Bethe Panel did not deal with test-
ing in this environment. 
There was still another area in which American technical 
preparation was relatively weak. Little thought had been given to 
ways in which nuclear explosions might be camouflaged and hid-
den. 39 There was not much experimental evidence, even with regard 
to fairly unsophisticated techniques such as shielding. Thus the 
Bethe Panel could not have done much more on this subject than 
to make certain hastily contrived assumptions and theoretical calcu-
lations. 
The Problem of the Threshold 
It was obvious to those who had studied the problem of de-
tecting nuclear explosions that in the prevailing state of knowledge 
no feasible system would be capable of detecting and identifying 
all explosions in all environments. There would always be, de-
assee Hearings: Control and Reduction of Armaments, supra note 14, 
pp. 1366-68. 
39See ibid., p. 1486. Jay Orear made a few estimates, but they were 
extremely unsophisticated. See ibid., pp. 1501-2; and Seymour Melman (ed.) 
Inspection for Disarmament, p. 96. 
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pending on the number of .control stations and their equipment 
and the rights of inspection, various thresholds beyond which under 
certain circumstances evasion might be possible. Apparently, the 
Bethe Panel made this point. However, neither that group nor the 
Administration generally reached a conclusion concerning what 
threshold would be compatible with American security interests; 
that is, concerning what was the maximum yield explosion which 
could be allowed to remain outside the absolute reach of the con-
trol system. Under the circumstances this was essentially a matter 
of political judgment which called for the highest level decision, 
taking into account all the relevant military as well as political 
considerations. 
Uncertainty about the threshold in large part accounted for 
the varying estimates of the number of control posts which would 
be needed in the USSR. Public estimates ranged from Professor 
Harrison Brown's statement before the Humphrey Subcommittee 
that ten would be sufficient, through Mr. Dulles' press conference 
remark that more than twenty-four would be required,40 to the 
high estimate given by Professor Frank Press, a leading seismologist 
at the California Institute of Technology, who stated that even 
with one hundred stations in the USSR, some nuclear explosions of 
2 kilotons or more might escape detection. 41 
In view of the then current interest in developing low yield 
tactical nuclear weapons-especially the neutron bomb, the detona-
tion of which would be difficult to detect-and because of the 
scientific possibility of extrapolating data gained from small ex-
plosions, there was general agreement that the threshold would 
have to be fairly low. Despite the urging of various scientists, 
however, the Administration did not attempt to reach a decision 
on a specific figure; instead this issue was dropped into the lap 
of the American delegation in Geneva. 
Policy-Makers' Awareness of the State of Knowledge Concerning 
the Detection of Nuclear Explosions 
It is important to ask how well United States policy-makers, 
whose decisions were responsible for the convening of the Con-
40U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 983 (April 28, 
1958), p. 684. 
41New York Times, May 1, 1958, p. 5. 
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ference of Experts, understood the state of knowledge with respect 
to the detection of nuclear explosions. It seems clear that they 
understood these matters in broad outline. Professor Bethe pre-
sented his conclusions· to the National Security Council in early 
April,42 and later that month testified before the Subcommittee on 
Disarmament. Of the forty-five minutes which the National Security 
Council spent discussing the issue, about forty were devoted to a 
discussion of the effects of a nuclear test ban on the relative military 
strength of the United States and the Soviet Union, and about five 
to a discussion of the problems of detection, although the fifteen-
page report was equally divided between the two questions. Pro-
fessor Bethe spent two hours and five minutes before the Sub-
committee on Disarmament. Most of that time was spent on the 
issue of detection. In addition, the Subcommittee received testimony 
from several other scientists on this issue on other occasions. 
Secretary of State Dulles' remarks in his news conferences 
indicate that in his case at least the scientists had made the point 
that no control system would give an absolute guarantee against 
evasion. 43 Indeed, it is widely reputed that members of the Presi-
dent's Science Advisory Committee were responsible for the ac-
ceptance by the Administration of the proposition that a less than 
absolute guarantee would provide adequate deterrence against eva-
sion, 44 although this idea certainly must have fitted Mr. Dulles' 
predispositions, as the broad concept of deterrence played an 
extremely important role in his own thinking. The political leaders 
must also have understood that very little was known about testing 
nuclear weapons deep underground and at high altitudes. In view 
of subsequent events, however, it is less clear that they understood 
the scientific implications of this lack of knowledge; that it was 
difficult if not impossible to predict what future discoveries would 
yield. Perhaps no one who did not have an extensive background 
in science could understand this, and, indeed, even some scientists 
42Charles I. V. Murphy, "Nuclear Inspection: A Near Miss," supra 
note 23, p. 124. 
43See especially his remarks at his news conference of April 8, 1958, 
U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 983 (April 28, 1958), 
pp. 682-83. 
44See William R. Frye, "The Quest for Disarmament Since World War 
II," in Louis Henkin (ed.), Arms Control: Issues for the Public (1961) pp. 
18-48, at 42. 
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occasionally tend to state their tentative conclusions as final answers. 
For the nonscientist, one confusing issue is that even the most 
tentative conclusions can be stated in what appear to be quanti-
tatively precise terms. Since the space age was only a few months 
old, the whole concept of testing nuclear weapons at high altitudes 
may well have seemed more like science fiction than reality. Nor 
is it clear that American policy-makers were fully aware of the 
inability on the part of the scientists to say with any degree of 
accuracy what would happen if clever scientific minds were ap-
plied to the task of devising means of conducting clandestine tests 
of nuclear weapons. Whether the scientists did their best to empha-
size these uncertainties and whether they were influenced in their 
presentation of the sketchy scientific facts by their own ideas re-
garding the wisdom of a test ban is also less than clear. 
The Instructions Given to the American Delegation 
The instructions which were given to the American members 
and advisors of the Western delegation to the Conference of Experts 
appear to have been minimal. In a press conference on June 10, 
Secretary of State Dulles described his instructions to the American 
experts in this manner: 
Our guidance to the United States experts, at least-1 
talked to them a few days ago and told them to look upon 
their job as a purely scientific technical job. They are to 
come to their own conclusions as to what is necessary to 
detect an explosion. Perhaps, in the light of the Soviet 
proposal, they may have to report on the evaluation of a 
lesser than complete detection system-bearing on the like-
lihood that there would be an evasion attempted. For ex-
ample, it may be that they would say this system isn't 
100 percent perfect but it is good enough that we would 
think that there would be a 75 percent chance that any 
evasion would be caught. They may have to make calcu-
lations of that sort. But we have given them complete 
authority to work on this matter as a purely scientific 
technical matter, to use their best judgment and report to 
us accordingly. I do not anticipate that there will be any 
need for political guidance. 45 
45U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 992 (June 30, 
1958), p. 1085. 
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Mr. Dulles was more painstaking in his private conversations than 
these remarks indicate. Terms of reference were drafted prior to 
the American experts' departure and a position paper was pre-
pared by the Department of State and cleared with other interested 
departments. Nevertheless, in broad outline, Mr. Dulles' press con-
ference remarks were a fairly accurate summary of the instructions. 
The American experts were given a great deal of freedom. They 
were merely told to seek some common understanding concerning 
the various techniques of detecting nuclear weapons tests, to 
analyze the capabilities and limitations of each technique, and to 
outline possible systems for policing a test cessation agreement. 
· They were not told what role and status any report resulting from 
the Conference of Experts would have. As an entity the Administra-
tion obviously had no clear conception or expectations in this 
matter. 
The general attitude reflected in these instructions or lack 
thereof partially explains why the advisers from the Department of 
State who were attached to the Western delegation had such rela-
tively junior rank, in contrast to the Soviet delegation which in-
cluded a senior diplomat as a full member. The assumption ap-
parently was that the Conference of Experts would be purely a 
technical conference, and the Department of State adhered to this 
assumption throughout the Conference, for although the American 
delegation reported daily, it was never given fixed instructions nor 
told what position to take. A large number of the scientists in the 
American delegation also regarded their task as a purely technical 
one. Public opinion, however, certainly did not treat the Conference 
in this fashion. On the contrary, it was widely heralded in the 
public debate as an event of great political significance, as the 
prelude to a test ban agreement. That the public concept of the 
political nature and significance of the Conference was not far from 
reality was to be brought out by subsequent events. 
One of the few political instructions which the American ex-
perts were given was that any control system must ultimately in-
clude mainland China. 46 The reason for this was that it was thought 
46Jn the same press conference, Mr. Dulles made the following state-
ment: "I would suppose that we would want to have-that the experts would 
feel we needed to have-inspection posts with some mobility not only in the 
Soviet Union but also on the mainland of China and other areas of that 
sort." Ibid., p. 1085. 
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that control posts on mainland China would be necessary for the 
detection of certain explosions inside some border areas of the 
USSR. Moreover, without control posts in China, in view of the 
Sino-Soviet alliance, the Soviet Union might conduct clandestine 
explosions there. It was known that the Soviet Union had conducted 
certain underground tests in China, though these were assumed to 
be chemical explosions. 47 Because of the United States' position 
wi~ respect to the recognition of the People's Republic of China, 
however, the experts were not permitted to refer to China, but 
instead had to insist on drafting a scheme for a "worldwide" sys-
tem. As Mr. Dulles put it in a press conference: " ... after the 
experts decide where it is necessary to have these posts, then there 
will have to be a political problem dealt with."48 Apparently as of 
June 1958, he was not prepared to tackle this problem in the 
abstract. Considering the known views concerning Communist China 
of the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter 
S. Robertson, and other influential political leaders, the problem 
would indeed be formidable. 
Beyond this, the experts were, as Mr. Dulles said, "to come to 
their own conclusions." Thus the experts were asked to "decide 
where it is necessary to have these posts," to determine in general 
terms the number and location of the control posts without, how-
ever, being told what risks the United States was prepared to accept 
in view of the fact that a foolproof control system was not tech-
nically feasible. As the Conference unfolded-it will be seen shortly 
-other judgments with important political implications had to be 
made and Mr. Dulles' statement of instructions proved increasingly 
inadequate. 
The United Kingdom Component 
In addition to the Americans, the British were the only mem-
bers of the Western panel to play an important role in the Con-
ference of Experts. Like the Americans, the British scientists were 
given minimal political instructions. They were, however, urged to 
do all that they could to facilitate an agreement. They did not bring 
47See Hearings: Control and Reduction of Armaments, supra note 14, 
p. 1546. 
48U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 992 (June 30, 
1958), p. 1085. 
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a substantial body of independently obtained scientific information 
to Geneva. What information they had, they had gained from staff 
studies of the official Atomic Energy Authority, rather than from 
studies by panels of nongovernment scientists, such as had been 
used in the United States. The strength of the United Kingdom 
participation was mainly derived from the scientific competence 
and stature of the British scientists. 
IV 
The Conference 
The External Environment 
The Conference of Experts ran its course, on the whole, unin-
fluenced by external events. It was not that the world beyond the 
shores of Lake Geneva was static. On the contrary, East-West 
tension rose sharply during the period of the Conference. The 
principal cause was the crisis in the Middle East, which led eventu-
ally to military intervention by the United States and the United 
Kingdom. In the spiraling tension, the projected summit conference 
was at least postponed. The only encouraging development during 
the Conference of Experts was that on July 2, Chairman Khrush-
chev, in another letter to President Eisenhower, in a sense re-
sponding to the President's earlier general proposal, suggested that 
there should be a meeting at the expert level to consider practical 
aspects of the problem of developing guarantees against surprise 
attacks, and the United States agreed to this suggestion on July 31.49 
It later transpired, however, that the two governments were hope-
lessly at odds as to the nature of this meeting. 
One other external event should also be mentioned. On July 
2, the day after the Conference of Experts opened, Premier Charles 
de Gaulle stated in a letter to Chairman Khrushchev that France 
would not agree to a test ban unless it were accompanied by other 
measures of disarmament. 50 This communication made it clear 
that the French government, obviously determined to preserve its 
freedom to develop its own weapons program, was opposed to any 
loosening of the Western disarmament package. 
49Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, pp. 1084-90. 
50New York Times, July 3, 1958, p. 2. 
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The Agenda 
As had become the fashion in East-West meetings, the Con-
ference of Experts opened with an argument about the agenda. The 
argument stemmed from the Soviet desire to obtain a prior com-
mitment that the ultimate objective of the Conference was a test 
ban, 51 and the contrary Western desire to limit the Conference to a 
technical analysis of the methods of monitoring a test ban. 52 The 
USSR had know}l what the Western position would be even before 
the opening of the Conference, among other reasons, because the 
United States Embassy in Moscow had delivered to the Soviet For-
eign Ministry a list of the technical factors and special questions 
which the United States felt should be covered in the talks. Ob-
viously, though, the submission of the list did not settle the issue, 
and at the very outset of the Conference the experts were faced 
with an essentially political issue. In this debate, Dr. Fedorov 
argued that national detection systems would actually be adequate 
to monitor a test ban, while Dr. Fisk, on the other hand, main-
tained that an international system would be required. Some East-
West meetings, it will be recalled, have deadlocked on the agenda 
issue with political implications and have never reached the sub-
stantive problems. Unlike these confrontations, however, this con-
troversy about the agenda was resolved fairly easily, and the 
solution was largely based on the Western position. After a brief 
recess, an agenda was adopted, and technical discussions began at 
the third meeting on July 4, 1958. 
The Analysis of the Techniques of Detection 
After a general exchange of views concerning the various 
methods of detecting nuclear explosions, the Experts examined in 
detail each of the four basic methods-recording acoustic and 
hydroacoustic waves, recording radio signals, collecting radioactive 
debris, and recording seismic signals. During this phase, the Con-
ference was a curious cross between a diplomatic negotiation and 
an international scientific congress, with the latter aspect generally 
5lSee Ye. K. Fedorov's opening statement: Conference of Experts 
Document EXP/NUC/PV. 1, p. 27. Hereafter all documents of the Con-
ference of Experts and the Geneva Conference will be cited by their symbol 
only. 
52See J. B. Fisk's opening statement, ibid., p. 12. 
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predominating. 53 The objective was to write brief reports outlining 
the capabilities and limitations of each of the methods. This was 
mainly a matter of interpreting agreed theories and objective data. 
Nevertheless, the conclusions would have significance for national 
positions and policies, and this fact was always apparent. 
The Western scientists tended to present more quantitative data, 
and their interpretations were, in general, more conservative than 
those of their Eastern counterparts. In a sense, this situation was a 
logical consequence of the respective political positions of the two 
sides; since the West was insistent upon the necessity of inter-
national control, it also had to bear the burden of proof of the 
necessity for such control. The Soviet scientists consistently took the 
position that the progress of science would make the task of detec-
tion easier. Although the Western scientists were unwilling to admit 
such a broad proposition in principle, interestingly, in each of the 
specific assessments of the four main techniques of detection, they 
were willing to admit a statement to the same general effect. Thus, 
the concluding paragraph in each subsection analyzing a particular 
technique, contained a sentence stating that the capabilities of that 
particular technique will most likely improve in the future. 
One of the most significant features of the exchange between 
the Western and Eastern scientists concerning these matters was 
that it was incomplete. Neither side was willing to reveal the effec-
tiveness of its national detection system, nor to divulge information 
about its weapons tests which might not be known by the other 
side. Therefore, the Eastern scientists generally presented their cal-
culations in theoretical terms only, and when the Western scientists 
used concrete data, it was information about Western tests which 
had already been fairly widely publicized. It is impossible to know 
whether or not greater openness on both sides would have resulted 
in more clarity and certainty. Presumably neither side accepted 
conclusions which its private information contradicted. 
There was one exception to this general pattern. Fairly late in 
the Conference, in an attempt to buttress an argument, Dr. Fedorov 
stated that during the current American test series in the Pacific, 
53For detailed analyses of this aspect of the Conference see Ciro E. 
Zoppo, Technical and Political Aspects of Arms Control Negotiations: The 
1958 Experts Conference (RAND Corp. 1962, Memorandum RM-3286-
ARPA), and Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, pp. 183-203. 
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although the Atomic Energy Commission had announced only 
fourteen explosions, the USSR had detected thirty-two and he gave 
the time of each of the shots. 54 Although the United States task 
force in charge of the series had in fact planned and attempted to 
detonate thirty-two explosions, only thirty of these attempts had 
actually been successful. The Western scientists could only conclude 
therefore that the USSR had obtained its data through some tech-
nique other than those being discussed at the Conference. Con-
ceivably the Soviet data could have been gained through monitoring 
the American communication network from Soviet ships stationed 
near the Pacific testing area. It goes without saying that Dr. Fedo-
rov's presentation did little to advance the Soviet position. More-
over, the American scientists were convinced that certain American 
explosions of small nuclear weapons had not been detected in the 
Soviet Union. 55 
There was little controversy between East and West regarding 
two of the methods of detection, recording acoustic and hydro-
acoustic waves and recording radio signals. The other two, record-
ing seismic waves and the collection of radioactive debris, however, 
were the source of some dispute. 
The Collection of Radioactive Debris and the Dispute Concerning 
Overflights 
There was a controversy as to whether the collection of radio-
active debris from ground stations would be sufficient, or whether 
sampling techniques involving the use of aircraft would also be 
needed. This issue was important because radioactive debris is the 
only incontrovertible evidence that a nuclear explosion has oc-
curred. The Soviet scientists maintained that collection points at 
ground stations would be sufficient for purposes of detection of 
nuclear explosions in violation of a test ban agreement, 56 while the 
Western scientists argued that in addition samples taken from the 
air were vitally necessary. 57 The problem can be stated this way: if 
the parties to a test ban were willing to allow aircraft to fly over 
MEXP/NUC/PV. 22, pp. 4-5. 
55See New York Times, August 1, 1958, p. 4. 
li6See EXP/NUC/PV. 8, p. 91; EXP/NUC/PV. 10, pp. 4, 26; 
EXP/NUC/PV. 12, p. 121. 
57See EXP/NUC/PV. 9, pp. 4, 5, 11; EXP/NUC/PV. 10, p. 21; 
EXP/NUC/PV. 12, pp. 4-6; and EXP/NUC/PV. 14, pp. 41, 48-50. 
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their territories on certain occasions, they would gain a more sensi-
tive, more precise and prompter means of detecting and identifying 
nuclear explosions. Exactly what the margins were, though, was 
difficult to determine. In reply to Dr. Fedorov's doubting request 
for information about explosions which were detected by aircraft 
but not by ground stations,58 two Western scientists--employees of 
the Department of Defense--cited the cases of two "low kiloton" 
explosions in Nevada, but added that the really important issue was 
the speed of detection. 59 Everyone agreed that as a consequence of 
a test ban agreement both methods would become more effective, 
since the quantity of radioactive debris in the atmosphere would 
decrease, and the effects of a new explosion would therefore be 
more obvious. 
Clearly this controversy involved an issue of basic political 
significance: the effectiveness of a system to monitor a test ban 
agreement on the one hand, and the degree to which signatory 
states would be required to open their territory on the other. Two 
years later the U-2 incident would show how sensitive the issue of 
overflight was. That the dispute had political implications was 
confirmed by the fact that when it was leaked to the press, pre-
sumably by some member of the Western panel, the Soviet delega-
tion complained bitterly.60 Ultimately, a compromise was worked 
out. It was agreed that sampling techniques involving the use of 
aircraft would be recommended. However, this agreement in prin-
ciple was qualified in the following manner: 
To this end use should be made chiefly of the aircraft 
flights over the oceans made for the purpose of metero-
logical observations. 
10. In some cases use can be made of aircraft flights over 
the territories of the USA, the USSR, the UK and other 
countries to collect air samples for the purpose of check-
ing on data obtained by the other methods of detection 
of nuclear explosions. 
The Experts consider that to accomplish this task it 
would be quite sufficient to make use of the aircraft of 
5BEXP/NUC/PV. 12, p. 121. 
59See EXP/NUC/PV. 14, pp. 41, 48-50. 
60See New York Times, July 13, 1958, p. 1, and EXP/NUC/PV. 12, 
p. 122. 
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the country being overflown and that in such cases it is 
sufficient that flights for the purpose specified should be 
made along routes laid down in advance. Representatives 
of the USSR, the USA, the UK or other States participat-
ing in the operation of the control system may be on board 
these aircraft in the capacity of observers. 61 
The Western scientists felt that because of the nature of this issue 
they had to refer the exact wording of the compromise formulation 
to Washington for approval, which was granted. This was the only 
instance in which this procedure was followed. 
The Problem of Seismic Signals 
Eastern and Western scientists were unable to agree on the 
effectiveness of the method of recording seismic signals. The reason 
for the difficulty was not clear. It may have stemmed partly from 
the fact that different scales for measuring seismic waves were 
used in Eastern and Western countries, and it was difficult to cor-
relate the data measured by the two scales. In addition, the prob-
lem of estimating the seismic signal which would be produced by 
nuclear explosions of varying yields was a task of considerable in-
tellectual difficulty, particularly in view of the fact that all of the 
calculations had to be extrapolations from a single point, the 
Rainier explosion. Whatever the cause, the controversy was ex-
tremely important, for the conclusions would determine many of 
the basic characteristics of the control network. Since underground 
nuclear explosions could only be detected through seismic waves, 
and since this was perhaps the least efficient of all the techniques, 
the figures accepted here would be of critical importance in de-
termining the spacing and location of control posts. Moreover, 
since a major purpose of this technique was to distinguish earth-
quakes from nuclear explosions, the assessment of the capability 
for accomplishing this purpose would vitally affect the number of 
on-site inspections which would be required. The Soviet scientists 
were consistently more optimistic than their Western counterparts. 
The Americans attempted to buttress their position by citing the 
61 "Report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of De-
tecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear 
Tests, August 21, 1958," in U.S. Department of State Publication, No. 7258, 
Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (here-
after cited as Geneva Conference), pp. 271-310, at 277. 
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Rainier experiment, but Dr. Fedorov and other Soviet specialists 
countered by arguing the need to introduce theoretical considera-
tions and data from TNT explosions. In the end, a compromise was 
reached, and as a consequence, the conclusions concerning this 
technique were considerably more optimistic than the original 
American presentation, 62 although they were not inconsistent with 
the Rainier data. 
Detection of Explosions at High Altitudes 
As indicated earlier, the United States had not detonated any 
nuclear weapons at high altitudes prior to 1958 and thus the 
Western scientists had no empirical foundation for any position. 
Both sides recognized this lack of experimental data with respect 
to the problem of detecting nuclear explosions conducted at high 
altitudes. The report made it clear that the Experts' conclusions in 
this area were based on purely theoretical considerations. Moreover, 
in contrast to the situation with respect to the surface, atmospheric, 
and underground explosions, the control system recommended by 
the Experts did not include any specific techniques for the detection 
and identification of nuclear explosions at high altitudes. 
Camouflaging and Concealing Nuclear Explosions 
During the course of the Conference very little attention was 
ghen to the ways in which a state which was determined to violate 
a test ban agreement might attempt to conceal or disguise nuclear 
explosions. Hans Bethe presented a paper in which he purported 
to prove that it would not be possible to "decouple" an under-
ground explosion so that no or significantly weakened seismic 
waves would be produced.63 Richard Latter, of the RAND Corpor-
ation, and Doyle Northrup, of the Department of Defense, dis-
cussed the possibility of shielding nuclear explosions so that their 
effects would be greatly reduced, and Harold Brown, of the Uni-
versity of California Radiation Laboratory, pointed out a number 
of techniques which might be used to make the identification of 
some nuclear explosions extremely difficult if not impossible. Soviet 
delegates tended to denigrate these presentations. Although the 
62Compare EXP/NUC/PV. 12, pp. 67-85, and "Report of the Con-
ference of Experts," Geneva Conference, pp. 277-79. 
63See EXP/NUC/PV. 14, pp. 57-85. 
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points raised by Drs. Latter, Northrup, and Brown found their way 
into the Experts' report, they were mentioned only in passing and 
quite incidentally. 
In these matters, as in the case of deep underground explo-
sions, the scientists were working without the benefit of much 
empirical data. Their calculations were largely theoretical. This had 
the effect of making it difficult if not impossible for either side to 
prove its points conclusively. 
The Elaboration of a System 
After an analysis of each of the various techniques for de-
tecting and identifying nuclear explosions had been completed, the 
next point on the agenda of the Conference of Experts was to 
examine these techniques in combination, with a view to consider-
ing what kind of system could be established for monitoring a test 
ban agreement. Formulating a system was partly a matter of de-
duction from the previously agreed conclusions concerning each of 
the various techniques-of applying the agreed formulae. However, 
various choices also had to be made. Perhaps the most important 
concerned the threshold-how sensitive should the system be, what 
yield explosions should the system be designed to detect and iden-
tify, and with what degree of assurance? Deductions as to the 
character of the system would depend on the answer to this ques-
tion. 
Even after the threshold had been established, there were 
other choices to be made. An equation containing several variables 
allows flexibility in fixing its components, and designing a control 
system involved manipulation of such an equation with a con-
siderable degree of discretion; for example, increasing the number 
of fixed control posts would tend to reduce the need for on-site 
inspections. Elaboration of a system depended to some extent upon 
assumptions about unknown factors, especially the level of back-
ground noise throughout the world which would interfere with 
reception by the various techniques and thus reduce their reliability. 
Finally, assumptions had to be made about the competence, efficiency, 
and reliability of the personnel who would operate the system. For 
example, one could compensate for presumed low level technical 
competence by more elaborate mechanisms or by mechanical re-
dundancy. In making these choices the American scientists, and 
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apparently the entire Western delegation, were completely on their 
own; their instructions provided no guidance. 
When the discussion of this agenda item opened, Dr. Fedorov 
immediately tabled a proposal for a control system involving from 
100 to 110 control stations. 64 All of the technical bases for this pro-
posal were not immediately made clear; however, several assumptions 
and calculations underlying it were brought out by both the Soviet 
and Western scientists in the subsequent debates. Apparently the 
acoustic method-a relatively efficient method of detecting nuclear 
explosions in the atmosphere-was used in establishing distances 
between control posts and thus determining their number.· In addi-
tion, the Soviet proposal relied considerably on the existing net 
of seismic stations for distinguishing earthquakes from underground 
nuclear explosions and purported to use other aspects of seismic 
signals than first motion for purposes of detection and identification. 
Neither approach was acceptable to the West. The Western 
scientists felt that the seismic method should determine the location 
of control posts. They held that existing seismic stations could be 
used to supplement the international control system, but could not 
serve as its basic components. For one thing, the Western scientists 
were doubtful about the adequacy of the equipment of existing seis-
mic stations. In addition, since reversing the polarity of a seismo-
graph can be accomplished fairly easily by merely switching some 
wires and the sign of first motion is thereby obscured and a com-
pression made to appear a rarefaction, they were unwilling to rely 
on seismic stations which were completely manned by the personnel 
of a possible violator state. Nor were the Western scientists willing 
to accept other criteria than first motion, which they felt was the 
only method that had been proved. 
The Soviet scientists never gave a flat estimate of the capabil-
ities of the system which they proposed, what yield explosions it 
would detect and identify. But given Mr. Tsarapkin's presence on 
the Eastern delegation-if nothing else-the threshold on which the 
proposal was based was presumably politically acceptable to the 
USSR. At one point the Western scientists estimated that the system 
by itself would have the following capability of detecting and 
identifying underground nuclear explosions of various yields: 5 
64EXP/NUC/PV. 22, pp. 3-31. 
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percent of those which had a yield of 1 kiloton; 50 percent of those 
which had a yield of 5 kilotons; and 90 percent of those which 
had a yield of 20 kilotons. 65 
Obviously, the Western panel could not just simply reject this 
proposal, but had to introduce a counter proposal. The task of 
elaborating a system for the West to propose was assigned to two 
young American scientists: Harold Brown of the University of 
California Radiation Laboratory and Richard Latter. The former, 
a child prodigy who had received his Ph. D. in physics while still 
21, was at the time 29. His colleague was 35. They used the 
seismic method-the principal means of detecting underground nu-
clear explosions and a technique for which the most effective 
range is somewhat less than that of the acoustic method-as the 
determinant of distances between control posts. They postulated 
that the criteria for determining the threshold of the system would 
be observation of the sign of first motion on seismographs at five 
stations of the international control system. On the basis of these 
assumptions, and positing that the system should have a 90 percent 
capability of detecting and identifying underground explosions with 
a yield of 1 kiloton, they concluded that approximately 650 con-
trol stations would be needed. 
Some of the Brown-Latter assumptions and calculations were 
outlined at the same meeting at which the Soviet proposal was intro-
duced, and they were developed in more detail and the conclusion 
about the number of control posts needed was presented in subse-
quent sessions. Although the exact number of control posts which 
would be required in the Soviet Union was never specified, it was 
obvious that it would be fairly large. Without formally rejecting the 
Western presentation-which the Americans insisted was not a pro-
posal-Or. Fedorov made it obvious that such a control system would 
be unacceptable to the USSR. 
Mter several sessions, on Tuesday, August 5, Sir William 
Penney of the United Kingdom, reading an agreed Western position, 
introduced a third system. 66 It was based on the same type of 
analysis as the system which the West had introduced previously; 
however, the threshold was raised. In this case with approximately 
65EXP/NUC/PV. 26, p. 26. 
66Jbid., pp. 26-35. 
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170 land-based control posts and several ships, the system was 
estimated to have a "good probability" of detecting and identifying 
nuclear explosions with yields down to one kiloton in the atmosphere 
and in the open ocean and also a "good probability" of recording 
seismic signals from deep underground nuclear explosions equiv-
alent to one kiloton. In the latter case, it was assumed that there 
would be some difficulty in distinguishing the signals generated by 
explosions from those generated by earthquakes, and that this 
difficulty would increase significantly as one moved down from 
five kilotons to one kiloton. It was estimated that the system would 
be able to "identify .as being of natural origin about 90 percent 
of the continental earthquakes, whose ~ignals are equivalent to 5 
kilotons, and a small percentage of continental earthquakes equiva-
lent to 1 kiloton."67 Since the system had relatively little capability 
with respect to subkiloton explosions, it was thought that it would 
probably not have been able to detect experiments involving the 
development of a neutron bomb. 
At the same meeting, Dr. Fisk suggested that the experts 
might adopt a report which wquld list all three systems, outlining 
the capabilities and limitations of each.68 Dr. Fedorov, however, 
made it apparent that the Eastern panel would only consider agree-
ing to a report which listed one system. Obviously a report which 
listed one system would have many more political implications and 
much greater political impact than one which listed several, and 
would be much more of a commitment so far as subsequent negotia-
tions were concerned. 
Six days elapsed before the next formal meeting. Dr. Fisk 
tried desperately to obtain a judgment from Washington as to 
whether or not the control system presented by Sir William would 
present an acceptable risk to the United States, but he could not 
obtain this assurance. Meanwhile, in Geneva there were three 
informal meetings, at which records were not kept. On Monday, 
August 11, the two sides promptly agreed to recommend to their 
governments a control system generally patterned after that which 
had been outlined by Sir William Penney. It was probably during 
this period that a number of the Western scientists were made 
61Geneva Conference, p. 290. 
68EXP/NUC/PV. 26, p. 61. 
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aware of the political ~plications of their efforts. Many of them 
appear not to have realized at the outset that what they did would 
become the basis for subsequent diplomatic negotiations. Even at 
this point, all of them may not have fully grasped all of the implica-
tions of their situation, but they must at least have been conscious 
of them to some extent. In any case, from this day on, and for 
the next three years, the figure of from 170 to 180 land and sea 
control posts became the fixed basis for negotiations. 
There were a number of other matters which had to be settled 
once agreement had been reached on the broad outlines of a 
system. Dr. Fedorov sought to include in the Report of the Con-
ference of Experts recommendations on the staffing of the control 
posts and the phasing of their establishment. He ventured the opin-
ion that one or two controllers from "the other side"-that is, 
from the Western powers in control posts in the USSR and other 
communist countries and vice versa-would be sufficient to insure 
the proper functioning of a control post, 69 and that the control 
posts should be established first on the territories of the United 
States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Australia, Africa, 
and the Pacific Ocean area. 70 The Western scientists ruled out 
discussion of both of these proposals on the ground that they 
involved "political" rather than technical issues. The Report of the 
Conference of Experts merely stated that approximately thirty 
persons would be required to man a control post, 71 and it only 
specified the number of control posts that would be required on 
each continent and generally on islands and ships on the high seas, 
without mentioning specific countries. 72 The Experts also considered 
and reached detailed agreement on the specific equipment to be 
installed at each control post. 
On-Site Inspection 
The final matter discussed by the Experts was the problem of 
on-site inspections. Originally, the Western scientists advanced the 
69EXP/NUC/PV. 23, p. 41. 
70EXP/NUC/PV. 22, p. 31. 
71 "Report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of De-
tecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear 
Tests," Geneva Conference, p. 288. 
12Jbid. 
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concept that inspections should be initiated by automatic criteria-
any suspicious and unexplained signal of a given magnitude-and 
that there should be an elaborate mechanism for conducting such 
inspections. 73 For a variety of reasons-principally Soviet objec-
tions and lack of time and data-the Western scientists did not 
follow this initial presentation with detailed proposals. Conse-
quently, the section in the Experts' Report dealing with the problem 
of on-site inspections is quite brief and contains few detailed 
directives. 74 As a result, it was possible to have a good deal of 
technical argument in the subsequent negotiations. The section on 
on-site inspections estimated that there would be from 20 to 100 
earthquakes a year which would be undistinguishable on the basis 
of their seismic signals from deep underground nuclear explosions 
of about 5 kiloton yield, and it also stated that: 
When the control posts detect an event which cannot 
be identified by the international control organ and which 
could be suspected of being a nuclear explosion, the in-
ternational control organ can send an inspection group to 
the site of this event in order to determine whether a 
nuclear explosion had taken place or not. 75 
This could· be interpreted as a mandate for compulsory on-site 
inspection in the case of all unidentified events. 
v 
An Agreed Report: A Hopeful Sign? 
Concluding Communiques 
With the agreement on this point, except for matters involving the 
drafting and style of the report, the Conference of Experts had 
concluded its work. These matters were handled expeditiously, and 
on August 21 the Conference held its final session. The Conference 
then issued a public communique; the report itself was not pub-
73See the presentation by Robert F. Bacher: EXP/NUC/PV. 22, pp. 
36-50. 
74"Report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of De-
tecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear 
Tests," Geneva Conference, pp. 289-90. 
15/bid., p. 289. 
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lished for several days after the conclusion of the Conference. 
Public attention probably focused most on these words in the 
communique: 
The Conference adopted an agreed conclusion regarding 
the technical equipment of the control system necessary 
for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions. 
The Conference reached the conclusion that it is tech-
nically feasible to set up, with certain capabilities and 
limitations, a workable and effective control system for the 
detections of violations of a possible agreement on the 
world-wide cessation of nuclear weapons tests. 76 
Probably most people tended to read this as saying--controls for 
a test ban are technically feasible. But was this an accurate repre-
sentation of the work of the Conference? 
In Geneva, among the Western delegations at least, there was 
a feeling of satisfaction that a difficult task had been completed. In 
the world at large, there was widespread public expectation that an 
arms control agreement might actually be in the offing. Dr. Fisk 
issued a communique which summed up the feeling of at least the 
American participants : 
The Conference of Experts has completed its work. 
We on the Western side are gratified that the task set for 
this Conference, which began its work seven weeks ago, 
has been successfully accomplished. 
That task was to seek a common understanding of 
the technical problems involved in the detection and 
identification of nuclear explosions. We have now reached 
such a common understanding, which is embodied in the 
report we have just agreed upon, and which we are now 
transmitting to our Governments. My colleagues and I are 
hopeful that this report, which carefully examines and 
sets forth the capabilities and limitations of present meth-
ods of detecting nuclear explosions, will prove helpful to 
all of our Governments in their future consideration of 
this important subject. 
As scientists we have sought to establish the facts 
pertinent to our subject and to draw from them sound 
and logical conclusions regarding a system of control.77 
76Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, p. 1091. 
77U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1004 (Septem-
ber 22, 1958), p. 452. 
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But had their role simply been that of scientists attempting to 
establish the facts, and were Dr. Fisk's modesty, on the one hand, 
and optimism, on the other, warranted? Had not the scientists 
engaged in a role of extremely great political importance? And how 
happy should one be with a document which in fixed terms stated 
matters concerning which there was very little empirical data? It 
is one thing to have a scientific paper proved incorrect, but what 
would happen if an internationally agreed to document was proved 
incorrect? 
Perhaps the basic question, however, was what would the 
United States do now in the light of this unexpected denouement. 
Even though at the outset the United States did not have any clear 
expectations in terms of broad strategy about the purpose of the 
Conference of Experts, now that there was an agreed report some 
fundamental decisions would surely have to be taken. 
PART II 
THE CONFERENCE ON THE DISCONTINUANCE 
OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS 
Chapter IV 
The Opening of the 
Diplomatic Negotiations 
I 
The Eisenhower Proposal 
The Conclusion of the Conference of Experts 
As the Conference of Experts drew to a close, it became apparent 
to the participants, and to the outside world as well, that it would 
result in a report accepted by the scientists of both East and West. 
Drs. Fisk and Penney informed President Eisenhower and Prime 
Minister Macmillan of the probable nature of the agreement several 
days before the conclusion of the Conference, and the American 
press began to forecast the outcome as early as August 10, 1958.1 
This development would clearly call for new policy decisions, 
especially by the United States. Since the United States had pro-
posed the Conference, and since American diplomats and politicians 
had consistently argued that the principal obstacle to disarmament 
was lack of agreement on controls, the United States bore a special 
onus for making the next move. 
The Committee of Principals 
The task of preparing the American response devolved upon 
a small group of officials within the Administration who had major 
responsibilities in the fields of foreign policy and national security. 
This group had met informally during the first half of 1958 in 
connection with the preparations for the Conference of Experts. 
Later, when negotiations for a nuclear test ban became an actual 
prospect, it came to be called the Committee of Principals. The 
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy 
lSee New York Times, August 10, 1958, IV, p. 6. 
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Commission, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science 
and Technology were regular members of the Committee. In addi-
tion, the Special Assistan,t to the President for National Security 
Affairs was what might be described as an ex officio "nonvoting" 
member, and the Director of the United States Information Agency 
attended occasional sessions. 
Whether an individual's role in a group such as the Committee 
of Principals is determined principally by his title and position within 
the Administration or by his own personal views is a moot point 
and in any case obviously varies with the individual, the strength 
of his convictions and personality, his experience, and the issue 
under consideration. It is obvious though that policies emerging from 
such committees are always a montage of departmental and agency 
viewpoints admixed with personal attitudes. Therefore, it is im-
portant to list the individuals who were involved. Under the Eisen-
hower Administration the Committee of Principals consisted of: 
John Foster Dulles, until he was replaced by Christian Herter in 
April 1959; Neil H. McElroy, until he was replaced as Secretary of 
Defense by Thomas S. Gates in December 1959; CIA Director 
Allan W. Dulles; John A. McCone, who succeeded Lewis L. Strauss 
as Chairman of the AEC in July 1958; Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., 
until he was replaced as the President's Special Assistant for 
Science and Technology by Dr. George Kistiakowsky in July 1959; 
Gordon Gray, who succeeded Robert Cutler as Special Assistant for 
National Security Affairs in July 1958; and, occasionally, USIA 
Director George V. Allen, or their deputies. When the Kennedy 
Administration assumed power in January 1961, the personnel of 
the Committee of Principals was changed to Dean Rusk, Robert S. 
McNamara, Allan W. Dulles, Glenn T. Seaborg, Dr. Jerome B. 
Wiesner, McGeorge Bundy, and, occasionally, Edward R. Murrow, 
or their deputies. 
During the first three and a half years of the diplomatic nego-
tiations, the Committee of Principals held somewhat more than 
thirty formal meetings. Although American policy relating to the 
negotiations was generally developed at a lower, "working," level, 
especially in the so-called Interdepartmental Working Group, the 
members of which came from the same departments and agencies as 
were represented on the Committee of Principals, this policy usually 
was at least discussed by the Committee of Principals before being 
The Opening of the Diplomatic Negotiations 87 
approved by the President. In those instances in which it reached a 
decision, the Committee usually made a definite recommendation to 
the President. Decisions in the Committee of Principals were always 
the result of agreement, rather than voting. If it proved impossible 
to obtain agreement in the Committee, the issue could be taken to 
the President for resolution; however, this was seldom done. Al-
though the Committee was sharply divided on a number of issues 
during the Eisenhower Administration, there were strong pressures 
against raising disputes to the Presidential level. To take a strong 
position necessitating a submission to the President would have 
risked alienating individuals whose collaboration was essential for 
the matter at hand and also in other vital endeavours. In such cir-
cumstances, an individual must regard an issue as being of particular 
importance before he will risk the possible consequences of elevating 
the dispute to the highest level. Moreover, in this case there was 
another inhibition. President Eisenhower strongly preferred to re-
ceive an agreed recommendation. At times, when he was con-
fronted with conflicting views, he would call for further study and 
discussion to see if the dispute could not be resolved. Under the 
Kennedy Administration, the Committee of Principals was much 
more united, and it also received firm Presidential directives. Thus, 
in both administrations, the device of appeal was seldom used. 
President Eisenhower's Statement of August 22 
When this group began to formulate the American response 
to the anticipated successful conclusion of the Conference of Ex-
perts, Secretary of State Dulles was in New York at the Emergency 
Special Session of the General Assembly which met from August 
8 until August 21, 1958, to consider the crisis in the Middle East. 
He was represented in the discussions by the Under Secretary, 
Christian Herter. 
Although no brief formulation can adequately portray several 
complex positions, the viewpoints. expressed in the Committee of 
Principals can be summarized in the following fashion. The De-
partment of State strongly felt that the United States should take 
the lead in proposing negotiations for a test ban. The reasons for 
this varied with individuals. It was partly a matter of wanting to 
respond to and capitalize on public pressures; to put the United 
States in a favorable light before public opinion. To put it nega-
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tively, the Department of State wished to avoid being placed in the 
position that it had been in the spring when the USSR unilaterally 
suspended nuclear testing. Another motivation was a desire to ex-
plore and follow up a seemingly favorable first step toward a 
measure of arms control. Put in simplest fashion, this meant 
exploring Soviet intentions (calling the USSR's bluff, if that is 
what it was) or, more hopefully, proceeding with constructive 
negotiations. Mr. Dulles himself inclined toward nuclear test ban 
negotiations as he viewed the changing role of nuclear weapons in 
military strategy and the developing "nth country problem." 
Although not at all sanguine about Soviet intentions or the outcome, 
he seemed to favor exploring arrangements, including a test ban, 
which might ultimately offer some assurance, not only against a 
deliberate nuclear attack but also against accident and miscalcu-
lation which could unleash nuclear war. The wish to exploit the 
agreement at the Conference of Experts for a move toward arms 
control was particularly strong in the American scientific commun-
ity, and it no doubt had an impact on the President's Science 
Advisory Committee and was expressed by the Special Assistant 
for Science and Technology. In addition, many scientists were 
deeply troubled by the problem of fallout. The Central Intelligence 
Agency favored any move which might introduce more openness 
into Soviet society. The Atomic Energy Commission and the 
Department of Defense, however, were convinced that a test ban, 
as an isolated measure of arms control, would endanger American 
security.2 
Beyond the basic disagreement on the wisdom of a test ban, 
there was also a disagreement as to whether the United States 
should continue testing nuclear weapons while the negotiations 
were in progress. The principal protagonists in this dispute were 
the Department of State, which argued that the United States should 
cease testing the day that the negotiations began, and the Department 
2Robert Gilpin argues that the fact that John A. McCone replaced 
Lewis Strauss as the head of the AEC on July 1, 1958, "removed from the 
policy debate a strong opponent of a nuclear test ban," (American Scientists 
and Nuclear Weapons Policy, p. 199). Even though Mr. McCone may have 
opposed a nuclear test ban less than Admiral Strauss, neither he nor the 
AEC favored a test ban as an isolated measure of arms control in these 
discussions. 
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of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, which held that 
testing should continue until the coming into force of a treaty. A 
compromise solution involving a moratorium covering only atmos-
pheric testing was mooted for a while, but ultimately abandoned 
on the ground that such a move would not be properly understood 
by public opinion. 
After consensus had been achieved within the Administration, 
on August 21, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was in-
formed of the action which the United States planned to take. 
Although the members of the Committee could present their views, 
it was then so late that they could not alter the course of American 
policy.3 
Allied views were also a factor. Perhaps the French view was 
the most important; at least it was the most clearly formulated and 
was argued with the greatest force. France was determined to push 
ahead with its plans for the development of an independent nuclear 
capability, and, as a consequence, continued to oppose a test ban 
as an isolated measure of arms control. Foreign Minister Maurice 
Couve de Murville reiterated the French position to President 
Eisenhower on August 21. In essence, the United States chose to 
downgrade seriously or perhaps even to ignore the French position. 
The American response to the successful conclusion of the 
Conference of Experts-specifically President Eisenhower's state-
ment of August 22-was a product of this melange of views. After 
it was drafted in Washington, the statement was taken to New 
York for Mr. Dulles' approval and then was released to the public. 
It was also immediately transmitted to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. 
The statement proposed the inauguration of negotiations for a test 
ban treaty and also defined the initial American negotiating position. 
The most important part of the statement was contained in the 
following paragraphs: 
199. 
The United States, taking account of the Geneva con-
clusions, is prepared to proceed promptly to negotiate an 
agreement with other nations which have tested nuclear 
weapons for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and 
the actual establishment of an international control system 
on the basis of the experts' report. 
3Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, p. 
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If this is accepted in principle by the other nations 
which have tested nuclear weapons, then in order to 
facilitate the detailed negotiations the United States is 
prepared, unless testing is resumed by the Soviet Union, to 
withhold further testing on its part of atomic and hydrogen 
weapons for a period of one year from the beginning of 
the negotiations. 
As part of the agreement to be negotiated, and on 
a basis of reciprocity, the United States would be further 
prepared to suspend the testing of nuclear weapons on 
a year-by-year basis subject to a determination at the 
beginning of each year: (A) the agreed inspection system 
is installed and working effectively; and (B) satisfactory 
progress is being made in reaching agreement on and im-
plementing major and substantial arms control measures 
such as the United States has long sought. The agreement 
should also deal with the problem of detonations for 
peaceful purposes, as distinct from weapons tests. 
Our negotiators will be instructed and ready by 
October 31 this year to open negotiations with other 
similarly instructed negotiators. 
As the United States has frequently made clear, the 
suspension of testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons is 
not, in itself, a measure of disarmament or a limitation of 
armament. An agreement in this respect is significant 
if it leads to other and more substantial agreements re-
lating to limitation and reduction of fissionable material 
for weapons and to other essential phases of disarmament. 
It is in this hope that the United States makes this pro-
posal.4 
The British statement which was issued almost simultaneously 
was similar. 5 The October 31 date for the opening of diplomatic 
negotiations and the inauguration of the one-year moratorium meant 
that the United States would have over two months to continue the 
test series which was then in progress. However, if the USSR 
accepted the Western invitation to engage in diplomatic negotia-
tions, the United States was pledged not to test nuclear weapons 
in any environment for a period of twelve months after October 
30. This decision to engage in a moratorium prior to the achieve-
ment of a test ban treaty proved to be crucially important, and some 
4Geneva Conference, p. 311. 
5See ibid., pp. 311-13. 
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have argued woefully misguided. 6 The rationale for the decision, 
which was developed mainly by the Department of State, was that 
such action was necessary because of the pressure of public opinion 
and to create the most propitious atmosphere for the diplomatic 
negotiations. The opposition of the Atomic Energy Commission 
and the Department of Defense to the decision was partly mollified 
by limiting the moratorium to twelve months. 
The implied suggestion that detonations for peaceful purposes 
should be dealt with separately in the agreement, while safeguard-
ing the American Project Plowshare, would pose difficult problems 
of discrimination. How could the purpose of an explosion be de-
termined and how would it be possible to be certain that a device 
allegedly designed to produce a huge natural cavity would not also 
have military applications? 
Perhaps the most important part of the statement concerned 
the conditions under which the United States-and the United 
Kingdom also-would be willing to cease testing nuclear weapons. 
The United States held to its earlier position that a test ban could 
only be regarded as one of several measures of arms control or 
disarmament, and as in earlier proposals, the United States sought to 
enforce this link by making the test cessation conditional on pro-
gress in other fields. In essence, President Eisenhower's statement 
was very similar to that which Harold Stassen had made on August 
21, 1957, before the London session of the UN Disarmament Subcom-
mittee. 7 The only differences were, first, that since the technical talks 
which Mr. Stassen had called for had already occurred, they could no 
longer be listed as a condition for extending the test cessation 
for a second twelve month period. Secondly, Mr. Stassen had 
implied that the only condition for making the test cessation per-
manent would be the achievement of a production cut-off, in 
addition of course to the condition that the test ban monitoring 
system be functioning effectively. President Eisenhower's statement 
opened up the possibility of several conditions. In some ways the 
American position as stated by President Eisenhower could be 
interpreted as indicating a lesser propensity to negotiate on the test 
6See Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, 
pp. 219-20; and, Thomas E. Murray, Nuclear Policy for War and Peace, pp. 
93-96. 
7See supra p. 18. 
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ban issue than could be inferred from Mr. Stassen's statement two 
years earlier. 
The requirement that a test cessation be conditional on achiev-
ing progress in other fields of arms control or disarmament was 
inserted in President Eisenhower's statement at the insistence of 
the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. 
The Department of State did not favor this position, but agreed 
to it in the process of mutual accommodation. 
Why the requirement was stated so vaguely, however, rather 
than in terms of specific disarmament measures, is not clear. 
Perhaps the vagueness was a negotiating tactic, a device for gaining 
bargaining strength and maintaining flexibility. The vagueness may 
also have stemmed from the fact that by this time the difficulties 
involved in linking a test cessation with a production cut-off and 
possibly with a requirement for the transfer of fissionable materials 
from weapons stockpiles were widely recognized, and there were 
therefore cogent arguments against maintaining this particular link. 
Rather than substitute some other measure immediately, it may 
have seemed wiser to await the outcome of other developments 
then in progress relating to arms control and disarmament. At that 
time, a technical conference concerning measures for the prevention 
of surprise attack was a distinct possibility. Also, the question of 
the uses of outer space was scheduled for discussion at the thir-
teenth session of the General Assembly, which would open in 
September. Both of these discussions would deal in some fashion 
with the launching of missiles, among other things. It was thought 
that controlling the launching of missiles would require control 
measures of roughly comparable scope to those needed to monitor 
a test cessation;8 and controlling technological developments with 
respect to delivery vehicles on the one hand and warheads on the 
other might be regarded as equivalent measures. Consequently, some 
may have hoped that a link between missile controls and a con-
trolled test ban could be established. 
There are also two other possible explanations for the vague-
ness of the link. It may have stemmed from inability to reach agree-
ment within the Administration or from a lack of preparation. 
8See Seymour Melman (ed.), Inspection for Disarmament, pp. 18-25, 
and passim. 
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Perhaps it was both. Assuming that there were strong arguments 
against the old position, discovering alternative measures of arms 
control with which a test ban could be linked would require a 
considerable amount of analysis. If a test ban alone would prove 
disadvantageous to the security interests of the United States, what 
other measures of arms control might serve as adequate compen-
sation? What types of controls would these measures require? These 
were questions which could not be answered simply, or without 
detailed analyses of the technical as well as of the political and 
military aspects, and at that time the United States government was 
ill-equipped to conduct such analyses. Mr. Stassen's staff had largely 
been dispersed even before his resignation in February 1958. It is 
true that other offices had responsibility for American policy con-
cerning arms control and disarmament; within the Department of 
State, the Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament and 
Atomic Energy Affairs, and within the Department of Defense, 
the Office of International Security Affairs. However, both of these 
offices had relatively small staffs, and, as their titles indicated, they 
also had other responsibilities. In addition, many of the personnel 
were directly involved in the Conference of Experts. Thus, there 
was hardly any manpower available for broad planning. Moreover, 
there was no group which could do technical analyses quickly and 
on a continuing basis. Mr. Stassen had relied on task forces com-
prised principally of nongovernmental experts, and if the appoint-
ment of the Bethe Panel was indicative of a policy, it appeared 
as if this technique would be continued. There seemed to be no 
alternative, since the Department of State did not have any 
technically qualified scientists among its personnel, and since the 
staff of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and 
Technology was quite small and the Science Advisory Committee 
was only a part-time group. However, the device of convening a 
special panel is relatively cumbersome, and it is not likely to be 
utilized unless a problem is clearly identified. Although cooperation 
of scientists in private employment is clearly indispensable, the 
panel of this type does not lend itself to systematic advance planning 
aimed at exploring a variety of longer range contingencies. The 
vagueness in the American position therefore probably was the 
result of disagreement on the old link and inability to conceive of 
a new one. 
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The Holifield Dissent 
The subtleties of President Eisenhower's statement, though, 
were largely ignored in public discussion in the United States. In 
the public view, the statement was generally regarded as an 
unambiguous invitation to negotiate a test ban. There was, however, 
at least one exception to the general euphoria. On August 22, 
shortly after the President's statement was released, Representative 
Chet Holifield read two statements into the Congressional Record. 
After generally expressing his approval, he went on to say that he 
was "gravely troubled" by the inclusion of the principle that a 
test cessation would be dependent on progress being made in other 
areas of arms control. 9 He pointed out that the statement was "un-
clear" and "susceptible of different interpretations," and asserted 
that if the condition were maintained he had "little hope for the 
completion of a nuclear testing agreement." He continued: 
I regret that I must state that the inclusion of the "one 
package" requirement as a contingency for nuclear weapon 
test cessation on a step-by-step basis casts a reflection on 
the sincerity of the President's statement. It seems to be a 
tragic continuation of the futile and abortive Dulles phil-
osophy which has failed to establish, in world opinion, our 
sincerity in the search for world peace. 
It is this fatal lack of vision, this holding back, this 
being dragged into the future which is killing our influence 
throughout the world. 
His statement was about as harsh a criticism of American policy 
as could be imagined. Interestingly, none of the major American 
newspapers or wireservices reported it. The Tass correspondent, 
however, noticed it and it was reported in Pravda. 10 
II 
Interim Sparring 
The Bombardment on Quemoy and Matsu 
In the interval between the issuance of President Eisenhower's 
statement of August 22 and the opening of the Geneva test ban 
9Congressional Record, Vol. 104, Part 15, p. 19245. 
lOAugust 25, 1958, p. 4. 
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negotiations on October 31, all interested parties sparred for posi-
tion. Chronologically, the first relevant event was Communist China's 
commencement on August 23 of heavy bombardment of the off-
shore island groups of Quemoy and Matsu. On that day the islands 
were hit by some fifty thousand shells within a period of two hours. 
The crisis which this action touched off continued until late October. 
It is impossible to know whether or not the Chinese Com-
munist action was in any way related to the developments con-
cerning a test ban. The People's Republic of China had for some 
time been engaged in a military build-up in the Fukien Province 
opposite Taiwan, and an increasing number of air and naval clashes 
between the Communists and the Nationalists occurred during the 
late summer. The Chinese Nationalist government had declared a 
state of emergency on Taiwan as early as August 7. It is therefore 
conceivable that the bombardment was unrelated to the events in 
Geneva and Washington. 
On the other hand, the People's Republic of China would be 
affected by a test ban. The Conference of Experts had after all 
proposed a global system of control posts. Moreover, a test ban 
might affect Communist China's ability to develop an independent 
nuclear capability in the same sense that it might have an impact 
on France's program. If the three nuclear powers agreed to a test 
ban, public opinion throughout the world would probably strongly 
oppose any attempt by other states to test nuclear weapons. The 
three nuclear powers presumably would also have a strong interest 
in seeing that other states did not test because it might upset the 
delicate balance of trust and calculation of advantage on which a 
test cessation would rest. Thus, a test ban conceivably could freeze 
the situation in Eastern Asia in which Communist China would 
continue to face nuclear equipped American forces without having 
such weapons of its own. 
Communist China and the USSR apparently had discussed the 
question of the former's obtaining a nuclear capability from time 
to time.11 The Chinese have claimed that the two governments 
signed an agreement on October 15, 1957, relating to new technol-
llSee Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear 
Era (1962). 
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ogy.12 The Chinese claim that the terms of this agreement obligated 
the USSR to provide the People's Republic of China with a sample 
of an atomic bomb and technical data relating to its manufacture. 
The USSR has neither confirmed nor denied the existence of this 
agreement. If in fact such an agreement existed, it is significant that 
it was signed after the breakdown of the London negotiations. The 
Soviet Union may well have agreed to sign the agreement only after 
it became clear that the prospects of obtaining a test ban at that 
point were rather remote. 
Immediately prior to the bombardment of the off-shore islands, 
Nikita Khrushchev visited Peking from July 31 to August 3 and 
held extensive talks with Mao Tse-tung. Soviet Defense Minister 
R. Y. Malinovsky and his Chinese counterpart, Marshall Peng Teh-
huai were present at the discussions. Rumors circulated in the West 
that the USSR had promised to supply its ally with nuclear 
weapons.13 If such matters were discussed at these meetings, in 
the light of subsequent developments and Chinese claims about the 
1957 agreement, it seems more likely that in return for assistance 
in developing a nuclear capability, the USSR insisted on gaining 
some control over China's military establishment.14 Whether or not 
it was at these meetings, it is fairly clear that the USSR made such 
a demand sometime in 1958. Once the possibility of a test ban 
increased, as it did with the progress of the Conference of Experts, 
Soviet leaders may well have reasoned that they should proceed 
cautiously with the implementation of the 1957 agreement. The 
Chinese, on the other hand, probably saw a test ban and the 
degree of East-West detente that it would imply, as an obstacle to 
their gaining an independent nuclear capability, and to achieving 
their broader political objectives. 
For these reasons, the timing of the Chinese bombardment 
of the off-shore islands is of particular interest, as is the reluctance 
with which the USSR supported the action. The Chinese move 
was certainly an expression of independence from the USSR, and 
12This Chinese claim is discussed in detail in Alice Langley Hsieh, 
"The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue: 1963," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
Vol. VIII, No.2 (June 1964), pp. 99-115, at 110-14. 
13Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1958 
(1959), p. 315. 
14See Alice Langley Hsieh, supra note 12, at 111-13. 
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it also may well have been a warning of opposition to a test ban, 
and more broadly to an East-West detente. 
Regardless of its motivation, however, the action by Communist 
China would certainly have had implications for the test ban nego-
tiations. Among other things it strengthened the forces in the 
United States which opposed the recognition of Communist China, 
and thus would complicate the problem of bringing that state into 
any agreement which might be negotiated. 
The Initial Soviet Reaction 
The first official reaction by the USSR to President Eisen-
hower's August 22 statement was an interview which Chairman 
Khrushchev gave to a Pravda correspondent, which was published 
on August 29.15 In this interview, Chairman Khrushchev asserted 
that: 
The statements of the United States and United Kingdom 
governments show that these Governments are continuing 
to seek every possible loop-hole in order to avoid an im-
mediate discontinuance of nuclear tests. This becomes 
especially clear if we consider the reservations and mani-
festly far-fetched conditions which the Governments of the 
Western Powers attach to their proposals. 
He objected to the fact that the initial suspension would be 
limited to one year. "It is obvious to everyone ... that such a 
brief suspension of tests is completely meaningless, since one year 
is precisely the time required for preparing the next series of tests." 
To the extent that it would require at least a year of preparation for 
the United States and the United Kingdom to carry out test series as 
extensive as those conducted in 1958, his time estimate was correct. 
He also objected to the two requirements which the Western 
powers listed as conditions for extending the moratorium on testing. 
He considered the requirement that a control system should be 
"installed and working effectively" was "an artificial one, since it 
has long been known that modem science guarantees the possibility 
of detecting any nuclear explosions and therefore control over the 
observance of an agreement on the discontinuance of tests is 
I5UN Document A/3904, pp. 3-9. 
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readily feasible." Did he mean to say that an international network 
of control stations was not necessary, that existent national systems 
were sufficient? Chairman Khrushchev's amplification of this state-
ment compounded the ambiguity. He argued that "the conclusions of 
the conference of experts fully confirm the correctness of the point 
of view which the Soviet government has always maintained on this 
question and demonstrate the falseness of the position of the Western 
Powers." But he then went on to say that the Soviet government 
agreed with all of "the conclusions and recommendations in the re-
port of the conference concerning a system of control. . . . " The 
exact implications of these statements were far from clear, and a 
doubting mind on the Western side could with little difficulty inter-
pret them as being most evasive. 
Chairman, Khrushchev also attacked the other requirement con-
cerning "satisfactory progress" with respect to other measures of arms 
control: 
But as everyone knows that it is the Governments of the 
Western Powers and those Governments alone which, by 
persistently adhering to a policy based on an armaments 
race and atomic blackmail, have year after year frustrated 
the achievement of agreement on matters of disarmament. 
In view of this situation, how is it possible to believe 
that they really want a discontinuance of tests when they 
put forward such a condition? 
Again, anyone convinced of the basic reasonableness of the Western 
position over the years with respect to disarmament and arms con-
trol, could easily regard his remarks as ominous. 
Despite his harsh comments, Chairman Khrushchev agreed that 
the negotiations should start October 31. However, he proposed that 
the negotiations should be held in Geneva, rather than in New York 
as the Western powers had suggested. He also proposed that the ne-
gotiations should be limited to two or three weeks. Finally, he flatly 
stated that the USSR was "completely unable to accept the reserva-
tions and conditions which the Western powers attach to their state-
ment of readiness to participate in the negotiations, since to accept 
them would be to foredoom the negotiations to failure." 
The following day, the Soviet Foreign Ministry sent a note to the 
American Embassy in Moscow accepting the proposal that negotia-
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tions should begin October 31 and repeating Chairman Khrushchev's 
suggestions with respect to the place and duration of the negotia-
tions.l6 The Chairman's interview with the Pravda correspondent was 
attached. For the next two months, the USSR and the United States 
argued, through various exchanges of notes and statements, about 
the nature of the forthcoming negotiations.17 In these exchanges, the 
USSR suggested that the conference should be at the level of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs and also sought to limit its duration. A time 
limitation would have created a public expectation that agreement 
could be reached promptly, and presumably would have subjected 
the Western delegations to considerable public pressure. The Soviet 
government would not have been subjected to corresponding pressure 
from its own public opinion in view of its control over its domestic 
mass media and public spokesmen. Both Soviet suggestions were re-
fused. The Soviet Union also continued to protest the requirements 
which the Western powers listed for extending the moratorium and 
to argue that the purpose of the conference should be "to conclude 
an agreement on the permanent discontinuance of atomic and hydro-
gen weapons tests ... and to establish an appropriate control system 
for the enforcement of such an agreement." The Western powers, on 
the other hand, refused to drop their conditions, and always re-
ferred to the forthcoming conference as "the meeting on suspension 
of nuclear tests and establishment of an international control sys-
tem." These differences were never entirely resolved. 
Continued Testing of Nuclear Weapons 
As these exchanges went on, both sides also maneuvered to 
gain advantages in nuclear weapons development. With at least 
a temporary cut-off date on further testing in prospect, where the 
development race would end became an important consideration, both 
in reality and in a symbolic sense. The United States and the United 
Kingdom test series were pressed forward. Additional shots, originally 
planned for a later period, were added to the American series then 
in progress. The effort came to be dubbed "Operation Deadline." 
In his interview with the Pravda correspondent, Chairman Khrush-
16Jbid., p. 2. 
17See UN Documents 3940, 3956, and 3973; and U.S. Department of 
State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1005 (September 29, 1958), p. 503. 
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chev said that because of the continued testing by the United States 
and the United Kingdom, the USSR was released from the obligation 
which it had unilaterally assumed the previous March, and on Sep-
tember 30, the Soviet Union in fact resumed testing. Between that 
date and October 25, the USSR conducted fourteen explosions. 
Seven of these were in the megaton range. These tests were probably 
designed both to advance the USSR's knowledge of nuclear weapons, 
and for their psychological effects. The Soviet resumption of testing 
would clearly put the West under a certain pressure by making a test 
ban agreement appear more desirable. It might also intimidate the un-
committed who in turn would increase the pressure on the West for 
a test ban. 
On October 7, Foreign Minister Gromyko, extending the con-
cept of East-West parity to a new sphere, asserted that the USSR 
had the right to continue testing until it had matched the number 
of tests conducted by the United States and the United Kingdom 
since March 31, the date on which the Supreme Soviet had adopted 
the decree resolving to discontinue testing in the Soviet Union. His 
statement had ominous implications for the possibility of establishing 
a moratorium at the beginning of the negotiations, for it was almost 
inconceivable that the USSR could match the number of Western 
tests by October 31. Nonetheless, the Western powers continued to 
plan that their testing would cease by October 31, and the last 
American shot was detonated shortly before midnight on October 
30. As of that date, according to a later official American tabula-
tion, the United States had set off 174 announced nuclear detona-
tions, the United Kingdom, 21, and the USSR, 53.18 Neither the 
United States nor the USSR had announced all of their shots. Of the 
American announced shots, 66 had been conducted in 1958. The 
Soviet Union had detonated 23 of its announced shots in that year. 
The Thirteenth General Assembly: Arena for Sparring 
The General Assembly of the United Nations, which opened 
its thirteenth session on September 16, was another arena for East-
West sparring in the period immediately preceding the Geneva test 
ban negotiations. Several subjects relating to disarmament and arms 
18U.S. Department of Defense, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 
671-81. 
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control were on the agenda, and the discussion and action on these 
subjects in the Assembly had direct and indirect implications for the 
forthcoming Geneva conference. 
Although the provisional agenda of the thirteenth General As-
sembly included a general item entitled, "The Question of Disarma-
ment," on September 15, the day before the Assembly opened, the 
USSR proposed that a specific item, "The Discontinuance of Atomic 
and Hydrogen Weapons Tests," should be added to the agenda. 19 In 
its supporting memorandum, the USSR stressed its view: 
. . . that the question of the discontinuance of atomic and 
hydrogen weapons tests should be separated from the 
general disarmament programme and resolved independ-
ently and at once, and that it should not be linked with 
other disarmament problems on which substantial differ-
ences exist among the States. 
Clearly, one motivation for the Soviet action was again to bring 
pressure to bear before the opening of the Geneva Conference against 
the Western insistence on linking a test ban with other measures of 
disarmament. 
One other part of the Soviet memorandum is also of special sig-
nificance. It contained the statement that "consideration and positive 
solution" of the problem "would constitute the first important step 
towards the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons," 
and then went on to say that it would also "create favourable con-
ditions for the solution of other important disarmament problems." 
Obviously the USSR and the Western powers had somewhat different 
expectations and hopes concerning the consequences of a nuclear 
test ban. The USSR seems to have hoped that the most important 
consequences of a test ban would be a prohibition on the use of 
nuclear weapons, which the Soviet Union had advocated over the 
years. The effect of such a prohibition would of course have been 
to neutralize the American nuclear superiority. The Western powers 
on the other hand-insofar as such broad generalizations are possible 
-appear to have had in mind other measures of arms control and 
disarmament. These and other differences between the two sides were 
delineated and exposed in the course of the ensuing debate in the 
Assembly. 
19UN Document A/3915, p. 1. 
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When the Assembly's Political Committee held its first meeting 
on October 8, Ambassador Zorin maintained that the question of 
nuclear testing should be discussed first and settled before other ques-
tions relating to disarmament were brought up.20 As supporting argu-
ments, he cited the urgency of the issue, the need to affect "the 
course and outcome of the Geneva negotiations," and the ineffective-
ness--demonstrated in his view in past sessions-of combining all 
disarmament items in one discussion. Ambassador Lodge, on the 
other hand, argued for a combined discussion, maintaining that the 
issues "were interrelated."21 He allowed, however, that delegates 
would "be free to discuss the items separately and in any order they 
wished." The issue of whether a link should be maintained between 
the test ban and other steps toward disarmament thus arose again 
in a procedural-tactical context at the very outset of the proceed-
ings. After three days' debate, the Committee adopted an American 
compromise proposal, which provided that all items relating to dis-
armament should be discussed together in a general debate, but that 
the decision on the priority of consideration of draft resolutions 
should be postponed until the conclusion of the general debate. 
For all practical purposes, the General Assembly's handling of 
the test ban issue and all other questions relating to disarmament was 
completed before the Geneva negotiations were really underway. The 
Political Committee concluded its work on these matters on Novem-
ber 4, and that same day the plenary session adopted the resolutions 
which the Committee recommended. In both forums, resolutions re-
lating to the cessation of nuclear testing were voted on first. The 
Political Committee voted on these resolutions on October 31, the day 
the Geneva negotiations opened. In a sense then, the Assembly's 
action can be regarded as an adjunct to negotiations which were 
conducted outside of the United Nations. Certainly, most of the 
Member States, and especially the participants in the Geneva nego-
tiations, regarded the Assembly proceedings in this light. 
In all, six resolutions relating to nuclear testing were submitted 
to the Political Committee. Both India and the USSR submitted 
resolutions on October 5. The Soviet draft, after repeating in the 
preamble the opinion often expressed by Soviet spokesmen that a 
20UN, General Assembly, First Committee, Official Records (13th Ses-
sion), p. 3. 
21Jbid., p. 4. 
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cessation of nuclear tests would be a first important step "towards 
the total prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons," called upon 
all states to halt nuclear tests, recommended that the nuclear powers 
"enter into negotiations with a view to the conclusion of an appro-
priate agreement between them," and called upon all states "to 
accede to that agreement. "22 Since the draft resolution made no men-
tion of controls, it could be regarded-like the Western statements 
of August 22-as a retrogression from an earlier position, that is from 
the position the Soviet Union had taken in 1957 during the London 
session of the Disarmament Subcommittee and the twelfth Assembly. 
There is also another interesting aspect of the Soviet proposal. 
One of the hoped-for effects of a test ban would be that it would 
serve to prevent the dispersion of nuclear weapons; that it would 
ease the so-called "nth country problem." Concern about this prob-
lem was probably one of the motivations for Soviet policy on 
nuclear weapons testing. To the extent that such a brief draft could 
provide an indication of the USSR's attitude, it seemed to imply 
that the rest of the world should go along with whatever the three 
nuclear powers decided regarding a test ban. 
The Indian resolution also called for an immediate suspension 
of the testing of nuclear weapons.23 However, the cessation was 
envisaged as a transitional step "pending an agreement at the forth-
coming conference among the States concerned in respect to the 
technical arrangements considered necessary to ensure the observance 
of the discontinuance of such tests." The "nth country problem" 
was handled by requesting the participants in the Geneva negotia-
tions to report back to the General Assembly so that it could take 
steps to extend the agreement to all other states, which meanwhile 
were requested not to test. 
Since both resolutions called for an immediate and essentially 
unconditional cessation of tests, they were unacceptable to the 
Western powers. Therefore, on October 10 the United States to-
gether with sixteen other countries-all of which were involved in 
NATO, SEATO, ANZUS, or OAS-tabled an alternative pro-
posal. 24 It first urged the parties to the Geneva negotiations to 
"make every effort to reach an early agreement on the suspension 
22UN Documents A/L. 247 and A/C. 1/L. 203 and Corr. 1 and Rev. 1. 
23UN Documents A/L. 246 and A/C. 1/L. 202. 
24UN Document A/C. 1/L. 205. 
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of nuclear tests under effective international control." Then, perhaps 
as a concession to the other side, and certainly as a concession to 
the pressure of world opinion, it urged the parties to the negotia-
tions not to test nuclear weapons while the negotiations were in 
progress. This could involve a longer suspension than had been 
envisaged in President Eisenhower's August 22 statements, but it 
was not as extensive a commitment as one not to test "pending an 
agreement," the formulation embodied in the Indian proposal. The 
seventeen-power resolution also called attention to the importance 
of the forthcoming technical conference on surprise attack. It 
lauded the effectiveness of the technical approach to negotiations and 
expressed the hope that it would contribute to the creation of "a 
balanced and effectively controlled world-wide system of disarma-
ment." The resolution provided that the UN should render assis-
tance to the Geneva negotiations and asked the parties to the negoti-
ations to keep the world organization informed. Interestingly, the 
draft resolution contained no provision relating to the "nth country 
problem." 
There were two major attempts during the course of the Po-
litical Committee's consideration of these matters to discover some 
compromise which might lead to a unanimous decision. India, in 
company with thirteen other countries-including Pakistan, which 
was also a sponsor of the seventeen-power resolution-submitted a 
modified version of its resolution. 25 The principal changes were to 
urge a cessation of nuclear weapons tests "until agreement is 
reached," rather than pending an agreement, and to insert mention 
of controls. Even as modified, however, the resolution was un-
acceptable to the United States and the United Kingdom. 
France also opposed the Indian resolution for the same reasons 
motivating the two Western nuclear powers as well as for other 
reasons, the most important of which concerned the resolution's 
treatment of the "nth country problem." French delegate Jules 
Moch stated that France would only agree to discontinue its nuclear 
weapons development program if "the 'atomic powers' should im-
mediately cease to increase and begin to reduce their stockpiles 
under international control."26 Perhaps the French attitude explains 
25UN Document A/C. 1/L. 202/Rev. 1. 
26UN, General Assembly, First Committee, Official Records (13th 
Session), p. 63. 
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why the seventeen-power resolution skirted this problem. Sig-
nificantly, France was not one of the seventeen sponsoring powers, 
and when that resolution was put to the vote, France abstained. 
Austria, Japan, and Sweden offered the other compromise pro-
posal. 27 Their draft resolution merely expressed the hope that the 
Geneva negotiations would be successful, asked the parties to the 
negotiations to report whatever agreement might result from the 
negotiations to the Assembly, and asked the Secretary General to 
provide such assistance as the Geneva conference might request. 
After a long procedural wrangle about the order in which the 
resolutions should be voted, it was decided ( 45-25 with 11 absten-
tions) to give priority to the seventeen-power proposal reflecting 
the Western view, which was adopted by a vote of 49 to 9 with 11 
abstentions. Only the Soviet bloc opposed the resolution. The com-
promise proposal submitted by Austria, Japan, and Sweden was 
voted on immediately thereafter and adopted by a vote of 52 to 9 
with 10 abstentions. Only the first operative paragraph of the re-
vised Indian resolution was voted on, and it was rejected 36 to 26, 
with 19 abstentions. The remainder of the proposal was withdrawn, 
as was the entire Soviet proposal. In the plenary session the seven-
teen-power resolution was adopted 49 to 9 with 22 abstentions, and 
the resolution submitted by Austria, Japan, and Sweden was ap-
proved 55 to 9, with 12 abstentions. 28 The revised Indian pro-
posal, which was reintroduced, was rejected, 27 to 41, with 13 
abstentions. 29 
The other draft resolution relating to nuclear testing which the 
General Assembly considered dealt solely with the dispersion of 
nuclear weapons capability.30 It was proposed by Ireland. After 
asserting that such a dispersion would aggravate international ten-
sion and make it more difficult to attain general disarmament, the 
resolution provided for the creation of an ad hoc committee to study 
the dangers inherent in this course and to recommend appropriate 
measures for averting these dangers. Only the paragraph containing 
the assertion was put to a vote, and it was adopted 37 to 0, with 44 
27UN Document A/C. 1/L. 213. 
2SUN, General Assembly Resolutions 1252 A and B (XIII). 
29UN, General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Official Records (13th 
Session), p. 430. 
30UN Document A/C. 1/L. 206. 
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abstentions, including France, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. After this vote, the resolution was withdrawn. 
In addition to the resolutions relating to nuclear testing, three 
other resolutions concerning arms control and disarmament were 
considered by the Assembly. One of these was a Soviet proposal 
which recommended that France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States should reduce their military budgets by from 
ten to fifteen percent and devote some part of the savings to 
economic development projects. 31 This proposal was rejected in the 
Political Committee by a vote of 10 to 39, with 32 abstentions. 
The other two resolutions were both sponsored by India and Yugo-
slavia. One gave the Assembly's blessing to the forthcoming tech-
nical talks concerning surprise attack. 32 The other provided for the 
reconstitution of the Disarmament Commission so that it would in-
clude all UN Member States. 33 Both resolutions were adopted with-
out opposition; there were, however, a few abstentions in each 
case. 
One other issue on the agenda of the thirteenth Assembly had 
implications for the Geneva negotiations, the Peaceful Use of Outer 
Space. Whether or not and under what conditions the development 
of missiles was controlled would have implications for the control or 
development of nuclear explosives. It will be recalled that the USSR 
requested the inclusion of an agenda item on this subject as early 
as March 1958. However, at that time, and in the original pro-
posal which it submitted to the Assembly, the Soviet Union insisted 
that the question of a ban on the use of outer space for military 
purposes must be linked with "the elimination of foreign military 
bases on the territories of other States, primarily in Europe, the 
Near and Middle East and North Africa."34 In other words, the 
Soviet Union took the position that it would only renounce its head 
start with respect to the development of ballistic missiles with inter-
continental range, if the United States dismantled most of its mili-
tary bases abroad. There is a striking parallel between the Soviet 
attitude with respect to the control of missiles, an area of weaponry 
in which it seemed to be ahead, and the United States attitude 
31UN Document A/C. 1/L. 204. 
32UN Document A/C. 1/L. 211. 
33UN Documents A/C. 1/L. 210 and Rev. 1 and 2. 
34UN Document A/C. 1/L. 219. 
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toward the control of nuclear explosives, an area of weaponry in 
which it held the lead. It is interesting and perhaps significant that 
the Soviet proposal did not mention bases in Eastern Asia. Per-
haps this implied a willingness by the USSR to have American 
power used to check that of the People's Republic of China in 
East Asia. In any case, the link between the control of missiles and 
the elimination of overseas bases was completely unacceptable to 
the United States and the USSR was fully aware of this. 
The Western twenty-power proposal on this issue was modest.85 
It merely called for the creation of an ad hoc committee with a 
broad mandate to explore the question of the peaceful uses of 
outer space. 
Eventually the USSR agreed to drop the condition that work 
toward the elimination of foreign bases must accompany that con-
cerning limiting the uses of outer space.86 Nevertheless, the Soviet 
Union and the United States could not agree on the composition of 
the ad hoc committee; the Soviet Union insisted on parity of repre-
sentation between East and West, a concept which the United States 
refused to accept. In the end, the Assembly adopted a revised 
version of the twenty-power proposal which provided for the crea-
tion of an ad hoc committee of eighteen-three from the Soviet 
bloc, twelve affiliated with the Western alliance system, and three 
neutrals-and the USSR announced that it would refuse to par-
ticipate in the new body.37 In view of this refusal, if any work were 
to be done prior to the next session of the General Assembly in the 
fall of 1959, when the composition of the ad hoc committee could 
again be reviewed, it would have to be done in the technical con-
ference on measures to prevent a surprise attack. This conference, 
it should be noted, would be composed-by agreement of all con-
cerned, including the United States--an the basis of parity. 
If the thirteenth session of the General Assembly can be re-
garded as a preliminary round to the Geneva negotiations, the United 
States and the West emerged with a slight lead. At least the As-
sembly had been kept from going on record as favoring an uncon-
ditional cessation of nuclear testing, and thus prejudging the outcome 
35UN Document AI C. 1/ L. 220. 
36UN Document A/C. 1/L. 219/Rev. 1. 
37UN, General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Official Records (13th 
Session), p. 616. 
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of the Geneva talks. On the other hand, the United States had 
backed a proposal calling for a suspension of nuclear testing as long 
as the negotiations continued, which was different and went some-
what further than President Eisenhower's statement of August 22. 
One analyst has argued that this resolution later became an im-
portant obstacle to the United States resuming testing after the 
expiration of the initial twelve months' moratorium.38 
The origin of the inconsistency between the President's state-
ment and the United States support of the UN resolution is not 
clear. At least three alternative explanations are possible. The in-
consistency may have been a conscious concession, considered and 
agreed in Washington by the governmental agencies concerned, per-
haps in response to pressures from friendly delegations reported to 
the State Department by the United States delegation to the As-
sembly.39 As such it may have been agreed to by the ABC and the 
Department of Defense without much thought of the consequences 
because no one expected the negotiations to last as long as a year. 
Again, the inconsistency may have resulted from a failure in the 
coordination between the United States delegation on one hand, 
and the Department of State and other agencies of the government 
on the other. Finally, it may have reflected an effort by some in-
dividuals within the United States government to use the United 
Nations as an instrument in bureaucratic infighting for the purpose 
of forcing an adjustment in the American position against the op-
position of their colleagues. Since the Department of State contained 
the highest proportion of individuals favoring an intensive exploration 
of test ban possibilities, and since it was in the best position to con-
trol the American stand in the UN, the last interpretation has a 
degree of plausibility. Incidents of this sort occur when policy ob-
jectives are not clearly articulated and when disagreements among 
the governmental agencies concerned are glossed over in general 
policy statements which do not provide sufficient guidance in new 
38Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, p. 284. 
39As a matter of law the delegation receives instructions from the 
President through the Secretary of State. In practice, the instructions are 
formulated in the Department of State which is also responsible for clearance 
with other agencies concerned. Not infrequently, the delegation suggests to 
the Department that its instructions be modified. 
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tactical developments, such as the situation in the General Assembly, 
requiring specific and prompt action. 
The fact that the discussion of limiting the development of 
missiles would be confined to the forthcoming technical conference 
on measures against surprise attack was another significant outcome 
of the thirteenth session of the Assembly. 
Domestic Sparring 
As this maneuvering for position was in progress on the inter-
national level, there was also considerable sparring on the domestic 
level within the United States. Although no simple description is 
adequate, perhaps the best way of briefly describing what happened 
would be to say that the individuals who questioned the wisdom of 
a test ban, having been somewhat nonplussed by the events of the 
summer, sought to bring their views to the fore. 
Perhaps the most significant effort of this group was an article 
by Professor Henry A. Kissinger entitled "Nuclear Testing and the 
Problem of Peace," which appeared in the October 1958 issue of 
Foreign Affairs. It was the lead article, and that issue of the maga-
zine was published in late September, coincidentally with the open-
ing of the thirteenth session of the General Assembly. During the 
debate in the First Committee, Soviet bloc delegates cited the article 
as proof that the United States was not really interested in a test 
ban. 40 Similar Soviet attempts to impugn American motives on the 
basis of citations from the public debate became a common feature 
of the Geneva negotiations. Doubtlessly, this was a negotiating and 
propaganda device. However, it may also have been more than that. 
In the early fall of 1958, any shrewd analysis of the American 
position would have to take account of the views which Mr. Kis-
singer expressed. On the basis of his book, Nuclear Weapons and 
Foreign Policy, published in 1957, he was a widely respected author-
ity, and it was clear that his views would receive at least a respect-
ful if not a sympathetic hearing by a number of influential people 
within and outside of the government. 
Mr. Kissinger asserted that when the Conference of Experts 
had concluded that it was technically feasible to detect nuclear 
weapon tests, the United States had been forced "to make a critical 
40UN, General Assembly, First Committee, Official Records (13th 
Session), pp. 16, 20 and 34. 
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policy decision, although only its technical aspects had been fully 
explored."41 He then went on to questionwhether a complete suspen-
sion of nuclear testing was desirable. He argued that the United 
States "should deal with the health hazard by ending tests which 
produce appreciable fallout," but that it "should agree to a com-
plete ban only as part of a general disarmament agreement which 
includes conventional weapons." He described the technical diffi-
culties and uncertainties which were involved in detecting and iden-
tifying nuclear explosions and pointed out that these would be 
compounded in the case of a closed society, such as the USSR. He 
also illustrated how difficult it might be to obtain credible evidence 
of a violation of a test ban agreement and raised the fundamental 
question of what action the United States could and would take 
if a violation occurred, a problem which was unresolved when the 
American delegation went to Geneva and which was to plague 
American representatives in the Geneva negotiations. He raised the 
possibility that the Soviet Union "might use a temporary cessation 
to prepare tests of superior weapons," an interesting thought which 
raised serious questions about the wisdom of accepting a moratorium 
before a treaty was signed. His basic arguments, however, concerned 
the wisdom of a test ban agreement from the point of view of 
American military policy. He made the point that a ban on nuclear 
testing might well lead to a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons 
and argued that unless the United States and the West generally 
were willing to increase substantially their conventional forces (or 
unless Soviet bloc conventional forces were decreased), such a pro-
hibition would cripple the defenses of the West. He maintained that 
advances in the development of nuclear weapons would benefit the 
West. Finally, Mr. Kissinger analyzed the strategic problems which 
confronted NATO and suggested that they could be solved through 
the development of a NATO nuclear striking force. As a policy for 
the Geneva negotiations, Mr. Kissinger suggested that the United 
States: 
... should invite the Soviet Union to join a U.N. commit-
tee which would immediately set a maximum dosage of 
permissible fall-out from testing well below the level 
41Henry A. Kissinger, "Nuclear Testing and the Problem of Peace," 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXVII, No. 1 (October 1958), pp. 1-18, at 2. 
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brought about by recent tests. The U.N. committee should 
then assign a quota to the United States and its allies and 
another to the Soviet bloc on a 50 - 50 basis. (Since most 
of the potential 'fourth' Powers are in the West, this would 
be a considerable concession to the U.S.S.R.) For two years 
all Powers would agree to register with the U.N. all tests 
which involve fall-out and both sides would agree not to 
exceed their quota. During those two years the quota 
would be progressively reduced, ultimately to zero. After-
wards, unless there were by then a general disarmament 
agreement, nations would remain free to conduct surface 
tests of 'clean' weapons, underground tests and tests in 
outer space, so long as they did not cause fall-out. Technical 
experts from both sides would agree on an adequate in-
spection system, which would be relatively simple. 42 
It is impossible to state the extent to which Mr. Kissinger's article 
reflected or influenced the views of individuals in responsible posi-
tions; certainly the initial American position in the Geneva negotia-
tions bore little resemblance to his recommendations. However, his 
article was a persuasive statement of the doubts which some felt 
about the wisdom of a comprehensive test ban as a single measure 
of arms control or disarmament. It served as a rallying point for 
individuals who shared these concerns. Thus the article was both a 
symbol of the fact that the argument within the United States about 
the course of American policy concerning this issue was far from 
settled and also an instrument in this continuing battle. 
The Surprise Attack Conference 
Even though chronologically it occurred after the Geneva nego-
tiations opened, the technical conference on surprise attack-form-
ally known as "The Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible 
Measures Which Might Be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack"-
which met from November 10 to December 18, 1958, must also be 
viewed as an element in the background of the test ban negotia-
tions. The Conference recessed after six weeks with no concrete 
achievements mainly because the two sides failed to agree on its 
purposes. 43 The United States sought to discuss methods of con-
42Jbid., p. 16. 
43For a more extensive analysis of the technical conference on surprise 
attack see: Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, 
pp. 464-88. See also the report of the Conference: UN Document A/ 4078. 
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trolling missiles, long-range aircraft, tactical aircraft, ground forces, 
missile-launching submarines, other naval forces, and other possible 
instruments of surprise attack, and in that order. The USSR, on the 
other hand, sought to discuss such matters as the creation of zones 
of inspection and the reduction of military forces in Europe, in-
cluding the denuclearization of Germany. The USSR refused to 
discuss the items which the United States raised on the ground that 
such discussion would involve divulging secret information which 
would be useful to the West without giving the Soviet Union any 
compensating advantages in return. In addition, Soviet delegates said 
that the USSR would not agree to discuss the establishment of 
controls on missiles until nuclear weapons had been banned. The 
American delegates, in contrast, who viewed this conference as an-
other Conference of Experts, refused to discuss the matters raised 
by the USSR on the ground that they involved "political" issues 
not appropriate for consideration in a technical conference. 
In essence, the two sides were concerned about different prob-
lems. So far as American policy in the Geneva test ban negotiations 
was concerned, the first essential implication of this denouement 
was that the USSR probably would not negotiate for controls on 
missiles--on means of delivery of nuclear weapons--except in the 
context of a board agreement covering several measures of arms 
control or disarmament. In other words, the concession which the 
USSR made on this point at the thirteenth session of the General 
Assembly would not hold up in a more concrete negotiating situa-
tion than the Assembly, and the USSR still insisted on maintaining 
a link between controlling missiles and other measures of arms 
control. A second implication was the underscoring of the USSR's 
concern about the possibility of the German Federal Republic's 
obtaining access to nuclear weapons. Putting it in a different way, 
the conference emphasized that the USSR was concerned about a 
very specific "nth country problem." 
The Opening Atmosphere 
Despite the optimistic expectations arising from the agreement 
at the Conference of Experts, the real setting for the Geneva Con-
ference was still the unrelieved Cold War atmosphere of deep 
distrust and mutual suspicion in which the motives of the other side 
were constantly questioned and scrutinized, with every doubt in-
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variably resolved against rather than in favour of the other side's 
good faith. Despite the generally recognized dangers of a nuclear 
catastrophe, the atmosphere was clearly not conducive to decisions 
involving the risks entailed in an immediate diminution of national 
power, in return for longer range benefits conditioned more or less 
on the continuing good faith of the other side. On entering the 
negotiations, the Soviet Union appeared to aim at obtaining an im-
mediate, permanent, and far-reaching commitment from the West, 
with minimum control machinery. The United States, while ap-
parently willing to give a qualified commitment, demanded guar-
antees against evasion which would lift the "iron curtain" substantially 
and which could not be frustrated unilaterally, and perhaps also 
further measures of arms control. Both sides appeared to ques-
tion each other's sincerity in desiring to give any genuine com-
mitment with respect to a test ban. The Soviet Union sought to 
find confirmation of its suspicions in the open public debate con-
tinuing in the United States on the wisdom of the test ban; the 
Western suspicions on the other hand fed on the unrestrained 
resort to propaganda by the Soviet Union's indiscriminately seeking 
to generate pressures on the West. As the negotiations opened, this 
pervading atmosphere made it exceedingly difficult for the two sides 
to cut through the underbrush of tactical and propaganda positions 
developed in the preliminary sparring and to start real negotiations. 
All in all, the setting was not auspicious. 
III 
The Initial Phase of the Geneva Negotiations 
The Selection and Preparation of the American Delegation 
As soon as the USSR agreed in its note of August 30 that ne-
gotiations concerning a test ban agreement should begin on October 
31, and while the preconference maneuvering for position was in 
progress, the United States began preparations for the opening 
of the talks. The first step was the appointment of a delegation. 
James J. Wadsworth was chosen as the U.S. representative, with 
the personal rank of Ambassador. Prior to 1953, he had been 
engaged in the management of various business enterprises and had 
held a variety of public offices, including membership in the New 
York State Assembly from 1931 to 1941. When the new adminis-
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tration took over in 1953, President Eisenhower appointed Mr. 
Wadsworth, a Republican, to the office of deputy representative of 
the United States to the United Nations with the rank of Ambas-
sador. In this capacity he had participated in various negotiations 
involving arms control and disarmament and nuclear energy. How-
ever, by self-admission, he was not in any sense a technical expert 
in the subject matter of the test ban negotiations. In fact, during 
the course of the conference he sometimes emphasized that he did not 
understand the technical intricacies which were involved. Ambas-
sador Wadsworth's greatest strength was his skill in advocacy and 
his personal relationships. Robert F. Bacher, a member of the 
President's Science Advisory Committee and one of the Western 
delegates at the Conference of Experts, was chosen as his deputy. 
In addition, the American delegation included: senior advisors from 
the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the 
Atomic Energy Commission; two Congressional advisors, Senator 
Albert Gore, with Senator Hubert H. Humphrey as his alternate 
(both Democrats); Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper (Republican); 
and a number of special advisors. 44 
Unlike the Conference of Experts, which consisted of Eastern 
and Western panels, the Geneva negotiations would be comprised 
of delegations from the three nuclear powers, the USSR, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. In practice, however, as the Soviet 
representatives constantly pointed out, there were only two sides. 
The two Western delegations hardly ever differed in the public 
sessions of the Geneva talks. The principal British delegate was 
David Ormsby-Gore, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. He 
44The advisers to the American delegation were: Charles C. Stelle, De-
partment of State; Alfonzo P. Fox, Lt. Gen., USA (retired), Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; George M. Kava-
naugh, Atomic Energy Commission; all titled senior advisers; and Vincent 
Baker, Department of State; Robert G. Baraz, Department of State; Stephen 
Benedict, USIA; Hans Bethe, PSAC; Darcey Brent, Department of State; 
Harold Brown, Atomic Energy Commission; Charles E. Collett, Col., USAF, 
Department of Defense; Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Office of the Special As-
sistant to the President for Science and Technology; Richard Latter, RAND 
Corporation; Doyle L. Northrup, Department of Defense; David H. Popper, 
American Consulate General, Geneva; Luther Reid, Department of State; 
Malcolm Toon, Department of State; Paul Toussaint, Department of State; 
Henry S. Villard, American Consulate General, Geneva; and Secretary of the 
Delegation, Virgil L. Moore, American Consulate General, Geneva. 
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had been a delegate at the 1957 London session of the UN Sub-
committee of the Disarmament Commission. The British delegation 
included several others from the Foreign Office, but interestingly 
no ranking scientists or high level officials from the Atomic Energy 
Authority or the Ministry of Defense. 
As has already been mentioned, Ambassador Semen K. Tsar-
apkin was appointed as the chief Soviet delegate. 45 Y evgeni K. 
Fedorov was his principal technical assistant. Dr. Fedorov had 
been the Chairman of the Eastern panel at the Conference of 
Experts and Mr. Tsarapkin had been a member of the panel. The 
Soviet delegation also included additional scientists and other diplo-
mats who had had previous experience in disarmament negotiations. 
The composition of the Soviet delegation reflected a consistent 
Soviet policy of generally continuing to use the same diplomatic 
and scientific personnel in disarmament negotiations. This policy 
has facilitated continuity and has avoided the laborious process of 
"educating" new persons. The American practice, followed by both 
the Republican and Democratic administrations, has been in striking 
contrast: new personalities, frequently lacking any related knowledge 
or experience, have been regularly placed in responsible negotiating 
or policy-making positions requiring almost instant action. 
In the relatively short time available after its appointment, 
the American delegation and other officials prepared a position 
paper which ultimately was approved by the Committee of Prin-
cipals. This paper, which was about ten pages in length, reiterated 
the basic elements of the August 22 statement, which became the 
core of the American negotiating position. The paper outlined the 
major issues which could be anticipated and formulated an Ameri-
can position on each of these. It was in no sense a draft treaty. 
Many issues were covered only generally and some hardly at all. 
The progress in other areas of arms control that would be re-
quired if the test moratorium were to be extended was not defined, 
any more than in the President's statement of August 22. A variety 
of technical problems were not worked out. Interestingly, the posi-
tion paper suggested that the United States might, at some appropri-
ate stage in the negotiations, introduce the concept that the treaty 
should only cover explosions above a certain yield level. In pre-
45See supra p. 57. 
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paring the paper, the scientists and the Department of State per-
sonnel tended to work separately on different problems and without 
a great deal of interchange. 
Whether or not the position paper constituted adequate prepara-
tion is a difficult question, and one which can be examined better 
at a later stage, after the actual negotiations have been reviewed. 
It is necessary though at this point to consider why the preparations 
were not more extensive. Partly, it was again a matter of time. Less 
than two months elapsed between the time that the delegation was 
appointed and the time that they had to depart for Geneva. In 
addition, the lack of detail in the position paper was partly a mat-
ter of tactics; it was thought that the American position should be 
developed in the context of the Soviet position as expressed in the 
negotiations, and in any case there was the general maxim of not 
displaying one's hand too early in the game. Further, the nature of 
the American preparation was related to the interim sparring that 
went on in this period. Since it takes two to reach an agreement, 
the seriousness with which one views one's task is partly a function 
of one's perception of the seriousness of the opposite party. View-
ing the course of events, an American justifiably could have some 
reservations about Soviet intentions. Finally, it must be said that 
American preparation was not more advanced because certain key 
officials were unwilling to do more and, above all, because it would 
have been difficult to get agreement in the Committee of Principals 
on a more precise document. The cleavages concerning the wisdom 
of various courses among the individuals and agencies represented 
on the Committee were too great to allow more than an agreement 
on broad and rather vague principles. Of course, these difficulties 
could have been resolved by directive from the President, but they 
were not. 
Opening Controversies 
As has already been mentioned, there was also something less 
than full agreement between East and West on the objective of the 
Geneva negotiations. The debate about this continued until the last 
hour. The final note on the subject was sent from the Soviet Foreign 
Ministry to the American Embassy and face to face controversy 
occurred the moment the conference opened. 
It took an informal, off-the-record meeting lasting three hours, 
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on Saturday, November 1, 1958, to achieve agreement on the title 
of the conference. Even after that the parties disputed the meaning 
of the title, "The Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear 
Weapon Tests." The United States held that discontinuance meant 
"suspension" while the Soviet Union interpreted it as meaning es-
sentially "cessation. "46 There was more to the dispute than mere 
semantics, a basic issue was at stake, the question of whether a test 
cessation would or would not be permanent and unconditional, and 
both sides sought to have the title reflect their position. 
There were also other procedural differences at an early stage. 
The USSR wanted the meetings to be open, but ultimately agreed 
to the Western proposal that they should be closed.47 The Soviet 
Union also suggested that the Conference should grant hearings to 
representatives from nongovernmental organizations. 48 Mr. Tsar-
apkin advanced this as a general suggestion and made a specific pro-
posal that the representatives from the Committee for a Sane Nuclear 
Policy-an international group with membership in several Western 
countries which strongly opposed the testing of nuclear weapons-
should be heard. The Western powers refused to accept the Soviet 
proposal, arguing that representatives of nongovernmental organiza-
tions could make their views known to the various delegations 
separately. 
Through both proposals the Soviet Union sought to use world-
wide public pressure against the testing of nuclear weapons as a 
way of influencing the Western position in the negotiations. Al-
though the Conference decided not to grant hearings to these 
representatives the Soviet delegation felt free not only to talk to 
them but-despite the agreed procedure-to hold formal press con-
ferences as well, obviously in order further to stimulate public 
pressures. In practice, even though the Soviet Union accepted the 
Western position that the Conference should be private-that is, 
that attendance should be limited to the representatives of the three 
nuclear powers and the Secretary General of the United Nations, 
that the records of the meetings should not be published until the 
participating states agreed, and that only brief communiques should 
46GEN/DNT /PV. 2, pp. 3-4. 
47GEN/DNT/PV. 1, p. 8. 
48GEN/DNT/PV. 7, p. 3. 
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be issued-the Soviet Union continued to play for the support of 
public opinion. 
For example, at the first meeting of the Conference the Soviet 
Union submitted a short draft treaty (which will be analyzed in 
more detail later) providing for an immediate, permanent and un-
conditional cessation of nuclear weapons tests. 49 Within a few days, 
the Soviet delegation to the United Nations gave the text of the 
proposal to the press, and it was subsequently published in a num-
ber of Western papers, although not in Soviet papers. Sharp Western 
protests in the Conference provoked first a defense of the action by 
Mr. Tsarapkin, and then the interesting statement, made, as he put 
it, purely of his "own volition, that the Soviet delegation has not 
handed the text of the draft agreement to anyone."50 Thus, despite 
an action for which his government could be held accountable, he 
sought to safeguard his own personal reputation with his negotiating 
partners. 
Subsequently, the Western delegations also sought to rally pub-
lic opinion to their side, and thereby to buttress their position in the 
Conference. In fact, Western techniques may even have been some-
what more sophisticated, leaks to the press were made with con-
siderably more subtlety. Two points, however, must be made. The 
first is that the USSR initiated the practice, and in a most blatant 
fashion. The second is that the play for public opinion was neces-
sarily confined almost entirely to efforts to influence opinion in 
Western and uncommitted countries. Because of the rigid controls 
of the press in communist countries, their citizens could read only 
what their governments approved. Some Western radio broadcasts 
may have reached citizens of these countries, but the effects were 
clearly negligible. Thus, although both sides had a more or less 
equal opportunity to influence people in uncommitted areas, the 
battle for "home opinion" was quite unequal. Moreover, the prin-
cipal Soviet policy-makers needed to be concerned about the "home 
opinion" much less than the Western governments. The USSR 
could seek to undermine the strength of the Western delegations, 
while the West did not have the same opportunity. For the West, 
this part of the battle had to be defined principally in terms of 
49GEN/DNT/l. 
50GEN/DNT/7, p. 10. 
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countering Soviet efforts. In negotiations involving an issue charged 
with as many emotional implications as that of nuclear testing, this 
difference was quite important. 
Continued Soviet Testing of Nuclear Weapons 
Although these Soviet efforts to play upon public optmon in 
the opening stages of the Geneva negotiations may have put the 
Western powers under some constraint, another Soviet action was 
even more bothersome to them. On October 30, the Soviet Foreign 
Ministry issued a statement on the "Question of the Cessation of 
Nuclear Tests," which was transmitted to the Secretary General of 
the United Nations the following day, the day that the Geneva 
Conference opened. 51 The statement asserted, as Foreign Minister 
Gromyko had done previously, that because of the continued test-
ing of nuclear weapons by the Western powers after the USSR had 
unilaterally renounced further testing on March 31, and because of 
the unacceptable nature of the Western proposal for a one-year 
suspension of further tests, the USSR had the right to continue 
testing until it had completed as many experiments as the United 
States and the United Kingdom combined had undertaken since 
March 31. The statement went on to say: 
This is just the line of action the Soviet Government will 
pursue, in its concern for the security of the Soviet people, 
so long as the Governments of the United States and the 
United Kingdom will persist in wrecking agreement and 
raising repeated obstacles to an agreement on the immedi-
ate stopping of the tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons 
for all time. 
On November 7, the United States Atmnic Energy Commission 
announced that the USSR had detonated two "relatively low-yield" 
devices in Siberia on November 1 and November 3; that is, after 
the Geneva negotiations had opened. The USSR's previous shots 
that fall had been conducted at a different proving ground. In ad-
dition, the November shots were at a different height from the 
immediately preceding series. The new shots seemed to be tests of 
51UN Document A/3973. 
52See Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1958, 
p. 78. 
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relatively unsophisticated weapons. 52 They may well have been 
planned principally for their psychological effect. 
Immediately after the ABC's announcement, President Eisen-
hower issued a statement in which he said that although the Soviet 
action relieved the United States of its unilateral obligation, under 
his proposal of August 22, not to conduct further tests, it would 
continue the suspension "for the time being," and he "understood 
that the United Kingdom would also." 
The Western delegations also raised the issue of the Soviet 
tests in the Geneva Conference on November 7. Although Mr. 
Tsarapkin replied immediately, over two weeks later, on November 
29, he read a formal declaration, which probably should be con-
sidered the USSR's official reply.53 The declaration essentially re-
stated the October 30 statement of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. It 
asserted the right of the USSR to continue testing, and then said: 
"This is exactly what the Soviet Government is doing, since it is 
concerned about its country's security." However, after November 
7, 1958, neither side announced a nuclear explosion on Soviet 
territory, until the USSR publicly abrogated the moratorium in the 
fall of 1961, and there is no publicly available evidence that the 
Soviet Union conducted tests during this period. 54 
There are several unanswered questions concerning the episode. 
For example, why did the Soviet Union not announce the tests, or 
why did the United States wait until November 7 to make its an-
nouncement? Were the two shots attempts to test the efficiency of 
the Western national detection systems? The most plausible inter-
pretation seems to be that the Soviet action was a warning that the 
USSR would not be bound by any cut-off date unilaterally pro-
claimed by the West and also an attempt to bully the Western 
governments into agreeing to the Soviet version of a test ban through 
playing on Western anxieties concerning the relative state of weapons 
development and on the widespread public fear of the consequences 
53GEN/DNT/l5, pp. 3-11. 
54Earl H. Voss, however, maintains that "the Defense Department 
finally recognized that clap.destine t~::sting probably had been occurring in the 
Soviet Union." (Nuclear Ambush, p. 512.) It is difficult to know how to 
evaluate his conclusion. It seems clear that some suspicious seismic signals 
were recorded during this period, but these obviously did not constitute 
incontrovertible evidence of clandestine nuclear detonations. 
The Opening of the Diplomatic Negotiations 121 
of further testing. If this was the Soviet goal, the action did not 
succeed. Nor did it result, on the other hand, in widespread public 
condemnation of the USSR for testing after the opening of the 
Conference. 
The Controversy Concerning the Agenda 
The basic conflict between the two sides manifested itself in 
the controversy over the agenda of the Geneva Conference. The 
dispute about the agenda began during the opening session and 
continued to occupy the Conference for three weeks. Finally, on 
November 21, the Conference implicitly dropped the idea of at-
tempting to reach agreement on an agenda, and launched into a 
substantive discussion without any formal agenda. 
In reality, the discussion on the agenda was a substantive dis-
cussion, for it involved attempts on both sides to influence the 
outcome under the guise of settling mere procedural issues. The 
essential issue at stake was whether the discussion of a control 
organization would precede, accompany or follow the conclusion 
of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. The 
Soviet proposal-mirroring those that it had advanced since the 
very first post-Second World War negotiations on arms control and 
disarmament-was that the first item on the agenda should be 
"Conclusion of an agreement on the cessation, by States possessing 
atomic and hydrogen weapons, of tests with such weapons."55 After 
that, according to the Soviet proposal, the Conference would ap-
prove provisions concerning the control organization to monitor 
such an agreement. The Conference would finally prepare a report 
to be submitted to the participating governments and the Security 
Council and General Assembly of the United Nations. In the Western 
view-again resembling Western reactions in the past-such an 
agenda could well result in an unmonitored test ban, since the obli-
gation not to test would be adopted prior to agreement on the 
control system. In any case, the Soviet agenda would have the 
effect of making it difficult to condition the cessation of testing on 
the establishment and effective operation of a control system and on 
progress in other areas of arms control or disarmament. 
In the agenda proposed by the United States, the order of the 
first two items was reversed, and, in addition, the agreement on the 
55GEN/DNT/PV. 2, p. 5. 
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"discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests" would not be adopted 
until the Conference had decided on interim measures to bring the 
agreement and control system into operation. 56 Mr. Tsarapkin 
initially took the attitude that to proceed in this fashion would be 
"tantamount to talking about pointless matters, since it is proposed 
to create a control system before any agreement is reached about 
what is to be controlled."57 He added that the nature of the control 
system would depend on the nature of the agreement concerning 
the cessation of the tests, and then asserted that a one-year mora-
torium would be an insufficient period of time even to establish 
a control system. He argued that the conditional moratorium pro-
posed in President Eisenhower's August 22 statement was a way of 
creating loopholes so that the Western powers could resume their 
testing programs. 
Both sides offered revised versions of their proposals. 58 The 
revisions were all in the direction of formulations which would 
allow simultaneous discussion of the nature of the agreement and 
the nature of the control system, although the Soviet proposals were 
always somewhat ambiguous in this regard. In the end, however, 
once the quest for an agenda was abandoned, this was in fact the 
procedure which the Conference followed. In terms of distance from 
opening positions, ignoring the question of whether or not these 
were justifiable, the outcome represented probably a greater con-
cession on the part of the USSR than on the part of the West. 
The Initial Soviet Proposal 
The same issues that were involved in the dispute about the 
agenda arose in the discussion of the draft treaty which the Soviet 
Union tabled during the opening session of the Conference. The 
proposal was both brief and simple. Its provisions were: 
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the 
United States of America, 
Pursuing the aim of putting a check to the nuclear 
56Jbid., p. 11. 
57Jbid., p. 19. 
58See GEN/DNT/PV. 7, pp. 11-12, 17-18; GEN/DNT/PV. 9, pp. 
3-4; and, GEN/DNT/PV. 4, p. 4. 
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armaments race and to the further improvement and crea-
tion of new, even more destructive types of these weapons 
of mass destruction, 
Endeavouring to take a practical step towards the 
'urgent objective of prohibiting atomic weapons and elim-
inating them from national armaments,' as indicated by 
the United Nations, 
Being moved by the desire to eliminate forever the 
danger to the life and health of the population of all 
countries of the world resulting from experimental ex-
plosions of nuclear weapons, 
Have decided to conclude for these purposes the 
present Agreement and have appointed as their plenipo-
tentiaries . . . who, having exchanged their full powers, 
found in good and due form, have agreed as follows: 
Article 1 
The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
em Ireland and the United States of America solemnly 
undertake not to carry out any tests of atomic and hydro-
gen weapons of any type from the date on which the 
present Agreement is signed. · 
Article 2 
The three Governments undertake to promote the assump-
tion by all other States in the world of an undertaking not 
to carry out tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons of any 
type. 
Article 3 
For the purposes of keeping observation on the fulfillment 
of the undertaking contained in Article 1 of this Agree-
ment, the States Parties to this Agreement shall institute 
machinery for control. 
The above-mentioned control machinery shall have at 
its disposal a network of control posts set up in accordance 
with the recommendations of the Geneva Conference of 
Experts. 
Article 4 
The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
em Ireland and the United States of America agree to 
the installation on their territories and also--in the case 
of the United States of America and the United Kingdom 
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of Great Britain and Northern Ireland--on the territories of 
their possessions and trust territories, of an agreed number 
of control posts. 
Article 5 
This Agreement shall continue indefinitely and shall enter 
into force immediately after it has been signed. 59 
This proposal paralleled the Soviet suggestions for the agenda 
of the Conference, and also the Soviet draft resolution submitted 
to the thirteenth session of the General Assembly. It also resembled 
tactics often previously employed by the USSR. It would have re-
sulted in the signatory states signing an agreement not to test 
nuclear weapons at a point when they had achieved only a vague 
agreement in principle on the nature of a control system. This draft 
treaty, in combination with the Soviet actions at the thirteenth 
session of the General Assembly, and the Soviet proposal with 
respect to the agenda of the Geneva Conference, clearly made 
many in the West wary of Soviet intentions and doubtful about the 
Soviet willingness actually to accept a control system. The Soviet 
position therefore served to strengthen the fears and also the hand 
of those within the United States who questioned the wisdom of 
a test ban. It also made those who favored a test ban somewhat 
reluctant, at this stage, to press their position with vigor. In the 
opening days of the Conference, it was difficult to argue that con-
cessions should be made to the Soviet position in the interest and 
hope of reaching an agreement. Whether the initial Soviet position 
would have been different if President Eisenhower's statement of 
August 22 had been more acceptable to the USSR is an interesting 
subject of speculation. If the Conference of Experts could be in-
terpreted as a concession to the West on the part of the USSR, 
the August 22 statement contained no compensating concessions to 
the Soviet position. Whether the statement was wise from the point 
of view of American security interests is one question. Its impact 
on the USSR is a separate, although related, question. 
The Soviet draft treaty has a number of other interesting as-
pects. First, no mention was made of other measures of disarma-
ment. Secondly, there was no mention of possible sanctions against 
59QEN/DNT/1. 
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a violation of the agreement. Thirdly, it was confined to the three 
nuclear powers. Fourthly, it attacked the "nth country problem" 
by fiat, so to speak. The only possible implication of Article 2 
would have been that the United States, the United Kingdom and 
the USSR would have been obligated in some way to see that 
their allies and neutral states too should agree not to conduct 
nuclear weapons tests. Immediately, this meant France and China 
and possibly at a later date, West Germany. Finally, since the 
"agreement" would have gone into effect immediately upon signa-
ture, so far as the United States was concerned, it would have 
circumvented the requirement of consent by the Senate to ratifica-
tion. No doubt, the choice of the word "agreement" was inten-
tional. 
Although the Western delegates raised most of these points 
in the debate, their criticisms centered on the vagueness of the 
provisions concerning control in the draft agreement. The initial 
Soviet response was that the problem of control had been settled 
by the Conference of Experts-the report of that Conference 
contained recommendations for a control system with which the 
USSR agreed-and that a separate document could be prepared 
containing the "technical details relating to the control system. "60 
The Western powers regarded this as an inadequate reply since it 
did not provide for the tight connection that they desired to see 
established between the obligation not to test and the establish-
ment and effective operation of a control system. 
On a more fundamental level, the Soviet response raised a 
problem which was to become increasingly troublesome for the 
Western powers during the course of the negotiations. The question 
concerned the status and significance of the report of the Conference 
of Experts. To what extent was it the basis for the Geneva Con-
ference? Was it the final formulation of the control system, or 
merely an initial recommendation? To what extent could the system 
recommended in the report be supplemented or altered without 
destroying the basis for the negotiations? It will be recalled that the 
Western panel had refused to discuss a number of issues at the 
Conference of Experts on the ground that they were political. How 
should these matters now be treated? In addition, the report of the 
60GEN/DNT/PV. 2, p. 31. 
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Conference of Experts contained no recommendations concerning 
a system for the detection of nuclear explosions at high altitudes. 
Just as the Western states lacked a clear conception at the outset 
concerning the function of the Conference of Experts, when the 
Geneva negotiations began, they were uncertain about the status 
which they were willing to assign to the report. But while the 
Soviet proposal raised this problem, it did not do so in a critical 
fashion, and at this stage not much attention was devoted to the 
issue. 
Senator Gore's Reaction 
Senator Albert Gore, who was a member of both the Joint 
Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy and the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, and who had been appointed as a 
Congressional Adviser to the United States delegation, attended the 
Geneva negotiations for a week during the early period when at-
tention was focused on the controversy about the agenda and on 
the Soviet draft agreement. The experience left him profoundly 
disturbed. On his return to Washington in mid-November, he 
voiced his concerns publicly,61 and also sent a private memorandum 
to President Eisenhower. In Senator Gore's view, the USSR's actions 
relating to the Conference, including the draft agreement which it 
had tabled, were ample grounds for suspicions of Soviet motives. 
He doubted that the USSR was actually willing to accept adequate 
control measures, and he had concluded that the USSR's ambition 
was merely to weaken United States deterrent strength, and par-
ticularly to inhibit the development of tactical nuclear weapons. 
Moreover, he felt that the USSR was winning widespread public 
sympathy by its behavior and that the Western position was not 
being properly understood. The conclusion that the Western posi-
tion was incapable of receiving widespread public support was 
implicit in his argument. 
He proposed that the West should adopt a new position. In 
his memorandum to the President he suggested that the President 
should: 
61See his signed article in New York Herald Tribune, November 16, 
1-958, and also the accounts in New York Times, November 16, 1958, p. 1, 
and November 18, 1958, p. 1. 
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announce the unconditional and unilateral cessation 
of all nuclear tests in the earth's atmosphere for a specific 
period, say three years, ask similar action by other nuclear 
powers and suggest that the Geneva Conference proceed 
immediately to negotiate a treaty among the nuclear powers 
for a permanent stoppage of atmospheric tests. 62 
His public recommendations were similar. Both publicly and pri-
vately he argued that stopping atmospheric tests would eliminate 
most of the danger of radioactive fallout. He also asserted that 
existing national detection systems had demonstrated their effective-
ness in detecting atmospheric tests. This was a most interesting 
assertion in view of the official American insistence then and later 
on an international control system. Of course, at this point the of-
ficial American position was not addressed to the question of a 
ban limited to atmospheric tests. After an atmospheric ban was 
signed, Senator Gore felt that the conference could go on to explore 
the more complex questions of inspection and control involved in 
a total ban. Senator Gore thought that shifting the United States 
position in this way would make it more attractive to public opin-
ion and might possibly lay the groundwork for a successful con-
ference in Geneva, or, at least, mitigate or save the United States 
from blame for its failure. 
It is impossible to know whether Senator Gore's experiences 
at the Geneva Conference spawned these ideas or whether his ex-
periences merely reinforced views which he had previously held. 
Certainly the ideas had been expressed before in the debate which 
had gone on within the United States. However, Senator Gore's 
expression of his ideas at this point was crucially important, and 
probably exerted some pressure on the USSR-if it was interested 
in a comprehensive test ban-to modify the Soviet position so that 
it would be more acceptable to the West. At the same time, Sena-
tor Gore's opinions also cast doubt upon the extent to which the 
efforts of the American delegation in Geneva would be supported 
within the United States, and particularly within the Senate, which 
would have to consent to the ratification of any treaty. Mr. Tsar-' 
62Memorandum for President Eisenhower from Albert Gore, U.S.S., 
November 19, 1958. 
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apkin, citing the reports of Senator Gore's statements, raised these 
doubts in the Geneva Conference. 63 
However, there is no evidence that the Senator's actions pro-
voked a formal reappraisal within the Eisenhower Administration 
of the American position at this time. The Administration had in a 
sense considered the possibility of a partial ban when the mora-
torium decision was made and had rejected it on the ground that 
stopping tests in only some environments would be misunderstood 
by public opinion. Moreover, it was thought that the USSR was 
only interested in a comprehensive test ban. Finally, many in the 
Department of State strongly wanted the world to experience the 
establishment and operation of an international control system, and 
it could be argued that the likelihood of this occurring would be 
less if Senator Gore's suggestion were adopted. In the same vein, 
one of the gains that the CIA saw resulting from a test ban was 
that it would "open up" the USSR. 
Just as Americans could be concerned about the USSR's mo-
tivations, Soviet analysts could with some justification have reserva-
tions about the American position. A casual reading of the popular 
press would have revealed the deep division within the United 
States about the wisdom of discontinuing tests of nuclear weapons. 
In view of this, as was suggested earlier, the August 22 statements 
of the Western powers could be interpreted as not indicating a 
serious intention to negotiate a test ban agreement. Senator Gore's 
statement could have had the effect of reinforcing the reservations 
which Soviet analysts might have had. Although it is impossible to 
weigh accurately the advantages and costs which would accrue to 
each side, it is probably true that the USSR would not benefit as 
much from a partial test ban as it would from a total cessation of 
nuclear weapons tests. It was the United States, not the Soviet 
Union, which expressed great interest in the development of tac-
tical nuclear weapons and in testing such devices underground. 
Putting it in a different way, American military leaders viewed 
tactical nuclear weapons as a way of compensating for the USSR's 
superior strength in conventional forces. Because of this superiority 
the USSR showed little interest in tactical nuclear weapons. Thus, 
probably neither the opening position of the Western powers in 
63GEN/DNT/PV. 10, pp. 8-9. 
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the Geneva negotiations-that is, the August 22 statements-nor 
Senator Gore's suggested alternative were very appealing to the 
USSR, and by mid-November, Soviet leaders, if they had any in-
trinsic interest in the problem, could-perhaps justifiably-begin to 
question whether the United States would accept an agreement 
which would also be acceptable to the USSR. If, on the other hand, 
the Soviet elite was merely interested in using the negotiations as a 
device to inhibit the weapons development programs of the West, 
they could interpret the course of events as indicating a need for 
some concessions to prolong the discussions. 
The Soviet Concession 
Since the opening positions of the two sides seemed basically 
incompatible, the initial task of the negotiators was to see if the 
gap between the two could be narrowed so that there would at least 
be a chance of reaching an agreement. In essence, this is what 
happened in the Geneva Conference during the period from the 
opening on October 31, 1958, until the second recess began on 
March 19, 1959, or during the first seventy-two meetings of the 
Conference. 
The process actually began even before the attempt to reach 
an agreement on an agenda was abandoned. Starting at the fifth 
meeting, on November 6, the Western representatives began to 
outline their concept of a control organization. Mr. Ormsby-Gore led 
off by outlining his conception of the general functions of a con-
trol organization.64 A week later, following the announcement that 
the USSR had continued testing after October 31, the United 
States tabled a "Working Paper Outlining a Treaty on Discontinu-
ance of Nuclear Weapon Test Explosions Including Establishment 
of an Effective Control Organization. "65 As in the August 22 
statement, the duration of the obligation not to test nuclear weapons 
was made conditional on satisfactory progress in the establishment 
and effective operation of a detection and identification system and 
on satisfactory progress "in reaching disarmament objectives to 
be agreed." 
Perhaps in response to the description of the control organiza-
64GEN/DNT/PV. 5, pp. 4-5. 
65GEN/DNT/PV. 8, pp. 5-8. 
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tion which was contained in these working papers and the verbal 
explanations which accompanied their presentation, or perhaps as 
a reaction to Senator Gore's statements, or maybe as an independ-
ently planned tactic, on November 29 Mr. Tsarapkin read a Declar-
ation in which inter alia the Soviet government announced its will-
ingness to have the basic provisions regarding control embodied in 
the text of the test ban agreement. 66 The Declaration in its en-
tirety was a curious mixture. It started out as a defense of the 
USSR's continued testing of nuclear weapons, shifted to an attack 
on the position of the Western powers in the Geneva negotiations, 
mentioned, almost in passing, the new Soviet willingness to have 
one document instead of two, and concluded with the submission 
of a revised version of the draft agreement which the Soviet Union 
had introduced the day that the negotiations had begun. The most 
basic change was the insertion of a new article stating that the 
provisions for a control system would be attached to the agreement 
as a protocol which would enter into force simultaneously with the 
agreement. In addition, the final article now stated that the agree-
ment would enter into force immediately after it had been "rati-
fied" by the parties "in accordance with their constitutional pro-
cedures." However, the obligation not to test would start on the 
date that the agreement was signed. Apart from these changes, the 
draft agreement was identical with the original version. Neverthe-
less, the basic concession was sufficient to narrow the gap con-
siderably between the Soviet position and that of the West. The 
USSR had again agreed that control was necessary as a part of any 
test ban agreement, and it was at least back to its 1957 position 
concerning this matter. With this concession, the actual negotiations 
began. 
What Parties to the Treaty? 
One week later, on December 6, 1958, the Conference adopted 
Article I of a Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon 
Tests. Three more articles were adopted before the Conference ad-
journed on December 19 for a brief Christmas recess, and another 
three were adopted before the second recess began on March 19, 
1959. These agreed articles dealt in part with noncontroversial for-
66GEN/DNT/PV. 15, pp. 3-11. 
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malities, such as the registration of the treaty with the United 
Nations. Other parts, however, concerned more basic issues. 
Perhaps more important than the number of agreed articles 
was that both sides began to exchange views in detail on their con-
cepts of a test ban treaty and a control organization, and to narrow 
their differences. In this respect, the Conference was unlike any 
other postwar political negotiations on disarmament. 
One of the first issues to be explored and settled was whether 
or not states other than the three nuclear powers would be allowed 
to adhere to the agreement and to have membership in the control 
organization. It will be recalled that the Soviet draft treaty men-
tioned only the three nuclear powers. The Western powers, on the 
other hand, from the outset envisaged a more inclusive organiza-
tion. The issue arose concretely first in the discussion of Article I; 
should it read, "Each of the Parties to this Treaty agrees ... " as 
in the American draft, 67 or should it read, "The Governments of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of 
America solemnly undertake . . . ", as in the Soviet version. Several 
issues were involved: 
1 ) the degree of security which would result from the system 
depending on how many and which states were included; 
2) methods of handling the "nth country problem"; 
3) the distribution of political power within the control organi-
zation; and 
4) the timing of the test ban. 
For the Western powers the first, or first two, aspects seemed 
to be the most important. The problem of China apparently loomed 
large in their considerations, although the United States delegation, 
like the American experts at Geneva a few months earlier, was 
under instructions not to mention the People's Republic of China. 68 
Nonetheless, it was widely known that the USSR had conducted 
explosions-apparently employing TNT-on the territory of the 
People's Republic of China. Moreover, the ability to detect nuclear 
67GEN/DNT/12. 
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tests in the USSR depended to some extent upon having control 
posts on mainland China. The USSR, on the other hand, seemed 
to be mainly concerned about the last issue, the timing of the test 
ban. It agreed to the Western phraseology only after it had re-
ceived assurances from the Western powers that including other 
states would not cause a delay, that the treaty would enter into 
force as soon as it had been ratified by the USSR, the United King-
dom, and the United States.69 Presumably, the original Soviet stand 
was at least partly motivated by the known opposition of France 
to a test ban. 
The same issues were involved-and were settled in a similar 
way-in the discussion of Article II, which obligated the parties to 
the treaty to establish a Control Organization and to cooperate 
with it. 
The "nth country problem" also came up in connection with 
the Soviet proposal that the treaty should contain an article binding 
the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States to "promote 
the assumption by all other States in the world of an undertaking 
not to carry out tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons of any 
type. "70 This had been article two in the original Soviet proposal. 
Significantly, Mr. Ormsby-Gore's question whether the treaty would 
be abrogated if, despite the best efforts of the signatory states, 
another state conducted a nuclear weapons test, went unanswered. 71 
The Western powers argued that they could not accept an obliga-
tion of this nature. In part, it violated Western concepts of co-
operation among sovereign states. Further, the Western powers too 
were bothered by the position of France. So far as this phase of 
the Conference was concerned, the "nth country problem" was 
handled by agreeing to mention it in the preamble, agreeing that 
the Control Organization should be open to other states and that 
there should be an article on accession by other states, and agreeing 
to this rather mild commitment in Article I, "to refrain from caus-
ing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of 
nuclear test explosions anywhere." In essence, what was ruled out 
was aiding another state to conduct a nuclear test explosion by 
69GEN/DNT/PV. 20, p, 6. 
70GEN/DNT /1, p. 25. 
71See Tsarapkin's vague statement: GEN/DNT/PV. 4, p. 16. 
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giving it technical or material assistance. The transfer of nuclear 
weapons for stockpile purposes, an important issue with respect to 
NATO, was not ruled out. 
Differing Concepts Concerning a Control Organization 
More profound differences between the two sides developed 
as they began to discuss the structure and nature of the proposed 
Control Organization. The Western powers envisaged an organiza-
tion which would consist of a small executive body or commission 
composed of the three nuclear powers and a few other states, a 
conference which would include all parties to the treaty, an inter-
nationally staffed detection and identification system including the 
basic components recommended by the Conference of Experts and 
certain other features, and a chief executive officer. 72 In the West-
em view, the Control Organization should, with only a few excep-
tions, either operate automatically on the basis of pre-established 
technical criteria or on the basis of some form of majority voting. 
The original Soviet concept of the Control Organization was 
quite different. 73 The detailed proposal which the USSR tabled had 
no provisions for a conference or a chief executive officer. The 
central headquarters of the detection and identification system would 
be staffed on the basis of parity between East and West, and control 
posts would be manned by the citizens of the territories where they 
were located, except that there would be one "controller" from the 
other side. All important decisions would require the agreement of 
the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
An even more fundamental difference between the positions of 
the two sides concerned what action the Control Organization might 
take in the event of a suspected violation. The USSR argued that 
if one of the three nuclear powers-and implicitly any state-re-
fused to allow an investigation of a suspicious event, the only con-
ceivable action would be for the Commission to report this disagree-
ment to the states which were parties to the treaty and to the 
Security Council of the United Nations.74 Although the Western 
72See GEN/DNT/PV. 5, pp. 4-5; GEN/DNT/PV. 8, pp. 5-8; GEN/-
DNT/PV. 13, pp. 4-5; GEN/DNT/PV. 17, pp. 5-9; GEN/DNT/13; and 
GEN/DNT/22. 
73GEN/DNT/ 19, pp. 16-18. 
74See GEN/DNT/PV. 13, pp. 19-20; and, GEN/DNT/PV. 24, pp. 
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delegates were always somewhat vague about their expectations, 
they made it clear that the Soviet position was unacceptable, and 
implicitly seemed to demand that the Control Organization should 
be able to obtain incontrovertible evidence that a nuclear explosion 
had occurred. 75 In the case of a suspected underground explosion, 
this would have meant an on-site inspection, the only means of 
obtaining definite proof. The Western position seemed to reflect 
some uncertainty about the problem. 
Taken at face value, the two different conceptions reflected 
different interests and fears, and paralleled the broad approach of 
the two sides toward international organization. The West wanted 
to avoid creating a Control Organization which the East could 
obstruct and the East wanted to avoid creating an international 
organization which the West might use against the interests and 
opposition of the East. In essence, the opening positions of the two 
sides on these matters were such that they were obviously unaccept-
able to the other. 
Some progress was made, however, prior to the Christmas 
recess, in reducing the distance between the two positions. After 
the Western powers had stated several times that the chief executive 
officer would be responsible to the Commission and would generally 
act under its directives, 76 and that some decisions of the Commis-
sion would require the agreement of the three nuclear powers, 77 the 
USSR accepted this formulation of Article III, which was suggested 
by Mr. Ormsby-Gore: 
The Control Organization established under Article 2 of 
this Treaty shall consist of: a Control Commission, here-
inafter referred to as 'the Commission'; a Detection and 
Identification System, hereinafter referred to as 'the Sys-
tem'; a Chief Executive Officer, hereinafter referred to as 
'the Administrator'; and a Conference of Parties to the 
Treaty, hereinafter referred to as 'the Conference'. 78 
In particular, the USSR sought and received Mr. Ormsby-Gore's 
assurance that the Administrator could not initiate an on-site in-
75See GEN/DNT/PV. 13, p. 12. 
76See GEN/DNT/PV. 22, pp. 13, 22, and 28; GEN/DNT/PV. 23, 
pp. 23-24; and GEN/DNT/PV. 24, pp. 31-32. 
77See GEN/DNT/PV. 21, pp. 5-6. 
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spection of a suspicious but undetermined underground event with-
out a specific directive from the Commission. 79 The Conference 
also agreed on a text of Article IV, which specified that the Com-
mission should consist of the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States as permanent members and four states elected for 
two-year terms by the Conference. 
The most basic differences, however, remained unresolved 
when the Conference recessed on December 19, 1958, and even 
some of the apparent agreements were in actuality merely formula-
tions which concealed wide disagreements. For example, even 
though it was agreed that there should be an Administrator, his 
powers remained undefined, and although it was agreed that the 
Commission should consist of seven states, the principles which 
should govern the selection of the four elected members and the 
voting procedures of the Commission were not determined. 
Differences on Other Issues 
There were other differences between East and West, which 
had been apparent even before the opening of the Geneva negotia-
tions, concerning the link between a test ban treaty and other meas-
ures of disarmament and also the duration of the Treaty. Mr. 
Tsarapkin kept pressing the Western delegates for an indication of 
what specific measures in other areas of arms control would be 
required for the continuance of the test moratorium.80 The Western 
delegates, however, were only able to say that the specific measures 
would have to be accepted by the Conference. and that eventually 
they would submit a detailed paper. That was the extent of their 
instructions. Mr. Tsarapkin also repeatedly made the point that the 
USSR would only agree to a permanent cessation of nuclear tests, 
not a temporary and conditional cessation as suggested in the West-
em proposals. 81 
Even so, as East-West conferences go, the Geneva Conference 
had an unusual record of achievement when the first recess began 
on December 19, 1958. 
79See GEN/DNT/PV. 23, pp. 16-20 and 23-24. 
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IV 
A Major Reverse and Some Lesser Advances 
The New Data 
When the Conference resumed on January 5, 1959, the Ameri-
can delegation requested that a brief informal meeting should be 
held immediately prior to the formal session. At that time, Mr. 
Wadsworth informed Mr. Tsarapkin, and through him the Soviet 
government, that during the underground tests which had been 
held in Nevada in October 1958, new data had been obtained which 
indicated that it would be more difficult to identify underground 
nuclear explosions than had previously been believed. In other 
words the conclusions of the Conference of Experts now seemed to 
be excessively optimistic in the light of further experimental evi-
dence. Specifically, the United States government now believed 
that: 
a) The method for distinguishing earthquakes from ex-
plosions by the direction of first motion is less effective 
than previously estimated. 
b) The number of earthquakes per year equivalent to a 
given yield is about double that previously estimated. 82 
In practical terms, if the new data were valid, it would mean either 
that the capability of the system proposed by the Geneva Con-
ference of Experts to detect and identify underground nuclear ex-
plosions would not be as great as had been expected-roughly the 
threshold would be raised from 5 to 20 kilotons--or that to obtain 
the same capability, a greater number of control stations and on-
site inspections would be required. In the informal session Ambas-
sador Wadsworth introduced the information and requested that it 
be considered. Later, in the formal session, he merely introduced 
it. That same day, the President's Science Advisory Committee 
released a public statement which contained similar information, 
although it had considerably less technical detail. 83 The Department 
of Defense issued a more detailed release on January 16, 1959.84 
The implications of this action were devastating. Reflecting on 
82GEN/DNT/25. 
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his experiences as a negotiator on arms control and disarmament 
measures in his book published in 1962, James Wadsworth wrote 
that "it spread a pall over the negotiations from which they never 
completely recovered. "85 For the opponents of a test ban treaty in 
the West, the new data provided convincing proof of the wisdom 
of their position. On the other hand, the Soviet Union could 
interpret the new data as an indication that the West was now 
raising the ante in terms of opening up the USSR, and Mr. Tsar-
apkin charged that the data had been introduced to justify sending ten 
times as many on-site inspection groups as the Conference of Ex-
perts had contemplated. The stark outline in which the new data 
was presented, and the fact that it was not accompanied by a 
definite proposal for action allowed all parties to draw whatever 
inferences they might. 
Why then, in the face of these obvious implications, did the 
United States submit the data in such raw form? Why did it not 
request an adjournment of the Conference during which the data 
could be properly evaluated from the technical viewpoint and, 
what is perhaps even more important, concrete proposals could be 
elaborated for the necessary modification of the detection and 
identification system? 
There are several answers. In the first place, President Eisen-
hower's immediate reaction on being informed of the new data 
(which will be treated in more detail later) was that the United 
States government must tell the "truth" to its negotiating partners 
and the American public. Secondly, it would have been impossible 
to keep the new data secret. Many seismograms yield data for the 
public domain. Moreover, the scientists and politicians opposing a 
test ban obviously perceived the value of the new data as powerful 
ammunition in support of their cause, and they could have leaked 
it through Congressional or other channels with even more serious 
consequences on the Geneva Conference. 86 Since past experience 
had shown that the Administration was not willing or able to con-
trol interventions of this sort-and they were encouraged from 
Congressional quarters-there was little risk involved for the per-
sons concerned. Another and perhaps more important reason for the 
85James J. Wadsworth, The Price of Peace (1962), p. 24. 
86See Wadsworth's frank statement in this regard GEN/DNT /PV. 50, 
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hasty submission may have been the conclusion reached by several 
within the Department of State that it would have been impossible 
to obtain agreement within the government on reasonable proposals 
to accompany the submission of the new data. Mr. Dulles, who had 
become increasingly convinced of the advantages of a controlled 
test ban, although skeptical of Russian motives, was taken aback 
by the new data. It will be recalled that the American delegation 
was never given concrete guidance on the threshold problem so 
that apparently there was no agreed policy on the subject which 
could now be reviewed in the light of the new knowledge and all 
other relevant technical and political-military considerations. Under 
the circumstances, any proposals based on the new data on which 
an agreement could have been reached among the agencies con-
cerned through regular process of coordination would probably 
have called for such far-reaching modifications of the scheme de-
veloped by the Conference of Experts that their submission in 
Geneva might well have spelled the doom of any further negotia-
tions. And Mr. Dulles was not prepared to take a strong stand 
and bring the matter before the President. Hence, the decision to 
submit the new data in unevaluated form appeared to be the least 
of several evils. 
Viewing it from a slightly different perspective, the new data 
is a reflection on the rather casual way in which crucial decisions 
were taken in the United States in the spring and summer of 1958. 
At that time, as was shown earlier, it was a matter of common 
knowledge, at least among American scientists, that the conclusions 
with respect to detection and identification of underground ex-
plosions rested on extrapolations from one case. In an environ-
ment where there had been just one less case, high altitude, the 
Conference of Experts had refused to make a recommendation. 
In Geneva, during the formal session on January 5 in which 
the new data was offered, Mr. Wadsworth suggested that the Con-
ference should appoint an ad hoc working group of technical ex-
perts to discuss the problem of high altitude detection. 87 He re-
called the absence in the Report of the Conference of Experts of 
a recommendation concerning this environment, and asserted that 
this gap had to be closed. He went on to say that he believed that 
87GEN/DNT/PV. 29, p. 17. 
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"good use" could be made of such groups "in getting forward with 
our negotiations." Mr. Tsarapkin's response was lightning quick: 
Mr. Wadsworth's last remarks with regard to high-altitude 
explosions . . . only confirm our view that we should not 
at this Conference depart from the starting point which 
we have already taken as the basis for our discussion, that 
is to say, the conclusions worked out by the meeting of 
experts at Geneva last summer.88 
Obviously, both men had the problem of the new data in mind. 
Two days later, Mr. Wadsworth formally proposed that the Con-
ference should convene a technical working group to study the 
implications of the new data. 89 Mr. Tsarapkin's immediate response 
was negative. 90 He argued that to convene a technical working 
group would merely delay the progress of the Conference, that 
new information could always be discovered, and that political ne-
gotiations had to have a fixed basis, in this case the Report of the 
Conference of Experts. He asserted that after the Control Organi-
zation was established, it could take steps to cope with the new 
data but that in the present form the "preliminary and hastily 
prepared document" did not call for study. Moreover, he affirmed 
the belief, often stated by Soviet scientists at the Conference of 
Experts, that the progress of science would make the process of 
detection and identification of nuclear explosions easier rather than 
more difficult. 
Roughly, this is where the controversy stood when the second 
recess began on March 19, 1959. The United States outlined the 
various alternative ways in which the Conference might attempt to 
cope with the new data, but its basic proposal continued to be that 
an ad hoc technical working group should be convened. 91 The 
Soviet Union, on the other hand, continued to deprecate and refuse 
any consideration of this proposal. 
The Darkening Atmosphere 
Meanwhile, the atmosphere surrounding the Geneva Conference 
darkened. Within the United States, domestic opposition to the 
BBJbid. 
89QEN/DNT/PV. 31, p. 7. 
90Jbid., pp. 8-13, 22-26. 
91See GEN/DNT/PV. 52, pp. 4-8. 
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test ban increased. After the new data was released, various con-
gressmen and administration officials spoke out against a compre-
hensive test ban as an isolated measure of arms control. Some of 
these had taken this position from the outset, and they asserted 
that the new data confirmed the wisdom of their position. Others 
apparently changed their position on the basis of the new data. And 
there was silence at the White House. 
In Geneva, the speeches became more acrimonious. Both the 
USSR and the United States issued statements from their national 
capitals blaming the other for the impasse. 92 While four articles 
had been adopted in the first twenty-eight meetings of the Con-
ference, none was adopted from the twenty-ninth until the seventy-
second, and then, on the last day before the recess, three articles 
were hastily accepted. 93 
The Conference continued to discuss the various issues relating 
to the nature of the Control Organization, but the differences be-
tween the two positions seemed to be even more implacable than 
they had been before the Christmas recess. 
Dropping the Link 
The atmosphere, however, was brightened somewhat when on 
January 19, 1959, Mr. Wadsworth opened the thirty-seventh session 
of the Conference by announcing that the United States would "no 
longer insist that the duration of the treaty be made conditional 
upon progress in other fields of disarmament."94 Mr. Ormsby-Gore 
made a similar statement immediately thereafter. In other words, 
"the link" had been formally dropped. 
Obviously, before this action could occur in Geneva, the Com-
mittee of Principals had to agree to new instructions for the Ameri-
can delegation. Certain key Congressmen were also involved in the 
reformulation of the American position, although the issue was 
basically decided within the Adininistration. In this intra-administra-
tion struggle, the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy 
Commission continued to insist on the wisdom of maintaining "the· 
link." Secretary of State Dulles, in opposition, argued that insistence 
92Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, pp. 1339-45. 
93GEN/DNT/PV. 72, passim. 
94GEN/DNT/PV. 37, p. 6. 
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on the link was muddying the waters, harming the public image of 
the United States by making it more difficult to prove to public 
opinion that the Soviet Union was really unwilling to accept ade-
quate control measures-a fact which in his view had been estab-
lished by Soviet actions since the Conference of Experts and 
particularly by the nature of Soviet participation in the diplomatic 
conference thus far. The President decided in Mr. Dulles' favor. 
Perhaps one reason that AEC and Department of Defense officials 
did not strenuously object to this decision to "drop the link" and 
to negotiate for a separate test ban treaty was their feeling that it 
was unlikely that an adequate treaty could actually be achieved in 
any event. This could explain the paradox that at a time when the 
disclosure of the new data had lessened even further the value of 
a test ban treaty in the eyes of the individuals who had insisted on 
"the link," those same individuals acquiesced in dropping the link. 
As is invariably the case when a controversial issue is con-
sidered within the United States government, the debate on the link 
"radiated" beyond the governmental chambers. The arguments 
in support of dropping the link, made for internal consumption, 
minimized the value of the link from the American viewpoint 
and the import of these arguments was, of course, not lost on the 
USSR. This made it more difficult for the United States delegation 
in Geneva to present the abandonment of the link as a real and 
important Western concession. Nevertheless, after the Western an-
nouncement of this concession, the outlook for the negotiations ap-
peared to improve slightly. Two days later, the USSR stated its 
willingness to allow more than two foreign "controllers" at control 
posts,95 and eventually suggested the number of four or five. 96 The 
Western powers, on their part, developed their concept of an "in-
ternational staff'' so that it allowed the possibility of citizens of 
countries which were allied with and friendly to the host country 
serving at control posts there as part of the foreign contingent.97 
In addition, they agreed that the administrative staff would be 
comprised completely of host country nationals. The differences 
between the two sides on the composition of the Commission and 
95GEN/DNT/PV. 39, p. 10. 
96GEN/DNT/PV. 47, R· 3. 
97GEN/DNT/PV. 42, pp. 29-31. 
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on that organ's voting procedures were also narrowed somewhat. 
But no move was made toward settlement of the basic question of 
whether or not the Control Organization would be able to take 
action against the wishes of one of the three nuclear powers. Nor 
was significant progress made with respect to a variety of other 
subsidiary issues. 
The West Tables an Article on Duration 
Throughout this phase of the Conference the Soviet Union 
constantly brought up the question of the duration of the treaty. 
Finally, on March 10, 1959, the United States tabled this article: 
This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the 
inherent right of a Party to withdraw and be relieved of 
obligations hereunder if the provisions of the Treaty and 
its Annexes, including those providing for the timely in-
stallation and effective operation of the control system, 
are not being fulfilled and observed. 98 
A party would have an "inherent" right to withdraw and be 
relieved of its obligations (it is not clear whether necessarily with 
immediate effect with respect to all obligations) if the treaty pro-
visions, including the control system provisions, were not fulfilled, 
or were violated by another party or presumably also by an organ 
set up under the treaty. The violations which would give rise to 
the right to withdraw were not defined; nor was there a provision 
for an automatic termination of the treaty in case of certain treaty 
violations. Thus the determination of the existence of the circum-
stances warranting withdrawal was left to each party but presumably 
would have to be made in good faith. 
In his book, Ambassador Wadsworth viewed this article as a 
built-in "three-way stretch" girdle of support for the continuation 
of the treaty. If one of the three nuclear powers parties to the treaty 
were to refuse cooperation in any way-in the development and 
maintenance of the control system or in observing other financial, 
political, or technical provisions of the treaty--either of the other 
two could withdraw; this-right, he argued, would constitute a strong 
deterrence against any violation at least as long as the continuation 
98GEN/DNT/PV. 70, p. 3. 
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of the treaty was considered in the national interest by all the 
powers concerned. 99 
The Soviet Union, of course, had already had considerable 
evidence that the United States did not intend to limit the test 
cessation to a twelve-month period. At the thirteenth session of the 
General Assembly, the American delegation had voted for a resolu-
tion urging that the moratorium should continue as long as the 
negotiations continued.100 And in January 1959, President Eisen-
hower, in his budget message, pointedly refrained from asking for 
funds for the conduct of nuclear weapons tests during the fiscal 
year 1960.101 However, by tabling the article on duration the 
United States formally accepted the Soviet position that a test ban 
treaty should be of indeterminate duration. 
Two sessions later, at the last meeting before the Easter recess, 
the Soviet Union accepted this article. It also accepted an article 
proposed by the United Kingdom authorizing negotiation of agree-
ments between the Control Organization on one hand and the 
United Nations and any future disarmament body on the other, and 
a United States proposal relating to the periodic review of the con-
trol system. The former article was a purely formal matter, al-
though it did have implications for the relationship between the 
Control Organization and the United Nations. The latter article was 
somewhat more significant in that it provided for a mandatory 
review of the effectiveness of the system two years after the coming 
into force of the treaty and the possibility of annual reviews there-
after.102 In a sense, this provision could be interpreted as a response 
to the "new data," since it indicated the possibility of changes in 
the detection and identification system proposed by the Conference 
of Experts, which was to be embodied in the treaty. 
To sum up the outcome of this opening stage of the Geneva 
Conference, the two sides dropped conditions which were obviously 
unacceptable to the other. The Western concessions concerning the 
link with other measures of disarmament and the duration of the 
treaty could-at least in terms of the negotiations-be regarded as 
99James J. Wadsworth, The Price of Peace, pp. 70-71. 
100See UN, General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Official Records (13th 
Session), pp. 421, 430. 
101New York Times, January 20, 1959, pp. I, 21. 
102See GEN/DNT/44. 
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the equivalent of the Soviet willingness to accept a Control Organi-
zation and some system of control, and to have one treaty instead 
of two. On the other hand, when the Conference began its Easter 
recess on the afternoon of March 19, many basic differences con-
cerning the nature of the Control Organization remained unre-
solved. Indeed, the progress which had been made in this area 
since January 5 was almost imperceptible. Moreover, the USSR 
continued adamantly to oppose the convocation of a technical work-
ing group to examine the new data. Whether or not the Conference 
was on balance nearer to a treaty than it had been at the time of 
the first recess was debatable. In any case, there were now two 
broad areas of controversy: one relating to technical data, going 
to the very basis of the negotiations, and the other relating to the 
Control Organization. Chapters V through VIII will deal with the 
former, Chapter IX with the latter. 
Chapter V 
Formulating A New Western Position 
I 
The Shifting Technological Base 
Although the information which the United States submitted to the 
Geneva Conference on January 5, 1959, and the statement which 
the President's Science Advisory Committee released that same day 
gave some indication of how the progress of science and technology 
had affected some of the conclusions of the Conference of Experts, 
they did not portray the full magnitude of the problem. To see the 
issues from the point of view of the American policy-makers, it is 
necessary first to consider in detail certain aspects of the United 
States 1958 nuclear weapon test series which, as was seen earlier, 
ended on October 30, the day before the opening of the diplomatic 
negotiations. 
Hardtack I and Argus: New Data 
For one thing, neither the information submitted to the Con-
ference nor the PSAC statement indicated that the United States 
now realized that it was possible to test nuclear devices at high alti-
tudes and had some understanding of the consequences of this 
possibility. During its 1958 test series the United States had deton-
ated five nuclear devices at high altitudes. On August 1 and August 
12, 1958, before the conclusion of the Conference of Experts, as 
a part of the Hardtack I series, two nuclear devices with yields in 
the megaton. range were detonated in the vicinity of Johnston Island 
in the Pacific Ocean, the first-Teak-at an altitude of nearly fifty 
miles, and the second-Orange-at an altitude of nearly twenty-
seven miles.! On August 27 and 30 and September 6, three more 
1U.S. Department of Defense, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 1962, 
pp. 50-52. 
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devices having yields from 1 to 3 kilotons were fired in the South 
Atlantic at an altitude of about three hundred miles. These three 
shots were called the Argus Operation. They were not weapons 
testing shots-but rather experiments designed to provide informa-
tion on trapping electrically charged particles in the earth's magnetic 
field-and therefore yielded only a limited amount of data which 
was relevant for a test ban control system. 
These high altitude shots were not made public until March 
19, 1959, when an article concerning them appeared in the New 
York Times. Although many scientists who knew about the tests 
favored announcing them and publishing some of the measure-
ments, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles expressed 
disappointment about the leak which had resulted in the story in 
the Times.2 In the same statement, Mr. Quarles also denied that the 
tests had any relevance for East-West negotiations then in progress. 
In fact, however, the Johnston Island and Argus tests made 
extremely obvious the need to fill in the gap which was caused by 
the failure of the Conference of Experts to recommend control 
measures for high altitudes and outer space. This need was further 
underscored on January 2, 1959, when the USSR fired "Lunik I," 
an earth satellite aimed in the direction of the moon, which went 
into permanent orbit around the sun, becoming the first artificial 
planet. Consequently, the President's Science Advisory Committee 
appointed a panel, headed by Professor Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky 
of Stanford University, to consider what control mechanisms would 
be required to fill this gap. 
The data gained from the high altitude tests also affected the 
test ban negotiations in another way. They indicated that nuclear 
explosions at high altitudes might interfere with certain radio and 
radar frequencies and thus inhibit military communications and 
warning systems. They also yielded data which indicated that the 
released neutrons from high altitude blasts could possibly be used 
to detonate incoming enemy warheads, and thus obviate the need 
for physical contact by an anti-missile missile. The tests, though, 
merely raised these possibilities, they did not confirm them. Thus, 
they created pressures among persons in the military establishment 
2New York Times, March 20, 1959, p. 10. 
Formulating A New Western Position 147 
and scientists interested in weapons development for further testing 
at high altitudes. 
Some have argued that this was the overall effect of the 1958 
test series. Writing in 1960 former ABC Commissioner Thomas E. 
Murray stated: 
Furthermore, the elaborate series of "small" tests which 
we rushed through at the Nevada Proving Ground in Sep-
tember and October 1958 to beat the moratorium dead-
line amply testified to the fact that the technology of 
lower and especially fractional kiloton weapons was still 
far from being adequately developed . . . the imperative 
objectives of our test program had not nearly been 
achieved. 3 
Among other things, the neutron weapon was not developed. How-
ever, significant advances were made with respect to certain weapon 
systems, for example, the Davey Crocket, a tactical nuclear weapon 
which could be carried by a small vehicle or a man. The extent to 
which one interpreted the 1958 test series as indicating a need for 
further testing depended really upon one's estimate of what ad-
vances could be made in nuclear weaponry and their utility. 
Hardtack II: More New Data 
The United States 1958 test series also included eight under-
ground detonations. These shots were fired from September 21 
through October 30 in Nevada as a part of the Hardtack II series. 
Of the eight, only two, the Logan 5~kiloton shot of October 16, 
1958, and the Blanca 19-kiloton shot of October 30, 1958-the 
last shot fired by the United States prior to opening of the test ban 
negotiations on October 31-yielded sufficient data for meaningful 
analysis of detection capabilities. However, the Working Paper 
which the United States submitted to the Geneva Conference on 
January 5, 1959, also listed the Tamalpais 72-ton shot of October 
8, 1958. American scientists used this shot in constructing their 
scaling law. The memorandum contained technical data only on the 
two principal shots. The PSAC statement did not contain any tech-
nical data. The American public first received the technical data 
in a Department of Defense press release of January 16. 
3Nuc/ear Policy for War and Peace, pp. 94-95. 
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In the West, the intensity of underground disturbances-thus 
of earthquakes and explosions-is measured on a logarithmic scale, 
commonly called the Gutenberg-Richter scale. Recorded earthquakes 
range from -1.50 to 8.50 on this scale. The farther down the 
scale one goes, that is, the smaller the size of the signal, the more 
earthquakes there are. The estimate of the intensity of an under-
ground disturbance is arrived at by averaging the signals received 
at several seismological stations. Because of the process of averag-
ing, and for other reasons, the estimate of an underground dis-
turbance was normally given with the reservation that there may be 
an error of plus or minus a specific amount which varies inversely 
with the magnitude on the Gutenberg-Richter scale. At the time of 
of the Conference of Experts in the summer of 1958, the magnitude 
of the Rainier 1.7 kiloton shot was believed to be 4.25. Since in 
the range from 4.1 to 5 the margin of error could be as high as 
plus or minus .4, the magnitude of the Rainier shot should be 
understood as 4.25 -+- .4. It should also be noted that the first 
public paper on the Rainier shot estimated its magnitude as 4.6.4 
In calibrating the Blanca and Logan shots it was discovered that 
the seven seismic stations near the event with adequate equipment 
which had recorded the Rainier shot gave anomalously large mag-
nitudes, 5.0 to 4.6 respectively. Three stations within the same 
radius had not recorded Rainier at all, but this fact had been dis-
regarded in the computation of its magnitude. Using seventeen sta-
tions, ten of which (including the seven that recorded Rainier) 
were permanent stations, and seven other specially established tem-
porary stations, the magnitude of the Blanca and Logan shots was 
estimated to be 4.8 and 4.4 respectively. Extrapolating from this 
data, American scientists concluded that the magnitude of the 
Rainier shot had been estimated incorrectly; that it should have 
been estimated as 4.06 -+- .4 rather than 4.25 -+- .4. Since seismolo-
gists knew that there were several times as many earthquakes of 
magnitude 4.06 as there were of magnitude 4.25, the new estimate 
of the Rainier magnitude meant that the problem of distinguishing 
between earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions would be 
considerably more difficult than it had been thought to be at the 
4G. W. Johnson and others, "The Underground Nuclear Detonation 
of September 19, 1957, Rainier, Operation Plumbbob," (February 4, 1958). 
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time of the Conference of Experts. Extrapolating and constructing 
a formula-now on the basis of three points instead of one-
American scientists estimated that for any given yield there would 
be several times as many unidentified events. The implication of 
this would be that unless the technology of detection could be im-
proved either the threshold of detection would have to be raised or 
the number of control posts or on-site inspections drastically in-
creased. The President's Science Advisory Committee examined 
the new estimate of the seismic magnitude of the Rainier shot and 
approved it. Later, however, some members of PSAC came to feel 
that the Committee had not exercised its responsibilities with suf-
ficient care and had acted too hastily. 
The Blanca and Logan shots also produced smaller signs of 
first motion than had been anticipated. Consequently, American 
scientists evaluating the data concluded that: 
. . . the first motion must exceed the background noise 
of natural unrest of the earth, by at least a factor of 3 to 
1 instead of the previous estimate of 2 to 1 if the direc-
tion of first motion is to be reliably determined. 5 
PSAC also approved this conclusion. In other words, if a factor of 
only 2 to 1 were used, which had been the basis on which the 
Conference of Experts had estimated the probability of detecting 
first motion, the compression or the upmotion caused by a nuclear 
explosion might be confused with background noise and only the 
subsequent swing of the seismogram, the rarefaction or downmotion 
might be noticed. Interestingly some scientists had always felt that 
the factor of 2 to 1 was too small. 
Baldly, the implication of the new conclusions was that the 
detection of nuclear explosions deep underground would not be as 
easy as it had been thought and that the conclusions of the Con-
ference of Experts concerning the size of explosion which could 
be detected were much too optimistic. 
How much the effectiveness of the control system was denigrated 
by these new conclusions was not clear. The Working Paper which 
the United States submitted to the Geneva Conference on January 
5, 1959, stated that: 
5U.S. Department of Defense, Press Release, January 16, 1959. 
150 DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS 
the annual number of unidentified continental earth-
quakes equivalent to 5 KT or larger will be greater than 
that previously estimated by a factor of 10 or more. 6 
The statement released by PSAC the same day contained a similar 
estimate. Thus the conclusion of the Conference of Experts that 
there would be from 20 to 100 earthquakes which would be in-
distinguishable on the basis of their seismic signals from nuclear 
explosions of about 5 kiloton yield, would have to be raised to 
from 200 to 1,000. However, in testimony before the Senate Sub-
committee on Disarmament on January 28, 1959, Dr. Carl Romney, 
an Air Force seismologist, who had headed the panel which had 
evaluated both the Hardtack II data and the original Rainier data 
stated that it was niore nearly a factor of 15, and that the number 
of unidentified events equivalent to a nuclear explosion of 5 kiloton 
yield would probably be from 700 to 3,000, 100 to 600 of which 
would occur within the USSR and mainland China. 7 
The evaluations of the data gained in the 1958 test series 
began to be available in late November 1958 and were analyzed 
first by government scientists. The last stages of the initial analysis 
were actually completed shortly after Thanksgiving Day in Geneva 
and the results of this preliminary analysis were presented to Messrs. 
Ormsby-Gore and Wadsworth in a one-hour briefing session. At 
that stage, neither the two diplomats nor the scientists making 
the presentation felt that the information was very significant. The 
scientists regarded the new conclusions as being within the realm of 
experimental error. 
This estimate would soon change, however, or at least others 
would take a different view. The next step in the evaluation was 
the convocation of a special panel and then the review by PSAC. 
As the evaluation proceeded, the implications for the test ban ne-
gotiations seemed to be increasingly ominous, and it was decided 
that another special panel should be appointed to consider whether 
or not there was any way in which the capability of the control 
system recommended by the Conference of Experts could be im-
proved and hopefully restored to the original estimate. The panel was 
6GEN/DNT/25. 
7U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommit-
tee on Disarmament, Hearings: Disarmament and Foreign Policy, 86th 
Congress, 2d Session (1959), p. 29. 
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to consider whether or not this could be done, first within the frame-
work of existing technology, and secondly through a program of 
research in seismology. On December 28, 1958, the President's 
Special Assistant for Science and Technology, James R. Killian, 
appointed Lloyd Berkner, the President of Associated Universities, 
Inc., as Chairman of the Panel on Seismic Improvement. 8 Although 
the Working Paper which the United States submitted to the Geneva 
Conference and the PSAC statement mentioned that the data from 
the 1958 test series was still being evaluated, neither mentioned 
the appointment of the Berkner Panel. The first public mention of 
this Panel occurred February 11, 1959.9 
Decoupling: A New Theory 
During this same period another technological development 
occurred which would have an even more profound effect on the 
course of the Geneva negotiations, the discovery of the decoupling 
theory. Edward Teller, who after the death of Ernest 0. Lawrence 
had become Director of the University of California Radiation 
Laboratory at Livermore, had always had grave doubts about the 
wisdom of a test ban. He felt that the further development of nu-
clear weapons would significantly and principally benefit the West. 
He also deeply distrusted the Soviet Union. The book, Our Nuclear 
Future, which he had written with Albert Latter and which was 
published in early 1958, contained the following passage: 
If an agreement were made to discontinue the tests, the 
United States would surely keep such an agreement. The 
very social and political structure of our country excludes 
8The other members of the Panel were Professor Hugo Benioff, 
California Institute of Technology; Professor Hans Bethe, Cornell University; 
Professor W. Maurice Ewing, Columbia University; Dr. John Gerrard, Texas 
Instruments, Inc.; Professor David T. Griggs, University of California at 
Los Angeles; Mr. Jack H. Hamilton, The Geotechnical Corporation; Dr. 
Julius P. Molnar, Sandia Corporation; Dr. Walter H. Munk, Scripps In-
stitute of Oceanography; Dr. Jack E. Oliver, Columbia University; Professor 
Frank Press, California Institute of Technology; Dr. Carl F. Romney, De-
partment of Defense; Dr. Kenneth Street, Jr., Lawrence Radiation Labora-
tory, University of California; Professor John W. Tukey, Princeton Uni-
versity. The group included eight geophysicists, three physicists, one nuclear 
chemist, one mechanical engineer, and one mathematician, specializing in 
statistics. 
9New York Times, February 12, 1959, pp. 1, 3. 
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the possibility that many people would collaborate in 
breaking an international undertaking. Whether Russia 
would or would not keep such an agreement would de-
pend on the ingenuity of the Russians, on their willingness 
to make economic sacrifices, and on their honesty. Of 
these three factors we can have a firm opinion about the 
first. The Russians are certainly ingenious enough to de-
vise secret methods of testing. As to the other questions, 
whether the Russians will want to invest the effort and 
whether they will be bound by their word, we feel that 
each man is entitled to his own opinion. According to past 
experience, an agreement to stop tests may well be fol-
lowed by secret and successful tests behind the iron cur-
tain.10 
In addition, Dr. Teller was convinced that no control system 
could give absolute assurance against violations, and that it would 
be especially difficult to devise an effective control system in an 
area such as that of nuclear weaponry where technological change 
was occurring at such a rapid pace. Both in Our Nuclear Future 
and in an article which he had published in Foreign Affairs in 
January 1958, he had expressed the opinion: 
In a more general way we may ask the question: Is it 
wise to make agreements which honesty will respect, but 
dishonesty can circumvent? Shall we put a free, demo-
cratic government at a disadvantage compared to the 
absolute power of a dictatorship? Shall we introduce pro-
hibition in a new form, just to give rise to bootlegging on 
a much greater scale? It is almost certain that in the com-
petition between prohibition and bootlegging, the boot-
legger will win. 11 
These attitudes-having little to do with science or technology, 
it should be noted-made him a firmly convinced opponent of 
efforts to draft a test ban agreement with the Soviet Union. 
After the conclusion of the Conference of Experts, Dr. Teller 
began to speculate about the effectiveness of the control system 
which had been recommended, and he asked some of the scientists 
at the University of California Livermore Laboratory-now named 
lOOur Nuclear Future, Facts, Dangers, and Opportunities (New York: 
Criterion Books 1958), p. 140. 
11Jbid., pp. 140-41; and "Alternatives for Security," Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. XXXVI, No. 2 (January 1958), p. 204. 
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the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory-and at the RAND Corpora-
tion to consider whether or not there might be ways in which a 
clever violator could evade detection. The President's Science 
Advisory Committee was scheduled to visit the Lawrence Labora-
tory in January 1959, and Dr. Teller hoped to be able to present 
to them a convincing case that the recommended control system 
was unsatisfactory. The scientists developed a number of ideas 
involving such possibilities as exploding a nuclear device in a moun-
tain, in a large porous container resembling an egg shell, or in an 
expandable container fashioned like a lung. There were also other 
schemes, some quite fanciful. None of the ideas seemed very prac-
tical, or to be more than mere possibilities. Nevertheless, Dr. 
Teller had decided to present them to the members of PSAC. 
Shortly before the PSAC meeting, Albert Latter of the RAND 
Corporation reexamined a possible means of concealing explo-
sions which had been considered at the Conference of Experts, 
setting them off in large cavities. Hans Bethe had presented a 
paper on this subject at the Conference and had concluded that it 
would be impossible to muffle the seismic signals from nuclear 
explosions in this manner. Doing paper and pencil theoretical 
analysis, Latter concluded, not that Bethe's calculations had been 
wrong, but that in certain instances they were irrelevant. Latter's 
conclusion (without going into technical details) was that if the 
cavity were sufficiently large in relation to the size of the explo-
sion so that the medium surrounding the hole would remain elastic 
under pressure, it would be possible to decouple or muffle nuclear 
explosions. His estimate was that it would be possible to decouple 
by a factor of several hundred, however, by January 1959 he had 
not completed all of his work, and his argument could be pre-
sented only in semi-quantitative terms. 
Albert Latter's theory was technically so convincing that Dr. 
Teller and his colleagues decided that it would be the only paper 
on concealment presented to the President's Science Advisory 
Committee. The members of PSAC, including Hans Bethe, recog-
nized the importance of the theory, and in general terms immedi-
ately accepted its validity.12 Now it appeared that the conclusions 
12Edward Teller & Allen Brown, The Legacy of Hiroshima (1962), p. 
196. 
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of the Conference of Experts might be obsolete for another reason 
beyond the new empirical data which had been gained from the 
1958 test series. 
After Albert Latter's presentation, some scientists, especially 
Professor David T. Griggs, of the University of California at Los 
Angeles, began to argue that the mandate of the Berkner Panel 
should be expanded to include consideration of the possibility 
of the concealment of tests as well as the implications of the 
new data. Eventually, in the latter part of February 1959, at the 
decision of Drs. Fisk and Killian, this was done. At this stage, 
only the scientists who were involved knew about the possibility of 
decoupling. Dr. Latter's first paper on the subject was not published 
for circulation within the government until March 30, 1959, and it 
was not declassified until October 20, 1959. 13 It was only given 
public release on December 22, 1959. One of the reasons for not 
making the theory public sooner was the fear that to do so would 
in effect tell the Soviet Union how to evade the control system. 
However, as a consequence of this secrecy, the public debate in 
the United States about the wisdom of a test ban treaty suffered. 
Scientists and politicians who were worried about the effectiveness 
of the control system had to base their public arguments on the 
data gained from the 1958 test series, even though they were ac-
tually much more concerned about the possible degrading effect 
of the decoupling theory. Since this argument could not be stated, 
their opponents conversely could not attempt to meet it. 
II 
Confusion and Controversy 
Within the United States 
"Betrayal by Science?" 
The immediate result in the United States of the revelation--or 
for most Americans, the partial revelation-that the technological 
assumptions on which the recommendations of the Conference of 
Experts had been based were no longer valid, was first to engender 
considerable confusion and perhaps a feeling of having been be-
trayed by science, and secondly to reopen the debate, which had 
13A. L. Latter, A Method of Concealing Underground Nuclear Ex-
plosions (RAND Corp. RM-2347-AFT, 1959). 
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been relatively quiescent during the opening days of the diplomatic 
negotiations, concerning the wisdom of a test ban. 
One account has it that when President Eisenhower was in-
formed of the evaluation of the 1958 test series he "was furious, 
and 'blew his stack.' " 14 Others were also bitterly disappointed. 
Yet it was not at all inconsistent with the history of science that 
subsequent experiments should modify earlier conclusions and hy-
potheses. 
As has already been mentioned, President Eisenhower's more 
reflective reaction to the new data was that scientific facts could 
not and should not be hidden, and that the government must tell 
the American people and the other states participating in the test 
ban negotiations what the scientific facts were. Eventually he came 
to feel that being confronted with the new data would be a good 
test of the USSR's intentions, since Soviet scientists could check 
on their validity. Thus the President dismissed the argument, raised 
by some individuals within the Administration, that to introduce the 
new data into the negotiations would open the ·United States to 
charges of duplicity. 
Since the matter was relatively technical, it is far from certain 
how many nonscientists fully understood the significance of the 
new data, and its limitations. For example, President Eisenhower's 
attitude indicated a certain lack of understanding on his part. While 
it is true that formulae based on three cases are probably more 
reliable than those based on one, there could be no certainty that 
with more experiments the conclusions would not have to be modi-
fied further. Moreover, as has been seen, the new conclusions were 
based on a rather complicated and-it will emerge-somewhat 
debatable process of reasoning. Actually, later, after having con-
ducted further deep underground nuclear tests, the United States 
would again revise its conclusions concerning these matters. More-
over, the Rainier, Logan, and Blanca shots were all conducted in 
the same location and in the same geological medium, tuff, or 
volcanic rock. Whether or not the formula constructed on the basis 
of these shots would be applicable to nuclear explosions in other 
media was an open question. 
HC. J. V. Murphy, "Nuclear Inspections: A Near Miss," Fortune, Vol. 
LIX, No. 3 (March 1959), p. 122 at 155. 
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Hans Bethe, in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Disarmament on February 2, 1959, repeated the point that he had 
made before the same forum the previous April, that the scientists 
badly needed more information.15 For the moment, however, be-
cause of the moratorium on testing, it would be impossible to 
gain further information, and it was uncertain whether any nuclear 
detonations would be allowed if and when a test ban treaty went 
into effect. Although Foreign Minister Gromyko had stated in a 
speech delivered before the Supreme Soviet on December 25, 1958, 
that it might be possible for a test ban treaty to contain a provision 
allowing nuclear detonations for peaceful purposes, the conditions 
which he set-inter alia parity between East and West in the num-
ber of detonations, and complete internal and external examination 
of the device to be detonated-were quite rigorous and possibly 
unacceptable to the West.16 Therefore, temporarily at least, scien-
tists would have to work with the data that they had. But to regard 
these as incontrovertible facts was too simple a view. 
Obviously it was even more difficult for those outside the Ad-
ministration to interpret the new data. After the publication of the 
PSAC statement of January 5, 1959, the public press was filled 
with conflicting estimates by politicians, scientists and military 
figures. To clarify the situation--or to reinforce their members' 
predispositions-two Congressional committees began hearings on 
the matter. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy held closed 
hearings and the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament open hear-
ings. Perhaps the earliest comprehensive exposition was the speech 
which Senator Hubert Humphrey gave on the Senate floor on January 
20, 1959, seven days-it is interesting to note-before his Subcom-
mittee opened its hearings. 17 
There was also disagreement about what effect the new con-
clusions would have on the test ban negotiations. Appearing before 
the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament, on January 28, 1959, 
Philip J. Farley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for 
Disarmament and Atomic Energy, asserted in a prepared state-
ment that: 
15Hearings: Disarmament and Foreign Policy, supra note 7, at 167. 
I6Pravda, December 26, 1958, pp. 9-10. See also the proposal which 
the USSR tabled on February 23, 1959: GEN/DNT/32. 
17Congressional Record, (1959), Vol. CV, Part 1, pp. 929-34. 
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This new information on the problem of detecting and 
identifying underground nuclear explosions has not had a 
significant impact on the negotiations as yet. It bears, of 
course, only on a limited part of the control system des-
cribed last summer by the Geneva experts, and prospects 
are encouraging that ways will be found to maintain the 
full effectiveness of that system. 
There has been an understandable initial Soviet sus-
picion of U.S. motives in transmitting and subsequently 
publishing the new data . . . . When our continuing 
studies of possible ways of overcoming these technical 
difficulties have reached the stage when they can be com-
municated in their tum to the Soviet Union, this may help 
persuade them of the probity of our intentions. 
In the meanwhile, the Soviet Union finds this U.S. 
action a convenient progaganda weapon to replace the 
one we have just deprived them of by our recent decision 
not to insist on a treaty link between disarmament prog-
ress and nuclear testing. 18 
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Others took a much more pessimistic view, and subsequent events 
would uphold their interpretation. 
The Battle Rejoined 
It was in this atmosphere of confusion that the controversy 
about the wisdom of a test ban flared again. Shortly after the 
release of the PSAC statement, Senator Gore pronounced that 
"events have sustained my position." To him the new seismic data 
indicated that an effective control system for all environments was 
impractical, at least at that point, and he repeated his suggestion 
for a partial test ban limited to atmospheric tests.19 Other Con-
gressmen rallied to his side. 
In a speech delivered on January 21, AEC Chairman John 
A. McCone denied that the Commission was opposed to the Ad-
ministration's policy of seeking a test ban with the Soviet Union. 
He then went on to say that the Commission supported any test 
suspension which could be "properly" policed, and which would 
give reasonable assurance against cheating. 20 Of course, the con-
lBHearings: Disarmament and Foreign Policy, supra note 7, pp. 33-34. 
l9New York Times, January 12, 1959, p. 14. 
20Jbid., January 22, 1959, p. 11. 
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troversy was whether or not a test ban could and would be "prop-
erly" policed. In the same speech, Mr. McCone indicated that the 
Commission was considering conducting tests late in the summer 
of 1959 relating to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It was his 
interpretation that the current East-West moratorium was "no 
injunction against the Commission going ahead with such tests." 
Four days later the New York Times contained a story stating that 
the ABC had recommended to the President that a test ban be 
limited to atmospheric explosions. 21 
Somewhat later, Senator Frank Church, a member of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, also made a similar proposal to 
the Acting Secretary of State. 22 He was supported on the Senate 
floor by Senators Dodd, Fulbright, Gore, and Groening. 
Partisans of different persuasions also raised their voices. In 
a public statement Hans Bethe asserted that it would still be 
possible to devise an effective control system,23 and Senator Hum-
phrey's exposition of January 20 had a fundamentally optimistic 
tone. A few days later, twenty-two prominent Americans, including 
Mrs. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Norman Thomas, Norman 
Cousins, James B. Carey, Ralph Lapp, and Robert R. Nathan, sent 
a letter to President Eisenhower, Chairman Khrushchev, and Prime 
Minister Macmillan asking them to take steps to conclude a test 
ban treaty despite the fact that there might be a risk of cheating. 24 
They averred that nations which could mobilize scientific talent 
and resources to develop hydrogen bombs and intercontinental 
ballistic missiles ought also to be able to devise "a workable in-
spection system to satisfy all reasonable requirements." After Mr. 
McCone's speech, a number of American scientists let it be known 
that they felt that plans for nuclear detonations for peaceful pur-
poses should be postponed so as not to disrupt the Geneva nego-
tiations. 25 
During this period, American policy seemed to lack certainty. 
When questions were raised concerning the implications of the new 
21Jbid., January 25, 1959, p. 1. 
22See his letter of February 25, 1959, Congressional Reccrd (1959), 
Vol. CV, Part 3, p. 3134. 
23New York Times, January 14, 1959, p. 5. 
24Jbid., February 2, 1959, p. 22. 
25Jbid., March 4, 1959, p. 14. 
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data at Secretary of State Dulles' news conference on January 13, 
1959, he replied that technical studies were in process; but, if 
necessary, alternatives such as that advocated by Senator Gore 
would be considered.26 Other Department of State officials asserted 
that official American policy continued to be to seek an accord 
covering all tests. There were no comments from the White House. 
Clearly this vagueness was partly attributable to the uncer-
tainty concerning the technological facts. It was also the result of 
the reopening of the debate within the Administration concerning 
the wisdom of a test ban. Furthermore, at this crucial juncture, 
the voice of the Department of State in intra-administration coun-
sels was severely weakened. In early 1959 Secretary of State 
Dulles' illness took a sharp turn for the worse, and on February 
9, 1959, he went on medical leave. Christian Herter was appointed 
Acting Secretary of State. During his last days in office, Mr. Dulles 
was not as effective as he had been previously. One source has 
reported that he showed himself to be "impatient and changeable" 
with respect to a test ban and disarmament. 27 Some of his closest 
associates even felt that he wanted to break off the test ban nego-
tiations. As an Acting Secretary, Mr. Herter did not have quite 
the same authority, and he was not appointed Secretary until 
April 22, 1959. Moreover, Mr. Dulles had had a particularly close 
relationship with the President, which few men could hope to 
duplicate. 
The Report of the Berkner Panel: The Need for Further Research 
Finally, on March 16, 1959, the findings of the Berkner 
Panel on Seismic Improvement were submitted to the President, 
and on March 31 the complete report was filed. 28 The two docu-
ments were not publicly released until June 12, 1959, the day that 
they were submitted to the Geneva Conference. However, fairly 
extensive accounts of the Panel's conclusions appeared in the New 
26U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XL, No. 1023 (February 2, 
1959), pp. 161-62. 
27Sir Michael Wright, Disarm and Verify: An Explanation of the 
Central Difficulties and of National Policies (1964), p. 119. Sir Michael 
was a member of the United Kingdom delegation in the nuclear test ban 
negotiations from 1959 through 1961. 
28Geneva Conference, pp. 335-39, 340-54. 
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York Times on March 8, 1959, and in an article in the March issue 
of Fortune.29 
In the summary of its findings, the Berkner Panel first af-
firmed the substantial correctness of the original evaluation of 
the new data. However, it produced a new figure for the total 
number of unidentified earthquakes which would generate a seismic 
signal equivalent to that of a 5-kiloton explosion (see Table 1). 
TABLE po 
Estimated Annual Number of Unidentified 
Worldwide Continental Earthquakes 
Estimate-Geneva Conference 
of Experts-August 1958 
Estimate--Geneva network and 
equipment on basis of Hardtack 
data-January 1959 
Estimate--Geneva network with 
improvements within the present 
state of technology on basis of 
Hardtack data-April 1959 
5KT 
and 
greater 
20-100 
10KT 
and 
greater 
1500 400 
300 40 
20KT 
and 
greater 
60 
15 
This figure was greater than that suggested by the PSAC state-
ment, but within the range mentioned by Dr. Carl Romney in his 
testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament. The 
Berkner report stated that within the framework of existing tech-
nology it would be possible partially to restore the capability of 
the control system recommended by the Conference of Experts 
by increasing the number of seismometers at each control station 
from 10 to 100 and by using other criteria than first motion for 
identifying earthquakes. It also stated that with the advance of 
29New York Times, March 8, 1959, p. 32; C. J. V. Murphy, "Nuclear 
Inspection: A Near Miss," supra note 14 at 162. 
30From the "Findings of the Berkner Panel on Seismic Improvement," 
Geneva Conference, p. 337. 
Formulating A New Western Position 161 
technology it would probably be possible to improve the capability 
of the Geneva system even more. Interestingly, this paralleled the 
claim of Soviet diplomats and scientists. The Panel emphasized 
the tentative nature of its estimates, the scanty data on which they 
were based, and the need for further research. The later report of 
the Berkner Panel was exclusively devoted to this last topic. 
The Berkner Panel had invited Albert Latter to present his 
theories. By the time of his presentation he had made a firm esti-
mate that by detonating a nuclear device in a large cavity it would 
be possible to reduce the seismic signal by a factor of 300. During 
the Panel's discussion, Hans Bethe estimated that the factor would 
be 700. However, the findings of the Berkner Panel merely stated 
"that decoupling techniques existed which could reduce the seismic 
signal by a factor of ten or more."31 Perhaps the reason for this 
caution was the theoretical nature of Dr. Latter's calculations. The 
report emphasized the need for high explosive and nuclear shots 
to test these calculations empirically. Although Dr. Latter's theories 
seemed to be incontrovertible, even at this stage many scientists 
doubted that they actually could be applied. They questioned 
whether or not it would be possible to create a large spherical hole 
deep underground in which to detonate a nuclear device. For ex-
ample, according to the theory, to decouple a tO-kiloton shot by a 
factor of 300, the shot would have to be detonated in a spherical 
hole 3,000 feet underground with a diameter of 360 feet. To many, 
this seemed like a formidable engineering feat, and even if feas-
ible, an incredibly expensive task. Until there was some experi-
mental evidence, however, neither side could prove its case. But 
whatever the reason for the discrepancy between the private gov-
ernmental estimate of decoupling and public estimate in the Berkner 
report, the latter was such an understatement as to be grossly mis-
leading. 
As mentioned earlier, the "Report of the Berkner Panel on 
Seismic Improvement" was essentially a detailed statement of the 
need for a research program in this area. It stressed how little was 
known about the propagation of seismic waves and the limited 
amount of funds available for research. It also stated that: "The 
USSR in recent years has emphasized seismological research to 
31Jbid., p. 338. 
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such extent that the Soviets enjoy a position superior in many re-
spects to our own."32 Similar statements appeared in other places 
in the report. The report oulined a number of hypotheses and areas 
for research and recommended an initial program involving ex-
penditures of more than $52,825,000 over a two-year period. For 
the moment, however, American policy-makers would have to act 
on the basis of the available data. 
III 
The British Seek the Lead 
The Soviet Reaction 
In formulating a new negotiating position, interpretations of the 
opponent state's behavior in the negotiations and estimates of its 
probable response to alternative courses are important factors-
or should be if the task is conducted rationally-therefore it is 
necessary to consider the USSR's reaction to the presentation of 
the new data on January 5, 1959. As has already been mentioned, 
Mr. Tsarapkin's immediate response was violently negative. 33 He 
attacked the motives of the Western powers in submitting the new 
data, asserting that their real purpose was either to undermine the 
Conference or to open opportunities for Western intelligence op-
erations. He ignored Mr. Ormsby-Gore's and Ambassador Wads-
worth's rather candid replies that if the Western delegations at-
tempted to suppress the information and it nevertheless became 
known, their positions would be untenable before Parliament, Con-
gress, and public opinion, and that this would have an unfavorable 
impact on the Conference and on the possibility of a treaty being 
ratified.34 Beyond casting aspersions on the motives of the Western 
powers, the Soviet position as espoused by Mr. Tsarapkin con-
sisted of several assertions. He held that the negotiations had an 
agreed base in the report of the Conference of Experts and they 
must not depart from this base. He acknowledged that new tech-
nological developments would always occur, but that these would 
have to be handled by the Control Organization, not the Conference 
32Jbid., p. 341. 
33Mr. Tsarapkin's comments may be found in GEN/DNT/PV. 29, 
pp. 14-15; PV. 31, pp. 20-28; PV. 32, pp. 22-24; PV. 41, pp. 8-10. 
34See GEN/DNT/PV. 32, p. 24; and PV. 50, p. 16. 
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drafting the treaty. Finally, he maintained strongly that the progress 
of science would always result in greater rather than lesser capacity 
for detection. 
Never once during the session of the Conference from January 
5 to March 19, 1959, did Mr. Tsarapkin deal with the technical 
matters connected with the new data. The closest that he came to 
touching technical issues was on January 23, 1959, when he denied 
that the relevant sections of the report of the Conference of Experts 
had been based solely on one case, the Rainier shot. He claimed 
that the experience with high explosive detonations had also been 
taken into account. This was true, but the Rainier shot had been 
the point from which the effectiveness of the recommended control 
system had been calculated. Mr. Tsarapkin continually rejected the 
suggestion that a technical working group should be convened to 
consider the new data. His greatest concession was contained in a 
formal statement of the Soviet Foreign Ministry which he read on Feb-
ruary 9 and which had appeared in the Soviet press the previous day. 
The statement declared that as soon as the Western powers com-
pleted their evaluation of the new data and submitted their conclu-
sions to the Conference, the USSR would have its scientists make 
a "careful study" of those conclusions. 35 It then asserted that in any 
case this ought not to affect the course of the negotiations. 
The only Soviet comment on the technical issues involved in 
the dispute was an article which appeared in Pravda January 20, 
1959, signed by Y. V. Riznichenko and L. Brekhovski, two corres-
ponding members of the USSR's Academy of Sciences, who had 
served as advisers to the Eastern delegation at the Conference of 
Experts. 36 They attempted to refute the American Working Paper 
submitted in Geneva on January 5, 1959. 
First, like Mr. Tsarapkin, they denied that the calculations of 
the Conference of Experts had been based on the Rainier shot 
alone. Secondly, they pointed out that the seismographs used to 
measure the Logan and Blanca shots did not conform to the recom-
mendations of the Conference of Experts. This was true, but at 
that date no existing or permanent station had seismographs which 
35GEN/DNT/PV. 51, p. 4. 
36Pravda, January 20, 1959, p. 6. A condensed version is printed in 
The Current Digest of Soviet Press, Vol. XI, No. 3 (February 25, 1959), 
pp. 23-24. 
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did conform to those specifications. Among other things, the Berk-
ner Panel recommended that a station conforming to the Geneva 
standards should be established so that its capabilities could be 
properly understood. 
The two Soviet scientists also asserted that the new estimates 
gave undue weight to the findings of the seven temporary stations 
which had been specially established to measure the Hardtack II 
series, and that these stations were less effective than the permanent 
ones. It will be recalled that the 1958 estimate of the magnitude of the 
Rainier shot had been based on the average of the signals received 
at seven permanent stations near the event and that three perma-
nent stations within the same radius from the event did not receive 
any signal. The signals received at the latter three stations and the 
seven temporary stations from the Logan and Blanca shots led the 
American scientists to conclude that the estimate for Rainier was 
incorrect. 
It was difficult for a nonscientist to judge whether or not the 
temporary stations were less effective than the permanent stations. 
Scientists presented conflicting 'Views in the public debate. For 
example, in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Dis-
armament, Dr. Carl Romney said that the temporary stations "on 
the average gave better results" than the permanent stations be-
cause "the temporary stations had better equipment than the average 
of the permanent stations at the same distances," while a few days 
later Professor Bethe stated that the temporary stations "were not 
as good in general as the permanent stations. "37 
The Soviet statement criticized the American Working Paper 
for not taking into account the recordings of other stations in the 
United States, of which there were ninety, or of stations outside of 
the United States, in such areas as Sweden. At the time that the 
American Working Paper was composed, these recordings were not 
taken into account. They were not available. They were, however, 
considered by the American scientists at a later date. In addition, 
the American scientists sought to obtain recordings from the sta-
tions in the USSR, but their requests were spurned for almost a 
year. The Soviet scientists claimed that the data from the Blanca 
37Hearings: Disarmament and Foreign Policy, supra note 7, pp. 18, 
184. 
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shot were not relevant, since the cavity had blown out, thus re-
leasing some of the energy. In fact, the cavity had caved in several 
seconds after the seismic effect had passed. Apparently the Soviet 
scientists were not aware of this. 
Finally, the Soviet scientists asserted that the new estimate of the 
magnitude of the Rainier shot was "within the limits of experimental 
accuracy." This was true. It will be recalled that in the range of the 
signal resulting from the Rainier shot, estimates of seismic magni-
tude were usually qualified as being accurate -+- .4. The change was 
within this range. 
The Soviet scientists concluded that there was no need to revise 
the conclusions of the Conference of Experts. Since Albert Latter's 
work with respect to decoupling was not public knowledge, the 
statement naturally contained no reference to it. 
On January 28, 1959, Carl Romney, in an appearance before 
the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament, criticized the statement 
of the two Soviet scientists and defended the American Working 
Paper. Ambassador Wadsworth echoed many of his statements in 
the Geneva Conference on February 11, 1959. Thus, a scientific 
controversy was touched off which remained a feature of the Geneva 
Conference throughout its course. 
To be fully understood, the Soviet position needs to be seen in 
the light of a proposal, mentioned in Chapter IV, which the Western 
delegations had tabled shortly before the Christmas recess in De-
cember 1958. On December 16, the Western delegations tabled a 
draft version of Annex I of the treaty, dealing with the detection 
and identification system. 38 Among other things the Annex included 
provision for on-site inspection of all unidentified seismic events 
with an estimated yield of five kilotons or more and of twenty per-
cent (selected on a random basis) of all unidentified seismic events 
with an estimated yield of less than five kilotons. In addition, any 
unidentified seismic event with an estimated equivalent yield of less 
than five kilotons which the data from the system indicated had an 
unusually high probability of being of nuclear origin would be 
inspected. In another section the Annex provided for the creation 
of a number of "inspection groups," personnel who would have 
the sole duty of carrying out on-site inspections. 
3BGEN/DNT/22. 
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On the basis of the figures in the summary of the findings of the 
Berkner Panel, the new data would have meant that the worldwide 
total of probable on-site inspections required by these provisions 
would have increased from 20 to 100 to more than 1500. Even 
with the improvements recommended by the Panel, the number 
still would have been more than 300. If the estimate which Dr. 
Carl Romney had expressed before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Disarmament were correct, and the Berkner Panel had accepted 
a figure for the gross total inside the range that he had mentioned, 
without improvements in the control system the new data would 
have meant that there would have to be at least from 100 to 600 
on-site inspections annually on the territory of the USSR and main-
land China. Whatever Soviet motivation may have been at this stage 
of the negotiations and regardless of the Soviet understanding of 
the technical validity of the new data, it is clear that acceptance of 
the Western interpretation would have involved opening up the 
USSR considerably more than had been envisaged under the orig-
inal assumptions. 
On January 30, 1959, the USSR submitted a list of actions by 
the Control Organization which would require unanimity of the 
three nuclear powers. The adoption of a decision to dispatch an 
on-site inspection group was included in this list, as was the "adop-
tion of a decision . . . on the basis of the results of such investi-
gations." Thus both questions relating to obtaining evidence of a 
violation by means of on-site inspections and those relating to the 
action to be taken if an on-site inspection yielded evidence of a 
violation would be subject to the veto. 39 It is probable that the 
USSR would have demanded a veto in these matters even if no 
new data had been discovered and submitted to the Conference. 
The USSR's desire to maintain absolute control over access to its 
territory is long-standing and well known. However, the implica-
tions of the new data must at least have strengthened Soviet reluct-
ance to allow on-site inspections to occur on a more or less auto-
matic basis. On the other hand, the Soviet demand for a veto was 
clearly unacceptable to the West on the ground that it might 
block the Control Organization from obtaining incontrovertible evi-
dence that a violation had occurred. 
39GEN/DNT/PV. 46, p. 32. 
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Macmillan's Proposal for a Political Compromise: A Quota of On-
Site Inspections 
Dr. Fedorov, who continued to be a member of the Soviet dele-
gation at this stage of the negotiations, discussed these problems 
with Mr. Ormsby-Gore during a private conversation sometime in 
early 1959. He intimated that it would be difficult for the Soviet 
Union to accept a treaty under which it could be subjected to 
an unlimited number of on-site inspections, and suggested that 
it would be easier for the USSR if it knew how many such in-
spections there might be each year. 40 He also suggested that one 
way of circumventing these difficulties would be to establish an 
annual quota for on-site inspections, and mentioned a range of 
figures that went from three or so to more than twenty. Mr. 
Ormsby-Gore reported this conversation to London, where it was 
studied and considered in detail. 
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan visited the USSR from 
February 21 through March 3, 1959, and had extensive talks with 
Chairman Khrushchev. During the course of these conversations, 
either without having discussed the matter with the United States 
or despite American opposition,41 the Prime Minister repeated Dr. 
Fedorov's suggestion for an annual quota of on-site inspections, 
mentioning a range of figures from three or five to more than 
twenty. This was the first' of a series of British initiatives designed 
to keep the negotiations alive and to stimulate progress in them. 
At that time, Chairman Khrushchev apparently neither accepted 
nor rejected the proposal, although he clearly found it attractive. 
Because of its implications for later developments, it is worth 
noting that the joint Anglo-Soviet communique issued at the con-
clusion of the talks between Prime Minister Macmillan and Chair-
man Khrushchev mentioned among other things the possibility of 
an agreement being reached on a limitation of both conventional 
and nuclear forces and weapons, under an appropriate inspection 
system, in an agreed area of Europe. 42 This concept was strongly 
40See Ormsby-Gore's account, GEN/DNT/PV. 293, p. 10. 
41For the conflicting reports see respectively T. E. Murray, Nuclear 
Policy for War and Peace, p. 104, and Sir Michael Wright, Disarm and 
Verify, p. 137. 
42New York Times, March 4, 1959, p. 1. 
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opposed by NATO Headquarters, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
and the United States. 
On March 5, two days after Prime Minister Macmillan had 
left Moscow, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey sent a memorandum 
to President Eisenhower, in which he advanced a proposal for a 
quota of on-site inspections very siinilar to that which had been 
discussed in Moscow.43 President Eisenhower agreed that the pro-
posal should be studied but refused to commit himself beyond that. 
The Western Summit 
By late March 1959, the stage was set for a major review of 
Western policy concerning the test ban negotiations. The Berkner 
Panel had completed its work, domestic opinion had had some time 
to congeal, and policy-makers had some sense of the Soviet reac-
tion and position. On March 19, Ambassador Wadsworth proposed 
that the Conference be recessed until April 13, and Mr. Tsarapkin, 
though stating that the USSR was opposed to the suggestion, 
agreed.44 That same day, Prime Minister Macmillan and Foreign 
Minister Selwyn Lloyd arrived in Washington for consultations with 
President Eisenhower and other American officials. 
During the next five days many issues were discussed, includ-
ing broader arms control and disarmament proposals, the Berlin 
crisis, and the prospects for a summit conference. With respect 
to these broader issues, it was agreed that a meeting of the foreign 
ministers of France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States should be convened in Geneva on May 11, 1959. 
The two Western leaders also spent considerable time discussing 
the flagging Geneva negotiations. Prime Minister Macmillan men-
tioned his suggestion to Chairman Khrushchev for an annual quota 
of on-site inspections. In explaining his suggestion, the Prime 
Minister used a golfing analogy, as Selwyn Lloyd did later in dis-
cussing the matter before the House of Commons. 45 The Prime 
Minister said the quota would be like a bisque, a stroke or strokes 
which can be used when desired by the opponent of the person 
against whom it is given. Despite this reference to the President's 
43Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, pp. 291-92. 
44GEN/DNT/72, p. 17. 
45U.K. House of Commons, Debates, April 27, 1959. 
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favorite sport, as in Moscow, Prime Minister Macmillan's sug-
gestion was neither approved nor rejected. 
Many of the discussions were held at Camp David and they 
ultimately included most of the Committee of Principals and their 
British counterparts. Mr. Dulles attended some of the conversa-
tions, but by that time he was greatly weakened. Ambassador 
Wadsworth, however, was not included in these meetings. Nor 
were Congressmen. In fact, it emerged in Mr. Wadsworth's testi-
mony before the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament on March 
25 that at that point neither he nor the Senators had had access 
to the conclusions of the Berkner Panel, although they had been 
submitted to the President nine days earlier. 46 The Camp David 
talks, though, settled the course of future Western policy. 
While the talks were in process pressures for and against a 
test ban continued to rage in the United States and abroad. Since 
Prime Minister Macmillan faced the prospect of a general election 
in the not too distant future, he no doubt was sensitive to the 
pressures in the United Kingdom. Unlike the situation in the United 
States, in the United Kingdom these pressures almost without ex-
ception favored efforts to achieve a test ban. 47 An important 
explanation for this is that British public opinion was much more 
fearful of nuclear war than was opinion within the United States, 
and rightly so, since the United Kingdom was much more vulner-
able. A pointed example of the pressure exerted on the British 
government occurred immediately after the conclusion of the Prime 
Minister's trip to Washington. On March 30, some fifteen thousand 
British citizens rallied in London to urge British unilateral nuclear 
disarmament. 48 
The Senate Resolution 
In an effort to put the debate within the United States in a proper 
context, and to strengthen the American negotiating position, and 
perhaps for other reasons as well, on March 27, Senator Humphrey 
46U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcom-
mittee on Disarmament, Hearing: Geneva Test Ban Negotiations, 86th Con-
gress, 1st Session ( 1959), p. 20. 
47For confirmation of this point by a British negotiator see Sir Michael 
Wright, Disarm and Verify, pp. 131, 135. 
4BNew York Times, March 31, 1959, p. 8. 
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introduced a resolution supporting the United States efforts to ne-
gotiate a test ban including "an adequate inspection and control 
system."49 Two days earlier, in explaining the purpose of the resolu-
tion to Ambassador Wadsworth, Senator Humphrey said: 
The idea behind this is that as the Soviet works its propa-
ganda apparatus, it tries to make it seem every time we 
bring up another consideration that we are out either to 
delay this agreement, or to wreck the conference, or to 
precipitate some kind of crisis that will produce a stale-
mate. 
It would seem to me that since the policy of our Gov-
ernment is what you are attempting to do, namely, to nego-
tiate an agreement, that it might be well to give some 
consideration to expressing as the sense of the Senate our 
genuine intent and good intentions. 50 
In keeping with this concept, the original resolution asked the 
President to request the Soviet government to transmit the resolu-
tion to the Soviet people, a provision which was subsequently 
dropped at the suggestion of the Department of State. 
Whether or not Senator Humphrey's resolution served to nullify 
Soviet propaganda is questionable. It is true that after it was 
unanimously adopted on April 30, 1959, Ambassador Wadsworth 
could refer to it as indicating the sense of the Senate. However, the 
debate in the United States was really about what constituted "an 
adequate inspection and control system," and whether or not such a 
system was even possible. Those who had always questioned the 
wisdom of a test ban treaty for the United States now focused 
their criticisms on these issues. 
A more important effect of the resolution may well have been 
that in the context of the domestic debate, its adoption made it 
more difficult for the Administration to break off the negotiations. 51 
To do so might have seemed to defy the sense of the Senate. 
Establishing this inhibition may well have been Senator Hum-
phrey's main motivation. 
49Congressional Record, Vol. CV, Part 4 (1959), p. 5347. 
1i0Hearing: Geneva Test Ban Negotiations, supra note 46, at 30. 
1i1See Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, p. 298. 
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The New Western Position 
Eisenhower to Khrushchev: An Atmospheric Ban? 
171 
The tensions in American opinion were amply evident in the new 
Western position which emerged from the Camp David talks. The 
new Western position was expressed in a letter which President 
Eisenhower sent to Chairman Khrushchev on April 13, 1959, the 
day that the Geneva Conference reconvened. That same day Prime 
Minister Macmillan also sent a letter to Chairman Khrushchev en-
dorsing the President's letter, and Ambassador Wadsworth intro-
duced and expounded the President's proposals in Geneva. 
The essence of the new Western position was to offer the 
Soviet Union two alternative courses. The President put it this way: 
If you are prepared to change your present position on the 
veto, on procedures for on-site inspection, and on early 
discussion of concrete measures for high altitude detec-
tion, we can of course proceed promptly in the hope of 
concluding the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement 
for suspension of nuclear weapons tests. If you are not 
yet ready to go this far, then I propose that we take the 
first and readily attainable step of an agreed suspension 
of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere up to 50 kil-
ometers while the political and technical problems asso-
ciated with control of underground and outer space tests 
are being resolved. If we could agree to such initial im-
plementation of the first-and I must add the most im-
portant-phase of a test suspension agreement, our nego-
tiators could continue to explore with new hope the 
political and technical problems involved in extending the 
agreement as quickly as possible to cover all nuclear 
weapons tests. 52 
In other words, the new Western position was that to obtain a 
comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons in all en-
vironments, the Soviet Union would have to agree to a variety of 
Western conditions, otherwise the West would only agree to an 
atmospheric test ban, which hopefully, however, would be the first 
phase of a more far-reaching agreement. The basis for the proposal 
for a phased treaty was a suggestion formally submitted to Sec-
52Geneva Conference, p. 355. 
172 DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS 
retary of State Dulles by AEC Chairman McCone on behalf of 
the members of the Commission in late January. 53 That it became 
an alternative choice offered to the Soviet Union rather than the 
single American position reflected the process of consensus-building 
within the Administration and between the Western allies. The 
Department of State and the British insisted on keeping open the 
possibility of a comprehensive test ban. For the moment, Prime 
Minister Macmillan's quota proposal was ignored. 
It is interesting how the President's letter underplayed the prob-
lem of the new data. In Geneva, in Salle IX of the Palais des 
Nations, Ambassador Wadsworth was less reticent. He explicitly 
mentioned "technical discussion of . . . improvements which might 
be made in the system of underground detection," as a condition 
for continuing efforts to reach a comprehensive agreement. 54 
Ambassador Wadsworth also defined the alternative course 
of a phased treaty more precisely. The first phase agreement, as he 
outlined it, would prohibit atmospheric, and if the USSR were 
willing, underwater nuclear tests. It would be monitored by station-
ary control posts in the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and the Pacific area, spaced in accordance with the recom-
mendations of the Conference of Experts for nonseismic areas; that 
is, at distances of 1,700 kilometers. The system would also include 
routine and special aircraft sampling flights. 
It will be recalled that several months earlier Senator Gore 
had asserted that an atmospheric test ban could be monitored by 
existing national detection systems. It is not clear why the United 
States was unwilling to adopt such a position at this point. Prob-
ably the principal reason was that no one within the Administration 
was willing to argue for it. The Department of State saw experience 
in operating a control system as one of the main benefits of a test 
ban agreement. The Central Intelligence Agency wanted to penetrate 
the veil of Soviet secrecy. And the Department of Defense and the 
Atomic Energy Commission sought as much assurance as they could 
get that an agreement would not be violated. Naturally the possi-
bility of detecting clandestine explosions in the USSR would be 
greater with some control posts on Soviet territory than without any 
53Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, p. 290. 
54GEN/DNT/PV. 73, p. 5. 
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there, but how significant this difference would be is debatable. 
The Western proposal for a phased agreement, as outlined by 
Ambassador Wadsworth also envisaged continuing negotiations 
within the framework of the Geneva Conference, or the Control 
Commission, toward extending the test ban to other environments 
and "joint" studies, research and possibly experiments concerning 
the technical problems which had arisen. The Preparatory Commis-
sion for the Control Organization might also be given responsibility 
for these activities. 
Finally, Ambassador Wadsworth presented a fairly precise 
summary of the conclusions of the Berkner Panel. 
Both within and outside the Geneva Conference the new 
Western position was widely interpreted as a victory for the position 
advocated by such individuals as AEC Chairman McCone, Senator 
Gore, and Thomas E. Murray. Depending on one's persuasion, the 
West had either finally awakened to the difficulties of control, or 
had at last revealed its underlying desire to continue developing 
nuclear weapons through testing in some environments. To a degree, 
both interpretations were accurate. Mr. Murray, in commenting on 
the proposal in his book in 1960, called it "one of the most sensible 
moves the Administration made," on the ground that it represented 
a "turning away from the chimera of an absolute fully policed test 
ban." He then went on to say that Chairman Khrushchev, recogniz-
ing the fact that the proposal "left an opening for the United States 
to acquire much-needed weapons capabilities in the tactical nuclear 
field, quickly rejected it. "55 
Both views, however, probably overestimated the importance 
of the Eisenhower and Macmillan letters. They represented only a 
new position, not a new policy, a limited move rather than a thought-
out plan. The West still lacked a clear conception of where it was 
going, or indeed where it wanted to go. However, the new Western 
position did have the merit of forcing the participants in the nego-
tiations and the onlookers to consider more seriously than they had 
previously the importance of the objective of reducing the hazards of 
radioactive fallout. It soon became apparent that the possibility of 
achieving this objective alone would not immediately be sufficient 
to induce an agreement. 
55Nucle~r Policy for War and Peace, p. 102. 
Chapter VI 
The Search for Technical Agreement 
I 
Some Initial Compromises 
President Eisenhower's letter, or more properly the formulation of 
a new Western negotiating position and its communication to the 
Soviet Union, touched off a process best described as a search 
between East and West for agreement on the technical issues in 
dispute, which lasted throughout 19 59, finally ending in seeming 
futility. A variety of issues were at stake: whether or not the test 
ban treaty would be comprehensive; the extent to which the new 
data and the changing technological base would be taken into 
account; eventually, the fate of the moratorium on testing; and, to 
some extent, the diffusion of nuclear capabilities. President Eisen-
hower's letter and Ambassador Wadsworth's presentation on April 
13 raised the first two issues. Given the public debate on these 
matters in the United States, the moratorium was obviously an 
important element in the background, and since one of the putative 
objectives of the Conference was prevention of the spread of nuclear 
weapons capability, this issue was inevitably involved. 
The USSR Protests NATO's Nuclear Plans 
The first Soviet move after the communication of the new 
Western position concerned the last problem. On April 21, 1959, 
the Soviet Foreign Ministry delivered a note to the American 
Embassy in Moscow protesting against plans, reported in the West-
ern press, for the provision of missiles to NATO countries and 
the stockpiling of nuclear warheads there .I As was described earlier, 
in December 1957 the NATO Council had decided that selected 
NATO countries were to be furnished missiles to which nuclear 
lDocuments on Di~armament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, pp. 1393-96. 
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warheads might be attached. Then the Atomic Energy Act had been 
amended in July 1958 to allow the transfer of nuclear warheads 
under certain specified conditions. These warheads were to remain 
in American custody until the President had decided that they could 
be used. 
Under these terms an agreement was signed with the United 
Kingdom in 1958, and work was begun on the installation of bases 
in that country for Thor intermediate range rockets. A similar 
agreement was reached with Italy in March 1959, for the installation 
of Jupiter rockets, although in this case both the missiles and the 
warheads would remain under American control. The Western 
press was full of speculation that the NATO Command also had 
plans to establish similar bases in other NATO countries. 
The Soviet note singled out Greece, Turkey, and the Federal 
Republic of Germany, and warned against the establishment of 
bases in these countries, especially in West Germany. It argued 
that no action should be taken in this sphere prior to the Foreign 
Ministers' meeting, since to do so would constrict and perhaps fore-
close the possibility of agreement. 
The West replied through a statement of the NATO Council 
issued on May 7, 1959, and a note from the American Embassy in 
Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry dated the following day. 2 
The essence of the Western position was to reiterate the public 
rationale of the December 1957 decisions; that is, that the USSR 
had prevented disarmament, and at the same time had introduced 
modern weapons into its armed forces, therefore, the West had no 
alternative but to take similar action. 
On May 5 and 6, bilateral agreements were signed by the 
United States with Greece, the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Turkey under the provisions of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1958 for the transfer to the latter countries of the 
non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons systems and knowledge 
about their use.3 A similar agreement was signed with Canada on 
May 22, 1959.4 At that time it was envisaged that intermediate 
range ballistic bases might be established in all of the countries 
2Jbid., pp. 1405-9. 
3See U.S. Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts, 
Nos. 4292, 4267, 4277, and 4278 (1959). 
4Jbid., No. 4271. 
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except West Germany, which according to the NATO plans then 
in effect was only slated to receive Matador rockets with a range 
of approximately six hundred miles. Eventually, only Turkey re-
ceived IRBM's, under an arrangement agreed to in October 1959. 
Nonetheless, the May agreements established the legal framework 
for the transfer of nuclear weapon systems within the limitations of 
the 1958 Atomic Energy Act. 
To a certain extent the signing of these agreements at this 
time merely represented the elaboration of previously agreed de-
cisions. It may also have been an attempt by those who had strong 
feelings in the matter, especially the United States Department of 
Defense, the NATO Command, and policy-makers in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, to make it difficult for the Foreign Ministers 
of the four powers to adopt a plan for nuclear or general dis-
engagement in Central Europe at their forthcoming meeting. These 
issues were relevant to the Geneva Conference since they dealt with 
the diffusion of nuclear weapons, one of the issues supposedly at 
stake in the Conference. 
Chairman Khrushchev's Formal Reply: "No" to Eisenhower, "Yes" 
to Macmillan 
The first direct Soviet reply to the new Western position came 
on April 23, 1959, in letters from Chairman Khrushchev to Presi-
dent Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan. 5 First, Khrushchev 
rejected the possibility of an atmospheric test ban. He argued that 
the aim of a test ban should be "to halt the nuclear arms race, or 
at the very least, to prevent the creation of new and ever more 
destructive types of atomic and hydrogen weapons." Since an 
atmospheric ban would allow testing in other environments, in his 
view, it would not achieve this goal. Although they evaluated it 
differently, in the United States, the opponents of a test ban treaty 
also clearly recognized this possibility. Khrushchev further asserted 
that nuclear weapons tests in the high atmosphere would cause fall-
out. He claimed that the purpose of the Conference should continue 
to be "to conclude an agreement providing for a cessation of all 
forms of nuclear weapon tests-in the atmosphere, underground, 
under water, and at high altitudes." 
5Geneva Conference, pp. 356-60. 
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Khrushchev then suggested that it might be possible to sur-
mount the difficulties in which the test ban negotiations were cur-
rently enmeshed by adopting Prime Minister Macmillan's proposal 
for an annual quota of on-site inspections. He elaborated that not 
many on-site inspections would be required and that they would 
have to be "founded . . . on objective instrument readings." It was 
his view that the mere possibility that an on-site inspection would 
be conducted would be sufficient to deter a potential violator. 
Four days later, in the Geneva Conference, Mr. Tsarapkin 
submitted a formal proposal embodying Chairman Khrushchev's 
proposal, 6 and in the next few sessions he elaborated its meaning 
and ramifications. He stated that if the instruments registered a 
suspicious event in a given location according to predetermined 
criteria, the opposite side could request an on-site inspection and 
an inspection group would be dispatched: there would be no 
question of voting in the Control Commission. 7 Thus he seemed to 
say that the Soviet demand for a veto on on-site inspections would 
be dropped, if the quota proposal were accepted. Mr. Tsarapkin 
also stated that the size of the quota-which would have to be a 
"small number"-for the territories of each of the three nuclear 
powers would have to be fixed by agreement among them. He ruled 
out the possibility of fixing the quota as a set percentage of the 
number of unidentified events registered on seismographs. 8 Or, as 
he put it to his partners in the Conference, agreement will be 
impossible "if you are going to talk of thousands of earth tremors 
a year and fix a certain percentage." Later, he asserted that it 
would not be necessary to consider the new seismic data prior to 
the adoption of the quota proposaJ.9 
Toward More Scientific Data: Projects Vela and Cowboy 
Meanwhile, the United States moved to consider more seriously 
than it previously had the technical problems involved in detecting 
and identifying nuclear explosions. On April 23, 1959, the same 
day that Chairman Khrushchev dispatched his letters to President 
6GEN/DNT/PV. 83, pp. 3-11. 
7GEN/DNT/PV. 84, pp. 10-11; PV. 85, p. 4. 
BGEN/DNT/PV. 84, p. 8. 
9GEN/DNT/PV. 85, p. 6. 
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Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan, Dr. Killian, Special 
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, Chairman 
McCone of the AEC, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles met 
to discuss the reports of the Panofsky Panel, which had considered 
problems of high altitude detection, and the Berkner Panel, which 
had examined problems of seismic detection.10 They decided that 
the Department of Defense should assume overall responsibility for 
implementing the research programs recommended by these two 
panels and that it should receive support from the Atomic Energy 
Commission and the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration. 
In the next few months various advisory groups within the 
Department of Defense began a number of preliminary studies, 
and then the Air Force Technical Applications Center prepared 
specific proposals for research. In August various supervisory 
committees were established. Finally, on September 2, 1959, the 
Secretary of Defense assigned responsibility for overseeing the 
research-subsequently named Project Vela-to the Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency of the Department of Defense, and the 
first work order was issued one month later. 
During the next two years the project was expanded to full 
dimensions. It was divided into three aspects: Vela Uniform, 
dealing with underground nuclear tests; Vela Sierra, relating to 
monitoring nuclear tests in space from ground bases; and Vela 
Hotel, concerning monitoring nuclear tests in space by satellite-
borne instrumentation. Various governmental and nongovernmental 
organizations were involved under contracts let in 1960 and 1961, 
and $10,000,000 was made available for the project during fiscal 
year 1960. From the outset it was envisaged that both conventional 
and nuclear explosions would be involved, and because of this the 
AEC was given a prominent role. Nuclear explosions were ob-
viously desirable from a technical standpoint: without them, theories 
relating to detection could not be completely tested, and since it 
would be some time before the project would advance to the stage 
in which nuclear explosions would be crucial, the planners of Vela 
lOU.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Summary-
Analysis of Hearings: Developments in the Field of Detection and Identifica-
tion of Nuclear Explosions (Project Vela) and Relationship to Test. Ban 
Negotiations, 87th Congress, 2nd Session ( Comm. Print. 1962), p. 12. 
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simply ignored the question of whether or not such explosions 
would be politically feasible. 
Curiously, the first public announcement of Project Vela was 
made May 7, 1960, well after the program was underway.U 
A second project, concerning decoupling, was inaugurated 
somewhat earlier. As soon as they were presented, Albert Latter's 
theoretical calculations invited empirical testing. The Atomic Energy 
Commission agreed to fund such work and assigned operational 
responsibility to the University of California's Lawrence Radiation 
Laboratory at Livermore. The RAND Corporation would also 
participate in the analysis of the data. These arrangements were 
discussed before Congressional Committees in June 1959. A series 
of ten or more underground chemical explosions was planned 
under the code name Project Cowboy and the first of these was 
conducted in a salt mine in Winnfield, Louisiana, on December 17, 
1959, before Project Vela was even seriously under way. Thus the 
United States moved faster to examine through empirical tests 
whether or not the seismic effects of underground nuclear explo-
sions could be muffled than it did to consider in the same way 
whether or not the effectiveness of the control system recommended 
by the Conference of Experts could be improved. 
An important reason for the difference in the speed with which 
the two projects got underway was the fact that several policy-
makers felt that if the decoupling theory proved valid a ban on 
testing nuclear weapons underground would probably be out of the 
question. In addition, Project Vela was much more complicated 
than Project Cowboy and required considerably larger expenditures 
of funds. Further, most aspects of Project Vela would be executed 
by nongovernmental agencies, often universities. Drafting and letting 
contracts is time consuming, and the rhythm of academic life seldom 
allows the rapid commitment of large scale resources to meet 
external requirements. Finally, housing Project Vela within the 
Department of Defense meant that the responsibility for proving 
that a test ban could be adequately monitored was given to an 
agency which was less than enthusiastic about the wisdom of a test 
ban and which had as its basic responsibility the overwhelming 
llSee President Eisenhower's Statement: U.S. Department of State, 
Documents on Disarmament, 1960 (1961), pp. 86-87. 
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and pressing task of developing and maintaining the military capa-
city of the United States. When priorities were established, as they 
inevitably were, the latter fact was especially important. 
Many Senators and scientists complained about the slowness 
with which Project Vela was implemented. Even Earl H. Voss, who 
was not among the most enthusiastic supporters of the test ban 
negotiations, commented in his book Nuclear Ambush that the 
project "obviously was not being pushed full speed ahead."12 
Divided Counsel: A "Political" or "Scientific" Question? 
Regardless of the West's state of technical preparedness, ne-
gotiations were in progress and Chairman Khrushchev's missives 
called for a reply. Among other things, the USSR appeared to be 
gaining propaganda benefits from the seeming shift in the Western 
position from advocacy of a comprehensive test ban to support for 
an atmospheric ban, a point stressed in Chairman Khrushchev's 
letters. In an attempt to counter this, the White House issued a 
statement on April 27, 1959, asserting that the United States con-
tinued to desire a complete test ban, but the Soviet Union thus far 
had "been unwilling to accept the control which would make such 
agreement possible."13 If the statement had any effect at all, how-
ever, it altered the situation only slightly. 
Thus on the one hand there was continued pressure by public 
opinion for a comprehensive test ban. Opposed to this were the 
arguments that such a ban could not be enforced. These contra-
dictory pressures clashed in the formulation of the next Western 
move. Chairman Khrushchev's proposal for a predetermined quota 
of on-site inspections caused deep divisions within the United 
States Administration. The Atomic Energy Commission, and es-
pecially its Chairman, John A. McCone, strongly opposed the 
concept, arguing that a test ban including such a provision would 
not provide adequate safeguards for American security. The De-
partment of State, on the other hand, gave the proposal a qualified 
endorsement. In addition, the British favored it; indeed, they in a 
sense had originated it. 
In the Committee of Principals, Mr. McCone took the attitude 
12Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, p. 445. 
13Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, p. 1402. 
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that this issue was "technical," not "political," and therefore the 
judgment of the technically qualified experts ought to prevail. The 
Department of State, on the other hand, took the opposite view. In 
reality, both technical and political judgments were intertwined. 
The crucial issues involved the size of detonation which one wished 
to detect and the degree of assurance which one sought that such 
detonations were detected; in other words the old threshold problem, 
which had never been resolved. Such issues were partly "technical" 
in that they involved estimates of the capability of the proposed 
control network, but they were also political, in that they involved 
judgments about the level of acceptable risk, and weighing the 
risks of a less than perfect test ban against the risks of a world 
without a test ban. Varying estimates of the trustworthiness of the 
Soviet Union also entered the picture. As in the past, these issues 
were not settled, but a new Western position was formulated which 
was more or less acceptable to all of the parties involved. 
The Western Response to Khrushchev: Further on the Inspection 
Quota 
The formal Western response was expressed in letters from 
President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan to Chairman 
Khrushchev dated May 5, 1959.14 The letters narrowed the dif-
ferences between East and West to a slight degree. Both Western 
leaders agreed to "explore," through their representatives in Geneva, 
the Soviet proposal for an annual quota of on-site inspections on 
the territories of the three nuclear powers. In particular, the Western 
leaders argued that questions relating to the criteria for initiating 
on-site inspections, timely access to areas where unidentified events 
occurred, and the relationship between the detection capability of 
the control system and the size of the quota, needed clarification. 
President Eisenhower also mentioned his feeling that broader prob-
lems concerning the operation of the Control Organization and sys-
tem should be settled. Both Western leaders reiterated their desire 
for a comprehensive test ban, but went on to say that this was 
dependent upon the USSR's agreeing to the appropriate control 
measures, and both repeated the earlier suggestion for a phased 
agreement starting with an atmospheric ban. President Eisenhower 
14Geneva Conference, pp. 360-63. 
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wrote that the West would welcome a technical discussion by scien-
tists to consider the feasibility of immediately extending the atmos-
pheric ban to high altitudes and outer space. 
Since the report of the Conference of Experts contained no 
recommendations for control measures at high altitudes and in 
outer space, obviously some technical decisions would have to be 
made for these environments. How well prepared the West was to 
embark on such decisions was debatable. For experimental data, 
there were the results of the 1958 Johnston Island and Argus shots. 
These data had been analyzed by the Panofsky Panel and certain 
tentative conclusions had been drawn. However, the first contract 
under Project Vela Sierra and Vela Hotel was not let until Septem-
ber 1960, and it would be at least another year before concrete 
results would be available. Apparently, though, no one on the 
Committee of Principals within the United States or in the West 
generally seriously questioned the wisdom of calling for technical 
talks at this time. 
Interestingly neither President Eisenhower nor Prime Minister 
Macmillan mentioned the new seismic data in their letters to 
Chairman Khrushchev, bringing it in only inferentially, by requiring 
that the quota have some relationship to the detection capability of 
the control system. In the Geneva Conference the Western negotiators 
were again more explicit on this point, and openly insisted that the 
new data had to be considered.l5 Mr. Tsarapkin, on the other hand, 
was equally adamant, maintaining that the technical basis of the 
negotiations had been established by the Conference of Experts and 
that these questions could not be reopened. He argued that: 
There can be no doubt that either side could, if it wanted, 
submit at any time endless so-called new scientific data, 
which might differ widely in their nature according to the 
purpose pursued by the experimental scientists in that 
field. Those who wanted to prove at any cost how difficult 
it is to detect and identify nuclear explosions would pre-
pare their experiments correspondingly. There are 
scientists who support this kind of view. We all know that 
there are certain such scientists in the United States also. 
It is sufficient to mention, for instance, Dr. Teller.16 
15See GEN/DNT/PV. 88 and PV. 89, passim. 
l6GEN/DNT/PV. 89, p. 19. 
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The USSR's position continued to be that the Treaty had to be 
negotiated on the basis of the recommendations of the Conference 
of Experts, which it held the three governments had "accepted"; 
that the Control Commission could consider new technical develop-
ments; and that the Periodic Review Article amply provided for 
revisions in the control system. 
The USSR also took the same attitude with respect to control 
measures for the detection of nuclear tests at high altitudes and in 
outer space. Mr. Tsarapkin maintained that the report of the 
Conference of Experts did contain certain conclusions and that 
these were sufficient. He also repeated and elaborated his statement 
made January 8, 1959, that the USSR would be willing to launch 
artificial earth satellites and to establish ground stations to receive 
signals from the satellites for purposes of control in these environ-
ments. 17 The technical details, he argued, could be worked out by 
the Preparatory Commission or the Control Commission. In his 
view, it would be diversionary to become enmeshed in a discussion 
of such technical details during the course of the political nego-
tiations. It might also set a precedent in terms of going beyond the 
work of the Conference of Experts prior to the signature of a test 
ban treaty. 
This was where matters stood on May 8, 1959, when the 
Geneva Conference recessed. The West requested the recess on the 
ground that the Foreign Ministers of France, the USSR, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States were scheduled to meet the 
following Monday, May 11, 1959, and they might hopefulJy re-
solve some of the issues which divided the Conference in the course 
of their meeting. 
II 
Technical Working Group I 
From Diplomats to Scientists: Getting Ready for Technical Working 
Group I 
Certain of these issues were indeed resolved at the Foreign Min-
isters' meeting-or it would be more accurate to say during the 
Foreign Ministers' meeting. On May 14, 1959, three days after 
17GEN/DNT/PV. 89, pp. 25-26. 
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the meeting opened, Chairman Khrushchev replied to President 
Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan.18 Basically the letters 
were restatements of the Soviet position; however, there was one 
important exception. The Chairman agreed that there should be a 
brief "technical discussion of concrete measures as to methods of 
detecting nuclear explosions at high altitudes on the basis of the 
conclusion of the Geneva meeting of experts, for the purpose of 
including such methods in the system of control." The Foreign 
Ministers confirmed this agreement. 
The terms of reference of the technical discussion--or of 
Technical Working Group I (TWG I) as it ultimately was called 
-were left to be worked out at the Geneva Conference after it 
reconvened on June 8, 1959. This proved to be a disputatious task, 
and one which took the better part of six meetings. The terms of 
reference were not finally approved until June 15, 1959. Several 
issues were involved; all probably more important in terms of their 
implications with respect to the controversial and still unresolved 
problem of detecting and identifying underground tests and the 
American new seismic data than in their own right. 
Chairman Khrushchev implicitly, and Foreign Minister Gromyko 
directly, both again refused to consider the new data and insisted 
that the negotiations had to be based on the conclusions of the 
Conference of Experts. The West on the other hand continued to 
insist that the new data had to be considered. On June 12, 1959, 
the United States finally introduced the findings and report of the 
Berkner Panel into the Geneva Conference.19 Having failed to 
obtain agreement through the Foreign Ministers, the United States 
now apparently hoped to force a modification in the Soviet position 
through a more open confrontation. Mr. Tsarapkin's immediate 
response was that the conclusions of the Berkner Panel had been 
"broadly known" to the USSR "since last March from the magazine 
Fortune."20 
The dispute about the terms of reference of Technical Working 
Group I should be viewed in the light of this continuing controversy. 
First, the two sides were divided as to whether or not the report of 
lSGeneva Conference, pp. 363-67. 
19GEN/DNT/PV. 94, pp. 24-31. 
20Jbid., p. 32. 
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the Conference of Experts should be mentioned. The Western 
powers finally reluctantly agreed that it should be. Secondly, there 
was a controversy concerning whether TWG I should discuss only 
which instruments should be used for detection, as the USSR argued, 
or more broadly evaluate the possible techniques of detection and 
identification, as the West insisted. In this case the Western position 
was accepted. Thirdly, the two sides differed about whether or not 
the tentative theoretical evaluations concerning the effectiveness of 
various techniques contained in the report of the Conference of 
Experts could be changed; the Soviet Union argued that they could 
not, and the Western powers that they could. A related issue was 
whether or not the data from the United States 1958 tests could 
be considered. Mr. Tsarapkin eventually agreed that the new 
material could be considered, and the larger issue was solved in a 
compromise fashion, as can be seen from the terms of reference: 
The technical working group should assess the capabilities 
and limitations of possible techniques for the detection and 
identification of nuclear explosions at high altitudes (more 
than 30 to 50 kilometers) above the earth and, on the 
basis of discussions and conclusions of the Geneva con-
ference of experts, recommend techniques and instru-
mentation for consideration by the Conference for 
incorporation in the Detection and Identification System.21 
Fifthly, the Soviet Union sought to expand the terms of reference 
of Technical Working Group I so that it would also be directed to 
consider the problem of determining criteria for on-site inspections 
in the case of suspected underground nuclear explosions. The 
Western powers refused this proposal on the ground that different 
technical specialties were involved and, more importantly, they felt 
that the question of criteria could not be examined without con-
sidering the new seismic data. Finally, the Soviet Union won 
Western agreement that the Technical Working Group should report 
to the Conference on June 29, 1959, one week after it was con-
vened, which proved to be an impossibly short time. Even though 
TWG I extended beyond this deadline, the scientists had an incredible, 
almost around the clock, working day during the Conference, as they 
did each time that they met during the test ban negotiations. 
21GEN/DNT/PV. 95, p. 13. 
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Once agreement had been reached on the terms of reference, 
it was necessary to assemble delegations to participate in the 
technical discussions. A British delegation of three scientists in 
government employ was quickly assembled.22 None of the three 
had attended the Conference previously. The Soviet delegation was 
headed by Dr. Fedorov, who had chaired the Eastern panel at the 
Conference of Experts and had stayed in Geneva for the opening 
stages of the political negotiations. Two others of the seven-member 
Soviet delegation had also served on the Eastern panel at the 
Conference of Experts, M. A. Sadovsky and 0. I. Leypunsky.23 
In the United States, several scientists had been approached 
on a tentative basis earlier. PSAC and the Office of the Science 
Adviser served as the bodies which recommended nominations to 
the President and the Department of State. On Tuesday the six-
teenth, those selected were informed that they should fly to Geneva 
that Thursday and be ready for the opening of the discussions the 
following Monday. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, Director of the High 
Energy Physics Laboratory at Stanford University, who had headed 
the Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee which had 
examined this subject, was chosen as the Chairman of the American 
delegation.24 In creating the delegation, an attempt was made-as it 
had been with respect to the Conference of Experts-to maintain 
balance between the conflicting points of view among scientists 
concerning the wisdom of a test ban, and those with extreme 
positions were not included. Of the nine men appointed to the 
delegation, only two, Richard Latter and Spurgeon Keeny had at-
. 22H. R. Hulme, I. Maddock, and R. Press. 
23The other members of the Soviet delegation were J. L. Alpert, A. I. 
Ustyumenko, 0. A. Grinevsky, and S. N. Vernov. There is reason for be-
lieving that Grinevsky was not a scientist but a political representative. 
24The other members of the delegation were: Sterling Colgate, Lawrence 
Radiation Laboratory, University of California; Allen F. Donovan, Director, 
Astrovehicles Laboratory, Space Technology Laboratory, Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia; Allen Graves, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, University of Cali-
fornia; Spurgeon Keeny, Jr., Technical Assistant, Office of Special Assistant 
to the President for Science and Technology; Richard Latter, Chief, Physics 
Division, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California; Col. Dent L. Lay, 
Assistant Director, Technical Operations Division, Advanced Research Pro-
jects Agency, Department of Defense; Allen M. Petersen, Head, Propagation 
Laboratory, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California; and Ken-
neth M. Watson, Professor of Physics, University of California at Berkeley. 
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tended the Conference of Experts. The former (like his brother 
Albert) was a RAND Corporation physicist and the latter, a 
technical assistant in the Office of the Special Assistant to the 
President for Science and Technology. In addition, the delegation 
included Allen Graves, a physicist on leave from the Lawrence 
Radiation Laboratory, who had been attending the political nego-
tiations as the representative of the Atomic Energy Commission. 
Professor Panofsky was actually intercepted in the midst of a 
cross-country trip with his wife and five children. His destination, 
though, was Geneva, where he planned to spend a year at CERN, the 
Organisation europeenne pour la recherche nucleaire. He left his 
family, hurried to Washington-he was the only nonofficial member 
of the delegation to go there prior to departure for Europe-where 
he had a fifteen-minute conference with the Secretary of State, and 
then went on to Geneva, arriving somewhat later than the rest of the 
American delegation, and after the first meeting of Technical Working 
Group I. 
Many of the members of the American delegation had been 
members of Professor Panofsky's Panel on the detection of nu-
clear explosions at high altitudes and in outer space, and this was 
the only preparation that the group had to work with. The Panel 
had met about eight or nine times in the winter of 1958-59. Each 
meeting lasted about a day, and the Panel members did various 
pieces of work in the interim periods. Dr. Killian had attended 
most of the meetings, and representatives of the Department of 
Defense and Atomic Energy Commission were members of the 
Panel. The Department of State, however, was not represented, and 
generally speaking the group had very little politicial guidance. 
Again, the scientists were not told what threshold of detection would 
be the maximum risk that the United States could accept. In this 
instance, in contrast to the Conference of Experts and a later 
technical working group, the questions of identification; and 
"objective criteria" were carefully avoided. The scientists were not 
told how much money the United States would be willing to invest 
in a detection and identification_ system, nor were they told how 
much to as~ume that an evader would be willing to spend to mask 
his action. Thus there were no cost figures. This was the case 
despite the fact that the report of the Panofsky Panel had con-
tained an approximate assessment of the cost of conducting clandes-
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tine nuclear explosions in space using various methods, and of the 
cost of various detection systems. The scientists were not given any 
guidance concerning the basis for choice between various alternative 
techniques. They were merely given the data from the 1958 test 
series and asked to evaluate the capabilities and limitations of 
various techniques for detection and identification and to elaborate 
a possible system. Secretary of State Herter did not expand these 
instructions very much in his brief conference with Professor Pan-
ofsky. Just as in the case of the Conference of Experts various 
crucial problems were left for the scientists to decide. 
Nor were these matters settled when the American delegation 
assembled in Geneva. The scientists spent most of the weekend 
brushing up on their technical preparation. Ambassador Wadsworth 
was reluctant to become involved in technical discussions, and in 
any case, could not make fundamental politicial decisions. A junior 
State Department member of the American delegation at the Geneva 
Conference was assigned to the scientists, but he did not fully 
understand the technical issues, nor did he attend all of the meetings 
of Technical Working Group I. During the course of the negotia-
tions the scientists found it completely impossible to obtain political 
guidance. In other words, the United States treated Technical Work-
ing Group I, as it had the Conference of Experts, as a purely 
technical session which the scientists should work at by themselves. 
TWG 1: Toward an Adjustment in the Scientific Base 
Technical Working Group I began with an argument between 
East and West concerning the agenda, which in several respects 
repeated the controversy about its terms of reference. Dr. Fedorov 
proposed a draft agenda which virtually would have limited the 
discussion to the elaboration of matters treated by the Conference 
of Experts.25 The West on the other hand preferred a broader 
definition of TWG I's tasks, and eventually won its point. However, 
the controversy continued to plague the technical discussions. 
Throughout TWG I the Soviet scientists tended to take the report 
of the Conference of Experts as a fixed document, binding the 
various states. They were willing to accept only evaluations which 
confirmed or upgraded the assessments arrived at then, and fought 
25GEN/DNT/TWG I, PV.1, pp. 12-15. 
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any attempts to demonstrate that these assessments were too opti-
mistic. 
As in the Conference of Experts, the burden of proof tended 
to rest with the West since it was the Western powers which had 
demanded that the technical discussion be held. The Western scien-
tists presented the bulk of the data, and it seems fairly clear that 
the Soviet scientists withheld considerable data which would have 
been useful to the discussions. This is not to say that the West 
made all of the data which it had available, but merely to say that 
it made considerably more available. Throughout the discussions, 
the Western scientists pressed for quantitative assessments. The 
Soviet scientists preferred more general formulations. The Western 
scientists sought to point out how violators might attempt to avoid 
detection. The Soviet scientists made light of these suggestions and 
often appeared not to have previously considered the possibilities. 
The Western scientists sought to indicate that although something 
was known about the signals of nuclear explosions at high altitudes 
and in outer space, very little was known about the natural back-
ground with which such signals had to compete. None of the de-
vices which were discussed as instruments of detection existed at 
that time, although some of their component parts were technically 
proved. The Western scientists introduced data from the United 
States 1958 test series but argued that only the Teak and Orange 
shots were directly relevant and that these were conducted at 
relatively low altitudes. They maintained that further empirical 
data might invalidate their theoretical conclusions, making them 
appear either too optimistic or too pessimistic. The Soviet scien-
tists argued as they had in the past that the progress of science as 
a whole could only result in improvements in the ability to detect 
and identify nuclear explosions at high altitudes. 
In testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
about a year later, Professor Panofsky summed up the position and 
difficulties of the Western scientists. 
We all realize that the Russians have very little interest 
in the technical reliability of control procedures because 
clandestine testing is essentially impossible in any of the 
Western countries. They do, however, have a very sub-
stantial interest in maintaining the secrecy of their country, 
and therefore in reducing the degree of access demanded 
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by the control system. Hence, it is always in their interest 
to minimize the extent of the control system; in order to 
do this the tendency is to view the performance of the 
control system in the best possible light. Any critical 
evaluation of the performance of the system, therefore, 
always rests upon the shoulders of the Western delega-
tions. In turn, this makes the performance of the negotia-
tions very arduous for the Western technical delegates 
since in many cases the facts which have to form the 
basis for a critical assessment have not been developed 
prior to negotiations. 26 
The differences between the Western and Soviet scientists in these 
matters were even more acute during the sessions of Technical 
Working Group I than they had been during the Conference of 
Experts. No doubt, both sides, and especially the Western scien-
tists, constantly had the controversial history of the report produced 
in that meeting in mind. 
Following the pattern of the Conference of Experts, and the 
agenda, the report of Technical Working Group I was divided into 
two basic sections. The first section contained a general discussion 
of techniques for detecting nuclear explosions at high altitudes. 
It was divided into two ~mbsections; the first, dealing with detection 
by means of apparatus installed in artificial earth and solar satel-
lites; and the second, dealing with detection by means of apparatus 
installed at ground-based control posts. The second half of the 
report contained recommendations for consideration by the political 
Conference concerning the techniques and instruments which rP.ight 
be incorporated in the Detection and Identification System. In this 
section, in contrast to the report of the Conference of Experts, 
alternatives were spelled out in certain areas and the choices left 
to others. 
Other than the problems which arose from the broad differ-
ences of approach mentioned above, drafting the first part of the 
report was relatively noncontroversial. The only deep difference ap-
peared to be caused by differing technical experiences; the orbit 
26U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Special Subcom-
mittee on Radiation and the Subcommittee on Research and Development, 
Hearings: Technical Aspects of Detection and Inspection Controls of a Nuclear 
Weapons Test Ban, 86th Congress, 2d Session (1960), pp. 38-39. 
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of Soviet satellites had been such as to gather little information on 
the Van Allen radiation belt, and as a consequence the Soviet scien-
tists were less inclined to take this feature of the atmosphere into 
account than the Western scientists. In general, both sides had very 
little empirical data on the level of background radiation in the 
atmosphere. 
Not surprisingly it proved less easy to agree on recommenda-
tions for control systems, which was after all the core of the issue. 
Indeed, it is difficult to see why the attempt to arrive at joint 
assessments was necessary, except as an effort to erect an agreed 
point of departure for the recommendations. In formulating the 
recommendations, the scientists were in effect engaging in political 
negotiations, though the subject matter was technical and scientific. 
The American scientists were clearly considerably more aware of 
this than they had been a year earlier at the Conference of Ex-
perts.27 However, their political instructions were not any more 
complete than they had been in the previous instance. In the absence 
of instructions on such vital matters as threshold and cost, the 
American scientists tended to push for the maximum. For example, 
one of the problems of detection of nuclear explosions at high 
altitudes was the danger of false alarms; the danger that the control 
system might indicate that a nuclear explosion had occurred when 
actually none had. The Americans sought to minimize this possi-
bility as much as possible through redundancy (having overlapping 
systems) and other methods; their target was a system that would 
not produce more than one false alarm every one hundred years. 
The Soviet scientists on the other hand were inclined to make more 
modest demands on the recot!llllended system, but ultimately gen-
erally agreed to the American position. 
The same pressure to provide for all possible contingencies led 
the American scientists to argue the need for a system of satellites 
in orbit around the sun, so that there would be no blind spots 
behind the sun or the moon. This recommendation, to which the 
27For example, during the Conference Panofsky said to Fedorov: "I 
am more than happy to negotiate on matters of recommendations where poli-
tical judgment is involved, where we must reach an agreement in order to 
have an agreed report concerning what steps are to be taken, but I cannot 
negotiate on the question of the modification of scientific facts." GEN/DNT/-
HAT/PV. 16, p. 46. 
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Soviet scientists were opposed and which would have involved sub-
stantial cost, was phrased in optional terms. Interestingly, after 
the conclusion of Technical Working Group I, with the advantage 
of further research, the American scientists also became less inter-
ested in the system of solar satellites. 28 They eventually concluded 
that the costs and difficulties of conducting clandestine nuclear 
explosions behind the sun or the moon would be so great that it 
was highly unlikely that any violator would take such action. 
In all, ten methods of detection were considered, and tech-
niques involving all but one of these were recommended for in-
clusion in the Detection and Identification System. The one which 
was not recommended was a ground-based technique, backscatter 
radar. After over a week of irrelevant, and at times spurious 
technical argument, Dr. Fedorov stated that the Soviet scientists 
could not agree to recommend backscatter radar because it could 
"also be used for purposes having nothing to do with the control of 
high-altitude explosions. "29 Although the American scientists were 
reluctant to admit that backscatter radar is an effective means of 
observing the launching of missiles, nevertheless, on the basis of 
the Argus experiments, the American scientists believed it to be an 
extremely useful means of detecting nuclear explosions at high 
altitudes. Failure to include it in the Detection and Identification 
System would result in an uncovered "hole" in the system under 
certain conditions in the area from 50 to 100 kilometers and a "half-
covered hole" from 100 to 1,000 kilometers. The report merely 
stated that the Technical Working Group had been unable to come 
to an accord on this matter. That under certain circumstances there 
would be a "hole" in the system was not mentioned in the report. 
This provides an example of the difficulty which the scientists 
had in obtaining political guidance. When it appeared certain that 
there would be an impasse on the question of whether or not to 
recommend backscatter radar in the control system, the American 
scientists felt that the most constructive move would be to agree 
to disagree. This being a political decision, the delegation sought 
guidance, but found it extremely difficult to convey the nature of the 
28See Panofsky's comments before the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, Hearings: Technical Aspects ... of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban, 
supra note 26, p. 47. 
29GEN/DNT/HAT/PV. 17, p. 81. 
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problem to the diplomats and politicians in Geneva and Washing-
ton. In the end, the scientists had to take the decision on their 
own responsibility. 
In formulating the recommendations the Western scientists 
sought to be as specific as possible, for instance listing the exact 
number of satellites required and their orbits. The Soviet scientists 
preferred more general formulations, and at one point suggested that 
matters involving a choice between various alternatives should be 
left to the Control Commission. Professor Panofsky refused to 
do this, on the ground that decisions on such issues should be the 
prerogative of the diplomatic Conference. 30 In some instances 
he was willing to leave the choice between alternatives for subse-
quent decision, although in more specific terms than the Soviet 
scientists preferred, but he argued that the diplomatic Con-
ference had to decide how the decisions should be made. The reason 
for the insistence of the American scientists on being specific was 
their awareness of the tentative agreement reached in the Geneva 
Conference that major changes in the detection and identification 
system would require the unanimity of the three nuclear powers. 31 
The problem of identifying the violator after a nuclear explo-
sion at high altitudes had been detected by the control system was 
not discussed in Technical Working Group I. Nor did the group 
discuss criteria for establishing evidence of detection. As had been 
mentioned, these issues had been carefully avoided by the politicians 
and diplomats in their discussions with the scientists. Technically, 
there is no way the violator could be identified unless the control 
system also had available to it information on missile launchings. 
Had the system been established, either some agreement would have 
had to have been reached on this point, or in the case of a detec-
tion of a nuclear explosion, states would have had to base their 
decision concerning what action to take on their unilateral in-
telligence systems. Since the duration article provided that the 
treaty could be terminated by unilateral action, this would be 
feasible. However, in all of the other environments the Western 
powers demanded incontrovertible evidence identifying the violator. 
One might ask if such evidence was necessary in other en-
sooEN/DNT/HAT/PV. 14, p. 71. 
SlSee Hearings: Technical Aspects ... of a Nuclear Weapons Test 
Ban, supra note 26, p. 40. 
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vironments, why not at high altitudes? Or, if not necessary at high 
altitudes, then why was it necessary for atmospheric, underwater, 
and underground explosions? Presumably the reason was that for 
identification it would have been necessary to have controls over 
another element of weaponry, the launching of missiles. But, to 
establish positive identification in the case of underground explo-
sions, on-site inspections are required, which might also reveal 
other aspects of military strength. 
Whether or not the system recommended by Technical Working 
Group I would have provided sufficient safeguards against the 
possibility of clandestine nuclear explosions in outer space was a 
matter of judgment. First, there was the "hole" in the system at low 
altitudes under certain conditions caused by the failure to recom-
mend the backscatter radar technique. Secondly, there was the 
problem of identification. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
at extremely high altitudes-above 5,000,000 miles-it would only 
be possible to detect nuclear explosions through the soft or thermal 
X-ray technique, and shielding would appreciably reduce the ef-
fectiveness of this technique. Thus, if a violator were willing to 
spend sufficient resources to put a nuclear device, the necessary 
instrumentation, and a shield into outer space, and were patient 
enough to wait some time for the results, he could conduct un-
detected nuclear weapon tests. 
Whether or not the possibility that a state might conduct un-
detected clandestine nuclear explosions in outer space constituted 
a serious risk was subject to debate. Professor Panofsky, in testi-
mony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy expressed this 
opinion: 
From the purely technical point of view, it appears likely 
that, given arbitrarily high incentives on the part of the 
violator, it will always be possible to devise an essentially 
undetectable means of carrying out the violation. I believe, 
however, that before that point is reached, there is the 
question of whether there really is sufficient incentive 
either for the violator to carry out tests under these ex-
treme conditions or for the detecting system to be ex-
panded to the maximum possible degree. 32 
32Hearings: Technical Aspects ... of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban, 
supra note 26, p. 37. 
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On the other hand, Dr. Byron P. Leonard, of the Space Technology 
Laboratory, during the same hearing asserted, "It is really no trick 
at all to run tests outside of the X-ray detection circle ... "33 Edward 
Teller expressed the same view in a syndicated newspaper article, 
"Testing in space provides a loophole through which one could 
drive a herd of wild elephants. "34 Again, all three scientists used 
the same technical data; where they differed was in their estimate 
of the necessary degree of security or in the threshold of detect-
ability below which American security interests would be endan-
gered. This was a political judgment involving an assessment of the 
intentions of other states, one's willingness to bear monetary and 
other costs involved in any type of detection system, and one's wil-
lingness to accept risks. Yet these were decisions on which the 
American scientists at Technical Working Group I, as their pre-
decessors at the Conference of Experts, received little guidance 
from either United States politicians or diplomats. 
TWG I Reports to the Diplomatic Conference 
Technical Working Group I adopted its report on the morning 
of Friday, July 10, 1959. That afternoon the report was presented 
to the diplomatic Conference. Both sides argued that the results 
of the Technical Working Group supported their position with 
respect to the report of the Conference of Experts. 35 In the Soviet 
view, the report of TWG I confirmed the findings of the earlier 
report, and proved that the progress of science made detection 
easier, while in the Western view it was conclusive evidence of the 
importance of looking at new data, and also proved that the demand 
to do this was not grounded on obstructionist motives. 
The Conference agreed to release the report of Technical 
Working Group I immediately. This was in contrast to the situation 
with respect to the report of the Conference of Experts, which had 
first been submitted to the governments concerned and then re-
leased. 
The next move with respect to the problems discussed by 
Technical Working Group I came one month later, on August 10, 
33Jbid., p. 345. 
84Houston Post, August 16, 1960. 
35See GEN/DNT/PV. 109, passim. 
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1959, when Mr. Tsarapkin announced that the USSR agreed to 
"the inclusion of the methods and instrumentation recommended 
. . . for the detection of high-altitude nuclear explosions in the 
system of control over the cessation of nuclear tests."36 That 
same day, the British delegate, Sir Michael Wright, stated that his 
government accepted the report "as a correct technical assessment 
of possible techniques for the detection and identification of high-
altitude nuclear explosions in the light of scientific knowledge 
available at the time of the Working Group's session."37 He added 
that his government was prepared to take part in discussions re-
garding the embodiment in the treaty of provisions on high-altitude 
controls, in the light of the recommendations contained in the 
report." 
It was obvious that Ambassador Wadsworth, at this point, had 
no instructions on the issue. On August 26, 1959, however, follow-
ing Sir Michael Wright's phraseology, he stated that the United 
States accepted "the report as a correct technical assessment of the 
capabilities and limitations of possible techniques for the detection 
and identification of high-altitude nuclear explosions in the light of 
presently available scientific knowledge."38 He also said that the 
United States was studying the "complex problems of timing and 
scope" that would be involved in preparing treaty language for a 
high-altitude detection system "that would be established" on the 
basis of "the report of TWG 1." However, the United States did 
not discuss its proposals concerning this matter in broad outline until 
March 29, 1961,39 nearly two years later, and it did not submit 
specific treaty language until April 18, 1961.40 
The basic reason for the delay was the inability of the United 
States Administration to agree on the degree of risk that the United 
States could reasonably accept; again, it was the threshold problem. 
The demands of the Atomic Energy Commission and, to a lesser 
extent, of the Department of Defense, were considerably higher than 
those of the Department of State or the President's Science Advisory 
36GEN/DNT/PV. 121, p. 10. 
31Jbid., p. 13. 
38GEN/DNT/PV. 127, p. 4. 
39See GEN/DNT/PV. 280, pp. 3-7. 
40Geneva Conference, pp. 508-9. 
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Committee. A related reason was the high cost of the complete 
high altitude system. Few were willing to countenance this cost. 
Thus the United States put itself in the uncomfortable position of 
insisting on the one hand that the "loophole" associated with the 
lack of high altitude coverage was sufficient reason to be an im-
pediment toward concluding a nuclear test ban treaty, while on the 
other hand it did not appear to regard the "loophole" as being of 
sufficient importance to be willing to pay the money to plug it. 
Significantly, when treaty language was finally proposed, with the 
advantage of data gained from Vela Sierra and Vela Hotel, the 
United States asked for a system which was somewhat more modest 
and consequently considerably less expensive than that which had 
been recommended by Technical Working Group I. Eventually, 
when the United States signed the Moscow Treaty, which relied on 
national detection systems, it agreed to a ban on testing at high 
altitudes and in outer space before basic elements in its own national 
control system were operative. 
The subsequent history of the action with respect to the report 
of Technical Working Group I, raises again the question of why the 
Western powers insisted on calling the meeting. Certainly the West-
ern governments did not learn anything from the discussions that 
they could not have learned from private consultations with their 
own scientists. The extent of knowledge was limited, and there were 
risks in doing anything such as making formal recommendations 
for a control system that might tend to "freeze" the situation. 
Formulating recommendations involved political choices, which the 
United States government was unprepared or unable or unwilling to 
make at that time and for more than a year and a half after the 
report of TWG I was filed. Perhaps some American officials hoped 
that the technical discussions would in some way solve the problem 
for them. If they did, they both overestimated and misunderstood 
the qualities and powers of science. In fact, however, the Technical 
Working Group I did set a precedent for reconsidering matters 
discussed by the Conference of Experts, and perhaps this was its 
principal function for the West. In addition, of course, when the 
United States eventually decided to accept some of the recommenda-
tions of TWG I, the Soviet Union was already on record as having 
done so. 
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The Diplomatic Conference Inches Along 
The Geneva Conference had been in session during the meet-
ings of Technical Working Group I and it continued in session until 
August 26, 1959. The meetings, however, appeared to be mainly 
exercises in marking time. Neither side substantially modified its 
position. The Western powers continued to insist that the new data 
had to be considered, and the USSR continued to refuse to take this 
action. Mr. Tsarapkin constantly referred to the report of the Con-
ference of Experts as "the basis" for the negotiations, while Ambas-
sador Wadsworth held that it was merely "an agreed statement of 
the best scientific opinion available as of mid-1958."41 
The USSR's position, though, w2s clarified somewhat when 
on June 19, 1959, Mr. Tsarapkin gave a more detailed response 
to the findings of the Berkner Panel.42 It was essentially negative. 
First of all, he alleged that to act on the recommendations of the 
Berkner Panel would mean that a test ban would be delayed for 
many years. He pointed out that no one could confidently predict 
how the suggestion for putting seismographs in deep holes would 
work out, since this technique was largely unexplored. He also 
objected to the suggestion of unmanned stations placed at consider-
ably closer intervals than had been recommended at the Conference 
of Experts. He alleged that they would create opportunities for 
espionage since men would have to install the stations and check 
their operation. 
The Soviet position was further clarified on July 9, 1959, when 
Mr. Tsarapkin submitted a draft article on on-site inspection. 43 As 
he had asserted previously in response to Western questioning, the 
terms of the article did not require the unanimous agreement of the 
three nuclear powers for the dispatch of an inspection team and the 
inspection teams could go anywhere that the instruments indicated 
that an unidentified event had occurred. From the Western point of 
view, an unexpected feature of the proposal was that the three 
nuclear powers would each be subject to an equal number of inspec-
tions. Actually the proposal advanced the negotiations very little, 
for the most crucial element, the number of on-site inspections that 
41GEN/DNT/PV. 99, p. 10. 
42fbid., pp. 14-16. 
43GEN/DNT/PV. 108, pp. 3-4. 
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would be allowed annually, was not specified; the draft merely 
contained a blank space. The USSR did not formally submit a 
definite figure until more than a year later. Hcwever, the day before 
Ambassador Tsarapkin submitted the draft article, Soviet First 
Deputy Premier Frol R. Koslov told Michigan's Governor G. Men-
nen Williams that the USSR might accept as many as three on-site 
inspections each year,44 which is the figure that the Soviet Union 
ultimately proposed on July 26, 1960. Soviet representatives also 
mentioned the figure three in informal conversations in Geneva in 
the summer of 1959. 
The West assumed that a much larger number would be 
needed, and the ensuing argument between East and West con-
cerning whether the quota should be "politically determined," as 
the USSR insisted, or "scientifically determined," as the United 
States and the United Kingdom insisted, was in reality principally 
an argument about numbers. At the time very little was known 
about the frequency of small earthquakes and the knowledge about 
the relationship between the seismological signals transmitted by un-
derground nuclear ·explosions and earthquakes was at best sketchy. 
If one accepted the estimate of unidentified events contained in the 
report of the Conference of Experts, the figure of three on-site in-
spections annually in the USSR would not be completely unrea-
sonable even though such a small figure would pose practical dif-
ficulties. However, the West felt that in view of the new data such 
a figure would be clearly insufficient. At the same time, the West 
was not prepared to submit a specific figure, and actually did not 
make a definite proposal until February 11, 1960. Then it merely 
suggested that a fixed percentage of unidentified events should be 
eligible for inspection. In fact, no one knew how many unidentified 
events there would be. In these terms, the Western demand that the 
Conference consider the new data and agree that the quota of on-site 
inspections should be scientifically determined were really demands 
to get pegs on which to base claims for a larger number of inspec-
tions. The United States position also reflected the Atomic Energy 
Commission's insistence that this was a "technical" matter on which 
its views should have precedence. In somewhat different terms, the 
question of the number of on-site inspections again raised the 
44New York Times, July 9, 1959, p. 3. 
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troublesome problem of the threshold. What risk could and should 
the United States take? 
The debate on these matters continued throughout this phase 
of the Conference. Perhaps the most lively session occurred on 
July 1, when the American delegation was accompanied by the 
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, John A. McCone, 
and a group of Congressional observers. 45 Both sides were at 
their belligerent best. Exactly what purpose this episode served is 
difficult to fathom. 
The Ending of Soviet Nuclear Assistance to Communist China 
Actually, the most important events for the course of the 
negotiations at this stage occurred elsewhere. Perhaps the most 
important of these was that the USSR appears to have decided to 
discontinue assisting Communist China develop a nuclear capacity. 
The Chinese have charged that on June 20, 1959, "The Soviet 
Government unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology 
for national defense concluded between China and the Soviet Union 
on October 15, 1957, and refused to provide China with a sample 
of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture."46 
If this charge is true, and the USSR has not denied it, such a de-
cision on the part of the Soviet Union had important implications 
for the prospects of a test ban. Like the United States, the Soviet 
Union apparently found it impossible to engage in a complete 
transfer of nuclear weapons to other states. One can only speculate 
about the reasons for this, but it seems plausible to assume that 
the USSR wanted to avoid creation of situations which might 
allow it to become involved in nuclear war by the actions· of an 
ally. No doubt the USSR was also concerned about its present and 
potential relationship with the ally in question. China's acquisition 
of a nuclear capability would strengthen that state in relation to the 
USSR. If these were the Soviet concerns, at this point a test ban 
may well have assumed greater importance for the USSR. 
45GEN/DNT/PV. 106. 
46"Statement of the Chinese Government, July 31, 1963," len-min 
Jih-pao, July 31, 1963, as quoted in Alice Langley Hsieh, "The Sino-Soviet 
Nuclear Dialogue: 1963," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. VIII, No. 2 
(June 1964), pp. 99-115, at 111. 
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The American Decision to Continue the Moratorium 
At that time, however, the West was ignorant of these develop-
ments. For the United States, the most crucial decision that had to 
be taken during this period was whether or not, in the light of the 
impasse in the negotiations, the one-year moratorium on testing of 
nuclear weapons offered by President Eisenhower in his initial 
proposal for the Conference should be continued. Although this was 
related to the question of whether or not the negotiations should be 
continued, the two issues were considered to be separable. That the 
issue of the moratorium had to be decided shows the limited signifi-
cance of President Eisenhower's statement, made in November 1958 
when he revealed that the Soviet Union had continued to test after 
the opening of the diplomatic conference, that the United States 
would no longer consider itself bound by its pledge to forego testing. 
Even though there was a specific point at which a decision in 
this matter supposedly was made, like so many important decisions 
in the course of these negotiations-and perhaps generally-by that 
time prior decisions and other events almost forced the choice. Al-
ternatives were first narrowed in the discussions and decisions re-
lating to the Federal Budget for fiscal year 1960. As has already 
been mentioned, the Administration decided not to ask for funds 
for the testing of nuclear weapons during that period. Chairman 
McCone and General Starbird of the Atomic Energy Commission 
explained the nature and ramifications of the decisions within the 
Administration-which Congress in due course confirmed-in testi-
mony before the House Committee on Appropriations on June 23, 
1959. They stated that the Administration had decided to request 
only sufficient funds to maintain the test sites on a standby basis 
"except for limited tunnel construction at the Nevada test site to 
provide an underground test readiness capability should weapons 
tests be resumed. "47 In the Pacific Test area, the AEC envisaged 
employing fewer people and spending less money than was normally 
spent in periods between test series; the objective was only to retard 
and prevent the inevitable deterioration resulting from the climate. 
The work on the tunnels in Nevada was in part designed to obtain 
47U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Appropriations Commit-
tee, Hearings: Atomic Energy Commission Appropriations for 1960, 86th 
Congress, 1st Session (1959), p. 72. 
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information from past tests. In addition, the program was designed 
to give decision-makers some flexibility. If no construction were 
undertaken, it would take nearly a year from the time that a decision 
was taken to resume testing until it could be executed. 48 As it was, 
because of the extensive nature of the 1958 test series and the 
budgetary decisions for fiscal 1960, the United States probably could 
not have resumed testing nuclear weapons on a significant and 
meaningful scale in 1959, and probably not even in the first half 
of 1960. 
A second factor narrowing the range of alternatives was that 
in the summer of 1959 a new round of East-West negotiations 
came into prospect. The Foreign Ministers of France, the USSR, 
the United Kingdom and the United States resumed their negotia-
tions in Geneva on July 13 and continued in session until August 
5. Among other things they agreed that a Ten-Nation Disarmament 
Committee should be established outside the framework of the 
United Nations and on the basis of parity between East and West. 
Thus, they finally conceded what the Soviet Union had demanded at 
the twelfth session of the General Assembly in 1957. They agreed 
that the Committee should meet sometime in 1960 and that it should 
report to the UN Disarmament Commission. In anticipation of this 
development, the Administration established a committee under the 
chairmanship of Charles A. Coolidge, a Boston attorney and a 
former Assistant Secretary of Defense, to reexamine and reevaluate 
the American position with respect to disarmament. The Adminis-
tration again chose to rely on an "outsider" and a generalist for 
a reexamination and reformulation of its basic disarmament position. 
A related development was that in mid-July, President Eisenhower 
decided that he would invite Chairman Khrushchev to visit the 
United States and that he would agree to return the visit. Khrush-
chev's trip was scheduled to coincide with the opening of the 
fourteenth General Assembly of the United Nations in September. 
Prior to his trip, Khrushchev made two important pronounce-
ments with respect to the test ban negotiations. On August 11 he 
stated that the USSR would accept a pledge not to be the first 
nation to resume testing nuclear weapons. 49 At about the same time, 
4BSee ibid., p. 168. 
49New York Times, August 11, 1959, p. 1. 
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an article was submitted under his name for publication in Foreign 
Affairs. Although it was not published until early September, de-
cision-makers were aware of its contents somewhat earlier. In 
the article he stated that the progress in the test ban negotiations 
justified "the hope that an agreement on the discontinuation of 
nuclear weapon tests will shortly be reached. "50 He went on to state 
that such an agreement "would be an important step on the way 
to the solution of the disarmament problem and the banning of 
nuclear weapons in general." Among other things, the statement 
revealed the verbal constancy of the Soviet objective of eliminating 
nuclear weapons. 
Thus when the Committee of Principals discussed whether or 
not to continue the moratorium there was really little choice. The 
United States was not in a position to inaugurate a significant test 
series. To end the moratorium might jeopardize the test ban talks 
and might also foreclose the possibility of fruitful negotiations on 
broader issues. In any case, the United States would be subjected 
to criticism on these grounds, and since the General Assembly was 
about to open, critics would have ample access to a worldwide 
forum. In the light of Chairman Khrushchev's pronouncement about 
the Soviet position, the United States could be particularly vulner-
able. 
The advice of the Committee of Principals and the decision 
of the President was first that the United States should ask for a 
six-week recess in the Geneva negotiations which would coincide 
with Chairman Khrushchev's visit to the United States and the 
opening of the General Assembly, and secondly that the United 
States should continue its unilateral suspension of nuclear weapons 
tests through the current calendar year. The latter aspect of this 
decision was made public in a statement released by the Department 
of State on August 26, the day the Conference recessed. 51 
The United Kingdom took a somewhat different line. On 
August 27 the Foreign Office announced that the United Kingdom 
would not resume nuclear weapons tests as long as "useful dis-
cussions" were under way looking toward an agreement. 
50"0n Peaceful Coexistence," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1 
(October 1959), pp. 1-18, at 10. 
51Geneva Conference, p. 375. 
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The following day the Soviet Government released its state-
ment on the matter. The statement was in accord with Chairman 
Khrushchev's earlier pronouncement. It stated that the Council of 
Ministers had resolved: 
Not to resume nuclear tests in the Soviet Union if the 
Western Powers do not resume testing of atomic and hy-
drogen weapons. Only in the case of resumption by them 
of nuclear weapons tests will the Soviet Union be free 
from this pledge. 52 
If all three governments acted according to their pledges, the mora-
torium would continue through 1959, and in view of the Soviet 
and British positions, there would be strong pressure to continue it 
even longer. At this point, the Soviet Union had in reality what it 
had always asked for, an unpoliced test ban. 
On the East River and at Camp David 
Actually, because of the British election, the Geneva Con-
ference did not resume until October 27. Meanwhile, the question 
of a test ban was considered and debated in other forums, both as 
a separate issue and in the context of broader measures of disarma-
ment. In particular, the matter was discussed in private meetings 
between President Eisenhower and Chairman Khrushchev and their 
advisers at Camp David and in public on the bank of the East 
River in the General Assembly of the United Nations. On the 
surface, none of the discussions appeared to advance the negotia-
tions. 
Chairman Khrushchev stole the headlines on September 19 
when, during the course of his appearance before the United Na-
tions, he offered a proposal for General and Complete Disarma-
ment."53 By the terms of this proposal all states "should divest them-
selves of the means of waging war" within a period of four years; 
they would be permitted to retain only those forces required for in-
ternal security. If the Western powers were not prepared to accept 
this, Khrushchev offered an alternative proposal for partial measures 
52Jbid., p. 377. 
53UN General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Official Records (14th 
Session), pp. 31-38. See also UN Document A/4219. 
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of disarmament. Interestingly, a test ban was not included in either 
suggestion. However, during the course of his address, he stated 
that the question of a test ban was "acute and eminently ripe for solu-
tion," and asserted that negotiations on broader measures of disarma-
ment should not delay progress on this matter. He also repeated the 
pledge that the USSR would not "resume nuclear explosions in its 
country if the Western Powers do not resume the testing of atomic 
and hydrogen weapons." 
Actually, British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd had outlined 
a comprehensive plan for disarmament the previous day, but be-
cause it was phrased in less dramatic terms, it received much less 
public attention. 54 His was a gradual scheme, which included a 
test ban as an integral first step. 
The General Assembly did not begin to consider either pro-
posal in detail or other matters relating to disarmament until 
October 9. In the interim, Chairman Khrushchev and President 
Eisenhower held their tete a tete at Camp David. The two leaders 
discussed the test ban talks fleetingly and Secretary of State Herter 
and Foreign Minister Gromyko also considered the matter. 55 Ap-
parently all that happened was that both sides expounded their 
positions. In retrospect, however, it appears that the Soviet leader-
ship became convinced of the American determination that the new 
seismic data would have to be considered before the United States 
would agree to a comprehensive test ban. 
Back in the General Assembly both the Soviet and British 
disarmament schemes were mooted, and eventually a resolution was 
unanimously adopted which referred both, as well as other sugges-
tions, to the new Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee.56 
In addition, the Assembly discussed the questions of banning 
nuclear tests and preventing the dispersion of nuclear weapons both 
in general terms and specifically with respect to the proposed French 
tests in the Sahara. In contrast to the previous session, neither the 
USSR nor the United States submitted draft resolutions. The pre-
54UN General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Official Records, (14th 
Session), pp. 21-26. See also UN Document A/C. 1/820. 
55See Secretary of State Herter's comment at his news conference of 
October 6, 1959: U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLI, No. 1061 
(October 26, 1959), p. 578. 
56UN General .Assembly Resolution 1378 (XIV). 
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vious year each protagonist had submitted draft resolutions with the 
obvious motivation of gaining support for their respective positions 
and strengthening their hands at the negotiating table. Now, however, 
the two superpowers seemed content to leave the matter for private 
talks, and it was the smaller powers who were attempting to use 
the Assembly. They felt strongly about the general issue and were 
particularly concerned about the proposed French nuclear tests. 
The strength of their sentiment can be explained in various terms. 
For one thing, nuclear weapons were glaring evidence of the dis-
parity between their power and that of the superpowers. Th~s the 
issue became mixed with the traditional small state-large state con-
troversy. For another, they regarded testing, with the resultant con-
tamination of the atmosphere all over the world, as a flagrant viola-
tion of their moral and legal rights. Their ire at the French plans 
stemmed from general concern about the "nth country" problem, 
and also from specific concern about the implications of the dis-
persion of nuclear weapons for their own relative strength and 
future plans. In addition, the fact that the French planned to test 
nuclear weapons in a colonial territory which was in the midst of an 
active revolt joined the issue with anticolonial sentiments and the 
anticolonial movement. 
In August, India had requested that the issue of the suspension 
of nuclear and thermonuclear tests be included in the agenda, and 
after the Assembly opened it submitted a draft resolution. Sub-
sequently, twenty-three other states, all of which except Cuba and 
Yugoslavia were from Africa and Asia, joined in sponsoring a 
version of India's proposal. Austria, Japan, and Sweden also sub-
mitted a draft resolution. Both resolutions expressed the hope that 
the states participating in the Geneva Conference would soon reach 
an agreement and that they would continue the present voluntary 
moratorium. 57 In addition, the twenty-four power resolution ap-
pealed to other states to desist from testing. In explaining the United 
States position, Ambassador Lodge asserted that the American ob-
jective was "the ending of nuclear weapons tests under an agree-
ment providing effective international control," and he argued that 
57See UN General Assembly Resolutions 1402 A (XIV) and 1402 B 
(XIV). 
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"an indefinite continuation of a voluntary uncontrolled suspension 
of tests would not contribute to that objective."58 
Both resolutions were enthusiastically supported by the Soviet 
bloc. The United States and the United Kingdom voted for the 
resolution which had been submitted by Austria, Japan, and Sweden, 
which was adopted by a vote of 76 to 0, with 2 abstentions, but 
abstained on the twenty-four-power resolution, which was adopted 
by a vote of 60 to 1, with 20 abstentions. The representatives of 
the United States and the United Kingdom never explained specifi-
cally why they took different action in the two instances, but clearly 
the position of France and the way that state was affected was a 
factor. 
France abstained from voting on the three-power resolution 
and opposed the twenty-four-power draft. Its opposition was even 
more pronounced in the case of those resolutions which dealt with 
the dispersion of nuclear weapons. One, submitted by Ireland, 
asked the newly created Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee to 
examine the feasibility of an international agreement including 
appropriate inspection and control provisions which would provide 
that the nuclear powers would refrain from giving control of nuclear 
weapons to non-nuclear powers, and tltat the latter would refrain 
from manufacturing nuclear weapons. 59 In other words, what was 
envisaged was a freezing of the nuclear club. The resolution prob-
ably did not contravene the NATO stockpile concept then in effect. 
It was adopted by a vote of 70 to 0, with 12 abstentions. The 
Soviet block, Peru, the Republic of China, and France abstained. 
Interestingly, all those states which abstained argued, basically, that 
the resolution was not sufficiently comprehensive, that this prob-
lem could only be h:mdled in the context of other measures of 
arms control. The Soviet Union argued that the resolution was 
meaningless as long as states could station nuclear weapons outside 
of their territory, an obvious reference to United States policy in 
NATO and elsewhere.6° France argued that it would only be just to 
5BUN General Assembly, First Committee, Official Records (14th 
Session), p. 178. 
59UN General Assembly Resolution 1380 (XIV). 
60UN General Assembly, First Committee, Official Records (14th 
Session), pp. 161-62. 
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take action against the dispersion of nuclear weapons in the context 
of broader measures leading to nuclear disarmament. 61 Their posi-
tions had interesting implications for the Geneva Conference, since 
easing the "nth country" problem was one of the putative ad-
vantages of the test ban. 
The other resolutions considered by the Assembly on the sub-
ject of the dispersion of nuclear weapons dealt with France di-
rectly. In August, Morocco had asked that the question of the 
proposed French tests in the Sahara be inscribed on the agenda, 
and the day that the debate on this item opened twenty-two African 
and Asian states submitted a draft resolution specifically asking 
France to refrain from conducting its planned tests. 62 During the 
course of the debate Italy and the United Kingdom submitted a 
substitute resolution, which merely would have requested France to 
take account of the views expressed in the debate and expressed 
the hope that France would associate itself with whatever arrange-
ments were worked out in Geneva for the discontinuance of nuclear 
weapons tests.63 Although the Western powers generally supported 
this resolution, the Mrican and Asian group and the Soviet bloc 
did not, and it was rejected in the First Committee by a vote of 24 
to 38 with 20 abstentions. Both the First Committee and the As-
sembly adopted a slightly modified version of the twenty-two-power 
draft. In the plenary session the vote was 51 to 16 with 15 absten-
tions. The United Kingdom and the United States both voted 
against the resolution, as did France. 
During the course of the debate Ambassador Lodge emphasized 
that the United States "had no technical information about the 
French experiment."64 The French delegate, Jules Mach, stated in 
extremely clear terms that France would abandon its planned tests 
only if the three original nuclear powers "agreed to halt, under 
international control, the production of fissionable materials for 
military purposes, to begin the reconversion of their stockpiles and 
6lUN General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Official Records (14th 
Session), pp. 581-82. 
62UN Document A/C. 1/L. 238 and Add. 1 and Rev. 1. 
63UN Document A/C. 1/L. 239 and Add. 1. 
64UN General Assembly, First Committee, Official Records (14th 
Session), p. 110. 
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to do away with nuclear weapons carriers-in short, to give up 
their de facto monopoly."65 
In the same debate, the Soviet delegate asserted that "the 
French nuclear test would not contribute to the success of the 
Geneva talks. "66 This statement was made immediately after he had 
repeated Khrushchev's pledge that: 
Only in the event of the resumption of nuclear weapons 
tests by the Western Powers, would the USSR be released 
from the obligation which it had taken upon itself. 
The point that he did not clarify was whether or not the USSR 
would regard nuclear tests by France as the resumption of tests by 
the Western Powers. The debate indicated clearly how difficult the 
"nth country" problem would be, and the serious implications that 
the problem had for the test ban negotiations. 
Presidential Politics 
At the same time that these events were occurring, the entire 
test ban issue was becoming involved in the political maneuverings 
associated with the forthcoming Presidential election in the United 
States. On October 25, in a radio interview, Governor Nelson A. 
Rockefeller, a prominent aspirant for the Republican nomination, 
stated that he felt that the United States should resume testing 
nuclear weapons underground. 67 Five days later, Senator Hubert 
H. Humphrey, a Democratic hopeful, in a speech in Pontiac, Michi-
gan, announced his position on the issue. 68 He favored extending 
the moratorium for one year. He advocated trying to negotiate a 
controlled agreement banning nuclear weapon tests in the at-
mosphere, at high altitudes, and underwater, and tests of weapons 
of five kilotons yield or more underground. He also proposed that 
a two-year moratorium should be established on tests of weapons 
of lesser yields. This period would be used to test Soviet good 
faith on inspection and for research to improve detection capabili-
ties relating to low yield underground explosions. 
65Jbid., p. 93. 
66[ bid., p. 113. 
67New York Times, October 26, 1959, p. 1. 
68Jbid., October 31, 1959, p. 3. 
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III 
Technical Working Group II 
The Resumption of the Geneva Conference: Another Mission for 
the Scientists 
The Geneva Conference resumed on October 27. For a week 
there was no change in the position of either side. The United 
States continued to insist that the new seismic data had to be con-
sidered, and the USSR, with equal adamancy, continued to refuse. 
Tones were moderate, but that was the only evidence of the spirit 
of Camp David. On November 2, Ambassador Wadsworth indi-
cated that, if there were no change in the Soviet position, the 
United States would begin a unilateral presentation of the technical 
situation, as Americans understood it. 69 
Mr. Tsarapkin-at least for the record-interpreted this as a 
threat to deadlock and possibly terminate the conference. Never-
theless (or perhaps, as a result), the following day, he proposed that 
the conference convene a technical working group to draft agreed 
criteria for the dispatch of on-site inspection terms and allowed 
that the "new seismic data" could be examined and considered 
within this context. 70 In making his proposal he pointed out that 
the Foreign Ministers had agreed some time ago that the question 
of criteria would have to be considered. He also proclaimed that 
the USSR could not agree to any revision of the Geneva Experts' 
report, which it viewed as the "agreed scientific and technical basis 
for drafting the treaty."71 Finally, he questioned what the objec-
tives of the Western powers were, if, as they claimed, they did not 
seek to increase the number of control posts or inspections. 
Although the shift in the Soviet position, publicly announced 
as a concession to the spirit of Camp David, meant that the 
deadlock was broken, three weeks elapsed before the Conference 
could agree on terms of reference for Technical Working Group II 
(TWG II). Agreement was finally achieved on November 24, the 
day that most of the experts arrived in Geneva, and the day before 
they formally began their work. The central controversies 'con-
cerned the status of the report of the Conference of Experts and 
69GEN/DNT/PV. 131, passim. 
70GEN/DNT/PV. 132, pp. 16-18. 
11Jbid., p. 13. 
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the freedom to be given the scientists in considering the new seismic 
data. Although the compromise formulation did not mention the 
new seismic data, the United States felt that it was worded so that 
they could be considered. 72 
The Technical Working Group of Experts shall consider 
the question of the use of objective instrument readings 
in connexion with the selection of an event which cannot 
be identified by the international control organ and which 
could be suspected of being a nuclear explosion, in order 
to determine a basis for initiating on-site inspections. As 
part of their work, the experts, proceeding from the dis-
cussions and the conclusions of the Geneva Conference of 
Experts, shall consider all data and studies relevant to 
the detection and identification of seismic events and shall 
consider possible improvements of the techniques and in-
strumentation. 73 
In addition, at Soviet insistence, the terms of reference included 
the requirement that the Group should report to the Conference by 
December 11; that is, in about two and a half weeks. 
The note of optimism generated by this agreement was fur-
thered by an event which occurred at about the same time outside 
of the framework of the Geneva Conference. After many years of 
disputation, on December 1, 1959, twelve states including France, 
the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States, after a brief 
negotiation of less than seven weeks, signed the Antarctica Treaty.74 
Among other things, the Treaty provided for the demilitarization 
of Antarctica, with full unilateral rights of inspection, and for a 
ban on nuclear explosions and the dumping of radioactive wastes 
there. During this same period the United States and the USSR 
also reached agreement on the composition of the United Nations 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Previously, the 
Soviet bloc had boycotted the Committee because of disagreement 
on this issue. Observers began to proclaim that perhaps the meet-
ing a deux between Chairman Khrushchev and President Eisen-
72See GEN/DNT/PV. 137, p. 14. 
73GEN/DNT/PV. 137, p. 14. 
74For a brief account of the negotiations and the issues involved see 
Howard J. Taubenfeld, "A Treaty for Antarctica," International Concilia-
tion, Vol. 531 (January 1961), pp. 245-322. 
212 DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS 
bower had significantly altered the climate and atmosphere of in-
ternational politics. 
TWG II: Differences of Motivation and Expectation 
Even within the Geneva negotiations significant progress was 
made. On November 30 the three powers reached agreement on 
Annex III to the draft treaty, setting forth the functions of the 
Preparatory Commission, and on December 14 the Soviet Union 
tabled a major compromise package proposal concerning a number 
of unresolved issues relating to the Control Organization. 
Whether or not the Western participants in Technical Work-
ing Group II were optimistic concerning their tasks, though, was 
another matter. In fact, it is far from certain that they, or the 
Western politicians and diplomats to whom they were responsible, 
had a very clear concept of what the optimum or even expected 
outcome of this meeting would be. No one seriously expected the 
Soviet Union to accept the new Western assessment of the capa-
bilities of the control system proposed by the Conference of Ex-
perts. Yet the basic instruction given to the American delegation, 
which was headed by James B. Fisk and included a number of 
other scientists who had previously been involved in one way or 
another in the negotiations, 75 was to attempt to straighten out the 
technical situation. 
In a press conference on November 12, Secretary of State 
Herter said that the United States sought the meeting "so that from 
the scientific point of view we would have a common understanding 
75The United States delegation consisted of: James B. Fisk, chairman, 
Executive Vice President, Bell Telephone Laboratories; Hans A. Bethe, Pro-
fessor, Cornell University; Harold Brown, Associate Director, Livermore 
Laboratory; Richard Foose, Stanford Research Institute; Richard L. Garwin, 
International Business Machines Corporation; Spurgeon Keeny, Jr., Tech-
nical Assistant, Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science 
and Technology; Albert Latter, Physics Division, RAND Corporation, Santa 
Monica, California; J. Carson Mark, Director, Theoretical Division, Los 
Alamos Scientific Laboratory; Jack E. Oliver, Lamont Geological Observa-
tory; Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, Director, High Energy Physics Laboratory, 
Stanford University; Frank Press, Director, Seismological Laboratory, Cali-
fornia Institute of Technology; Carl F. Romney, Assistant Technical Director, 
Office of Atomic Energy, Department of Defense; John Tukey, Princeton 
University; Anthony L. Turkevich, Enrico Fermi Institute for Nuclear 
Studies, University of Chicago. 
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as to what existing instruments were capable of doing from the 
point of view of detecting. "76 Twelve days later, in another press 
conference, he described the purpose of the technical working group 
as being to examine all available data and "to determine whether 
or not existing technological instrumentation is adequate to detect 
all types of underground tests or only some underground tests, 
and what kind, and what improvements are likely to be made in 
the instrumentation itself."77 He allowed that the scientists might 
not agree and even envisaged the possibility of separate reports. 
Secretary Herter then went on to say that it would be difficult for 
the United States to agree to a comprehensive test ban "if our 
scientists, in their objective judgment, felt that the instrumentation 
that might be available was not good enough to be an effective de-
terrent from the point of view of inspection."78 His comments 
indicate the range of expectations which was possible for one 
individual. Given the different perspectives of other individuals, 
one can easily see the melange of views which was involved in 
any discussion of this issue by the Committee of Principals. 
In a sense, the American insistence on holding Technical 
Working Group II was a product of the divergence of opinion 
within the United States government and of the inability of the 
government to reach a decision on the basic political issues of what 
risks it would be willing to accept. Those who questioned the wis-
dom of attempting to negotiate a comprehensive test ban could see 
the working group as an opportunity to embarrass the Soviet 
Union; the disagreement which they expected to result would serve 
as a justification for shifting to an attempt to negotiate a partial 
test ban or even as a rationale for breaking off the negotiations. 
On the other hand, the proponents of a comprehensive test ban 
could see the technical working group as a device for keeping the 
negotiations going and could hope that some solutions to the tech-
nical problems would emerge, either from the meeting with the 
Eastern scientists or from time and research. Somewhat later, in 
describing his expectations before the Subcommittee on Disarma-
ment, Philip J. Farley of the Department of State said: "It was, 
76U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLI, No. 1066 (November 
30, 1959), p. 785. 
77Jbid., Vol. XLI, No. 1068 (December 14, 1959), p. 863. 
78Jbid., p. 865. 
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of course, our hope that the facts would be looked at there, that 
answers would be found that would provide a technical basis for 
concluding a comprehensive agreement."79 For both groups and for 
those who were not strongly identified with either, the technical 
working group could serve as an excuse for avoiding decisions on 
the basic issue concerning the degree of risk that the United States 
could tolerate. 
The Soviet Union viewed its agreement to hold Technical Work-
ing Group II as a fundamental concession to the West. Thus the 
Soviet scientists, who were again headed by Dr. Fedorov,80 ap-
parently had no firm instructions in a positive sense as to what 
should emerge from the discussions. They did, however, as will 
become apparent, have firm instructions as to what should not 
emerge. In essence, they could not agree to any joint report which 
would make the problem of detecting and identifying nuclear ex-
plosions appear to be more difficult than it had seemed at the time 
of the Conference of Experts in 1958. 
As in the case of the previous technical negotiations, there 
was no special preparation for the American delegation. The Chair-
man was briefed by the Secretary of State, but the other scientists 
went directly to Geneva. Their technical preparation consisted of 
the knowledge which they had as a result of their individual work 
and their past experience in matters relating to the negotiations. 
The Vela Project was just getting underway, and so far as the data 
gained from Hardtack II was concerned, there had been little 
further analysis of it during 1959, after the preparation of the 
document which the United States submitted to the Conference on 
January 5.81 
Again, following the pattern of other sessions, Technical Work-
ing Group II opened with a disagreement about the agenda. The 
70U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommit-
tee on Disarmament, Hearing: Technical Problems and the Geneva Test Ban 
Negotiations, 86th Congress, 2d Session (1960), p. 19. 
BOThe other Soviet scientists were K. Y. Gubkin, V. I. Keilis-Borok, 
D. R. Pashchnik, Y. V. Riznichenko, M. A. Sadovsky, V. Shustov, and A. I. 
Ustyumenko. 
StSee the testimony of Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky before the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy: Hearings: Technical Aspects ... of a Nuclear 
Weapons Test Ban, supra note 26, p. 69. 
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controversy really derived from the ambiguity of the terms of 
reference. The central issue, although it was not stated this baldly 
at that time, was whether or not TWG II should reevaluate the 
capability of the control system recommended by the Conference 
of Experts. In the Western view this was the essential function of 
the discussions. On the other hand, this was one of the things to 
which the Soviet scientists could not agree. Although a compromise 
formulation for the agenda was achieved in an informal meeting, 
it essentially glossed over the problem, and this fundamental dis-
agreement continued to plague the discussions.82 
Where Science Ends and Politics Begin 
Although the basic reason for the Soviet refusal to agree to a 
reevaluation of the Experts' control system was to avoid undercut-
ting the USSR's negotiating posture, the Soviet scientists adduced 
technical and philosophical reasons to support their position. Dr. 
Fedorov argued that even with the data gained from the Hardtack 
II experiments, because the data were still extremely limited, any 
estimate of the capability of the control system would be, as it had 
been in 1958, conjectural in nature; th:Jt the capability could only 
be properly assessed when the control system was in operation. 83 
He also, as will be shown, attacked the validity of the new data. 
The Western position, on the other hand, was that the assessment 
had to be as up-to-date as possible. This position was advanced as 
having no political motivation; as being simply a demand that the 
Working Group should provide the gowrnments concerned with, as 
Dr. Fisk put it, "a sound basis for taking the decision which they 
must take."84 In the discussions, Dr. Fisk repeatedly asserted, at 
times almost plaintively: 
S2See the agenda GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 2, p. 3. For the different 
way in which this agenda was interpreted by the two sides see: GEN/DNT/-
TWG. 2/PV. 8, p. 37; GEN/DNT/PV. 11, p, 77; GEN/DNT/PV. 13, pp. 
58-60; GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 16, pp. 93-95. Panofsky commented on 
this problem in his testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 
Hearings: Technical Aspects ... of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban, supra 
note 26, p. 64. 
S3He made this point in several of the exchanges cited above. See also 
GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 10, p. 42, and GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 18, p. 31. 
84GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 13, pp. 58-60. 
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I assure Mr. Fedorov once again that our sole purpose in 
these meetings is to set the scientific and technical facts 
straight. . . . Our motives are purely technical, and the 
spirit of our proposals is scientific. 85 
But regardless of how the Western scientists perceived their moti-
vations, their position had fundamental political ramifications. This 
was particularly true in that the majority among them at that time 
thought that the decoupling theory involved a much more serious 
degradation of the control system recommended by the Conference 
of Experts than the new seismic data and a degradation for which 
they could see no effective remedy. The implications of this were 
ominous when coupled with such statements as that made by Sec-
retary of State Herter at his press conference the day before the 
Working Group began its sessions. Both in the discussions in the 
Working Group and in the Conference, Soviet delegates alleged 
that the West was motivated by a desire to prove that a compre-
hensive test ban could not be adequately monitored. 86 The fact 
that after the discussions were over the United States sent the 
USSR part of the terms of reference of the American delegation to 
TWG II may or may not have convinced Soviet leaders that this 
was not the American goal. 
From their actions, it is easy to infer that the Soviet delega-
tion had political instructions and guidance. They apparently could 
not agree to: anything that would indicate that the control system 
recommended by the Conference of Experts was less effective than 
the original estimate; anything that would imply that control over a 
comprehensive test ban would be impossible; or anything that 
would imply that there should be a greater number of control posts 
or on-site inspections in the USSR than originally had been thought 
necessary. 
While the United States scientists did not have political in-
structions in the same sense, there were clearly political limits on 
their actions, although these may well have been self-imposed.87 
85GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 12, pp. 36, 37-40. 
86See for example, Fedorov's statement in the Working Group and 
Tsarapkin's statement later in the Conference: GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 
19, p. 92, and GEN/DNT/PV. 148, p. 7. 
87Gilpin puts it even more bluntly, "Uttle did the American scientists 
realize, however, that the Russian scientists were actually no more political 
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The American scientists were clearly aware of how important the 
concept and issue of control over arms control agreements were to 
the United States. As a group, they were also much more aware 
of the legal and political ramifications of any document that might 
emerge from their discussions than the American delegation to the 
Conference of Experts had been. The American scientists also now 
had a conception of Soviet behavior which led them to believe that 
in formulating any joint document everything should be developed 
in as much detail as possible. They felt that if it were not, there 
would be disputes subsequently and, moreover, once an agreement 
was signed, nothing new could be added. As a consequence of 
these factors, in evaluating and analyzing data, the American sci-
entists felt that they had to be, as Dr. Fisk told the Conference, 
"as careful and as conservative as we could. "88 
At times, as a result of these factors the American posture 
became almost grotesque. For example, in a discussion of instru-
mentation Hans Bethe made this statement: 
We believe that the experts in 1958 knew quite well about 
instruments, but we believe that we now know even bet-
ter about them. We do not believe that the experts of the 
control commission will know any better than we know.89 
To argue in abutting sentences that knowledge had changed, but 
would not change again, posed certain logical complications, at the 
least. 
On the other hand, because of the political position of their 
state, the Soviet scientists had to be as optimistic as they could. 
Dr. Fedorov typified their attitude at one of the final meetings, 
during a discussion of formulating criteria for the initiation of on-
site inspections, when he asked, "What kind of scientists are we if 
we cannot find a solution for such a problem?"90 
There was also another difference between the nature of the 
than they." (American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, p. 243). Al-
though this may be true in terms of the end effect of the action of each 
group, there were important differences in method and style, which should 
not be ignored. 
SSGEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 20, p. 4. 
89QEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 12, p. 16. 
90QEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 19, p. 91. 
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participation of the American and Soviet scientists in the Tech-
nical Working Group. The United States delegation presented by far 
the bulk of the empirical data which was considered. The Soviet 
contribution was principally in the nature of critical analysis. 91 
There is no way of knowing how open either side was in terms of 
presenting data, or whether or not all of the available data were 
put before the Group. During the course of the discussions the 
United States did submit a vast quantity of data, and the USSR 
did make available seismograms with signals recorded during the 
Hardtack series. Dr. Fedorov stated that the USSR had not carried 
out any underground nuclear explosions and thus could not supply 
data beyond that which it had gathered on American tests. 92 
In terms of formal participation, the British scientists, who 
were again headed by Sir William Penney,93 played only a nominal 
role. Because of their limited experience, they could not add much 
empirical data. At that time the United Kingdom had not detonated 
a nuclear device underground. On the few occasions on which he 
spoke, Sir William Penney emphasized the importance of a test ban 
and, consequently, of attempting to reach agreement within the 
Working Group. This reflected both his personal preferences and 
the official attitude of the United Kingdom. 
On the Hardtack II Data: An Uncomfortable Uncertainty 
Carl Romney, a seismologist with the United States Air Force, 
made the first technical presentation in Working Group 11.94 In it, 
he expounded the American analysis of the Hardtack II data. Al-
though he presented more technical details, his basic conclusions 
were identical with those contained in the January 5 Working 
Paper; that is, that the magnitude of Rainier had been estimated in-
correctly and consequently that there were many more earthquakes 
of equivalent size, and that first motion was more difficult to detect 
than it had previously been thought. The decoupling theory was 
91See Panofsky's comment, Hearing: Technical Problems and the 
Geneva Test Ban Negotiations, supra note 79, pp. 35-36. 
92GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 3, pp. 103-5. 
93The other British delegates were H. R. Hulme, I. Maddock, F. Panton, 
and J. W. Wright. 
94GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 1., pp. 22-56. 
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not presented until a week later, at the seventh meeting of the 
Working Group.95 
The immediate Soviet response to both presentations was of 
a legalistic character. With respect to the Hardtack II data, the 
Soviet scientists argued that since the instrumentation used was not 
identical with that which had been recommended in the report of 
the Conference of Experts, no implications could be drawn for the 
recommended control system. With respect to the decoupling theory, 
Dr. Fedorov questioned whether it could be considered under any 
item of the agenda. 96 After Hans Bethe and Albert Latter had 
presented the theory, he caustically commented that: 
... the contribution to our work which Dr. Latter tried 
to make in his report is quite similar to the contribution 
that he made previously to this problem; I mean the book 
that he published on the subject along with Dr. Teller.97 
Later in the conference, he would mention the book, Our Nuclear 
Future, in even more bitter terms. 
When the Soviet scientists began to comment on the substance 
of the issues, they did so by way of the presentation of formal 
papers which countered and contradicted the American findings. 
The American scientists professed to be puzzled and upset by the 
disagreement. At the tenth meeting Wolfgang Panofsky commented: 
It just should not occur that objective examination and a 
full exchange of seismic data should lead our Soviet col-
leagues to one conclusion while the conclusions of our 
own seismologists are different. 98 
At the following meeting Frank Press repeated the same sentiment 
and then offered the explanation and recommended solution which 
most of the American scientists seemed to favor: 
As scientists we know that given the same basic data we 
should be able to arrive at similar conclusions, and yet 
911GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 7, pp. 58-110. 
96[bid., pp. 55-56. 
97[bid., p. 111. 
98QEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 10, p. 4. 
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we have not been able to. This can only be because the 
communication and interchange between us has been im-
perfect. The only way to make progress, to resolve these 
differences, is to improve the communication, to study the 
data jointly step by step. 99 
The solution, the American scientists thought, would be small in-
formal meetings, and they began arguing for such meetings at an 
early stage in the conference. The Soviet scientists, however, did 
not agree to this procedure until the final week of the meetings. 
Even after the informal sessions, several fundamental disagree-
ments remained, although some differences were eliminated and 
others narrowed. With respect to the Hardtack II data, the Soviet 
scientists tended to concentrate their attention and criticisms on 
the problem of measuring seismic magnitude. They made a number 
of what can be termed procedural criticisms. They were critical of 
the fact that less than thirty of the seismological stations in the 
United States which had recorded Logan and Blanca had had 
seismographs which were sufficiently calibrated so that magnitude 
could be measured. They also criticized the fact that the American 
scientists gave them one relevant seismogram for study as late as 
December 14, during the sixteenth meeting of the Working Group. 
Their more fundamental substantive criticisms centered on the 
statistical methods used in the computation of seismic magnitudes 
and on the use of magnitude scales. To deal with the issue of 
statistical methods first, the relevant empirical data were widely 
scattered. The question was whether in the computation of aver-
ages all of the figures should be used, as the Americans insisted, 
or whether the extremes and certain other figures should be ex-
cluded as the Russians argued. The second issue involved the 
question of how to relate two different scales of measurement. 
Some American scientists felt that what their Soviet counterparts 
did in this matter was unscientific and dishonest. 1oo 
There is evidence, however, that a number of American sci-
entists felt rather uncomfortable with respect to the whole problem 
of measuring the seismic magnitude of nuclear explosions because 
99GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 11, pp. 87-90. 
lOOSee Romney's comment before the Disarmament Subcommittee, 
Hearing: Technical Problems and the Geneva Test Ban Negotiations, supra 
note 79, p. 38. 
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of the great uncertainties involved. Wolfgang Panofsky put it suc-
cinctly in testimony in April 1960 before the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy when he stated that: 
. . . the matter is greatly beclouded by the inaccuracy of 
our seismic information concerning earthwide occurrence 
of small earthquakes. Specifically, a body of information 
on the frequency of occurrence of small earthquakes 
exists only for California and New Zealand, and going 
from this information to worldwide estimates, and particu-
larly to estimates for the Soviet Union, involves many un-
certainties; these uncertainties are in fact considerably 
larger than change in the situation created by the new 
data of the Hardtack series. This issue is, therefore, not an 
important new consideration, and it now appears that 
probably its importance has been overemphasized in the 
United States.101 
Because of these facts, many of the American scientists participat-
ing in TWG II concluded that the question of the number of on-
site inspections required was essentially a political issue, as the · 
USSR maintained. During the meetings of the Working Group, 
on several occasions Dr. Fisk sought to emphasize that the Ameri-
can delegation did not consider this aspect of the Hardtack II 
data the most important element. 
Nevertheless, the differences between the Soviet scientists and 
the American scientists with respect to the problem of measuring 
seismic magnitude led the former to interpret the Hardtack II 
data as indicating that there would be fewer earthquakes which 
would give signals equivalent to any given size nuclear explosion 
rather than more, as the Americans felt would be the case.102 
Rather than their revised estimate of the seismic magnitude 
of the Rainier shot, the American scientists tended to stress instead 
the fact that the Hardtack II data indicated that because of back-
ground noise it would be much more difficult than had been thought 
to detect the sign of first motion. They now estimated that the 
ratio of signal to noise would have to be greater than had pre-
viously been thought for the compressional first motion to be 
101Hearings: Technical Aspects ... of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban, 
supra note 26, p. 65. 
102See Geneva Conference, pp. 392-93. 
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detected, that is, for it not to appear as a rarefaction. In other 
words, first motion would only be useful for detecting substantially 
higher yields than had been estimated at the Conference of Ex-
perts. Here, the principal Soviet criticism was that the instrumenta-
tion used in the Hardtack II test series was not identical with that 
recommended by the Conference of Experts. The Americans coun-
tered by arguing that, although the Soviet charge was true, valid 
extrapolations could be made. 
In the course of the argument, in the second week of the 
meeting it was discovered that the Russian and English versions 
of the report of the Conference of Experts were different, and that 
the differences would allow different interpretations of what in-
strumental characteristics with respect to magnification and response 
the Experts had recommended. 103 The differing interpretations led 
the scientists from the two sides to feel that the Conference of 
.Experts had recommended instruments which would conform to 
those that they had used in their national stations. This episode 
underscores the importance of proper translation in negotiations. 
The American scientists were nonetheless convinced that their 
interpretation was the correct one; that instruments constructed on 
the basis of their interpretation would be the most efficacious in 
detecting first motion; and that the instruments used during the 
Hardtack II test series fell within the category recommended by 
the Experts. To prove their point, as soon as the difference was 
discovered they designed a seismograph based on the Soviet inter-
pretation of the specifications and had it built. On December 9 
it was installed on a pier at a location in Oklahoma alongside an 
instrument similar to those used in the Hardtack II series. In the 
first eight hours of operation there was a small earthquake, and a 
comparison of the signals received on the two instruments clearly 
indicated that the instrument based on the Soviet interpretation was 
considerably less effective in detecting the sign of the first motion.104 
Despite this evidence, however, the Soviet scientists continued to 
103See Panofsky's comment before the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy: Hearings: Technical Aspects . .. of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban, supra 
note 26, pp. 67-68. The only American scientist fluent in Russian at the 
Conference of Experts, Turkevich, left the meeting before the final texts of 
the report were prepared. 
104See Romney's presentation, GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 17, pp. 91-96. 
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maintain that because the instruments used in the Hardtack II 
series did not conform exactly to those recommended by the Con-
ference of Experts, the data recorded by them were not relevant.105 
On Decoupling: "Deeply Embarrassed" 
Hans Bethe and Albert Latter presented the decoupling theory 
during the second week of the meeting. Later, Professor Bethe 
referred to the task as a "doubtful honor" and said that he felt 
"deeply embarrassed in so doing because it implied that we con-
sidered the Russians capable of cheating on such a massive 
scale."106 His views of the Russian character provide an interesting 
contrast with those expressed by Edward Teller and Albert Latter 
in their book. For a variety of reasons, Professor Bethe was a 
logical person to be involved in the task. He had presented the 
relevant material at the Conference of Experts, and in the course 
of the discussion he had to admit that his original calculations were 
"not correct."107 It was also tactically expedient to have him share 
in the presentation, since he, in contrast to Albert Latter, was 
known as a proponent of a test ban. 
Most American scientists who participated in the Working 
Group agreed with Professor Bethe's comment that "the Russians 
seemed stunned by the theory of the big hole."tos At first they 
attempted to develop counter theoretical arguments, but after various 
formal confrontations and informal meetings, they admitted the 
theoretical validity of Albert Latter's calculations concerning de-
coupling. They maintained, however, that there was no proof that 
the theory would work in practice, and, of course, at that time 
there was very little empirical proof. The British, who had been 
informed of the theory of decoupling in the summer, had con-
ducted a limited series of experiments involving detonating small 
charges of TNT in cavities, and they presented the results of these 
experiments, which tended to confirm the theory, to the Working 
Group.109 The first explosion in Project Cowboy was detonated on 
105See Geneva Conference, pp. 393-94. 
106"The Case for Ending Nuclear Tests," Headline Series, No. 145 
(January-February 1961), p. 17. 
107GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 8, p. 47. 
I08"The Case for Ending Nuclear Tests," supra note 106, p. 17. 
109GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 11, pp. 32-37. 
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December 17, 1959, the day before the Working Group recessed, 
and the project was not discussed during the session. 
The question of the feasibility of constructing cavities of suf-
ficient size to allow the decoupled detonation of fairly large sized 
weapons was not discussed either, although the United States was 
prepared to go into this matter in some detail. In the fall of 1959 
the Atomic Energy Commission had become concerned with this 
issue and had discovered that petroleum companies used large 
underground cavities for storing their materials. In October the 
Philips Petroleum Company had been commissioned to undertake 
certain feasibility studies, and the individual responsible for this 
work was brought to Geneva for the week of December 7. His 
work, however, was confined to assisting Albert Latter and others. 
On the On-Site Inspection: a Quoi Bon? 
During the course of 1959 another element of doubt, in addi-
tion to the implications of the Hardtack II data and the decoupling 
theory, had arisen in the American scientific community. Starting 
in April 1958 scientists at the University of California Radiation 
Laboratory at Livermore had become concerned about the matter 
of on-site inspection, and after preliminary discussions with geolo-
gists and geophysicists, and exploratory studies, the Laboratory let 
a contract to the Stanford Research Institute for the conduct of 
studies of the problem of on-site inspection during the Hardtack II 
test series. These studies indicated that the problem of conducting 
an on-site inspection would be quite difficult, and that the chance 
of actually obtaining radioactive debris and thus identifying a 
clandestine underground explosion would be relatively small. The 
American delegation was given freedom to introduce or to withhold 
this issue. Eventually, the delegation decided to introduce the issue, 
but not to stress it, and perhaps thereby detract from what they 
considered the more important degradations of the control system 
caused by the Hardtack II data and the decoupling theory.11o Dr. 
Fisk mentioned the problem in the plenary session, 111 the reports 
110Earl H. Voss has interpreted this, we think wrongly, as a deliberate 
attempt to gloss over the difficult problem of on-site inspection (Nuclear 
Ambush, p. 347). In his book he virtually accuses American scientists of 
attempting to mislead the American public on the issue of on-site inspections. 
lllGEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 8, pp. 76-77. 
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on the work were introduced as an annex to the records of the 
conference, 112 and the project director from the Stanford Research 
Institute communicated his findings to Dr. Fedorov in a private 
meeting. The only Soviet response was a brief denial of the Ameri-
can analysis and interpretation.113 The issue was not mentioned in 
any of the formal reports of Technical Working Group II. 
On Improving the Control System: What Conclusions from Scientific 
Data? 
Along with their presentation of the Hardtack II data, the de-
coupling theory and the information relating to on-site inspection, 
the American scientists also presented their thoughts concerning 
possible improvements in the control system recommended by the 
Conference of Experts. They concerned both instrumental matters 
and improved diagnostic techniques. Interestingly, one of the more 
significant of these improvements was discovered by Albert Latter 
during the meetings of the Technical Working Group and was im-
mediately presented at the next-to-the-last meeting.114 On these 
matters, there was considerable agreement between the Soviet and 
Western scientists. 
What disagreement there was, concerned what practical con-
clusions to draw from the technical facts. This was illustrated by 
the attempts of Dr. Fedorov at the conclusion of each American 
presentation to elicit a formal proposal or recommendation for the 
use of new instruments or techniques. The American response was 
invariably that the state of knowledge was not sufficient to allow 
definite formulations, but that the presentations indicated lines of 
further inquiry. After one such exchange, Dr. Fedorov exclaimed, 
". . . this is not a congress of seismologists. . . . What we are 
interested in here . . . is how this scientific contribution can be 
used in practice to improve the control system. . . . "115 The Ameri-
can scientists, however, were determined not to become involved 
in the elaboration of any forma] texts which their scientific data 
and understandings could not fully support. 
112GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 9/ Add. 1. 
113GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 11, pp. 51-61. 
114GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 20, pp. 31-36. 
115GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 4, p. 82. 
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Despite this disagreement, the Technical Working Group was 
able to produce an agreed report regarding possible improvements 
of techniques and instrumentation.116 In keeping with their general 
positions, in the preparation of this report the American scientists 
sought to be much more specific than the Soviet scientists. 
On Criteria for On-Site Inspection: Can One Agree Without 
Agreement on Data? 
The .final substantive item on the agenda of Technical Work-
ing Group II was the formulation of objective criteria which could 
serve as a basis for the initiation of on-site inspections. From the 
outset, the American position was that there was no point in at-
tempting to discuss this matter until there was agreement on the 
technical data; for example, on the effectiveness of first motion as 
a diagnostic technique. As it developed, the discussion of criteria 
began without agreement on the technical data. Indeed, there was 
no agreement on the data at the time that the conference adjourned: 
The Soviet scientists led off at the eighth meeting on December 
3 by tabling a draft proposal relating to criteria.117 The Americans 
objected to this proposal, first because they felt that it contained a 
number of judgments which were concerned with matters beyond the 
purview of the technical working group.118 For example, it as-
sumed that there would be a quota of on-site inspections and that 
data from national seismic stations would play an important role. 
Moreover, it also contained stipulations on the circumstances under 
which on-site inspections should be discontinued. Among other 
things, the Soviet draft provided that if the epicenter of an un-
identified event were located in a densely populated area, or if its 
depth of focus were beyond technological possibilities, it would 
be considered to be an earthquake. The American scientists felt 
that both of these involved political, rather than technical, con-
siderations. However, the more important American objections to 
the Soviet criteria were of a technical nature. The American sci-
entists felt that the Soviet criteria would have resulted in clandes-
tine nuclear explosions being categorized as earthquakes: in par-
116Geneva Conference, pp. 386-88. 
117GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 8, pp. 87-92. 
llBSee Fisk's comments: GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 13, p. 22. 
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ticular, they argued that the Blanca and Logan experiments would 
have been so classified.119 
The American proposal on criteria was introduced on Decem-
ber 11.120 Soviet objections to this proposal were equally as strong 
as the American objections to the Soviet draft. Dr. Fedorov com-
mented that the criteria proposed by the United States scientists 
turned the principle of selection "topsy turvy," the result would be 
"that from the total number of recorded events the greater part 
of them will remain open to suspicion [and thus eligible for on-
site inspection] and the smaller part would be free from suspi-
cion. "121 He asserted that this was contrary to the conclusions of 
the Conference of Experts. The Americans agreed with his con-
clusions, but argued that with the present state of knowledge, they 
could not go farther. In the context of this debate, Dr. Fedorov 
remarked that science had solved more complicated problems and 
ought to be able to solve this one. He went on to assert that 
". . . the purpose we have as scientists is to try to help our political 
officers to identify suspicious events."122 Dr. Fisk rejoined, " ... sci-
ence is not the servant of political expediency. "123 
The American draft did list various types of auxiliary informa-
tion, which it was stated might develop into criteria "to establish 
an event as natural in origin" at some later time after further re-
search. Wolfgang Panofsky again summed up this problem a few 
months later in his testimony before the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy: 
The principal problem is that these methods are poten-
tially useful, but within the present state of knowledge 
there is no way of evaluating quantitatively how useful 
they could be nor is it possible to write specific recom-
mendations under which they could be used by unskilled 
operators. In the hands of skilled seismologists, even at 
119See Fisk's comments: GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 12, pp. 57-66; and 
Hearing: Technical Problems and the Geneva Test Ban Negotiations, supra 
note 79, p. 7. See also Panofsky's comments before the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy: Hearings: Technical Aspects ... of a Nuclear Weapons Test 
Ban, supra note 26, p. 72. 
120GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 14, pp. 3-21. 
121GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 15, pp. 27-30. 
122GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 19, p. 76. 
123[ bid., p. 81. 
228 DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS 
the present the use of some of these methods might very 
well improve the judgment which can be exercised in 
distinguishing earthquakes from explosions.124 
As his comments indicate, in addition to being worried about the 
state of knowledge and the legal and political status of their re-
port, the American scientists were concerned about the technical 
competence of the personnel that would staff the control posts, 
and they tended to assume, probably rightly, a relatively low level 
of competence.125 
Although both sides made some compromises, the differences 
in approach proved irreconcilable, and Technical Working Group 
II failed to agree on criteria for initiating on-site inspections. In-
terestingly, the Soviet scientists did not include their proposed 
criteria in their report to the Conference. Whether or not the Soviet 
criteria were intended as a serious proposal or as a bargaining 
position was moot. The Soviet proposal was logically defensible 
only in the light of the Soviet criticisms of the measurements of 
the Hardtack II series, and especially the criticism of the instru-
ments which had been used. 
Although submission of an agreed report to the Geneva Con-
ference seemed to be out of the question in view of the basic 
divisions between the Eastern and Western scientists, all three 
groups of scientists, for their own reasons, strongly wanted an 
agreed report, and an attempt was made. Dr. Fisk even suggested 
the possibility of reconvening the Working Group in January 1960 
after a Christmas recess, 126 but in the last analysis the scientists 
recognized that their differences could not be resolved by further 
meetings. 
The attempt to write an agreed report was complicated by the 
fact that the scientists knew that the report of Technical Working 
Group I had been given immediate public release and they were 
concerned about the effect of any report on public opinion. In 
124Hearings: Technical Aspects ... of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban, 
supra note 26, p. 70. 
125See also Panofsky's comments before the Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, Hearing: Technical Problems and the Geneva Test 
Ban Negotiations, supra note 79, pp. 9-10. 
126GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 20, p. 62. 
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addition, neither side wanted to have a report prejudge issues which 
were still in contention in the Conference. The American objections 
to the Soviet proposals on criteria have already been mentioned. 
Similarly, the Soviet scientists objected to American proposals re-
lating to experimental explosions designed to yield data that would 
be helpful in improving the control system.127 
In the end, the many divisions proved insurmountable. The 
scientists could agree only on a brief procedural report to which 
four annexes were attached.128 The first of these contained the agreed 
recommendations on improvements, and the remaining three, the 
separate views of the three delegations. The British report basically 
agreed with the American conclusions, except in the matter of 
magnitude and the number of equivalent earthquakes. 
IV 
Deadlock 
Scientists Disagree: Back to the Diplomats 
Technical Working Group II recessed after twenty-one meetings 
at 9:20 p.m. on Friday, December 18. The following afternoon 
the report and the annexes were presented to the diplomatic 
Conference.129 The meeting was acrimonious. Dr. Fedorov's state-
ment, which Dr. Fisk subsequently labeled "incorrect, distorted, 
and misleading,"130 attacked the scientific integrity of the Ameri-
can delegation, among other things. The American scientists were 
deeply distressed by this, 131 and by the general denouement. In 
addition to the substantive issues at stake, many of them felt that 
in the process of the discussion personal relationships with Soviet 
scientists, carefully built up over a number of years, had been 
jeopardized. 
The outcome of Technical Working Group II meant that the 
search for agreement between East and West on a technical level 
had failed. The closing speeches of the diplomatic representatives 
127GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 21, p. 6. 
128See Geneva Conference, pp. 384-413. 
129GEN/ DNT /PV. 150. 
130Jbid., p. 16. 
131See the comments by Panofsky and Fisk, Hearing: Technical Prob-
lems and the Geneva Test Ban Negotiations, supra note 79, pp. 13, 35. 
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in the Conference, indicated that each side saw the other's action as 
precluding agreement and revealed the prevailing mutual suspicions 
concerning motivations. Mr. Tsarapkin went so far as to charge 
that there were forces trying to prevent the conclusion of a com-
prehensive agreement. The West clearly felt that the USSR was 
evading the issue of control. 
Perhaps the British delegate, Sir Michael Wright, sounded the 
most optimistic note. He argued that the principal difficulties were 
caused "by the comparative scarcity of firm experimental data 
and by the lack of time thus far for research directed to our spe-
cial problems. " 132 He expressed the opinion that a solution might 
well be found through research, "jointly undertaken." For the 
moment, however, the negotiations had reached an impasse. 
132Jbid., p. 22. 
Chapter VII 
The Search for Political Compromise 
I 
Revamping the Western Position 
The failure of Technical Working Group II to achieve agreement 
marked the conclusion of one phase in the Geneva Conference. 
The attempt to restore the agreed basis for the negotiations through 
the mechanism of technical talks had failed. If the negotiations 
were to be advanced, new mechanisms would have to be tried. 
Thus the failure of TWG II touched off an effort to by-pass the 
technical disagreement, which continued until the Geneva Con-
ference adjourned sine die on January 29, 1962. 
Although this effort was principally diplomatic in nature and 
was pursued mainly on a diplomatic level, it continued to have a 
large technical component. This was inevitable since the dispute 
concerned technical issues, but it was also a product of the Western 
attraction for the concept that political agreements could be achieved 
through efforts at the technical level. Rather than technical talks, 
hopes came to be pinned on technical research, conducted by the 
individual governments themselves and perhaps jointly. Research 
might yield ways of satisfying both the Soviet demand for a com-
prehensive treaty and the Western demand for "adequate control." 
Moreover, research was a neutral device. One could be for research, 
just as one could be for technical talks, regardless of one's position 
on the wisdom of a test ban treaty. By stressing research one could 
avoid political disputes and decisions. Signs of this developing 
attitude were already evident in the speeches of the Western dele-
gates-especially Sir Michael Wright's-at the session of the Geneva 
Conference when Technical Working Group II reported. However, 
research would take time. Meanwhile, compromises would be neces-
sary on the political level. 
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The Decision to Continue the Moratorium 
The first decision that the United States had to take related to 
the moratorium on testing nuclear weapons. As will be recalled, in 
August the United States had announced that it would continue the 
voluntary suspension until December 31, 1959. The British had 
taken a different position; they had declared that they would con-
tinue the moratorium as long as the negotiations continued; there-
fore this issue did not arise for them. 
In late December, President Eisenhower summoned a group of 
advisers to Augusta, Georgia, to discuss what action the United 
States should take. The failure of TWG II had strengthened the 
convictions and the case of those who questioned the wisdom of 
continuing the moratorium. They were now even more convinced 
that it would be difficult to detect and identify clandestine explo-
sions of small nuclear weapons. The experience of TWG II had also 
served to underscore the reservations which many had about Soviet 
intentions. No one, however, went farther than to argue for a 
resumption of testing underground and possibly in outer space. 
That no one urged resuming atmospheric testing reflected both the 
extent to which public opinion, or fear of an adverse public reaction, 
could inhibit United States policy, and the conscience of American 
policy-makers. 
On the other side, it was argued that broad East-West rela-
tionships were moving gradually toward a detente. General dis-
armament talks were to be resumed again for the first time since 
1957 when the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee would meet 
in Geneva in March 1960. Even though the Coolidge Committee 
had been unable to formulate a new American negotiating position, 
the United States looked forward to these talks. There were pros-
pects for a summit meeting later in the spring or early summer, and 
it seemed likely that President Eisenhower would make a trip to the 
USSR sometime thereafter. Moreover, more progress had been made 
in the Geneva Conference than in any other arms control negotiation 
since the Second World War. By this time the three states had 
agreed to a preamble, seventeen articles, and an annex to a treaty, 
an unprecedented achievement. 
To compound the matter, it was not at all clear what the effects 
of any given American policy would be on the Soviet Union; for 
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example, whether continuing the moratorium would make the USSR 
more or less willing to negotiate. 
The result was a compromise embodied in a declaration and 
inaction with regard to the substantive issues at stake. On December 
29, 1959, President Eisenhower issued the following statement: 
Although we consider ourselves free to resume nu-
clear weapons testing, we shall not resume nuclear 
weapons tests without announcing our intention in advance 
of any resumption. During the period of voluntary sus-
pension of nuclear weapons tests the United States will 
continue its active program of weapon research, develop-
ment, and laboratory-type experimentation.1 
He prefaced this statement by saying that the prospects for a test 
ban agreement had been injured by "the recent unwillingness of 
the politically guided Soviet experts to give serious scientific con-
sideration to the effectiveness of seismic techniques for the detection 
of underground nuclear explosions," and he characterized the Soviet 
annex to the Technical Working Group II report as "intemperate 
and technically unsupportable." On the other hand, no decision was 
made to ready test sites, nor were budgetary allocations for such 
activities increased. Administration officials explained the President's 
statement to the press as a "bargaining maneuver."2 
In his account of the negotiations, Sir Michael Wright has 
argued that by choosing the course that it did, the "Eisenhower 
Administration got the worst of both worlds."3 He maintains that 
while the United States did not in fact resume testing, "the statement 
enabled the Russians to claim that the West had been the first to 
speak of resuming." 
It is difficult to know how the Soviet Union interpreted the 
American decision. Although the Eisenhower statement was 
criticized in the Soviet press and in statements by Soviet officials, 
the criticism was relatively restrained, and on January 3, 1960, 
Chairman Khrushchev reiterated his pledge that the USSR would 
not resume testing nuclear weapons unless the West did. He re-
peated this pledge eleven days later in a speech before the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR, and in so doing pointed out that any state 
lGeneva Conference, p. 413. 
2New York Times, December 30, 1959, p. 1. 
3Sir Michael Wright, Disarm and Verify, p. 126. 
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that resumed testing nuclear weapons would find it difficult to 
reconcile its decision with the decisions of the United Nations.4 In 
the same speech he acknowledged that it might be possible to 
camouflage some underground nuclear explosions and that others 
would be difficult to detect. Regardless of these difficulties though, 
he argued that if an agreement were signed, it would be fulfilled: 
"Should any side violate the obligations to which it has committed 
itself, the instigators of such violations will cover themselves with 
shame, and they will be condemned by people of the world." 
Curiously, a few days earlier, on December 30, 1959, Pravda 
charged that the United States had already violated the moratorium 
by setting off underground atomic explosions. 
Chairman Khrushchev's Supreme Soviet speech also contained 
other elements of some significance for the test ban negotiations. 
Most notably, he gave figures on Soviet troop strength over the 
years, and proposed that the current total of 3,623,000 be reduced 
by a third. The Supreme Soviet promptly enacted legislation to 
implement this suggestion. In the West this move was alternatively 
interpreted as indicating either a desire for detente, or the moderni-
zation of the Soviet armed forces. To a certain extent, probably 
both interpretations had elements of validity. In any case, the move 
would mean that as their conventional capacity lessened, Soviet 
forces would become increasingly reliant on nuclear weapons. In 
a certain sense, Khrushchev's speech paralleled Dulles' massive re-
taliation pronouncement six years earlier. Indeed, Khrushchev spoke 
of the Soviet Union having sufficient modern weapons: 
. . . that should any madman launch an attack on our 
state or on other socialist states we would be able to 
literally wipe the country or countries which attack us off 
the face of the earth.5 
Clearly, the Soviet Union was moving in the direction of adopting 
a doctrine of deterrence. 
The United States' Proposal for a Phased Treaty 
The decision about the moratorium was a relatively simple one. 
Formulating a new Western negotiating position in view of the 
4Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 4-15. 
5Documents on Disarmament, 1960, p. 14. 
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outcome of Technical Working Group II was a more complex issue 
and one which required more time. In fact, the United States was 
unable to present a new position until February 11, 1960, over 
four weeks after the Geneva Conference had resumed. Meanwhile, 
the Conference lagged. Ambassador Wadsworth pointed out that the 
United States' position would have to be based on the conclusions 
of the American expert delegation to TWG II; any treaty which was 
not so based would clearly be rejected by the Senate.6 Mr. Tsar-
apkin countered by pointing out that the scientific position advanced 
by the Western scientists would leave large numbers of events 
eligible for inspection, and then went on to say that the USSR 
might ease its concept of criteria defining events eligible for on-
site inspection if the West would accept the Soviet proposal for an 
annual quota of on-site inspections. 7 The West would have to agree 
to the quota concept, however, before the criteria could be for-
mulated. He pointed out that the Control Commission would be able 
to conduct research, and that improvements in the capability of the 
detection and identification system presumably would result. He also 
argued that in any case there would be no on-site inspections until . 
the control system was completely installed; that is, for a year or 
two after the treaty entered into force. Several days later, though, 
Mr. Tsarapkin allowed that the real problem with violations, if 
indeed there would . be a problem, would relate to underground 
explosions, that a violator would not attempt to test in other less 
covert environments. 8 
Finally, on February 11, the United States tabled a new 
negotiating position. Although the terms of the American proposal 
were not publicly released until after their presentation in Geneva, 
they were in large measure revealed and discussed in the press 
and other mass media long before their presentation to the Con-
ference. In part, this was inevitable, since the new American 
proposal was derived rather logically from past American positions, 
particularly President Eisenhower's suggestions of April 13, 1959, 
and from the outcome of Technical Working Group II. That the 
new proposal was telegraphed in advance was also the result, 
though, of the American decentralized processes of decision-making. 
6GEN/DNT/PV. 152, pp. 4-5, 20. 
1Jbid., pp. 8, 12, 19. 
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The American proposal was presented verbally; no treaty 
language was tabled.9 In essence, it provided for a phased treaty, 
testing nuclear weapons would be prohibited in those environments 
where in the American view control was feasible, and the pro-
hibition would be extended as control could be extended. The 
proposal provided for the immediate prohibition of testing in the 
atmosphere, underwater, "in outer space up to the greatest height 
with respect to which agreement can be reached on the installation 
of effective controls," and underground "down to the lowest limit 
of size or threshold" which the United States felt could be ade-
quately controlled. As an illustration, and as a proposal, the United 
States suggested a threshold of magnitude 4.75 on the unified 
magnitude scale. With respect to on-site inspection, the United 
States presented two alternative schemes, depending on whether or 
not agreement could be reached on criteria. Both, however, en-
visaged actual inspection of only a fraction of the unidentified 
events, the choice to be determined by the "other side." Thus the 
proposal involved acceptance in principle of the concept of a 
numerical quota of on-site inspections. If agreement were reached 
on the criteria proposed by the American delegation to Technical 
Working Group II, thirty percent of all unidentified events would 
be subject to inspection, otherwise twenty percent of all events 
located by the system would be eligible. The United States es-
timated that with a threshold of magnitude 4.75 and with control 
posts initially only on the territories of the three nuclear powers, 
the application of either formula would result in about twenty on-
site inspections in the Soviet Union in an average year. The United 
States also estimated that the number of comparable events in the 
United States and the United Kingdom together would be approx-
imately the same. A higher threshold would result in fewer inspec-
tions, and a lower one in more. Ambassador Wadsworth stated 
that the United States would be willing to have the quota fixed 
in numerical rather than percentage terms, but in that instance the 
quota would have to be subject to revision at least annually and 
it should be determined by applying "the agreed percentage to the 
number of events which has actually occurred in the previous 
period." In presenting the new American position, Ambassador 
9See GEN/DNT/PV. 170, pp. 3-9. 
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Wadsworth stressed the dynamic nature of the phasing concept, 
and proposed that the three countries institute a "program of joint 
research," with the aim of moving toward a comprehensive treaty 
as rapidly as possible. The results of the research would be intro-
duced into the control system as rapidly as "they had reached a 
technologically useful state." This would allow the parties to the 
treaty to consider the extent to which each advance might permit 
moves toward a comprehensive treaty. 
The new American proposal was an attempt to reset the 
requirement of "adequate" control, but at the same time to satisfy 
the Soviet demand that the number of on-site inspections be 
limited. In addition, since it implicitly allowed the possibility of 
testing some nuclear weapons, at least temporarily, it was satis-
factory to those who had always felt, or had come to feel, that 
American security interests demanded this. 
It was this last aspect which drew the most critical questions 
from Mr. Tsarapkin. He immediately asked whether or not the 
treaty would prohibit nuclear tests underground that would register 
below the 4. 75 seismic magnitude threshold, and if it would not, if 
there would be a moratorium on such tests.10 He also asked if all 
tests in outer space would be prohibited. After receiving Ambassa-
dor Wadsworth's negative replies, and hearing his admission of 
lack of full instructions concerning outer space, Mr. Tsarapkin 
charged that the new American proposal was an invitation to renew 
the nuclear arms race; that the nuclear powers would strive to 
improve their capabilities and that non-nuclear powers would 
attempt to gain nuclear status. Ambassador Wadsworth denied the 
second point by arguing that only the countries that were already 
nuclear powers had sufficiently advanced technology to create 
devices or weapons with low enough yields so as not to violate the 
threshold. Mr. Tsarapkin also criticized the concept of expressing 
the threshold in terms of seismic magnitude, arguing that, as Techni-
cal Working Group II had indicated, determination of magnitude was 
a controversial issue. Finally, he alleged that, American assertions 
to the contrary notwithstanding, an international control system was 
not necessary to detect those tests covered by the American pro-
posal, but only for a comprehensive test ban. Although his remarks 
10Jbid., pp. 9-10. 
238 DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS 
were impromptu and did not constitute a formal Soviet reaction, 
they certainly presaged a less than warm reception for the American 
proposal. 
II 
Differences Narrow 
The French Nuclear Tests 
The formal Soviet reply did not come until several days later; 
meanwhile an event ocurred which had significant implications for 
the test ban negotiations, although its immediate effect was im-
perceptible. On February 13, 1960, refusing to heed the General 
Assembly's recommendations, France detonated an atomic device 
with an estimated yield of from 60 to 70 kilotons. Interestingly, 
this development was not mentioned in the Geneva Conference until 
March 2, and then only implicitly when Ambassador Wadsworth 
referred to what had previously always been called the "4th country 
problem," or the "nth country problem," as the "5th country 
problem." The Soviet Union did not mention the fact that France 
had tested a nuclear device until September 29.U By that time, 
France had detonated a second nuclear device, and it would deto-
nate a third before the year was out. Clearly, with each passing 
day the "nth country" problem would become more difficult, and 
for that reason, the question of a test ban more complicated. 
The Soviet Proposal for Temporary Criteria 
On February 16, Mr. Tsarapkin presented the USSR's formal 
response to the American suggestion for a phased treaty.12 In a 
rather moderate speech he labeled the suggestion "unacceptable" 
because the USSR favored a comprehensive treaty; but he went on 
to suggest that it might be possible to surmount the difficulties in 
which the Conference was enmeshed by exploring a concept which 
had been advanced by the United Kingdom on January 15, that 
is, to have temporary criteria for the initiation of on-site inspections. 
He then proposed temporary criteria which would apply for an 
initial period of from two to three years. These provided that an 
event would be eligible for inspection if it were localized on the 
llGEN/DNT/PV. 248, p. 13. 
I2GEN/DNT/PV. 172, pp. 3-7. 
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basis of data from several surrounding stations within an area of 
approximately 200 square kilometers. If the control posts were 
situated only on one side of the event, as for example an event in 
a coastal area, a larger area would be allowed. An event would be 
ineligible for inspection if ( 1 ) its depth of focus were established 
as below 60 kilometers, (2) its epicentral location were established 
to be in the deep ocean and· it were not accompanied by a hydro-
acoustic signal, ( 3) it were established within 48 hours as the fore-
shock of an earthquake, or ( 4) if it were established as the aftershock 
of an earthquake. Mr. Tsarapkin claimed that these criteria repre-
sented the area of agreement between the Western and Soviet 
scientists, and in large measure they did, except that the concept of 
first motion was completely omitted. All events regardless of their 
seismic magnitude would be eligible for inspection, the actual 
number of inspections to be fixed according to the Soviet quota 
proposal, but the USSR continued to be unwilling to indicate any 
specific figure for a quota. During the period that the temporary 
criteria were in effect, Mr. Tsarapkin envisaged that the Soviet and 
Western scientists "would continue the joint study of the question 
of criteria" with the aim of agreeing upon a complete and more 
rigid set of criteria which would replace the temporary criteria. Thus 
the Soviet Union accepted the principle of "joint research," and this 
was confirmed in subsequent questioning. The following day Mr. 
Tsarapkin stated that the research program could begin immediately 
after the signature of the treaty-that is, before its coming into force 
-and that nuclear devices would not be required in the program, 
that chemical explosives would be sufficient.l3 
Even though Mr. Tsarapkin denied it, the Soviet proposal 
seemed to acknowledge some of the technical difficulties which the 
Western scientists had striven so painfully to present in Technical 
Working Group II. In any case, the two sides appeared to be 
moving closer to agreement, and on March 2, Ambassador Wads-
worth pronounced the proposed Soviet criteria "generally acceptable 
technically."14 The American reservation applied principally to the 
area of localization, which Ambassador Wadsworth argued was too 
small, but also to the identification of foreshock. In addition, he 
13GEN/DNT/PV. 173, p. 8. 
14GEN/DNT/PV. 180, p. 5. 
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maintained that the proposal would only be acceptable if some 
arrangement could be worked out so that if agreement were not 
reached on more rigid criteria during the initial period, the organiza-
tion would not be left without criteria. However the divergence be-
tween East and West on broader issues was still great, and the 
greatest portion of Ambassador Wadsworth's speech was actually 
devoted to pointing these out. In sum, the United States continued 
to believe that with existing technology it would be impossible ade-
quately to control low yield underground explosions, and thus that 
for the time being a comprehensive treaty was out of the question. 
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, continued to insist on a 
comprehensive treaty, and held to its position that on-site inspections 
could occur only within such a context. 
The Soviet Proposal for a Phased Treaty and a Moratorium 
The next attempt to narrow the gap between the two sides 
was also advanced by the Soviet Union, although its origins were 
more diffuse. On Saturday, March 19-just in time for the Sunday 
editions-Ambassador Tsarapkin announced that the USSR would 
be willing to conclude a treaty "on the cessation of all nuclear 
weapon tests in the atmosphere, in the oceans, and in outer space, 
and of all underground tests which produce seismic oscillations of 
magnitude 4. 7 5 conventional units or above. "15 He stated that the 
Soviet government would also agree to the American proposal 
"to institute a programme of joint experiments by the Soviet Union, 
the United States, and the United Kingdom," with respect to un-
identified events below magnitude 4. 7 5 conventional units, "on the 
understanding that all parties to the treaty assume at the same time 
the obligation not to carry out during that period any nuclear 
weapons tests producing seismic oscillations of magnitude 4. 7 5 
conventional units or below." In other words, the partial treaty 
would have to be accompanied by a moratorium covering the tests 
which were not banned. Apparently the USSR felt that the mora-
torium should be part of the treaty. Senator Humphrey had made 
a similar suggestion several months previously in a speech in Pon-
tiac, Michigan, and the idea was explored verbally in guarded 
fashion by the principal delegates to the Geneva Conference several 
l5GEN/DNT/PV. 188, p. 13. 
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days prior to the Soviet proposal.16 Sir Michael Wright had 
indicated that he would advance the concept to the United Kingdom 
government. 
The Soviet proposal was widely regarded as a major move. 
Coming as it did a few days after the opening session of the Ten-
Nation Disarmament Committee, and with a summit meeting 
scheduled within two months, it could be interpreted as an attempt 
to secure a detente. On the other hand, it involved a continuation 
of the unpoliced moratorium. 
Formulating a Western Response 
The first Western response was to probe the precise meaning 
and implications of the Soviet proposal. Some questions were put 
to Mr. Tsarapkin immediately after he made the proposal. These 
were repeated in a more formal fashion and others were added at 
the next session of the Geneva Conference on Monday, March 21.17 
The first group of questions related to the "joint research pro-
gramme" and the obligation to refrain from testing. They concerned 
the length of the program and whether or not the two aspects would 
be concurrent. Ambassador Wadsworth also asked what would 
happen at the end of the period, and specifically, "if, in the opinion 
of the scientists, the controls were still not completely effective, 
would the obligation not to test nevertheless persist?" Ambassador 
Wadsworth was also concerned about the scope of the research 
program, particularly whether it would be limited to the problem of 
criteria or would be broader. 
A second group of questions concerned the number of on-site 
inspections and the threshold of magnitude. Ambassador Wadsworth 
asked if the Soviet Union accepted the Western proposal to use the 
unified magnitude scale. He also asked if the Soviet Union accepted 
the threshold of magnitude 4.75 and if there would be a quota for 
inspections above the threshold, below the threshold, or for the 
entire range. A related query concerned the Soviet attitude toward 
the American proposal for simplified criteria. 
A third area of questions concerned high altitude and outer 
16See the interchanges between Tsarapkin and Popper (US), GEN/-
DNT/PV. 183, pp. 11-13; GEN/DNT/PV. 184, pp. 10-18; and the remarks 
by Wright, GEN/DNT/PV. 185, p. 3. 
17GEN/DNT/PV. 189, pp. 5-8. 
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space. Since the Soviet proposal envisaged a complete prohibition 
on testing in these environments-which the United States phased 
treaty proposal of February 11 did not necessarily-Ambassador 
Wadsworth inquired about what type of a control system was 
"proposed for the installation in the high-altitude environment, what 
elements it would contain and at what intervals such elements of the 
high-altitude system would be installed." He also wanted to learn 
what "would be done about high-altitude or cosmic space tests 
which could not be identified by the initially installed system." Thus 
he raised a question which American policy-makers themselves had 
previously evaded. 
Finally, Ambassador Wadsworth asked: 
As regards the underground environment, in the event that 
effective control of small underground explosions proved 
impossible and if the proposed temporary prohibition 
against such explosions lapsed, would the remainder of the 
treaty continue in effect? 
Given the ideas which many in the American scientific community 
held about the difficulty of detecting underground nuclear explo-
sions this was perhaps the most crucial question. The last of the 
non-nuclear blasts in the Cowboy series had been fired on March 
4 and the evaluation of the series substantially confirmed Albert 
Latter's theories concerning decoupling. 
Mr. Tsarapkin's responses followed the same order as Am-
bassador Wadsworth's questions. He repeated his previous state-
ments that the "joint research programme" could begin immediately 
after the signature of the treaty. In the Soviet view the program 
should be drafted by the Preparatory Commission. Mr. Tsarapkin 
stated that the USSR felt that, although research would be a 
continuing aspect of the Control Organization, a suitable length for 
the specific program aimed at events below the threshold of magni-
tude 4.75 would be four or five years, and that the question of 
the moratorium and the research program were "closely interre-
lated." Mr. Tsarapkin asserted that the Soviet government did not 
admit the possibility that the research program might not be 
successful, but if it did take the most pessimistic view, it felt that 
the failure of the program "should not automatically release the 
parties to the treaty from their obligations regarding the moratorium 
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and should not mean that the treaty would terminate or be liqui-
dated." The governments concerned would have to discuss the 
situation and agree on further measures. With respect to the scope 
and nature of the research program, Mr. Tsarapkin asserted that 
experiments in the program should be conducted with "conventional 
chemical detonations, not nuclear weapons." 
Concerning the second group of questions, the Soviet view was 
that the quota of on-site inspections, which would have to be 
determined on the basis of a political compromise, would apply 
both to events above and below the threshold; thus the issues of 
determining the magnitude of specific events would not arise. The 
quota would be revised in the light of the experience of the Control 
Organization in accordance with the periodic review article, there-
fore, for the first time, two years after the entry into force of the 
treaty, and subsequently on an annual basis. 
With respect to high altitude and outer space, Mr. Tsarapkin 
asserted that there should be a total prohibition on testing regard-
less of the number or the schedule of installation of control tech-
niques. 
The answer to the last question had been given implicitly in 
the answers to the first group. In essence, it was that the prohibi-
tion on testing nuclear weapons should be permanent regardless of 
the outcome of the research program. 
Simultaneously, discussion and debate began within the United 
States and the Western alliance about what the Western response 
should be. The extent to which the detailed questions raised by 
Ambassador Wadsworth and the responses given by Mr. Tsarapkin 
entered into the decision-making process is not clear. Many of the 
arguments were those which had been visible throughout the nego-
tiations. Moreover, at his news conference on Friday, March 25-
four days after the interchange between Wadsworth and Tsarapkin 
and two days after the Committee of Principals framed its re-
commendation-Secretary of State Herter stated that the Department 
had not received all of Mr. Tsarapkin's answers.18 Of course their 
general nature had been reported in the press. 
On Tuesday, March 22, Senator Clinton P. Anderson, then 
ISU.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLII, No. 1085 (April ll, 
1960), p. 548. 
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Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, declared that 
the Soviet proposal "has the appearance of a phony. "19 It was his 
view that the Soviet proposal was an attempt to secure a prohibition 
against all testing, regardless of whether or not the agreement could 
be controlled. In his picturesque terms: 
Again the United States is asked to buy a "pig in 
the poke." We are asked to forego testing and to accept a 
totally inadequate inspection system. We are asked again 
to agree to a system based largely on trust of the Soviets 
rather than real controls. 
John A. McCone, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, 
was known to hold similar views. 20 To these men, the acceptance 
of the Soviet proposal would endanger American security because 
of its failure to provide adequate control. 
Another force acting as an undercurrent, but in tandem with 
this interpretation, was the increasing pressure in the United States 
to resume the testing of nuclear weapons. Perhaps Freeman J. 
Dyson, a physicist and professor at the Institute for Advanced 
Study at Princeton, articulated the case most clearly. His views 
were advanced in an article entitled "The Future Development of 
Nuclear Weapons," published in the April 1960 issue of Foreign 
AfjairsP which was released in mid-March. In his article, Professor 
Dyson stressed particularly the importance and possibility of a 
fission-free weapon, or a neutron bomb, which would not produce 
fallout. He also asserted that complete control over a ban on testing 
nuclear weapons would be impossible without almost unlimited 
inspection rights. 
The adverse reaction in the United States to the Soviet pro-
posal so alarmed Prime Minister Macmillan that he hastily arranged 
to fly to the United States to confer with President Eisenhower 
about the Western response. He regarded the Soviet proposal as 
an extremely favorable action. Many in the United States also 
inclined toward this position. The day after Senator Anderson 
19Congressional Record, Vol. CVI, Part 5 (1960), pp. 6219-20. 
20New York Times, March 23, 1960, p. 12. 
21Freeman J. Dyson, "The Future Development of Nuclear Weapons," 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 3 (April 1960), pp. 457-64. 
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issued his pronouncement, Hans Bethe released a statement in 
which he viewed the Soviet proposal favorably. 22 Senator Hubert 
H. Humphrey also made a lengthy speech in the Senate that day 
describing in detail the progress of the Geneva Conference and 
relating the Soviet proposal to his Pontiac speech and the United 
States suggestion for a phased treaty.23 He was well informed, 
among other reasons because his Subcommittee on Disarmament 
had held a hearing on the technical problems involved in the 
negotiations on February 4, 1960. He pointed out that the Soviet 
proposal differed from his suggestion in that the number of on-site 
inspections was not specified and the proposed moratorium was four 
to five years instead of two. He also read into the record a detailed 
statement of the Advisory Committee on Science and Technology 
of the Democratic Advisory Council, which emphasized the 
importance of a test ban agreement. In view of all of these factors, 
his conclusion was that the Soviet proposal should be regarded 
"as a significant indication that the USSR may be willing to accept 
the necessary number of inspections to monitor a test-ban treaty 
and to work for the improvement of the control system." 
Following his speech, Senators Humphrey, Anderson, and Case 
engaged in a low-keyed debate about the progress of the test ban 
talks. Perhaps the most interesting point was Senator Humphrey's 
insistence that from twenty to thirty on-site inspections would be 
necessary annually in the USSR, and Senator Anderson's reply 
that in informal conversations Soviet delegates had mentioned the 
possibility of two or three.24 The Soviet Union still had not pre-
sented a concrete figure for the quota in the Geneva Conference, 
and it would not until July 26, 1960. Clearly, this issue was a 
factor which had to be considered in viewing the Soviet proposal. 
A closed debate raged within the Administration, although the 
views and positions were not significantly different from those 
expressed in the public arena. The Committee of Principals held 
meetings on March 22 and 23.25 Chairman McCone argued force-
22New York Times, March 24, 1960, p. 1. 
23Congressional Record, Vol. CVI, Part 5 (1960), pp. 6356-63. 
24Jbid., p. 6362. 
25See the account of these two meetings in Chalmers M. Roberts, 
"The Hopes and Fears of an Atomic Test Ban," The Reporter, Vol. XXII, 
No. 9, pp. 20-23. 
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fully against accepting the Soviet proposal. James H. Douglas, who 
had recently been promoted from the Secretaryship of the Air Force 
to Deputy Secretary of Defense, and who was sitting in for Secre-
tary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., made the strongest case for 
a favorable response. He argued that any agreement which would 
"open up" the Soviet Union by stationing international inspectors 
within the USSR, and thus break down Soviet secrecy and insularity, 
would be more valuable to the United States than any gains from 
continued testing, and he felt that the proposal seemed to offer the 
possibility of such an agreement. Mr. Douglas' arguments repre-
sented a considerable shift in thinking in the Department of Defem;e. 
Although he was perhaps the most articulate exponent of the new 
views, they were apparently subscribed to in varying degrees by 
the Secretary and other senior officials. George Kistiakowsky, the 
President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, supported 
his stand. Allen Dulles made the point that current intelligence 
estimates continued to indicate that the United States held a lead 
in nuclear weaponry, and thus that a freeze on development would 
be to its advantage. By the end of the second meeting a recom-
mendation urging a conditional favorable response to the USSR was 
framed. Messrs. Douglas, Kistiakowsky, Dulles, and Herter sup-
parted this recommendation; Chairman McCone opposed it. The 
President accepted and approved the recommendation. At this point, 
he strongly favored attempting to achieve a nuclear test ban. 26 
Thus by March 26 when Prime Minister Macmillan arrived in 
the United States, his trip was rather redundant. Nonetheless, it 
allowed joint consultation, which had not occurred prior to this 
point, and a display of Western unanimity. 
The Eisenhower-Macmillan Joint Declaration 
On March 29, after meetings in Washington and Camp David, 
President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan issued a joint 
declaration. The most important part of this declaration, and the 
Western response to the Soviet proposal, was the statement that the 
President and the Prime Minister had agreed that as soon as a test 
ban treaty was signed: 
26Robert Gilpin feels that the President's desire was the strongest 
factor in the decision. See American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, 
pp. 249-50. 
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. . . and arrangements made for a coordinated research 
program for the purpose of progressively improving con-
trol methods for events below a seismic magnitude of 
4.75, they will be ready to institute a voluntary mora-
torium of agreed duration on nuclear weapons tests below 
that threshold, to be accomplished by unilateral declara-
tion of each of the three powers. In order to expedite 
progress, the President and the Prime Minister have 
agreed to invite the Soviet Government to join at once 
with their two Governments in making arrangements for 
such a coordinated research program and putting it into 
operation. 27 
247 
Several features of the statement are worthy of note. First, this was 
the first mention of a "coordinated research program." Previously 
the adjective "joint" had always been used. The developing differ-
ences between the Soviet Union and the Western powers concerning 
whether chemical or nuclear explosions would be required were 
responsible for this shift in terminology. American scientists of 
almost all persuasions were convinced that nuclear detonations 
were necessary for the research program, and the Administration 
was determined not to be put in a position whereby the Soviet 
Union could block this. Secondly, the statement implied that the 
research program should begin immediately, not after the signature 
of the treaty. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the moratorium 
would be voluntary and accomplished by unilateral declaration. 
This would retain an element of freedom of action, and also meet 
the constitutional problem posed by President Eisenhower's depar-
ture from office in January 1961 (actually the uncertainty that this 
involved was soon removed by pledges from the major Presidential 
candidates that they would honor a moratorium commitment). 
Also, the duration of the moratorium was left to be determined, 
which implied, as various statements by officials had, that the West 
would not accept a period as long as from four to five years. 
With the issuance of this statement the positions of the three 
parties to the Geneva negotiations moved significantly closer to-
gether, and the prospects for a test ban treaty appeared to rise 
sharply. In th~ .following days the world press contained numerous 
speculations that the remaining unresolved issues could be solved 
21Geneva Conference, p. 424. 
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at the forthcoming meeting of heads of governments, now scheduled 
to open May 16. 
The diplomats at the conference table seem to have shared 
these expectations.28 In the fifteen meetings that were held between 
March 29, the date on which the statement was issued and May 
12, the day the Conference recessed for the summit meeting, they 
worked hard, as Ambassador Wadsworth put it, "to clear away as 
much underbrush as possible."29 This consisted mainly of attempting 
to settle minor issues and clarify major ones. Significant progress 
was made on achieving agreement concerning the Annex on Privi-
leges and Immunities, and the differences with respect to other 
aspects of the Control Organization were defined as precisely as 
possible. Of course, major effort was devoted to clarifying the 
Eisenhower-Macmillan statement and its exact relationship to the 
Soviet proposal of March 19. It was not until May 3 that the USSR 
conditionally accepted most aspects of the Western position.30 
Meanwhile, on April 6, Ambassador Wadsworth had discussed 
in general terms the type of "coordinated research programme" 
that the United States felt should be carried out, and six days 
later he had proposed that scientists from the three states be brought 
to Geneva to advise the Conference on the technical aspects of the 
proposed research program. 31 This suggestion had been accepted 
by the Soviet Union on April 14, and on May 3 when the USSR 
broadly accepted the new Western position, it also agreed that 
the Seismic Research Program Advisory Group, as it came to be 
called, should hold its first session May 11. Ultimate responsibility 
for the research program was to rest with the Geneva Conference. 
A Basic Consensus? 
By May 12, when the Conference recessed, it can fairly be 
said that there was a mutually acceptable framework for a test 
ban treaty. Leaving aside issues affecting the nature of the control 
organization, which will be treated in a later chapter, the differences 
stemming from technical aspects of the matter appeared not to be 
insurmountable, and scientists from the three sides were already 
28See Sir Michael Wright, Disarm and Verify, pp. 127, 137. 
29GEN/DNT/PV. 198, p. 8. 
30GEN/DNT/PV. 202, pp. 3-6. 
31GEN/DNT/PV. 196, pp. 3-4. 
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at work on the research problems. Seemingly in recognition of this, 
on April 1 the Conference agreed that its verbatim records through 
February 29, 1960, and adopted portions of the draft treaty should 
be released on April 19 and that thereafter verbatim records would 
be released monthly with a one-month time lag. 32 This move also 
satisfied a long-standing complaint of the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy about the secrecy of the negotiations. 
The Soviet Union had agreed that the moratorium could be 
accomplished by a series of unilateral declarations by the three 
governments and that as a part of the planned research there might 
be "a strictly limited number of joint underground nuclear ex-
plosions."33 The Western powers had agreed that the quota of on-
site inspections should apply to events both above and below the 
magnitude 4.75 threshold. The unresolved issues related to the size 
of the quota-(the Soviet Union had not yet tabled a specific 
proposal),-the duration of the moratorium, and what obligation 
the parties to the treaty would have at the end of the moratorium 
if the research program were not completely successful in improving 
the capability of the control network. The Soviet Union continued 
to argue that the moratorium should be from four to five years, and 
cited an October 29, 1959, statement of John A. McCone in which 
he had said that it would take from four to five years to create a 
reliable control system. In any case, Mr. Tsarapkin insisted that 
the research program and the moratorium should be coterminous. 
The Western representative on the other hand argued that four to 
five years was too long a period for the moratorium. On the other 
issue, the USSR also maintained its position that at the expiration 
of the moratorium the parties to it should not be "automatically 
released" from their obligations. The Western powers on the other 
hand felt that at the end of the moratorium each of the three powers 
should be "free to take any position that it deems necessary." Also, 
the Soviet Union continued to talk about and insist on a "joint 
research programme" while the Western representatives used the 
phrase "coordinated research programme." 
However, even though the unresolved issues of a technical 
nature may have seemed relatively minor, some involved fairly 
32GEN/DNT/PV. 192, p. 6. 
33GEN/DNT/PV. 202, p. 6. 
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deep-rooted disagreements. The West was determined not to agree to 
permanent measures of arms control unless they could be policed 
with a high degree of assurance. Thus the length of the moratorium 
and what happened at its expiration were crucial issues for Western 
policy-makers. So too was the question of the adequacy of the 
research program, and consequently the desire not to allow the 
other side to have veto powers. The USSR had other fears. Mr. 
Tsarapkin expressed some of these in explaining the Soviet argument 
that at the expiration of the moratorium the parties to the treaty 
should meet to consider the situation. 
The meaning of this proposal is perfectly obvious. It is 
meant to preclude obstruction by any party who, in the 
absence of such a provision in the treaty, might under 
various pretexts prevent positive results from being 
achieved by the research and then, on the ground that the 
agreed time-limit for carrying out the research programme 
had expired, declare its freedom of action and resume 
testing.34 
If the USSR assumed that within the limits of a politically 
acceptable control system there would always be some threshold 
of detectability, and that it might be extremely difficult and perhaps 
even impossible to compensate for such degradations in control as 
posed by decoupling, the Soviet fears could be well founded. In any 
case, the USSR had the development of the theory of decoupling 
as a backdrop of immediate history. The desire to exercise a high 
degree of control over the research work would fit with this inter-
pretation, as would pressure for a lengthy moratorium. 
Dissents From Interested Parties 
These divergencies, however, remained undercurrents. The 
most salient signs seemed to indicate rapid and swift progress 
toward a test ban. As a result, those interested parties which might 
be affected by a test ban began to raise their voices. On April 7, 
President de Gaulle reiterated the position that France would only 
abandon its nuclear weapons development program if the three 
nuclear powers destroyed their nuclear weapons. 35 He repeated this 
34GEN/DNT/PV. 192, p. 9. 
35New York Times, April 8, 1960, p. 1. 
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several days later during a trip to the United States in an address 
before a Joint Session of Congress. 36 His position was underlined 
by the detonation of a second French nuclear device on April 1. 
Another "nth country" also made its position known. On April 10, 
Premier Chou En-lai stated that Communist China would not be 
bound by any accord which it did not sign. 37 At a news conference 
about a month later, he stated that the People's Republic of China 
would only take part in a disarmament conference if it were 
recognized by the other participating states. 38 These statements had 
ominous implications for the prospects of a general test ban and 
also for the Sino-Soviet alliance, coming as they did in the midst 
of the developing controversy between Communist China and the 
USSR in which differences concerning disarmament figured promi-
nently.39 
Joint Committee Hearings: The Bethe-Teller Debate 
There were stirrings within the United States too. On April 
11, Senator Clinton Anderson announced that two subcommittees 
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, meeting jointly, would 
hold public hearings, starting April 19, on the technical aspects of 
the detection and inspection controls of a nuclear weapons test ban. 
The hearings were carried on for four days and most of the 
scientists who had participated in one way or another in the test 
ban negotiations and others as well testified. 40 Although the Chair-
man of the hearings, Representative Chet Holifield, strove valiantly 
to confine the discussion to technical matters, questions concerning 
the wisdom of past and possible future negotiating positions were 
inevitably raised. On these occasions, the positions which were by 
then well known were repeated. Perhaps Edward Teller and Hans 
Bethe portrayed best the two extremes among the scientists that 
testified, the former displaying great caution concerning the wisdom 
of a test ban and the latter controlled enthusiasm. A variety of 
36U.S. Department of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1960 (1961), 
p. 81. 
31New York Times, April 11, 1960, p. 7. 
3BDocuments on Disarmament, 1960, p. 87. 
39See Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (1962), 
especially pp. 290-94. 
40For an extensive analysis of these hearings see Earl H. Voss, Nuclear 
Ambush, pp. 395-456. 
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estimates and judgments were involved. For Teller, the development 
of tactical nuclear weapons was important and promising, while 
Bethe viewed it as of marginal utility and as possibly being tech-
nically difficult. Teller was pessimistic about the possibility of 
improving the control system, while Bethe was optimistic. Teller 
regarded the decoupling theory as a degradation of great importance 
for which compensations were unlikely. Bethe, on the other hand, 
questioned the practicability of decoupling, particularly for large 
detonations in the range of tens of kilotons, and also felt that the 
problem could be conquered. Despite this disagreement, however, 
there was consensus among these two scientists and others on the 
capabilities of the system recommended by the Conference of 
Experts; they all estimated it at roughly 19 kilotons for an under-
ground shot which had not been decoupled. 
And Some New Suggestions 
Other than the Bethe-Teller debate, which was framed more 
neatly than it had been previously, three elements stand out most 
in the hearings. The first of these occurred the second day when 
Richard Latter of the RAND Corporation testified. In the period 
after Technical Working Group II he analyzed the control system 
proposed by the Conference of Experts in more detail than anyone 
previously had, and in the process he experimented with some of 
its parameters.41 He presented the results of this work to the 
Committee. No one yet knew how many control posts there would 
be in the Soviet Union-the issue had not been discussed in the 
Geneva Conference-but Dr. Latter assumed on the basis of infer-
ences and calculations that there would be 21. If there were control 
posts only on the territory of the three nuclear powers-21 in the 
Soviet Union, 14 in the United States, and 1 in the United Kingdom 
-and assuming a magnitude 4. 7 5 threshold, using earthquake 
tables, he estimated that this would result in about 173 unidentified 
events per year in the United States and 53 in the Soviet Union. 
If 30 percent of these were eligible for on-site inspection, there 
could be 52 inspections per year in the United States and 16 in the 
41See his testimony: U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 
Special Subcommittee on Radiation and the Subcommittee on Research and 
Development, Hearings: Technical Aspects of Detection and Inspection Con-
trols of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban, 86th Congress, 2d Session (1960), 
pp. 38-39. 
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Soviet Union. If control posts were established throughout the 
world, as recommended in the report of the Conference of Experts, 
he calculated that the number of unidentified earthquakes in the 
United States and the Soviet Union would be reduced to 143 and 
28 respectively, and again assuming that 30 percent of these would 
be eligible for on-site inspection, the maximum number of on-site 
inspections would correspondingly be reduced to 43 and 8. He 
also calculated that by modestly increasing the number of control 
posts within the Soviet Union, especially in the seismic areas, the 
number of unidentified earthquakes could be reduced even farther. 
Thus, assuming control posts only in the USSR, the United States, 
and the United Kingdom, but increasing the number of control 
posts within the Soviet Union from 21 to 25 would result in there 
being only 20 unidentified earthquakes each year on Soviet terri-
tory. Using the 30 percent figure again, only 6 events there would 
be eligible for on-site inspection. 
The second novel element appeared in Hans Bethe's testi-
mony.42 He argued that with a large number of control posts and 
with feasible improvements in seismological instruments, it might 
be possible to detect even decoupled detonations of as little yield as 
20 kilotons. In his estimate, with foreseeable improvements, some 
600 control posts would be required in the Soviet Union to achieve 
this capability. Both of these features are interesting chiefly because 
they indicate how the technical parameters of the control system 
could be changed if one were willing to alter the elements of the 
system. Dr. Latter's testimony illustrated the same point and was 
also significant because of the low number of on-site inspections 
involved and the differential between the number required in the 
United States and the Soviet Union. His figures varied greatly from 
those being used by the American delegates in the negotiations. 
Finally, the Joint Committee hearings were interesting because 
they brought out in vivid detail how difficult it would actually be 
to conduct an on-site inspection. On the basis of this a number of 
Congressmen concluded that the probability of an on-site inspec-
tion's detecting evidence of a violation was very close to zero. Their 
conclusion had ominous implications for the possibility of Senatorial 
consent to ratification of a comprehensive test ban. 
42See ibid., pp. 171-86. 
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III 
The Seismic Research Program Advisory Group 
The Opening Atmosphere 
The early meetings of the Seismic Research Program Advisory 
Group, which convened on Wednesday, May 11, 1960, seemed to 
sustain the general air of optimism. The excitement and tension 
following Premier Khrushchev's announcement on May 7 that the 
USSR had captured an American pilot whose U-2 aircraft had been 
shot down over Soviet territory six days previously seemed to have 
no effect on the work going on inside the Paiais des Nations. 
The technical representatives of the three states were generally 
younger and of lower rank than their counterparts at previous meet-
ings. The American delegation was headed by Frank Press, a seismol-
ogist at the California Institute of Technology, and Carl Romney of 
the Air Force served as Associate Chairman. 43 M. A. Sadovsky, who 
had attended the Conference of Experts and the two technical work-
ing groups, headed the Soviet delegation, 44 and H. R. Hulme, the 
British delegation.45 Although the American delegation had not had 
any special preparation, several members had previously participated 
in the negotiations at one time or another, and all were deeply 
involved in Project Vela, the United States research program, final 
approval of which had been announced on May 7. Since the purpose 
of SRPAG was to discuss research, this background was probably 
sufficient preparation. They were, however, instructed to avoid 
"political" issues, to refer such matters to the diplomatic conference, 
and to avoid anything that might give the USSR veto power over 
the United States research program. 
The task of the Seismic Research Program Advisory Group 
seemed fairly clear cut, and since it involved research, this con-
43The other members of the American delegation were: Carlton M. 
Boyer, Department of Defense; Gerald W. Johnson, Department of Defense; 
Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Office of the Special Assistant to the President for 
Science and Technology; Richard Latter, RAND Corporation; Robert C. 
Scheid, Department of Defense; and M. Carl Walske, Atomic Energy Com-
mission. 
44The other members of the Soviet delegation were Y. V. Riznichenko, 
0. A. Grinevsky, V. I. Keilis-Borok, I. P. Pasechnik, G. L. Schnierman, and 
A. I. Ustyumenko. 
45The other members of the British delegation were M. Hill, H. T. 
Morgan, J. W. Wright, F. Panton, and R. M. Evans. 
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ference probably elicited more professional enthusiasm from the 
participating scientists than had any of the others. Also, the meeting 
appeared to offer the opportunity of proving the contribution of 
scientific research to the solution of political problems. Dr. Press's 
opening comments, when he spoke of the procedures and language 
of science as being universal and recalled the fruitful results of 
international scientific cooperation in the research involved in the 
International Geophysical Year,46 symbolized the general tone that 
characterized the participation of the Western delegates in the early 
meetings. The Soviet scientists also seemed to be somewhat more 
candid in these sessions than they had been in the past and appeared 
to share the Western enthusiasm for the scientific character of their 
task. For example, in a discussion about the American plan to 
offer improved seismological equipment to seismological stations 
throughout the world, Mr. Sadovsky said: "We shall also try to 
use the political situation for the improvement of seismology in 
general. "47 The conference could conceivably allow the scientists 
both to further their own professional interests and to contribute 
to the reduction of East-West tensions. 
At the first meeting, the American scientists gave a compre-
hensive and detailed exposition of the United States research pro-
gram. The plans then in effect envisaged various theoretical and 
empirical studies, including the detonation of approximately 11 
nuclear and chemical explosions, some of which would be designed 
to test Albert Latter's decoupling theory. Another aspect of the 
program was the scheme, mentioned above, to re-equip the seismic 
stations of the world. There was also a plan to establish certain 
model stations, some equipped according to the recommendations 
of the Conference of Experts. This would provide the first practical 
test of a so-called Geneva-type station. The next two meetings were 
devoted to the presentation of the much more modest British re-
search program and to discussion of the Western plans. 
At the fourth meeting, on Saturday, May 14, Y. V. Riznich-
enko presented a paper on the Soviet research program. Since it 
was not presented as the American program was in terms of cost 
or man-years of activity, it was rather difficult to grasp its exact 
magnitude. It appeared to be an extensive program, although it 
46GEN/DNT/SRPAG/PV. 1, p. 3. 
47GEN/DNT/SRPAG/PV. 5, pp. 62-65. 
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was clearly not as elaborate as that of the United States. Certain 
aspects of Mr. Riznichenko's presentation were moreover rather 
ambiguous. He stated that for the experiments two of the seismo-
logical stations in the USSR would be "equipped with the full set 
of equipment, bearing in mind the recommendations of the Geneva 
Conference of Experts in 1958 and 1959."48 Was this or was it not 
a commitment to construct two Geneva-type stations? His presenta-
tion was even more ambiguous on the subject of underground nuclear 
explosions. At one point he stated: "The systematic recording of 
seismic waves produced by earthquakes and also by underground 
chemical and nuclear explosions carried out under different condi-
tions and in different areas of the profile will take place during the 
years 1960-1963."49 Later, he said, " ... it seems obvious to us 
at the present time that a certain number of co-ordinated nuclear 
explosions of definite magnitude or energy will have to be carried 
out by us,"50 and referred to an earlier statement on this subject 
by Mr. Tsarapkin. However, in response to questioning on this 
point, Mr. Sadovsky said that he could not give an answer until 
the following meeting. It was clear from Mr. Riznichenko's presenta-
tion, that the Soviet scientists planned to utilize a number of large 
industrial chemical explosions as sources of data, and that they 
would generalize from this data. The Soviet scientists also planned 
to make extensive use of models. Again in response to questioning, 
Mr. Sadovsky stated that there would be no experiments in the 
Soviet Union to test the theory of decoupling. 51 The reasons that 
he gave were avowedly political, and his statement was almost 
apologetic. At the following meeting on Monday, May 16, he 
announced that there would be no nuclear explosions in the USSR 
and that the references in the Soviet paper were to nuclear explo-
sions envisaged in American program. 52 
What Conclusion? 
Although the atmosphere of these early sessions was quite 
technical and cordial, it was not immediately clear what the out-
48GEN/DNT/SRPAG/PV. 4, p. 12. 
49fbid., pp. 13-15. 
50fbid., pp. 27-30. 
51/bid., p. 56. 
52GEN/DNT/SRPAG/PV. 5, p. 21. 
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come would be. Of course, the joint discussion and criticism of the 
three programs yielded certain results in itself. As a consequence of 
Soviet criticisms, the American scientists agreed that some aspects 
of the United States program should be altered; for example, they 
thought that the number of temporary stations should be increased 
and the recording times-that is, the time which a temporary 
station would occupy a site-lengthened. 53 In addition, there were 
various informal meetings where problems of methodology were 
discussed and some agreements reached on matters of technique. 
However, it was not obvious what the meeting as a collective body 
could or would recommend. On May 17, the British suggested 
various forms of cooperation, involving such matters as exchanges 
of data and personnel and the elaboration of uniform methodology, 
and these were incorporated into a draft which was submitted by 
the United States the following day. The principles involved and 
the documents elaborating these principles were discussed in SRP AG 
sporadically through May 24. 
The Collapse of the Summit Meeting: The Changing Soviet Posture 
Meanwhile, events had transpired which would seriously affect 
SRPAG, and indeed the entire course of the Geneva negotiations. 
The heads of government of France, the Soviet Union, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom had agreed to meet in Paris on 
May 16 to discuss world problems. When the four leaders gathered 
in Paris, Chairman Khrushchev refused to proceed farther unless 
President Eisenhower condemned and cancelled all U-2 flights 
and arranged to have those "guilty" of perpetrating such flights 
brought to strict account. Since President Eisenhower refused to 
take such action, the summit meeting collapsed. Whether the 
Soviet move was attributable to conflicts within the Soviet ruling 
group among Chairman Khrushchev and his associates, to in-
creasing tensions in Sino-Soviet relations, or to President Eisen-
hower's assumption of personal responsibility for the U-2 flights 
and unabashed assertion at his news conference of May 11 that 
such activities were a "distasteful but vital necessity" when dealing 
with a closed society such as the USSR, 54 are matters clearly 
53GEN/DNT/SRPAG/PV. 7, p. 36. 
54U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLII, No. 1092 (May 30, 
1960), p. 851. 
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beyond the scope of this study.55 For our purposes the significant 
issue is that from that point on the attitude of the Soviet Union 
toward the test ban negotiations appears to have been markedly 
different from what it had been previously. Annex II on Privileges 
and Immunities was formally adopted on October 14, 1960, but 
this was the only treaty language that was adopted after the col-
lapse of the summit. Through the summer of 1960 the USSR made 
what could be interpreted as a few concessions on other issues, 
but as early as the fall of 1960, it began to retract positions which 
it had previously tabled. 
The End of Another Try by Scientists 
The sharpest indication that the Soviet posture had changed 
and that this would have an impact on the test ban negotiations 
came on Friday, May 27, eleven days after the date on which the 
summit conference was scheduled to begin. At the first meeting of 
the diplomatic conference to be convened after the recess on May 12, 
Mr. Tsarapkin, after a long review of the history of the negotia-
tions, stated that, "since the Soviet Union has no doubts regarding 
the validity of the report of the Geneva experts of 1958, it sees 
no need for undertaking any research or experiments on its own 
territory."56 In other words, there would be no Soviet research 
program. In addition, Mr. Tsarapkin demanded that Soviet scien-
tists be allowed to participate fully in all steps of any experiments 
that might be carried on in the West. 
This shift caused considerable embarrassment for the Soviet 
scientists participating in the Seismic Research Program Advisory 
Group. SRP AG had been meeting on a daily basis through May 
25. Then several days elapsed before the final meeting on May 
30. At that session, in response to questioning about the Soviet 
research program, Mr. Sadovsky would only say: 
65For a good summary of the speculation which was rampant soon 
after the event se-e Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 
1960 (1961), pp. 83-88. 
56GEN/DNT/PV. 206, p. 8. Wadsworth mentions this reversal of the 
Soviet position in his book, The Price of Peace, p. 27, but he somewhat 
unfairly fails to put it in the context of the collapse of the summit con-
ference. 
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the programme of test explosions, not only nuclear 
but also chemical explosions, is, in our view, linked to 
the control system. Our view is that if we do not have 
definite indications that such a system will be set up in 
the near future, then the programme of test explosions is 
unnecessary and should not be carried out. We are con-
ducting seismological research in the USSR and apparently 
this seismological research will continue. 57 
259 
Obviously, in this atmosphere an agreed report was out of the 
question. Dr. Press, in particular, argued against separate reports 
on the ground that "it broadcasts to the world that the scientists 
have disagreed."58 SRPAG therefore agreed on the expediency of 
individual private reports by each of the three technical delegations 
to their own diplomatic delegations. 
IV 
How Near an Agreement? 
Remaining Differences 
One can only speculate about whether or not the outcome would 
have been different had not the broader context of East-West 
relations altered so radically. It is significant though that there were 
important disagreements from the outset. Eastern and Western 
scientists had different conceptions concerning the length of the 
research program, an issue which had important implications for 
the duration of the moratorium on nuclear testing below the 4.75 
seismic magnitude threshold. Also, the American scientists in par-
ticular were insistent that there had to be experiments concerning 
decoupling, while the Soviet scientists were adamantly opposed to 
this. As early as May 18, it was apparent that the Soviet scientists 
had serious objections to the American plans for low-yield nuclear 
explosions. 59 The United States program included four nuclear 
explosions of less than 5 kilotons, one of 500 tons and two of 100 
tons, and possibly one of 2 kilotons. The first specific objection 
that the Soviet scientists raised to these shots was to assert they 
might appear "suspicious" because of the American interest in the 
li7GEN/DNT/SRPAG/PV. 13, p. 16. 
liSGEN/DNT/SRPAG/PV. 12, pp. 7-10. 
59GEN/DNT/SRPAG/PV. 7, pp. 17-20. 
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development of tactical nuclear weapons. 60 The American response 
was that the USSR was certainly entitled to assurance that the 
shots would not be used for weapons development, but that the 
precise arrangements for this were beyond the scope of a technical 
group. The Soviet scientists then argued that with the current state 
of technology, the prospects of recording seismic signals "at dis-
tances which might be of interest for the purpose of the control 
system" were extremely remote.61 The views of Western scientists 
were cited to support this contention. The balance of Mr. Sadovsky's 
statement is extremely interesting. He went on to say: 
Frankly speaking, nothing has changed so far in this 
respect, and we are still in a situation whereby we would 
be completely satisfied if we were to succeed in a relatively 
short time-succeed in carrying out the views which had 
been stated with regard to the detection and identification 
of five-kiloton explosions. We still believe that five-kiloton 
explosions can be detected and identified, but it seems to 
us that we should begin precisely by tackling this task. 
If from the outset we begin to try to tackle not only this 
task but alongside a second task, that of detecting and 
identifying much smaller explosions, I am afraid that we 
shall meet considerable difficulties, and we may fail in the 
solution of both tasks. 
This was perhaps the most candid public recognition on the part 
of any official Soviet representative in the test ban negotiations of 
the technical difficulties involved in the detection and identification 
of underground nuclear explosions. By implication the statement 
recognized that the technical situation had deteriorated since the 
summer of 1958 and the Conference of Experts. The statement 
also clearly implied that there would be a threshold below which 
nuclear explosions could not be detected. 
If the attitude of the Soviet scientists with respect to low-yield 
nuclear explosions is put alongside their position on decoupling, 
what they seemed to be saying is that they could not contemplate 
any experiments which might give proof that certain nuclear ex-
plosions could not be controlled without radically altering the 
60GEN/DNT/PV. 10, pp. 17-20. 
61GEN/DNT/SRPAG/PV. 10, p. 47. 
Chapter VIII 
The Collapse of the Conference 
I 
The Diplomats Resume 
Although there were sixty-eight meetings of the Geneva Conference 
on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests between May 27, 
when it reconvened after the collapse of the summit meeting, and 
December 5, 1960, when it recessed for the final time that year, 
and aiso for the final time during the Eisenhower Administration, 
little progress was made. The attempt to solve the differences be-
tween East and West relating to. the technical aspects of a control 
system for a test ban had failed. Agreement had not been achieved, 
and the attempt to bridge the disagreement through political com-
promise and scientific research had collapsed. 
American Policy: A Fixed Course 
President Eisenhower-like many Americans-was greatly dis-
heartened by the collapse of the summit meeting, and the obvious 
stalemate in the nuclear test ban talks. He virtually gave up hope 
of achieving a test ban treaty, and his views were shared by a 
number of American policy-makers. Nevertheless, Western, and 
more particularly American, policy seemed almost to have achieved 
a momentum of its own, and the policies established earlier in the 
negotiations were pursued with very little modification. 
There were several reasons for this. The manner in which the 
United States, at the end of 1959, had phrased its decision to 
continue the moratorium meant that a positive decision would be 
required to resume testing, and that in the absence of such a 
decision, the moratorium would continue. There were a number of 
inhibitions against taking a positive decision to resume testing 
nuclear weapons. On May 28, Chairman Khrushchev warned that 
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The Collapse of the Conference 263 
the USSR would resume nuclear testing if the United States did.1 
Moreover, during the late spring and early summer the Adminis-
tration wanted to avoid having the matter become involved in the 
politics of the presidential election. That it very nearly did become 
involved could be seen in the debate on the Republican platform in 
July.2 The Administration felt that to do anything other than main-
tain the status quo would affect, and perhaps in a disadvantageous 
way, the chances of the Republican presidential candidate. 
President Eisenhower decided, however, that if Richard Nixon 
won the presidential election, he, Eisenhower, would announce that 
the United States would resume nuclear testing. His purpose in 
doing this would be to spare his Republican successor the burden 
of taking this-in his view-unpopular step. When John F. Kennedy 
won the election, President Eisenhower felt that the decision should 
be left to him, particularly since Kennedy had stated on several 
occasions during the election that he favored continuing and in-
tensifying the effort to achieve a nuclear test ban. 
Another factor inhibiting the possibility of changing American 
policy concerning the nuclear test ban negotiations was that as the 
year went on East-West tension rose. On June 27, the USSR walked 
out of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Talks. The following month 
the Congo crisis erupted, and despite early unanimity, by late 
August the USSR and the United States were at loggerheads over 
their own and the UN's roles in these events. To take action such 
as resuming nuclear tests might jeopardize a remaining point of 
East-West contact and also further exacerbate relations between the 
two powers. Furthermore, these events tended to push other matters 
into the background and the attention of policy-makers was focused 
on them rather than on the test ban negotiations. 
In another way also, American policy had a momentum which 
carried it ahead in the previously set direction. Project Vela was 
now underway, and it represented a large and continuing effort. 
Not only were funds and people committed at this point, but also 
the promise that scientific research might yield means of circum-
venting the perceived technical difficulties remained. For all of these 
reasons then, American policy continued virtually without change. 
lNew York Times, May 29, 1960, p. 1. 
2See New York Times, July 24, 1960, p. 38; July 26, 1960, p. 21; and 
July 27, 1960, p. 17. 
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Safeguards: Some Revolutionary Concepts 
There were, however, some slight modifications in American 
policy. The original plan for the Vela Program had called for a 
series of underground nuclear explosions starting in the fall of 1960. 
As early as May 27, the USSR demanded precise information on 
the safeguards which would be established so that it could be certain 
that the experiments were not being used for weapons development 
purposes.3 The initial American proposal merely provided for: 
observation of the detonations; limitations on the instrumentation 
which could be used at the time of the detonation; and prior place-
ment of the devices which were to be detonated in a depository 
which would be guarded jointly.4 Representatives of the other side 
could examine only the exterior of the devices. 
The Soviet Union argued that this was insufficient and main-
tained that unless the Vela shots were carried out with appropriate 
safeguards, it would regard them as parts of a weapons development 
program, would consider that the moratorium had been broken, 
and would feel free to resume weapons testing itself.5 As Mr. 
Tsarapkin explained it, appropriate safeguards would involve full 
Soviet participation in the detonations, the right to inspect the in-
ternal structure of the devices used and to have a veto over the 
type of shots to be fired. He made it clear that the Soviet Union 
would not allow decoupled shots. 
This was where matters stood in mid-summer, 1960. Mean-
while the United States had gone ahead with its plans for chemical 
explosions and had invited the Soviet Union and the United King-
dom to send observers for a shot planned for July 14, with the 
stipulation that American scientists should receive reciprocal privi-
leges to observe chemical explosions in those two countries. On 
June 27, the USSR refu&ed to agree to this in the absence of agree-
ment on the overall research program, including the matter of 
safeguards, and Mr. Tsarapkin stated that the question of reci-
procity therefore did not arise. 6 The United States conducted the 
explosion with observers only from the United Kingdom. 
On July 12, the United States introduced a new proposal on 
3GEN/DNT/PV. 206, pp. 8-9. 
4GEN/DNT/PV. 208, pp. 3-9. 
5GEN/DNT/PV. 214, p. 7. 
6GEN/DNT/PV. 220, p. 12. 
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safeguards. It suggested that all three powers should put a number 
of outmoded weapons in a pool which would be under joint sur-
veillance and from which devices could be drawn for experimental 
detonations. 7 All three parties could inspect the internal structures 
of these devices. The United States Administration promised to seek 
changes in the Atomic Energy legislation so that this would be 
possible. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had been con-
sulted before the offer was made, and had given its tentative consent. 
Had the offer been accepted, and appropriate legislation adopted, a 
most interesting situation would have resulted, for the United 
States would have willingly revealed to its chief adversary in the 
Cold War secrets regarding nuclear weapons which it would not 
reveal to most of its allies. That policy-makers would even consider 
such action is an interesting commentary on the impact of nuclear 
weapons on international politics. 
Although Mr. Tsarapkin allowed that the new American 
position was a step forward, he asserted that as the USSR did 
not plan to conduct any nuclear explosions, it would not contribute 
any devices to the pool and thus would not reveal any of its nuclear 
weapons to the United States. Since the United States would not 
create a pool unilaterally, an impasse resulted, and consequently 
the proposed nuclear explosions in the Vela Program were post-
poned. 
One Agreement-Continuing Disagreements 
Soviet policy also was rather static during this period. Some 
of the same factors that were operative in the American case may 
have affected the USSR too. To some degree both sides were 
reluctant to act during the closing days of the Eisenhower Admin-
istration. In addition, during this period Sino-Soviet tensions deep-
ened, 8 and opposition to Chairman Khrushchev's policies may well 
have increased within the Soviet elite. Khrushchev's views on 
security policy, particularly those which he expressed in his January 
1960 speech concerning the composition of the Soviet armed forces, 
are known to have occasioned some controversy among Soviet 
7GEN/DNT/PV. 227, pp. 3 ff. 
8See Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961. 
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policy-makers.9 It is also possible that the Soviet leadership had 
already decided to resume nuclear testing, once preparations could 
be completed. 
One technical matter was resolved by the Geneva Conference 
during 1960: on July 2 7 the three parties agreed on a precise 
definition of 4.75 seismic magnitude.10 In view of the previous 
disputes on this issue, and if 4.75 were to be a threshold in a 
treaty, this agreement was relatively important, but little other 
progress was made. There continued to be disagreement on the 
size of the q~wta of on-site inspections, although on July 26 the 
Soviet Union finally advanced a concrete figure, 3.11 The criteria 
to be used for the initiation of on-site inspections and the degree 
of localization required were also in dispute. 
In addition, it became apparent that East and West had quite 
different conceptions of how many control posts would be required 
on each other's territories. On May 12, the United States had 
submitted a proposal which provided that the network of control 
posts would be established in three overlapping phases, each lasting 
four years, so that within six years the entire system would be in 
operation.l2 The first phase provided for 21 posts in the Soviet 
Union, 1 in the United Kingdom, 11 in the United States, and 2 
on ships and 12 on islands in the northern hemisphere. 
The Soviet Union responded to this proposal on August 11. 
It protested that the proposal did not provide in the first phase for 
control posts in the southern hemisphere, where it was known that 
the Western powers had carried out weapon tests. The USSR also 
complained that the proposal provided for too many posts in the 
Soviet Union and too few in the United States.13 The Soviet counter-
proposal envisaged the establishment in the first phase of 15 control 
posts in the Soviet Union, 11 in the United States, 1 in the United 
Kingdom, 7 in Australia, 20 on oceanic islands belonging to the 
United States and the United Kingdom, 2 in North America ex-
9See Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (1964), 
especially pp. 31-37. 
IOGEN/DNT/PV. 235. 
llGEN/DNT/PV. 234, p. 15. 
I2GEN/DNT/22/ Add. 1. 
13GEN/DNT/PV. 241, pp. 12-19. 
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elusive of the United States, 2 in Africa, and 10 on ships.14 In total, 
there would be 68 control posts, rather than 4 7 as in the American 
proposal. With a touch of irony, Mr. Tsarapkin supported the 
Soviet proposal by citing portions of Richard Latter's testimony 
before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in April 1960, and 
pointed out that Dr. Latter had assumed that there would be 14 
control posts in the United States, rather than 11 as the United 
States proposed.15 No progress was made toward resolving these 
difficulties during 1960. 
In the discussion of the installation of the control· posts, another 
related difference became apparent. In November, Mr. Tsarapkin 
made it known that the Soviet Union would not allow any on-site 
inspections until the conclusion of the first phase in the installation 
of control posts, a process which in its view would take four 
years.16 The Western powers, on the other hand, envisaged the first 
phase as being divided into two two-year periods, and maintained 
that on-site inspections could and should begin at the end of the 
first period. This difference also remained unresolved. 
The Acrimonious Fifteenth General Assembly 
The deteriorating atmosphere of the Geneva Conference was 
evident in the conduct of the United States and the USSR in the 
fifteenth session of the General Assembly in the fall of 1960. Both 
gave detailed expositions and justifications of their positions.11 The 
debate was acrimonious. Poland submitted a resolution which would 
have placed the question of the cessation of nuclear tests before a 
special session of the General Assembly if agreement were not 
reached by April 1, 1961, and which would have requested the 
nuclear powers to maintain the moratorium on testing until an 
agreement had been achieved.18 The resolution also contained 
several provisions aimed at preventing the dispersion of nuclear 
weapons capability, some of which might have been construed as 
directed against NATO programs then in effect. Because of a pro-
14GEN/DNT/104. 
15GEN/DNT/PV. 256, p. 10. 
16GEN/DNT/PV. 270, pp. 11-12. 
17UN, General Assembly, First Committee, Official Records (15th 
Session), pp. 190-92, 193-95. 
lBUN Document A/C. 1/L. 252. 
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cedural decision, this resolution was not put to the vote; however, 
three other resolutions relating more or less directly to the Geneva 
Conference were. 
The first of these was a resolution submitted by Ireland con-
cerning the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weap-
ons. The second was a resolution offered by Austria, India, and 
Sweden urging the states which were engaged in the test ban 
negotiations to press toward agreement and to continue their 
voluntary moratorium on testing. The third, sponsored by twenty-five 
African and Asian states and Venezuela, also made these same 
requests.19 
The three resolutions were all adopted by large majorities: 68 
to 9, with 26 abstentions; 72 to 0, with 5 abstentions; and 67 to 
11, with 11 abstentions, respectively. The Soviet Union voted for 
all three resolutions, the United Kingdom abstained on the first, 
but voted for the second and third, and the United States abstained 
on all three. The position of the Western powers on the first reso-
lution was determined by the French attitude. The French remained 
adamant in their determination to acquire a nuclear capability and 
detonated their third nuclear explosion on December 27, 1960. 
The United States abstained on the last two resolutions because 
it felt that the language of the three power draft implied that the 
unresolved issues in the Geneva Conference were unimportant, and 
because both asked for a continuation of the moratorium. As the 
votes indicate, the United States was as distant from the main-stream 
of majority sentiment in the United Nations concerning this issue 
as it ever had been, or would be, during the test ban negotiations. 
Matters relating to these negotiations, however, were largely 
submerged in the broader issues that gripped the Assembly. The 
Soviet proposal for General and Complete Disarmament, a follow-
up to Chairman Khrushchev's suggestion at the previous session of 
the Assembly, was debated heatedly and at length, but without 
resolution. Chairman Khrushchev's attack on Secretary General 
Hammarskjold and demand for a reorganization of the upper levels 
of the Secretariat, a product of the Congo crisis, was also in the 
forefront, and this controversy carried over into the Geneva Con-
ference. 
19See General Assembly Resolutions 1576 {XV), 1577 {XV), and 
1578 {XV). 
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II 
The Kennedy Administration: A Renewed Effort 
Reappraising of the American Position 
269 
On January 20, 1961, when the Kennedy Administration assumed 
power, American policy in the test ban negotiations seemed to 
have reached a dead end. The Geneva talks were clearly dead-
locked, and, as evidenced by the voting on these issues in the 
fifteenth General Assembly, United States policy obviously com-
manded little worldwide support. Even the United Kingdom, 
America's partner in the Geneva negotiations, did not vote with 
the United States. These facts alone would have made a new 
administration reappraise past policies. Further, as a Senator and 
a presidential candidate, John F. Kennedy had been highly critical 
of the Eisenhower Administration's policies relating to disarmament 
and arms control. 20 During the presidential campaign, he had 
written a letter to Thomas E. Murray in which he had pledged that 
if he were elected, the United States would not be the first to begin 
atmospheric tests, and that if the Geneva Conference were still in 
progress when he assumed office, he would direct "vigorous ne-
gotiation . . . in the hope of concluding a realistic and effective 
agreement."21 He had also stated that he would direct the Atomic 
Energy Commission to prepare for underground testing, and if 
agreement were not reached within a reasonable period, he would 
order the resumption of underground testing. 
Even before his inauguration, President Kennedy appointed 
John J. McCloy-a prominent Republican-as his adviser on 
disarmament. Five days after the inauguration, the United States 
Disarmament Administration, a unit within the Department of State 
created in September 1960, and the forerunner of the United States 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, announced the appoint-
ment of a panel headed by Dr. James B. Fisk, to study and review 
the technical aspects of the test ban negotiations. 22 A few days 
20See, for example, his remarks at the University of New Hampshire, 
Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 58-65. See also John F. Kennedy 
(Allan Nevins, ed.), The Strategy of Peace (New York: Harper, 1960), pp. 
19-30. 
21Documents on Disarmament, 1960, p. 289. 
22The other members of the panel were Dr. Hans A. Bethe; General 
Austin W. Betts, Division of Military Applications, Atomic Energy Commis-
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later, the President named Arthur Dean-usually considered a 
Republican-as United States Representative to the Geneva Con-
ference. Other personnel changes also resulted from the inaugura-
tion of the new Administration. From the point of view of the 
nuclear test ban negotiations, the most important of the new officials 
were: Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Robert S. McNamara, Sec-
retary of Defense; Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic 
Energy Commission; and Jerome B. Wiesner, Special Assistant to 
the President for Science and Technology. Dr. Wiesner, in particu-
lar, was deeply worried about the nuclear arms race and committed 
to making every possible effort to obtain measures of arms control 
and disarmament. He had also been critical of past American 
policy. In an article published in the fall of 1960 he had stated 
that " ... the West has always been suspicious of Soviet proposals, 
and furthermore has generally been ultraconservative in the in-
spection requirements it places upon any system."23 
On balance, the new policy-makers probably contributed 
more to the reformulation of American policy than the technical 
review, which was after all conducted by the same scientists who 
had been active in the Eisenhower Administration. Moreover, at 
this date, early 1961, Project Vela had produced very little. Various 
close observers have noted how important the change in personnel 
at the top policy-making echelons was. Sir Michael Wright, the 
sometime British representative in the negotiations has asserted 
that President Kennedy took decisions on issues ". . . over which 
the previous administration had been hesitating, in some cases for 
sion; Dr. Harold Brown, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore, Califor-
nia; Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Office of the Special Assistant to the President 
for Science and Technology; Dr. Richard Latter, the RAND Corporation; 
General Herbert B. Loper, Office of Secretary of Defense, Department of 
Defense; Dr. J. Carson Mark, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratories; Doyle 
Northrup, Air Force Technical Application Center, Department of Defense; 
Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, High Energy Physics Laboratory, Stanford 
University; Dr. Frank Press, Seismological Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, California; General Alfred D. Starbird, Division 
of Military Applications, Atomic Energy Commission; and Dr. Herbert F. 
York, Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense. In addi-
tion, there were observers from interested government agencies and de-
partments. 
23Jerome B. Wiesner, "Comprehensive Arms-Limitation Systems," 
Daedalus (Fall 1960), pp. 915-50, at 917-18. 
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a year or even two years."24 And Earl H. Voss has written that 
with the inauguration of the Kennedy Administration, for the first 
time a United States administration " ... agreed within its own 
house on a complete program for ending nuclear tests. "25 
To facilitate the review of American policy, President Kennedy 
requested that the resumption of the Geneva negotiations be de-
layed. 
The new American position was approved by the President and 
discussed with the United Kingdom toward the end of February. 
When the Geneva Conference resumed on March 21, Ambassador 
Dean presented the broad outlines of the new position,26 and, on 
April 18, jointly with the United Kingdom representative, he 
tabled a draft treaty embodying the new proposals. 27 This was the 
first time that the United States had tabled a complete treaty. As 
in the past, prior to their formal presentation, several aspects of 
the new American position were discussed in the Western press. 
So far as technical matters were concerned, the changes in 
the United States position were not major. The United States still 
envisaged a threshold treaty which would not cover events of less 
than 4.75 seismic magnitude. It was, however, willing to ban all 
tests at high altitudes and in outer space. The United States urged 
the Soviet Union to reconsider its opposition to backscatter radar, 
but it proposed a control system based on the principal recom-
mendations of Technical Working Group I. The United States' 
views on the length of the moratorium and on events not covered 
by the treaty were modified somewhat. It now proposed that the 
research program and the moratorium should be coterminous, each 
lasting three years from the date of the signature of the Treaty. The 
United States was also willing to accept the Soviet position on 
safeguards on research explosions; that is, it was willing to agree 
that, if the United States alone conducted nuclear explosions, Soviet 
scientists could examine American nuclear devices without the 
USSR's giving American scientists reciprocal privileges. Ambassador 
Dean stated that the President would request that the Atomic En-
ergy Act be amended so that this could be implemented. In terms 
24Disarm and Verify, p. 127. 
25Nuclear Ambush, p. 459. 
26QEN/DNT/PV. 274, pp. 16-27. 
27QEN/DNT/110 and corr. 1. 
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of implications for traditional friend-foe relationships in world 
politics, this change made the American proposal even more extra-
ordinary, and underscored again the impact of nuclear weapons on 
the nature of politics and relations among states. The American 
position continued to be that a quota of 20 on-site inspections 
would be necessary for the Soviet Union, but it was willing for 
quotas of 20 to be assigned to both of the Western powers. The 
United States was also willing to alter the proposed distribution of 
control posts in Asia, so that there would be a total of 19 control 
posts in the Soviet Union, rather than 21. 
In sum, the United States sought to meet the Soviet position 
by offering various compromises on points to which the USSR had 
objected in the past. Much of this was the result of a careful study 
of the record of the negotiations through 1960 by Ambassador 
Dean and others. With respect to the basic technical issues which 
had divided the Conference, however, little modification was made 
in the Western position. The new Administration, like its predeces-
sor, felt bound by the "facts" as they were then understood. 
Soviet Disengagement: "Troika" and France 
Much to the disappointment of the new Administration, the 
changes in the American position were without effect in terms of 
advancing the negotiations. Though it did little to soften the blow, 
this result was predicted even before the Geneva Conference re-
sumed. 28 The Soviet attitude toward the test ban negotiations ap-
pears to have shifted significantly by this time, and apparently 
Chairman Khrushchev forecast this on March 9 in a lengthy inter-
view with the American Ambassador in the USSR, Llewelyn E. 
Thompson. 
Mr. Tsarapkin's opening speech in the Conference on March 
21 dramatically demonstrated how much the Soviet position had 
changed. 29 After a bitter ex parte account of the negotiations, he 
stated that on the basis of the Soviet Union's experience in "other 
international organizations" the USSR now felt that "the single 
administrator of the control system should be replaced by a collec-
tive executive organ, in which the three main groups of States would 
28See New York Times, March 20, 1961, p. 1. 
29GEN/DNT/PV. 274, pp. 3-16. 
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be equally represented and invested with equal rights. "30 In other 
words, Chairman Khrushchev's suggestion for the reorganization 
of the upper levels of the Secretariat of the United Nations was 
now applied to the proposed control system. This was the first 
time that this issue had permeated the Geneva Conference. 
In addition, Mr. Tsarapkin raised the question of the French 
tests of nuclear weapons. His exact words bear analysis, for they 
were certainly scrutinized with care by American policy-makers. 
In conducting nuclear weapons tests, the French Gov-
ernment is actively spurring on the nuclear armaments 
race. If this development of events is not checked, the 
number of States possessing nuclear weapons will rapidly 
grow. In that case, it will be much more difficult to reach 
agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests, and all 
the more difficult to reach agreement on disarmament. 
At the same time the French nuclear explosions re-
veal the true meaning of the position which the Govern-
ments of the United States and the United Kingdom have 
taken up at our Conference, namely, by endlessly dragging 
out the discussions on the discontinuance of nuclear wea-
pon tests, they, that is the United States and the United 
Kingdom, have provided their NATO ally-France-with 
time in which to conduct further nuclear weapon tests. 
All this looks very much like what one might term a 
"division of labour" among the allies. We cannot ignore 
in our negotiations the fact that in conducting nuclear 
weapon tests, France as a member of NATO can, in line 
with her commitments to her allies within the NATO 
framework, carry out for other members of this military 
group--in other words on behalf of the United States and 
the United Kingdom-definite work in connexion with the 
improvement of nuclear weapons and perhaps even the 
creation of new types of weapons. Such activity by the 
Western countries, while the Soviet Union is honestly ful-
filling its commitment not to conduct nuclear tests, cannot 
be viewed in any other way except as a desire by the 
Western Powers to obtain for themselves one-sided ad-
vantages. All this threatens to nullify the possibility of 
concluding a treaty and to render it pointless. 31 
30fbid., p. 14. 
Sl[bid., pp. 15-16. 
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It was difficult to know whether the USSR interjected this issue as 
a pretext to justify actions taken for other reasons or because of 
genuine concern. In one sense, the innuendo contained in the state-
ment, that France was conducting nuclear weapons tests for the 
United Kingdom and the United States-which was subsequently 
turned into an outright allegation-was blatantly false and the 
Soviet Government clearly must have been aware of this. The 
French explosions were caused by technically simple devices, not 
the sophisticated mechanisms that the United Kingdom and the 
United States would be interested in testing, and the Soviet national 
monitoring system must have given Soviet leaders data that would 
indicate this fact. 
If the statement were approached somewhat less literally, and 
a good case could be made for searching for allegorical meanings 
in Soviet statements, it perhaps had more significance. Even with-
out elaborate inference, the meaning of the first paragraph is fairly 
clear and the proposition which it contains is almost axiomatic. 
Moreover, the development of a nuclear capability by France 
probably had implications for the dispersion of nuclear weapons 
capabilities within the Soviet bloc, and especially it may have fanned 
the desire of Communist China to acquire a nuclear capability. By 
this time, the USSR had refused to assist the Chinese in gaining an 
independent nuclear capability, and in mid-1960 all Soviet economic 
and military advisers and technicians had been withdrawn from 
China.32 
With respect to the second paragraph, although it was true 
that the Soviet Union should have been able to tell that the devices 
that France had detonated were unsophisticated, and therefore of 
little or no interest to the United Kingdom and the United States, 
as the French weapons program progressed, at some future point, 
such discrimination might not be as easy. Moreover, the mere fact 
that France was developing a nuclear weapons capability had im-
plications for the overall strength of NATO in relation to the War-
saw Pact, regardless of the initial lack of sophistication of these 
weapons. 
32Alice Langley Hsieh, "The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue, 1963," 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (June 1964), pp. 99-115, at 
p. 113. 
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Thus it was quite plausible that the continued testing of nuclear 
weapons by France might be a matter of serious concern to the 
Soviet Union. If stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to "nth" 
countries was a motivating factor in Soviet policy with respect to 
the Geneva negotiations, the French action probably decreased the 
attractiveness of the negotiations, or of a test ban, for it indicated 
how weak an instrument these devices were and might be for con-
trolling the spread. If the USSR were genuinely concerned about 
the French nuclear weapons development program, the fourth deton-
ation in the program on April 25, 1961, probably served to heighten 
Soviet fears and to dramatize the fact that the United Kingdom and 
the United States could not or would not restrain the French. 
Mr. Tsarapkin's speech signaled a sharp change in the Soviet 
conduct in the negotiations. From that point on the USSR was 
increasingly intransigent. The stalemate was obvious, but at this 
point the motivations for Soviet behavior were not. Were the con-
cerns which Mr. Tsarapkin mentioned the explanation for Soviet 
conduct, or merely pretexts to cover courses chosen for other 
reasons? Did the USSR expect still further concessions, or was it 
seeking to provoke the West into breaking off the negotiations?33 
Within the United States, pressures to resume nuclear testing 
mounted.34 
For the time being, however, the Kennedy Administration 
stuck to its determination to try to achieve a test ban, and refused 
to accept the most pessimistic interpretations of Soviet behavior .. 
On May 29, Ambassador Dean suggested a new approach to the 
problem of the quota for on-site inspections. 85 He proposed that 
the quota should be established on the basis of a sliding scale, 
and that the quota for the USSR should range from 12 to 20. The 
lower number would prevail if there were not more than sixty 
located seismic events of magnitude 4.75 or above during the year. 
The quota would rise by one for each five located seismic events of 
magnitude 4.75 or above; beyond 60, however, no more than 20 
on-site inspections would be authorized under any circumstances. 
Even with the personnel of the new Administration, achieving con-
S3Earl H. Voss favors the latter interpretation; see Nuclear Ambush, 
p. 460. 
S4See ibid., pp. 462-63. 
85QEN/DNT/PV. 311, pp. 3-11. 
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sensus on this new position had been difficult, yet it and other 
Western concessions were ignored. 
When President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev met in 
Vienna on June 3 and 4 for a general discussion of critical world 
problems, the test ban negotiations seemed to be completely dead-
locked. The talks between the two leaders did not change this 
situation, in fact, at the conclusion of the discussions the chances 
of a test ban treaty seemed even more remote than they had pre-
viously. Khrushchev insisted that any more than three on-site 
inspections per year would constitute espionage and argued that the 
Congo crisis had demonstrated the necessity for a "troika" arrange-
ment in the control organization.35a Kennedy attempted to counter 
these points and stressed the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Khrush-
chev in return depreciated the importance of a test ban as an isolated 
measure of arms control. He did tell Kennedy, however, that the 
USSR would not resume nuclear testing until the United States did, 
and Gromyko said the same thing to Rusk. 35b 
During the course of the conversations, Chairman Khrush-
chev handed President Kennedy an aide memoire which reiter-
ated the general Soviet position as enunciated in the Geneva Con-
ference. It went on to suggest that the difficulties facing the nego-
tiators could be eased, and implied that the Soviet proposal for a 
"troika" would be dropped, if the problems of a test ban and 
general and complete disarmament were solved simultaneously. 36 
The Soviet Union seemed to be saying that the West could only 
obtain the controls which it argued were necessary for a test ban 
treaty in the context of general and complete disarmament. Subse-
quent questioning in Geneva and diplomatic correspondence brought 
out that this was indeed the Soviet position. In Geneva, the questions 
led to an acrimonious exchange. Now, in contrast to the situation 
prior to January 1959, it was the Soviet Union rather than the West 
which insisted that a test ban could only be considered in combination 
35aDetailed accounts of the Vienna meeting can be found in Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House 
(1965), pp. 369-72, and Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy (1965), pp. 549 and 
617-18. 
35bArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 398, and Theodore 
C. Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 617-18. 
36Geneva Conference, pp. 538-42. 
The Collapse of the Conference 277 
with other measures of disarmament. The circle was closed! As the 
talks dragged on in Geneva through the summer of 1961, Ambassa-
dor Dean became increasingly convinced that they were fruitless and 
that the USSR was preparing to resume nuclear testing. He cabled his 
views to the Department of State. Several policy-makers and observers 
shared his opinion. 
To Test or Not To Test 
In this atmosphere, further darkened by the developing Berlin 
crisis, the pressure in the United States for ending the moratorium on 
nuclear testing mounted, and this pressure was alluded to in the 
various exchanges. As early as February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had 
urged the President to resume testing if agreement were not reached 
within sixty days of negotiations. 36a The Joint Chiefs favored atmos-
pheric testing. The Department of Defense, though, would have 
limited the resumption to underground testing. There were also 
pressures from Congress, especially from the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, from the press and from public opinion. A Gallup 
Poll in July 1961 showed more than two-to-one public support for 
the United States unilaterally resuming testing. 
As a response to the pressure, and also to gain advice, on 
June 28, President Kennedy announced the formation through the 
President's Science Advisory Committee of an eleven-man ad hoc 
panel, headed by Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, to review technical 
questions connected with the problem of nuclear testing. 37 Their 
mandate was to consider whether or not the Soviet Union could be 
conducting clandestine nuclear tests during the moratorium, and 
what progress the USSR could make through such tests. The group 
36aFor accounts of these pressures see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A 
Thousand Days, pp. 454-58, and Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 618. 
37The other members of the panel were William 0. Baker, Vice Presi-
dent, Bell Telephone Laboratories; Hans A. Bethe, Professor of Physics, 
Cornell University; Norris E. Bradbury, Director, Los Alamos Scientific 
Laboratory; James B. Fisk, President, Bell Telephone Laboratories; John S. 
Foster, Director, University of California Radiation Laboratory; George B. 
Kistiakowsky, Professor of Chemistry, Harvard University; Frank Press, 
Director, Seismological Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, Pasa-
dena, California; Louis H. Roddis, President, Pennsylvania Electric Co.; 
John W. Tukey, Professor of Mathematics, Princeton University; Walter H. 
Zinn, Vice-President, Nuclear Division, Combustion Engineering, Inc. 
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was also asked to consider what progress the United States could 
make if it resumed nuclear testing, and what would happen if both 
sides resumed testing. In connection with the last question the panel 
was specifically asked to estimate the possibility of the Soviet Union's 
overcoming the United States' lead in nuclear weapons. 
This panel did not complete its work until early August 1961. 
Meanwhile, no decision was taken to resume nuclear testing, nor 
were large-scale preparations made for such a contingency. When 
the Panofsky Panel reported to the President and the National Secur-
ity Council it concluded that " ... it was feasible for the Soviet Union 
to have conducted secret tests, that there was no evidence that it had 
done so (or had not done so), and that there was no urgent technical 
need for immediate resumption by the United States."37a The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff filed a paper questioning the premises and the con-
clusions of the Panel's report. In the ensuing discussion, they and 
certain scientists, such as JohnS. Foster, the Director of the Lawrence 
Radiation Laboratory, argued for at least a limited resumption of 
nuclear testing underground. However, the President rejected their 
advice. During this period the Western position in the test ban 
negotiations seemed to enjoy considerable support among the gov-
ernments of the world and in the world press, and the Adminis-
tration decided that it should continue to attempt to capitalize 
on this. On July 15, the Western powers had requested that an 
item entitled "The Urgent Need for a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weap-
ons Tests Under Effective International Control" be inscribed on 
the agenda of the sixteenth session of the General Assembly.38 For 
the United States to resume testing would obviously hamper West-
ern efforts to muster support in the forthcoming Assembly. More-
over, the heads of state or government of twenty-five nonaligned 
states were scheduled to meet in Belgrade from September 1 through 
September 6. For the United States to decide to resume testing 
would risk condemnation by this group. 
The United States not only did not decide to resume nuclear 
weapons testing, it did not even make preparations to do so. Presi-
dent Kennedy decided that in the relatively open conditions in 
which policy is formulated in the United States, one must decide 
37aArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 456. 
3SUN Document A/4799. 
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either to test or not to test. Preparations as extensive as those 
which would be required for a major test series could probably 
not be kept secret, and if they became known, he reasoned, they 
would surely be interpreted as indicating a decision to test, and the 
United States would suffer from all of the adverse consequences 
that it would have faced had it actually decided to resume nuclear 
testing. However, in mid-August, President Kennedy concluded that 
sometime later in the fall, the Atomic Energy Commission might 
announce contingency preparations for underground testing, although 
this would not mean that the United States had decided to resume 
tests. ssa 
It is true that as a part of the Vela and peaceful uses pro-
grams some preparations were made for underground nuclear test-
ing in Nevada. This work consisted principally of readying tunnels, 
and in Geneva the United States sought to negotiate safeguards 
to assure the Soviet Union that the projected detonations would 
not involve weapons development. 
To prove that the United States was not preparing a weapons 
testing program, in the summer of 1961 Ambassador Dean and 
Mr. John J. McCloy, Special Advisor to the President on Disarma-
ment, offered to allow a team of Soviet or neutral experts to examine 
American testing sites to determine the extent of American prepara-
tions for the resumption of testing, if any, provided that the USSR 
would give the United States reciprocal privileges.39 On several 
occasions, the proposal was rejected as "impractical." The reasons 
for the suggestion's impracticality soon emerged. 
Actually Chairman Khrushchev hinted at these reasons in his 
meeting with Mr. McCloy. He told Mr. McCloy "that Soviet sci-
entists and military leaders were urging the testing of a 1 00-megaton 
bomb that could be carried in a rocket."40 Mr. McCloy, of course, 
cabled these words to the President. They were another fore-
warning. 
The only action that was taken in response to the warnings 
of Mr. McCloy, Ambassador Dean, and others was to step up 
38aArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, pp. 458-59. 
39See GEN/DNT/PV. 341, p. 75, and John J. McCloy, "Balance Sheet 
on Disarmament," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XL, No. 3 (April 1962), pp. 339-
59, at 342, note 2. 
40Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, p. 467. 
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American surveillance of the Soviet Union, to the extent that this 
could be done. 
In Geneva, at the negotiating table, the United States even 
offered new concessions. Ambassador Dean presented these to the 
Conference on August 28.41 He offered to eliminate the 4.75 
seismic magnitude threshold in the treaty, if the Soviet Union 
would agree to increasing the number of manned or unmanned 
control posts or of on-site inspections. Alternatively, if the threshold 
were kept, he proposed that six months prior to the expiration of 
the moratorium, a panel composed of one scientist from each of 
the countries on the Control Commission should be convened to 
propose recommendations on improved instrumentation, and on 
lowering the threshold. As was no doubt expected, the USSR re-
buffed these suggestions, arguing that the problems could only be 
solved in the context of general and complete disarmament. 
III 
The Coup de Grace 
The USSR Breaks the Moratorium 
At 12:30 p.m. on Thursday, August 30, 1961, the three-hundred-
and-thirty-eighth session of the Geneva Conference adjourned. Like 
countless meetings before it, it had produced no resolution of the 
stalemate. On the other hand, the three delegates gave no indication 
that their governments were about to break off or in any way disrupt 
the negotiations. The next meeting was scheduled for Friday, 
September 1. Thursday evening, however, the torporific atmosphere 
of the negotiations was broken when Moscow radio announced that 
the USSR had decided to resume the testing of nuclear weapons. 42 
The statement denigrated the importance of a test ban as a sole 
measure of arms control, and it cited the French nuclear tests and 
the tension surrounding the German and Berlin problems as the 
reasons for the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing. It disclosed 
that the USSR had worked out designs for creating a series of 
"superpowerful nuclear bombs" of from 20 to 100 megatons. 
On September 1, 1961, the Soviet Union tested the first 
41GEN/DNT/PV. 337, pp. 3-14. 
42U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Dis-
armament, 1961 (1962), pp. 337-43. 
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nuclear device in what was to become its most extensive series of 
tests, a series which would involve the largest nuclear detonations 
ever conducted, and which experts estimate must have taken a 
minimum of six months, and more likely a year or more to pre-
pare. It is possible that the USSR began preparing for this test 
series shortly after the collapse of the summit meeting in late May 
1960. Clearly preparations must have been underway by the time 
that the Kennedy Administration completed its reappraisal of the 
American position and tabled the new Western proposals, that is, 
by March 21, 1961. This is not to say, however, that the decision 
to conduct the test series must have been taken by then. That de-
cision could well have been delayed until shortly before the first 
detonation in the series. Meanwhile, in sharp contrast to the situa-
tion in the United States, the preparations could be conducted in 
secret. 
Little mention was made of the tests in the Soviet press. Sig-
nificantly, the USSR also tested several intercontinental ballistic 
missiles during September 1961, which roused the suspicion that 
the two developments were related, that they were designed to 
perfect a new series of ballistic missiles and their warheads as 
Chairman Khrushchev's talk with Mr. McCloy had forewarned. 
The Western Riposte 
The Western response was swift. Shortly after the Soviet 
statement, the White House issued a statement condemning the 
USSR's decision to break the moratorium. 
Although he was bitterly disappointed, and felt personally 
deceived, President Kennedy chose this course, and did not follow the 
advice of those, including apparently Secretary of State Rusk, who 
argued that the United States should immediately announce its inten-
tion to resume testing. 42a The rationale for the decision taken was 
that the United States should not do anything that might deflect the 
opprobrium of public opinion from the Soviet deed. Edward R. 
Murrow was the most articulate spokesman against precipitate action. 
Kennedy, and Vice-President Johnson too, felt that they could with-
42aSee Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, pp. 449-50, 459, 
and Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 619-20. 
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stand for a while the pressure of those in the Senate and elsewhere 
who demanded a more belligerent course. 
On September 3, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Mac-
millan proposed that the United States, the United Kingdom, and the 
USSR immediately agree not to conduct nuclear tests "which take 
place in the atmosphere and produce radioactive fallout."43 This 
agreement would require no international control measures, and the 
Western leaders proposed that representatives of the three states meet 
in Geneva not later than September 9 to sign the agreement. This pro-
posal was almost revolutionary in terms of past Western positions. For 
the first time, the West announced its willingness to accept a ban 
on testing in some environments, without the establishment of any 
international control machinery. Never before had the Western pow-
ers admitted that national detection systems would be sufficient. 
Whenever the Western powers discussed a partial ban previously, 
they always maintained that at least some international control 
machinery would be necessary. Some in the West, Senator Gore for 
instance, had argued against this position from the outset. While 
the Kennedy-Macmillan proposal won some immediate sympathy, 
it also served to undermine past Western positions, and would 
make it difficult for the Western powers to return-as they sub-
sequently did-to the claim that international machinery would 
be necessary to control atmospheric testing. The proposal also 
meant that the Western powers were willing to allow the USSR to 
realize whatever gains it might achieve from its tests without at-
tempting to match them through a counter-series. 
The Kennedy-Macmillan proposal was formulated in Secretary 
of State Rusk's office by a small group of British and American 
policy-makers al}d advisers. Their prime objective was to embarrass 
the USSR. The proposal was a serious offer, which the participants in 
the sessions were willing to implement. Indeed, somewhat earlier, the 
American ambassador in Moscow, Llewellyn Thompson, had sug-
gested that the West should try again for a limited ban, prohibiting 
tests in the atmosphere and under water, and President Kennedy had 
relayed this suggestion to Prime Minister Macmillan in a letter in 
early August. 43" On the other hand, none of those who formulated 
43Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 351. 
43aArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 459. 
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the September 3 proposal seriously expected the USSR to accept it. 
Nor did any among them see much prospect for fruitful negotiation 
in the future. Although the effects of the proposal on past and possi-
ble future Western positions were discussed, because of the immediate 
objective and the expectations about the future, such effects were 
accorded little weight in the final decision. 
Chairman Khrushchev scornfully rejected the Kennedy-Mac-
millan proposal on September 9. Following this, the Western pow-
ers asked for a recess in the Geneva Conference until the decisions 
of the sixteenth General Assembly were known. 
On September 5, President Kennedy announced that he had 
"ordered the resumption of nuclear tests in the laboratory and 
underground, with no fallout. "44 The first American test since 
1958 took place on September 15. The test series which followed 
was minor. The United States was not prepared to conduct major 
experiments! Indeed, it was not until November 2 that President 
Kennedy announced that atmospheric tests might be necessary and 
that preparations were being made. On April 24, 1962, after the 
Geneva Conference had ended, he announced that he had author-
ized atmospheric tests, and the first American atmospheric test 
was conducted the following day. The British did not resume 
nuclear tests until their underground shot on March 1, 1962. 
Whether because of the quick United States decision to resume 
underground nuclear tests, or because of a feeling that the United 
States bore an equal or greater share of the blame for the fact that 
a test ban agreement had not been achieved (a feeling to which 
the Kennedy-Macmillan proposal for a nationally monitored at-
mospheric ban contributed in a curious way), or because of a more 
general reluctance to condemn one side, and especially the Soviet 
side in the Cold War, the neutral nations in Belgrade, while be-
moaning the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing, were almost 
equally critical of the United States. This behavior angered President 
Kennedy. 4411 
The Sixteenth General Assembly 
The West was somewhat more successful in mustering support 
in the General Assembly of the United Nations. On October 27 
44Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 355. 
44aTheodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 538. 
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the Assembly adopted a resolution requesting the USSR to refrain 
from conducting a proposed atmospheric test of a nuclear device 
of 50 megatons or more.45 Only the Soviet bloc and Cuba opposed 
this resolution, and Mali abstained, but all other UN Member 
States voted for it. Despite this, on October 30, the USSR carried 
out its test of the "superpowerful" bomb. Subsequent evaluations 
estimated its yield as 58 megatons, but Hans Bethe, who headed the 
ABC panel which evaluated the Soviet test series pointed out that 
had the fusion materials been encased in uranium rather than lead, 
its yield would have been 100 megatons or more. 46 
The Assembly also adopted, by a vote of 71 to 11 (Soviet bloc 
and Cuba) with 15 abstentions, a resolution submitted by the 
United Kingdom and the United States entitled "The Urgent Need 
for a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons Tests Under Effective Inter-
national Control."47 This resolution, in a sense, gave the Assembly's 
sanction to the Western position in the test ban negotiations. This 
was the first time that this had happened. 
The United States and the United Kingdom voted for a resolu-
tion submitted by Ireland on the prevention of the dissemination 
of nuclear weapons. 48 This resolution was very similar to that 
which Ireland had submitted and which the Assembly had adopted 
the previous year, and on which the United States had abstained. 
The affirmative American vote at the sixteenth Assembly was an-
other sign of the way in which the position of the Kennedy Ad-
ministration on these matters differed from that of its predecessor. 
Some of the Assembly's other actions in this general area 
were not as pleasing to the West, however. The two Western powers 
abstained from voting on a resolution which was submitted by 
several African states urging that states consider and respect the 
continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone, 49 since to favor such 
a resolution would implicitly condemn the French for their nuclear 
tests in the Sahara. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 55 
to 0 with 44 abstentions. 
45Qeneral Assembly Resolution 1632 (XVI). 
46Speech delivered at Cornell University January 5, 1962. Reprinted in 
the Congressional Record (1962), pp. A1397-99. See also Ralph E. Lapp, 
Kill and Overkill: The Strategy of Annihilation ( 1962), pp. 36-37. 
47Qeneral Assembly Resolution 1649 (XVI). 
48General Assembly Resolution 1665 (XVI). 
49Qeneral Assembly Resolution 1653 (XVI). 
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The United Kingdom and the United States also voted against 
a resolution which had originally been submitted by India, but 
which was ultimately sponsored by several states, urging the states 
concerned to resume the moratorium on nuclear testing and to 
maintain it until the adoption of a test ban treaty. 50 The 20 states 
which voted against this resolution were a curious combination of 
the Soviet bloc and the West; 71 states voted for the resolution, 
while 8 abstained. 
Finally, the United States and the United Kingdom voted 
against a far-reaching resolution which declared inter alia that: 
(a) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is 
contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United 
Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter 
of the United Nations. 
(d) Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons 
is to be considered as violating the Charter of the 
United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of 
humanity and as committing a crime against man-
kind and civilization. 51 
The resolution, which had been submitted by several neutralist 
states, garnered 60 favorable votes, including those of the Soviet 
bloc. Sixteen states voted against it, and 25 abstained. In a sense, 
this resolution could be interpreted as a broad attack on the basic 
concepts underlying Western military policy. 
Whether on balance the United States could be said to have 
achieved important gains in terms of mustering world support for 
its position and against that of the Soviet Union is difficult to say. 
Certainly the United States fared better in the sixteenth session 
than it had the year before in the fifteenth, but it was far from 
an unblemished victory. And it is worth noting that President Ken-
nedy rejected the advice of Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleve-
land, who argued that the United States should bring the Soviet 
resumption of testing before the Security Council. His reasoning was 
that it would look hypocritical for the United States to take such 
action if it had already decided to resume testing itself. 518 
50General Assembly Resolution 1648 (XVI). 
51General Assembly Resolution 1653 (XVI). 
5laArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 481. 
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The End of the Conference 
After the passage of the Assembly resolutions on the test ban 
negotiations, the United States proposed that the Geneva negotia-
tions be resumed, and the Soviet Union in due course agreed. The 
Conference therefore reconvened on November 28, 1961. Thirteen 
meetings were held between then and January 29, 1962, when the 
Geneva Conference finally recessed sine die. 
The day before the Conference reconvened, the Soviet Govern-
ment issued a statement, which was published in the world press 
and which Mr. Tsarapkin subsequently read into the record. 52 The 
essence of this statement was that the situation had changed rad-
ically since the test ban negotiations had begun, and that if the 
negotiations were to continue, they would have to do so on a new 
basis. Consequently, the USSR proposed the immediate conclusion 
of an agreement "for the discontinuance of nuclear tests in the 
atmosphere, under water and in outer space," to be monitored by 
national detection systems. The statement cited the Western pro-
posal of September 3 as evidence that national systems were ade-
quate. In addition, the USSR proposed that there should be a 
moratorium on underground tests, "pending agreement on a system 
of control over underground explosions as a constituent part of 
an international system of control over the implementation of a 
programme of general and complete disarmament." The Soviet 
Union also insisted that France should be brought into the nego-
tiations. The USSR proposed a treaty embodying these provisions. 
By implication the Soviet Union no longer accepted the report of 
the Conference of Experts as the basis for the negotiations. In 
fact, in arguing that an international control system was not neces-
sary, the USSR reverted to the position that it had held prior to 
1957 London negotiations. 
The Western powers implicitly rejected the new Soviet proposal 
immediately, and after joint British-American consultations formally 
rejected it on January 16, 1962. They were willing to negotiate 
on the basis of the proposals which they had tabled previously, 
including the draft treaty of April 18, 1961, and subsequent modi-
fications, but they insisted that an international control system was 
necessary. With respect to the Western proposal of September 3, 
52GEN/DNT/PV. 341, pp. 21-30. 
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Ambassador Dean pointed out that it was confined to the atmo-
sphere, that it had been made in the hope of forestalling imminent 
Soviet tests which had been carried out, and that by its own terms 
it had expired on September 9, 1961.53 At this point, among other 
things and perhaps above all, the Western powers wanted to retain 
the freedom to C()nduct their own nuclear tests if their evaluations 
of the current Soviet test series indicated that the relative military 
strength of the two sides had been significantly altered. 
Because of this new shift in the Soviet position, the test ban 
talks were even more deeply deadlocked than they had been pre-
viously. Consequently, the Western powers proposed that the Con-
ference should adjourn, and that the problem of a test ban should 
be referred to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, a 
body which had been created by agreement between the Soviet 
Union and the United States during the sixteenth session of the 
General Assembly to consider the plans for general and complete 
disarmament and which was scheduled to have its first meeting on 
March 14, 1962. Since the Soviet Union would not agree to this, 
the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests 
simply adjourned on January 29, 1962. It even proved impossible 
to agree on a communique. When the Geneva Conference ended, 
the technical controversies which had divided it since January 1959 
remained unsolved. The attempts both of a technical and a political 
nature to resolve these had been futile. 
113QEN/DNT/PV. 342, pp. 13-14. 
Chapter IX 
Controversies Concerning the 
Control Organization 
I 
An Overview 
Even though they were somewhat overshadowed by the dispute 
about technical matters and the coverage of the treaty, controversies 
concerning the nature of the organization which would oversee 
compliance with the proposed nuclear test ban were a prominent 
feature of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear 
Weapon Tests throughout its course. These controversies too were 
unresolved when the Conference held its final meeting on January 
29, 1962. 
The controversies began in the early days of the negotiations 
when the parties broadly outlined t.lteir positions. The positions 
were developed in detail and probed, and several compromises 
were arranged in the succeeding two years so that by mid-1960 the 
gap between the positions of East and West had been narrowed 
considerably. In 1961, however, this agreement evaporated. 
Despite the fact that there is no provision for a control organi-
zation in the partial test ban treaty which was concluded in 1963, 
the negotiations on these issues are of considerable interest. To 
some extent these negotiations explain the absence of control 
machinery from the Moscow Treaty. Moreover, they are one of the 
few detailed discussions among the Soviet Union, the United King-
dom, and the United States about an international organization 
which might have significant functions with respect to these powers 
themselves as well as to other parties. Viewed more narrowly, the 
Geneva negotiations represent the first concrete discussion among 
the three nuclear powers of an arms control or disarmament or-
ganization since the late nineteen-forties. Although it is true that 
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related issues were raised in the talks concerning the creation of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there was little 
real negotiation in this instance as the Soviet Union largely accepted 
the United States' draft proposal (which however had been pre-
pared with an eye to Soviet sensibilities), and in any case, IAEA's 
control mechanism was not designed to apply to the nuclear 
powers.1 
The positions concerning the control organization advanced by 
the participants in the Geneva Conference were a product of several 
factors. They stemmed partially from each party's understanding of 
the technical properties of the control mechanisms recommended 
by the Conference of Experts and the subsequent technical meet-
ings. Such matters as their estimate of the reliability of the instm-
ments, whether or not the instmments could be made tamperproof, 
and the clarity or ambiguity of the evidence that could be obtained 
of possible violations, affected their attitude toward the human 
elements of the control system. A related consideration involved 
estimates about the technical proficiency, reliability, and impartiality 
of personnel who might be recmited to staff the control system. 
Their positions also implicitly reflected their basic assump-
tions about the societies which would be affected. Notions about 
the degree of openness of a given society and the degree of access 
that would be required to assure effective control and about the 
need for taking institutional action, for instance in the event of a 
violation, conditioned the concepts of a control organization which 
the participants advanced. Then too, their confidence in their 
unilateral means of obtaining information was also a factor. 
In addition, each of the parties had had experience in func-
tioning international organizations, especially the United Nations, 
and this affected their approach toward the constitution of a new 
organization. The West wanted to avoid a deadlock such as had 
occurred in the UN Security Council as a result of the Cold War. 
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, obviously had in mind the 
curtailment of its power in the United Nations when the center of 
activities shifted from the Security Council to the "veto-less" Gen-
lFor an excellent account of the establishment of IAEA, see Bernhard 
G. Bechhoefer, "Negotiating the Statute of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency," International Organization, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (Winter 1959), pp. 
38-59. 
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eral Assembly, and the Secretary General assumed important func-
tions far beyond those originally contemplated. All parties to the 
Conference wanted to avoid, if at all possible, problems which they 
had encountered in the past. 
Finally, each of the parties viewed a control organization for 
a nuclear test ban as a possible precedent for other organizations in 
the field of arms control and disarmament, and this too had an 
impact on their positions. In the broadest sense, the Western powers 
on the one hand and the Soviet Uniou on the other pressed for an 
organization that would conform as closely as possible to their 
ideology and image of world order. 
Because so many of the questions relating to the control 
organization involved both scientific and political aspects, United 
States proposals relating to these matters had to pass through the 
same process of interagency agreement as did broad policy posi-
tions concerning such matters as the continuation of the morator-
ium and the negotiations, and the threshold problem. This meant 
that all of the American positions had to be approved either by the 
Committee of Principals or by interagency working groups at a 
lower level. Since it proved impossible in practice to determine pre-
cisely whether a given question was essentially political, scientific, 
or military, and thus to identify the agency primarily concerned, 
for all practical purposes each agency involved had power to block 
the formulation of a position on almost any issue, or to insist that 
its concepts should prevail. Not only was this procedure of achiev-
ing agreement within the American government a time-consuming 
process, it also meant that the American negotiator was quite 
tightly bound to rather rigid instructions. 
The two Western powers tended to move in unison on issues 
relating to the control organization, as they did in all aspects of 
the negotiations. Many proposals were advanced jointly. A sub-
mission of a separate proposal by one or the other Western power 
usually reflected a prearranged division of responsibility for the 
presentation of material, rather than unilateral action, and in most 
cases, joint approval could be assumed. 
The United Kingdom felt a greater sense of independence on 
these matters, however, than it did on the broader questions relat-
ing to the coverage of the treaty. It often attempted to play a 
leading role on these issues within Western councils, and from 
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time to time even acted unilaterally in the Conference. British 
negotiators were particularly active during 1960, both before and 
after the collapse of the summit meeting. Occasionally, the British 
delegate even advanced proposals ad referendum, and Her Maj-
esty's Government always ultimately accepted them and supported 
its delegate. In early 1960, the United Kingdom hoped to make 
it possible to consummate an agreement at the summit meeting. 
After the collapse of the summit meeting, the United Kingdom's 
primary objective apparently was to perpetuate the talks. The fact 
that the United States was in the midst of an election campaign, 
while the United Kingdom was not, having just completed a general 
election the previous year, may also explain why the latter was 
somewhat more active and flexible during 1960. 
The Soviet Union generally left to the Western powers the 
task of presenting detailed proposals on the organizational aspects 
of the prospective treaty and expounded its position through com-
ments and criticisms. It is true that the USSR tabled a "complete" 
draft treaty on the opening day of the Conference, but this was a 
bare skeleton. 2 Thereafter it occasionally submitted memoranda 
on specific points, and very infrequently, formal treaty language. 
However, until mid-1960, the Soviet delegate was often able to 
respond more quickly to new suggestions than his American coun-
terpart. 
Discussions of a control organization were interspersed 
throughout the 353 meetings of the Geneva Conference. Only for 
a few days during this period was the possibility even mooted that 
a test ban treaty need not provide for any control organization. 
As recorded in Chapter VIII, on September 3, 1961, in an 
effort to stave off further Soviet testing, President Kennedy and 
Prime Minister Macmillan proposed that a treaty banning the 
testing in the atmosphere of nuclear weapons which created radio-
active fallout should be signed immediately and stated that such a 
treaty could be monitored adequately by national systems. The 
USSR refused this offer, and it expired on September 9, 1961. On 
November 28, 1961, the Soviet Union proposed a draft treaty which 
would rely exclusively on national detection systems, and it main-
tained this proposal until the end of the Conference. With the 
2For the text, see supra pp. 122-23. 
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exception of those two periods, all three parties to the negotiations 
always acted on the assumption that any treaty would require the 
creation of some control organization. Even the phased treaty 
proposed by the United States on February 11, 1960, envisaged an 
extensive control organization and system from the outset. 
While the discussions concerning a control organization went 
on continually throughout the Conference, there were certain pe-
riods when greater attention was devoted to these matters. The most 
notable of these were ( 1) the opening period of the Conference 
from October 31, 1958, through March 19, 1959; (2) the period 
immediately prior to the convocation of Technical Working Group 
II and during the early sessions of that body in late November 
and December 1959; (3) the period immediately prior to the sum-
mit meeting in the spring of 1960; and ( 4) the period from March 
21 through May 31, 1961, when, following the Kennedy Admin-
istration's accession to power, the Western states advanced a series 
of compromise proposals. Bargaining, or the exchange of con-
cessions, occurred only in the first three periods. These were the 
three periods in which the prospects for agreement appeared to be 
highest. Activity in the last period, that is in the spring of 1961, 
was confined to an exposition of positions, although it was not 
until this time that the West tabled an entire draft treaty. 
II 
The Initial Opposing Concepts of the Control Organization 
The Western Blueprint 
An analysis of the controversies during the Geneva Conference 
concerning the proposed control organization can appropriately 
begin by outlining the broad concepts which the two sides advanced 
initially. The basic Western ideas were set forth in a memorandum 
tabled by the British on November 13, 1958,3 a working paper 
presented by the United States on November 13, 1958,4 four draft 
articles tabled by the United States on December 15, 1958,5 and a 
draft annex I, concerning the Detection and Identification System 
4GEN/DNT/PV. 8, pp. 5-8. 
SGEN/DNT/PV. 5, pp. 4-5. 
liGEN/DNT/21. 
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introduced by the United States the following day.6 Oral presen-
tations elaborated the points made in these documents and added 
others. 
The Western blueprint was extensive. It was an amalgam of 
traditional concepts of international organization prevalent in the 
West and the technical system proposed in the report of the Con-
ference of Experts. It provided for a Conference, a Commission, 
and an Administrator. All treaty signatories would be represented 
in the Conference, which would hold annual meetings and could 
convene in special sessions. The functions of the Conference would 
be to approve budgets recommended by the Commission, consider 
and approve reports, consider amendments to the treaty, and pro-
pose matters for consideration by the Commission. The Commis-
sion would consist of the Original Parties (the three nuclear pow-
ers in the Geneva Conference) as permanent members and an 
unspecified number of states elected by the Conference. It would 
be organized, like the Security Council of the United Nations, so 
that it could function continuously. It would oversee the installa-
tion and operation of the Detection and Identification System, ap-
point and direct the activities of the Administrator of the system, 
authorize nuclear detonations for peaceful purposes, and prepare 
findings with respect to violations of the treaty. Although at an 
early stage the Western powers allowed that some decisions of the 
Commission would require the unanimous agreement of the Orig-
inal Parties, these were not specified. For most decisions, only some 
form of majority would be required. According to the Western 
plans, the Administrator would be responsible for the day-to-day 
operation of the detection system, most aspects of which would 
function automatically on the basis of predetermined criteria. Thus, 
although the Administrator would oversee on-site inspections, 
decisions concerning their dispatch would depend solely on whether 
or not certain criteria had been met. 
Following the recommendation of the Conference of Experts, 
the Western plan envisaged the ultimate establishment of from 
160 to 170 control posts. It went no farther than the Experts had 
in specifying the locations of these posts, merely repeating the 
specifications which the Experts had outlined concerning the maxi-
6GEN/DNT/22. 
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mum permissible spacing between the posts and their distribution 
by continents and oceanic islands. The Western plan endorsed the 
Experts' recommendations concerning instrumentation. The initial 
Western position was that each control post should be operated 
by an international staff, which would consist of 32 individuals 
(the Experts had specified "about 30"), none of whom would be 
nationals of the host country. Roughly one-third of this staff would 
have to have relatively high-level technical qualifications, the equiv-
alent of a British university degree, or an American master's degree. 
In addition to this technical staff, each post would require a com-
munications staff of 8, who would also be recruited on an inter-
national basis, and an administrative and supporting staff of 21, 
who could be host country nationals. In sum, each control post 
would require a staff of 61, and the system of posts, depending on 
whether there were 160 or 170, a total of from 9,760 to 10,370, 
roughly one-sixth of whom would have to be highly qualified. In 
addition, the Western plan provided for "a sufficient number" (the 
Experts had recommended "about 10") of ships to maintain control 
over ocean areas which did not contain islands suitable for the 
establishment of fixed-base control posts. Presumably, these would 
be staffed in the same manner as the land-based control posts. 
Although the Western powers agreed that a time schedule would 
have to be elaborated for the establishment of control posts, they 
did not give any indication of its nature. The Western plan also 
included provisions for daily routine aircraft sampling flights and 
special aircraft sampling flights. 
The Western powers envisaged that on-site inspections of events 
which could not be identified as natural should occur on a routine 
basis, and that if a state attempted to block such an investigation 
it would be in violation of the treaty. The Western proposals pro-
vided for the establishment of several permanent groups whose sole 
function would be to conduct on-site inspections. The precise num-
ber and location of these groups would be determined by the Ad-
ministrator with the approval of the Commission. Nationals of the 
country being investigated were to be excluded from the inspection 
team. 
The Western proposals contained provision for a headquarters, 
consisting of (1) a data analysis and research center, (2) a central 
radiochemical laboratory, and (3) a central inspection office. 
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Among its other responsibilities, the headquarters would conduct 
research relevant to the concerns of the control system. The 
Administrator could also, with the approval of the Commission, 
let contracts so that research could be done by external agencies. 
The Western proposals envisaged the creation of "about 10" re-
gional offices which would provide administrative and logistical 
support to the elements of the control system operating in their 
regions. 
Although the Western powers thought that a control organiza-
tion for a nuclear test ban treaty should be autonomous, they felt 
that it should have a relationship with the United Nations similar to 
that of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and that it should 
also have some relationship with any other organizations which 
might be established with functions relating to arms control and 
disarmament. 7 
Had the Western proposals for a control organization been 
implemented, the staff of the organization would have been con-
siderably larger than that of any international organization in 
existence. The UN Secretariat has a staff of somewhat more than 
4,000; over twice that number would have been required to man 
the land-based control posts alone. Moreover, the control organiza-
tion would have had more extensive powers with respect to the 
original parties than any other extant international organization. 
It would have been able to order an investigation on the territory 
of the superpowers against their wishes and to adopt a report con-
cerning a possible violation on their part despite their opposition. 
The Soviet Concept 
In contrast, the concept of a control organization which the 
Soviet Union advanced initially was extremely limited. The draft 
treaty which the Soviet Union tabled on the opening day of the 
Geneva Conference merely stated that the parties to the agreement 
"shall institute machinery for control," and that this machinery 
"shall have at its disposal a network of control posts set up in 
7For an interesting and thoughtful analysis of the problem of the rela-
tionship between the UN and a control organization for arms control 
measures, see Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "The United Nations and Organiza-
tions for the Control of Armaments," International Organization, Vol. XVI, 
No. 1 (Winter 1962), pp. 1-19. 
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accordance with the recommendations of the Geneva Conference 
of Experts."8 The treaty would commit the three nuclear powers 
to agree to the establishment on their territories of "an agreed 
number of control posts." These were the only provisions for 
control machinery contained in the draft treaty; the Soviet view 
was that the details should be spelled out in a separate agreement. 
The similarity between this and earlier Soviet proposals concern-
ing arms control and disarmament has already been noted. The 
Soviet proposal contained no provision for signature or accession 
by parties other than the three participating in the Conference. 
Before long the Soviet Union agreed that detailed provisions 
concerning a control organization as well as the obligation to cease 
testing nuclear weapons should be contained in a single treaty, and 
on December 8, 1958, it tabled a draft outlining its view of the 
basic provisions of a control system. 9 Although this moved the 
USSR's position much closer to that of the Western powers, there 
was still a great distance between the two. 
The role of states other than the three original nuclear 
powers was obscure in the Soviet concept. They were mentioned 
only implicitly in the draft in a discussion of control posts. In 
his oral exposition, Mr. Tsarapkin stated that after the control 
system had been established among the three original parties, the 
question of the cooperation of other states in the control system 
would have to be considered, and that the discussion of these 
matters could be entrusted to a conference of the states parties to 
the treaty.10 There was no mention of a conference as a regular 
organ of the Control Organization in the Soviet draft. 
In the Soviet concept, a Commission would be the central 
body in the Control Organization. Although the draft did not 
specify the composition :>f the Commission, Mr. Tsarapkin stated 
that the British suggestion that the Commission should consist of 
the three original parties as permanent members and four other 
states would be acceptable "provided that all major issues are 
settled by agreement among the three permanent members of the 
Commission."11 The Commission would "direct the entire activity 
BGEN!DNT/1. 
DGEN/DNT/19. 
10GEN/DNT/PV. 21, p. 37. 
llfbid., p. 29. 
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of the Control Organization." It would review evidence concerning 
events which could be suspected of being nuclear explosions and 
after reviewing additional data, including material from existing 
seismic stations, would inform the government concerned and re-
quest its opinion. After considering the reply of that government, 
the Commission would determine whether or not an on-site in-
spection was required. In the event of disagreement, the Commis-
sion would so inform the parties to the treaty and the Security 
Council of the United Nations. The Soviet draft contained no 
mention of an administrator or executive officer. 
The Soviet draft contained provisions for land-based control 
posts, although no specific number was mentioned, and stated that 
they should be equipped in accordance with the recommendations 
of the Conference of Experts. In the Soviet view, the staff of 
each control post should consist of not more than thirty specialists 
and several supporting personnel. Of the thirty, four or five would 
be required to have a higher education and the remainder, a sec-
ondary technical education. All of these individuals would be 
nationals of the host country. In addition, one or two foreign con-
trol officers representing the side interested in carrying out control 
in the area concerned would be stationed at each control post. In 
the cases of control posts situated on the territories of states which 
were not members of either alliance system, there would be control 
officers from both sides. The control officers would place their seals 
on all instruments and would be present when data was removed 
and processed. They would countersign all reports to the control 
commission, and, when they disagreed with the chief of the control 
post, they would have the right to express their dissent. The control 
officers would have the right and the abilit: · to check all instruments 
at any time, and they would enjoy diplomatic immunity. The host 
country would be responsible for providing appropriate means of 
communication for each control post so that around-the-clock 
transmission of information would be insured. The basic communi-
cation of each control post would be a daily coded telegraphic 
report. The Soviet plan called for control posts on ships, but 
did not specify how many. These would be staffed by personnel 
from the state which owned the vessel. In addition, there would be 
one or two control officers, including one who was a navigation 
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specialist. The draft also contained provision for regular air sam-
pling flights. 
In contrast to the Western view, on-site inspections were to 
be regarded as exceptional rather than routine. This difference was 
symbolized by the fact that while the Western plan provided for 
the inspection of "unidentified events," the Soviet proposal pro-
vided for the inspection only of "suspicious events." In the Soviet 
scheme inspection teams would be constituted on an ad hoc basis. 
The supporting and technical personnel would be nationals of the 
country involved, but the inspection team would also include "a 
very small number of control officers, whose duties would include 
checking all the team's work to ensure that it was being properly 
carried out."12 
The Soviet plan envisaged that the Commission would have 
at its disposal a technical apparatus-not a headquarters-which 
would consist of appropriate departments for processing and ana-
lyzing data and for providing .the control organization with lo-
gistical and technical support and personnel. The Soviet draft held 
that the personnel of the technical apparatus should be recruited 
and approved by the Cominission on the basis of equal represen-
tation of the two sides among the original parties. Among other 
things, this implied that the consent of the original parties would be 
required for all appointments. There was no provision for the con-
duct of research by the control organization. Nor was there any 
provision for regional offices. 
The Soviet draft stated that the right of extraterritoriality should 
not extend to the territory and the preinises of control posts and 
that the movements of personnel on the posts "must take place on 
regular terms and conditions and in accordance with the procedures 
existing for foreigners." : >ersonnel for guarding the posts would be 
supplied by the host country. These points were not covered in the 
initial Western presentations. 
The peep-Seated Differences Between the Concepts 
Obviously neither East nor West expected its initial position 
to be accepted in toto. They and the world had had ample evidence 
of their differing approaches toward international organization, and 
if agreement were to be reached some compromises would clearly 
12/bid., p. 34. 
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be required. The foreknowledge of the disagreement and the ex-
pectation of bargaining probably led both sides to overstate their 
initial positions. This is not to suggest, however, that each side 
did not, rightly or wrongly, conceive its scheme of a control or-
ganization as being optimally designed to satisfy its interests, and-
according to its own interpretation-perhaps also those of the 
world. It therefore is worth considering the implications of the two 
positions and their rationale, both as explicitly stated and implied. 
In formal constitutional terms, the Western proposals repre-
sented what can be termed the vertical or hierarchical approach to 
international organization, while the Soviet proposals represented 
the horizontal approach. The Western proposals implied some--
although not much--diminution of state sovereignty and transfer 
of authority to an international body. The Soviet proposal, in con-
trast, was designed with state sovereignty as its most basic assump-
tion. It could almost be characterized as a plan for legitimizing by 
mutual agreement certain national intelligence activities. Mr. Tsar-
apkin repeatedly put this quite directly by saying, under our plan 
you will "control" us and we will "control" you. He meant this in 
the French sense of the word "control," that is in terms of gath-
ering information. The Soviet plan went little beyond this, and 
in no case could the control organization take action against the 
wishes of one of the original parties. 
Some analysts have distinguished between two approaches to 
the control of disarmament agreements by calling one the "impar-
tial" approach, and the other the "reciprocal" or "adversary" ap-
proach. 13 In the first as the name implies the emphasis is on gaining 
control through devices and personnel disassociated from the 
principal parties, while in the second the principal parties them-
selves exercise control. In general terms, the Western proposals 
were in the spirit of the first approach, and the Soviet, the second. 
The differences between the Soviet and Western proposals 
represented first of all deep-seated philosophical differences. The 
13See Fred C. Ilde and others, Alternative Approaches to the Interna-
tional Organization of Disarmament (RAND Corp., 1962, R-391-ARPA), 
especially, pp. 3-4; Lawrence S. Finkelstein, ''The Use of Reciprocal Inspec-
tion," pp. 82-98 in Seymour Melman (ed.) Disarmament: Its Politics and 
Economics (1962); and Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "Arms Inspection," Inter-
national Conciliation, No. 540 (November 1962), pp. 5-89. 
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West, and particularly the United States, has been committed for 
some time, at least on the level of declaratory policy, to the ulti-
mate goal of an ordered and peaceful world, regulated by enforce-
able legal norms and powerful international institutions. In terms 
of this perspective, national defense forces are regarded as a 
temporary expedient, to be maintained and utilized only as long as 
this ultimate goal remains unachieved. At the time of the First 
World War when these concepts were originally formulated, the 
growth of democracy was viewed as an important means of achiev-
ing the ultimate goal as well as a basic component of it; but over 
the years as a result of increasing sophistication, or despair, or 
both, less emphasis came to be placed on this feature. Though 
subject to disagreement, the prevalent attitude in the West seems 
to be that the international goal can be achieved despite diverse 
domestic regimes. Being constantly exposed to and immersed in 
these views, and repeating them in public presentations, Western, 
and particularly American, policy-makers have tended to take 
them into account in formulating new positions. The gains of past 
experience are accepted and each new situation viewed as an 
opportunity for incremental advances. This applies a fortiori in 
situations which might involve the reduction of national armaments, 
given the rationale for the maintenance of national defense forces 
mentioned earlier. Thus the Western concept of a control organiza-
tion was modeled after the United Nations and other existing inter-
national organizations such as the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, with the addition of certain new features. 
The Soviet Union's ultimate goal, again at least on the level of 
declaratory policy, has been a world of Communist societies. In 
its view, non-Communist states and organizations dominated by 
these states have been hostile, or potentially hostile, to this goal. 
Thus, its view of international organization has been considerably 
different from that of the West and, given its long-run goals, it 
cannot have the same commitment to international organization as 
the West.14 For the USSR, cooperation in international organiza-
tions has been at best a temporary expedient, not a goal in itself. 
14For a detailed elaboration of the Soviet attitudes toward interna-
tional organization, see Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United 
Nations (1962); and also, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Academy of 
Sciences, Institute of State and Law, International Law ( 1960). 
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According to its doctrine, the fundamental problems of society 
could only be solved through transformation to Communist re-
gimes. Moreover, distrusting all non-Communists, it could not 
conceive an impartial or neutral international organization. In the 
Soviet view, therefore, international organizations including non-
Communist states ought to be instruments designed to facilitate 
temporary cooperation between opposing sides, and consequently 
ought to involve only minimal indispensible limitations upon sov-
ereignty. 
Of course the two sides had also had differing experiences 
in existing international organizations. Particularly during the early 
years of the UN and its affiiliated agencies, the United States and 
the United Kingdom were usually in a controlling position, able 
to command a majority for positive action and to block proposals 
deemed undesirable. During the same period, the Soviet Union 
on the other hand was a permanent minority in these institutions 
and frequently saw them take action against its wishes. 
Initial Compromises 
Despite these deep-seated differences, it was possible to effect 
compromises between East and West in a number of instances, and 
by the time of the 1959 Easter recess, several agreements had been 
reached which narrowed the gap somewhat. Six articles of a draft 
treaty had actually been adopted. One of these was purely formal, 
stating that the treaty and major agreements concluded by the 
Control Organization would be registered with the United Nations in 
accordance with the requirements of Article 102 of the Charter. 
The others, however, had greater substance. One specified that the 
treaty would be of indefinite duration, subject to the inherent right 
of the parties to withdraw if the provisions of the treaty were not 
being fulfilled and observed. Another provided for the periodic 
review of the control system. 
The remaining three articles, which had been adopted by 
mid-March 1959, specified the obligations of the parties to the 
treaty and the composition of the Commission. Each signatory 
would undertake: 
(a) to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of nuclear 
weapons test explosions at any place under its juris-
diction or control; and 
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(b) to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way 
participating in, the carrying out of nuclear weapons 
test explosions anywhere.15 
The meaning of the first of these obligations was clear; that of 
the second, less obvious, and the debate did not clarify it. Nor 
was there ever any discussion of how compliance with the second 
obligation would be verified. The signatories would also agree 
"to cooperate promptly and fully with the Control Organization 
. . . and to assist the Control Organization in the discharge of its 
responsibilities . . . . "16 
In accepting the article on the Commission the negotiating 
states had implicitly agreed that other states would have a role 
in the Control Organization, for it provided that four other states 
would be members of the Commission. According to this article 
the four nonpermanent members of the Commission were to be 
chosen by a Conference in which all states would participate and 
which would have regular annual sessions. 
The two sides also moved closer together in several other 
areas. The West agreed that control posts should be established 
first in the territories of the three nuclear powers. The Soviet Union 
allowed that there might have to be an administrator to oversee 
the operation of the control system. It also agreed that there could 
be from four to five "controllers" at a control post, rather than 
merely one or two. 
Despite these compromises, there were still wide differences 
between the two sides. Although they agreed that the Commission 
should consist of seven states including the three Original Parties, 
they could not agree on the political distribution of the other four 
states. The West held that these four states should consist of one 
from each side and two neutrals. The Soviet Union on the other 
hand maintained that--considering the two-to-one preponderance 
of the West among permanent members-this formula would not 
yield a balanced Commission. It argued that the four nonpermanent 
members should consist of one from the Western side, two from 
the Soviet side, and one neutral. There continued to be differences 
with respect to the staffing of control posts. The West also con-
15GEN/DNT I 14. 
16GEN/DNT I 151 Add. 1. 
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tinued to insist on the necessity of permanent inspection groups, 
while the Soviet Union denied this. To buttress his case, Mr. Tsar-
apkin held that this concept had been rejected at the Conference 
of Experts.17 Although this was true, it was also true that the Soviet 
position that permanent inspection groups were unnecessary had 
been rejected. 
Perhaps the most fundamental difference related to voting 
in the Control Commission. On January 30, 1959, evidently draw-
ing upon its experience in the United Nations Security Council, the 
Soviet Union submitted a comprehensive list of decisions which 
would require four affirmative votes, including those of the three 
Original Parties. This was the USSR's strongest assertion that it 
would not agree to the proposed Control Organization's being able 
to take any significant action against its wishes. Or, as Mr. Tsarap-
kin put it, claiming the familiar defense of the veto in the Security 
Council, this would insure the cooperation of the Original Parties. 
Prior to the March 19 recess, the Western powers agreed that 
unanimity among the Original Parties should be required for: 
amendments to the treaty, revision of the detection methods, and 
appointment of the Administrator. They also agreed that it might 
be required, if appropriate safeguards could be worked out, for 
the determination of sites of control posts and routes for control 
aircraft flights. However, they would not go beyond that. They 
adamantly argued that the veto could not apply to the other de-
cisions named in the Soviet list, especially those relating to on-site 
inspections and violations of the Treaty. This represented the most 
fundamental difference between the approaches of the two sides, 
and it was unresolved by the time of the Easter recess in 1959. 
In considering these issues, it is necessary to recall that the so-
called "new seismic data" was introduced by the West prior to the 
submission of the Soviet veto list. Perhaps the Soviet Union would 
'have taken the same position in any case, but the new data appeared 
to increase vastly the number of prospective on-site inspections and 
thus pro'vided a further incentive for the Soviet Union to seek iron-
clad protection against imposed decisions. 
17GEN/DNT/PV. 18, p. 16. 
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III 
Further Compromises and Continuing Controversies, 
1959-60 
So far as concepts of the control organization are concerned, 
the period of the negotiations from the time that the Geneva 
Conference resumed on April 13, 1959, through the final meeting 
in 1960 on December 5 can be considered as a unit. Although the 
positions of the two sides shifted somewhat during this period, 
these shifts did not involve departures from the framework estab-
lished in the initial phase of the Conference. Further compromises 
of course brought additional agreements, but some controversies 
remained unsolved. Since there was a basic unity to this period, 
the negotiations during it can be treated topically rather than 
chronologically. It is important to emphasize though that both 
sides constantly viewed the control organization as a whole and 
that each aspect was inextricably linked to the others. While this 
meant that trade offs were possible, it also meant that on important 
matters, piecemeal settlements were ruled out. 
Areas of Agreement 
During this period the three parties agreed to a preamble, 
eleven more articles, and two annexes for the prospective treaty.18 
The preamble and ten of the articles were adopted during the 
seventeen meetings held from April 13 to May 8, 1959. This 
achievement was in large measure the result of the momentum 
established in the initial phase of the negotiations. In many in-
stances the adoption of an article merely represented ratification 
of a tentative understanding achieved earlier. Several of the articles 
adopted during this period were of a formal character, and few 
fundamental issues were involved. 
18The text of the preamble, the seventeen articles, and Annex III 
adopted by the Conference is contained in the appendix to William J. 
Gehron, "Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon 
Tests: History of Political and Technical Developments of the Negotiations 
From October 31, 1958, to August 22, 1960," Department of State Bulletin, 
Vol. XLIII, No. 1109 (September 26, 1960), pp. 482-97, at pp. 494-97. 
Annex II, dealing with privileges and immunities, was adopted October 13, 
1960, after this article was written. It may be found in GEN/DNT/52/Rev. 
1. 
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( 1) "Formal" Articles 
One article concerned authentic texts. It followed the standard 
form in international agreements. Another article provided that the 
annexes should form an integral part of the treaty. Since it was 
envisaged that the detailed specifications for the Detection and 
Identification System would be contained in an annex, this met 
the Western insistence that these provisions should have treaty 
force. A third article concerned amendments to the treaty and its 
annexes. It provided that amendments would enter into effect 
when they had been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the mem-
bers of the Conference and ratified by two-thirds of the parties 
to the treaty, including the Original Parties. This procedure was 
patterned after that specified in the UN Charter, and gave the 
Original Parties veto power. 
(2) "Other States" 
Two of the articles touched on the question of how other 
states should be brought into the Control Organization. The first 
of these defined the parties to the treaty. The USSR, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States were specified as the Original 
Parties. It was also agreed that this article should contain a second 
paragraph allowing other states to become parties, but no treaty 
language was worked out during this period. Actually, none was 
even proposed until mid-1960. The Western powers nevertheless 
felt satisfied that they had won their point that states other than 
the three nuclear powers should be allowed to become members 
of the Control Organization. 
The second article relating to this matter concerned the sig-
nature, ratification, and entry into force of the treaty. According 
to this article, the treaty would enter into force as soon as the in-
struments of ratification of the Original Parties had been deposited, 
thus meeting the Soviet argument that bringing other states into 
the Control Organization should not be allowed to delay the im-
plementation of the treaty; other states were given a period of six 
months in which to sign the treaty, but no time limit was set 
for the deposit of instruments of ratification or acceptance. 
The article on the Conference also dealt with states other 
than the three nuclear powers which might become parties, in 
that it spelled out certain powers that they would have within the 
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Control Organization. These were minimal. The Conference would 
meet annually, and could be convened in special sessions. As has 
already been mentioned, it would have a role in the procedure for 
amending the treaty. Beyond that, its powers would be to elect 
the nonpermanent members of the Commission~ approve the budget 
(although the way in which this would be accomplished and 
the majority required were left for later specification), consider 
the annual report of the Commission, approve reports to the UN, 
and approve agreements with other international organizations. 
In addition, the Conference could discuss any matter within the 
scope of the treaty, a provision reminiscent of Article 10 of the 
UN Charter relating to the powers of the General Assembly. It 
could also make decisions on matters specifically referred to it by 
the Commission, propose matters for consideration by the Com-
mission, and request reports from the Commission. All decisions, 
except those on budgetary matters and on amendments, would be 
by a simple majority of parties to the treaty present and voting, 
unless the Conference itself decided that a two-thirds majority 
would be required. It was clear from these terms of reference that 
the Commission and not the Conference would be the dominant 
body in the Control Organization, and that states other than the 
Original Parties would have only limited rights and responsibilities. 
(3) Obligations of the Parties Concerning the Control System 
Three of the articles which were adopted dealt with obliga-
tions of the parties to the treaty with respect to the control system. 
The first committed them to accept the placement on territory under 
their jurisdiction of the control components which would be estab-
lished on the basis of the report of the Conference of Experts and 
installed and operated in accordance with the treaty and its annexes. 
The second spelled out specific obligations of cooperation. 
These included: giving inspection groups "immediate and undis-
puted access" and refraining from any interference with them; pro-
viding "adequate and expeditious transportation" for on-site in-
spections; entering into arrangements for the utilization of existing 
aircraft flights for routine air sampling purposes; entering into ar-
rangements for making aircraft available for special aircraft flights 
or permitting special flights by aircraft belonging to the control 
system; and, entering into arrangements for the utilization of ex-
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isting weather and geophysical exploration vessels. It was agreed 
that another paragraph concerning the cooperation required for the 
high altitude detection system would be added to this article. 
The third article of this group provided that representatives to 
the Conference and the Commission and the Administrator and 
other executive personnel, should enjoy such privileges and im-
munities as would be necessary for the exercise of their functions. 
The precise terms of the legal capacity of the Organization and 
the privileges and immunities of associated personnel were to be 
spelled out in an annex. This meant that these matters would have 
treaty force. Except for this feature, which is also found in the 
Rome treaties establishing the European Common Market and 
Euratom, the article paralleled those usually found in the charters 
of international organizations. Since the UN Convention on Privi-
leges and Immunities has been ratified by the USSR and the United 
Kingdom, but not the United States, it is interesting that the United 
States readily agreed to this formulation, which was proposed by 
the United Kingdom. Perhaps all parties saw it as a way of cir-
cumventing the hurdle of Congressional ratification of a separate 
convention. 
( 4) "External" Relations 
The final article on which agreement was reached in the four 
weeks from April 13 to May 8, 1959, concerned relationships with 
other international organizations. Its terms were simple. It merely 
stated that the Commission, with the approval of the Conference, 
could enter into an agreement establishing "an appropriate rela-
tionship" between the Control Organization and the United Nations, 
and that the same action could be taken with respect to "any 
international organization which may in the future be established 
among any of the Parties to this Treaty to supervise disarmament 
and arms control measures." 
The implkations of the article, however, are interesting. First, 
it signified that the Control Organization would not be a part of the 
United Nations. Secondly, it also implied that the functions of this 
complicated mechanism would be limited to the control of nuclear 
explosions; that further measures of arms control and disarma-
ment would require the creation of additional international organiza-
tions. Despite popular speculation that the underlying Western am-
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bition was to establish a control organization whose functions 
gradually could be expanded, 19 this possibility was never discussed 
in the Geneva Conference, and on several occasions it was implicitly 
rejected. 
The only controversy surrounding the adoption of this article 
involved phraseology. The second paragraph of the original British 
proposal allowed appropriate relationships to be established with: 
. . . any international arms regulation organization which 
may in the future be established among any of the Parties 
to this Treaty to supervise arms control measures. 20 
Consistent with its general position in the disarmament debate, the 
USSR objected to control without disarmament and proposed that 
the paragraph read "international disarmament organization . . . 
to supervise disarmament control."21 The final formulation mention-
ing both arms control and disarmament was a compromise between 
the Soviet and Western positions. 
(5) How Much Emotion in the Preamble? 
Related issues arose in the discussion of the preamble. Al-
though the Western powers basically accepted a Soviet proposal, 
they insisted on changing the opening two paragraphs. The original 
draft read: 
Pursuing the aim of putting a check to the nuclear arma-
ments race and to the further improvement and creation 
of new, even more destructive tYPes of these weapons of 
mass destruction; 
Endeavoring to take a practical step towards the ur-
gent objective of prohibiting atomic weapons and eliminat-
ing them from national armaments, as indicated by the 
United Nations.22 
The formulation which was adopted was: 
Pursuing the aim of reducing international competition in 
armaments and in the development of new weapons of 
war; 
19For example, see The Observer, February 15, 1959, p. 14. 
20GEN/DNT/39. 
21GEN/DNT/PV. 76, pp. 10-11. 
22GEN/ DNT I 46. 
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Endeavoring to take a practical step towards the 
achievement of the objectives of the United Nations in the 
field of disarmament including the eventual elimination 
and prohibition of nuclear weapons under effective inter-
national control and the use of atomic energy for peaceful 
purposes only. 
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The change did little to alter the meaning of the preamble. Its 
principal effect was to eliminate some of the emotionalism directed 
against nuclear weapons, a constant component of Soviet policy 
until the nineteen-sixties. In addition to these paragraphs the pre-
amble mentioned the desire of the signatories to bring about a 
permanent discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests; recognized that 
permanent, effective and continuous control was essential to achieve 
this objective; expressed the hope that other countries would join 
in the undertakings spelled out in the treaty; and asserted that a 
discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests would make possible "prog-
ress toward agreement on measures of disarmament." A more cautious 
way of expressing the last sentiment could hardly be found. 
(6) The Organization, Its Headquarters, Transitional 
Arrangements 
Beyond these achievements of the period from April 13 to 
May 8, 1959, agreement on three other matters was reached dur-
ing the course of the Geneva Conference. On August 11, 1959, the 
three states adopted an article specifying the elements of the Control 
Organization. According to this article, the Control Organization 
would consist of: the Commission, the Detection and Identification 
System, the Administrator, and the Conference. The headquarters 
of the Organization would be in Vienna, which is also the head-
quarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Soviet 
Union would not agree to this article until the Western powers had 
given assurances that the Administrator's powers would be limited 
and that he would be clearly subordinate to the Commission. As 
will be recalled, early Soviet formulations contained no mention of 
a chief executive officer. 
Annex III dealing with the Preparatory Commission was 
adopted November 30, 1959. The provisions in this Annex are 
reminiscent of the Preparatory Commission which was established 
by the International Atomic Energy Agency Treaty. The Prepara-
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tory Commisison would come into existence on the day that the 
treaty was signed by the Original Parties, and would consist of one 
representative from each of the Original Parties. At this stage, the 
Preparatory Commission would plan and oversee the preliminary 
installation of the control system. Once the treaty came into force, 
the three Original Parties by unanimous agreement would co-opt 
four additional states from those that had signed the treaty, and the 
Preparatory Commission would then assume the functions of the 
Control Commission, until the latter could be formally constituted. 
It would also exercise the functions of the Administrator, until he 
was appointed. During this stage, the voting procedures would be 
those specified in the Treaty for the Commission. The Soviet Union 
accepted the draft for this annex, which the United States had 
tabled on July 27, 1959, almost in its entirety. The USSR insisted 
on only two changes: first, that the requirement for unanimity 
among the Original Parties be specified, rejecting Ambassador Wads-
worth's contention that it was assumed23; and second, that the 
task of recommending the location of regional offices be omitted, 
since it was not agreed that there should be such offices. 
(7) Privileges and Immunities 
The final section of the proposed treaty to be adopted was 
Annex II, dealing with privileges and immunities, which was ac-
cepted October 17, 1960. As this section developed in detail some 
of the conditions under which the Control Organization would oper-
ate on the territories of each of the parties, it was among the more 
important to be adopted. 
The Soviet Union included a proposal on this matter in the 
draft basic provisions which it tabled on December 8, 1958, shortly 
after the negotiations began. 24 This proposal merely stated that the 
foreign control officers should "enjoy diplomatic immunity equal to 
that of the staff of foreign embassies, legations and missions." In 
addition, as was mentioned earlier, the proposal made it clear that 
"the right of extraterritoriality" would not extend to the premises 
of control posts and that movement of foreign personnel of the posts 
in the territory of the state must take place in accordance with 
23GEN/DNT/PV. 115, pp. 4, 10, II. 
24GEN/DNT/ 19. 
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the procedures existing for foreigners. This proposal was consistent 
with the modest Soviet concept of the Control Organization. 
In keeping with the Western concept of an elaborate control 
system, Western ideas called for much more specific provisions 
which would ensure that the Control Organization and its personnel 
would receive all the privileges and immunities they might require 
for the performance of their novel task. This approach led to the 
conclusion that the privileges and immunities would have to embrace 
those generally granted to international organizations such as the 
United Nations and NATO, and also include certain special features. 
However, not until a year later did the United States submit a 
proposal reflecting this line of reasoning. The delay in tabling a 
Western draft for this section of the treaty was due chiefly to the 
necessity of working out an agreed text between the two Western 
partners, with the United Kingdom favoring more detail and speci-
ficity than the United States. Furthermore, Western policy-makers 
saw no cause for according this matter priority over other proposals 
on which agreement was considered more urgent. The flagging pace 
of the negotiations and the technical complexity of the subject may 
also have contributed to the delay. 
The draft as finally submitted by the United States on De-
cember 7, 1959,25 was modeled after the 1946 Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, the 1947 Con-
vention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, 
the 1959 Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency and, last but not least, the 1951 
Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
National Representatives and International Staff. That the Soviet 
Union offered no serious objection to this draft can be explained 
in part by the fact that it had previously agreed to substantially 
similar privileges and immunities in other contexts by having rati-
fied the first and the third of these three agreements. 26 
The discussion that preceded the acceptance by the USSR of 
the American draft was much less extensive than the Western dele-
25GEN/DNT/74. 
26The United Kingdom has ratified all four of these agreements while 
the United States has ratified the last only. The United States has also 
ratified the 1947 Headquarters Agreement with the United Nations, which 
contains provisions on several topics covered in the other agreements. 
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gations expected. The section that occasioned the most argument 
involved the right of the Control Organization to exchange currency, 
but this disagreement was not very serious. The American proposal 
was that the organization should be entitled to the most favorable 
rate of exchange. After considerable verbal sparring, Ambassador 
Wadsworth explained that this provision was designed to prevent 
countries with completely managed currencies from hampering the 
work of the Control Organization by establishing discriminatory rates 
of exchange. 27 He stated that this would be important because of 
the magnitude of the expenditures which would be involved. It was 
apparent that the provision was formulated principally because at 
that time the USSR maintained two rates of exchange: one of ten 
rubles to the dollar for tourists; and the other of four rubles to the 
dollar for other expenditures. The USSR strongly objected to this 
provision. Mr. Tsarapkin argued that the passage should follow the 
pattern of the UN Convention and that of the Specialized Agencies 
and merely give the Control Organization the right to convert cur-
rency. Although he argued generally that a country could not be 
forced to grant to the Control Organization an exchange rate which 
it had established for some special purpose, he actually seemed to 
be objecting more to the fact that the provision appeared on the 
surface to discriminate against the USSR, since in practice it was 
the only one of the Original Parties to which it would apply.28 The 
compromise finally worked out was to delete the provision, but to 
agree to include in the eventual financial regulations of the Control 
Organization-following the example of the United Nations-the 
requirement that all contributions must be assessed and paid in 
United States dollars unless the Administrator approved another 
currency. 
Although the Soviet Union proposed certain other amendments 
to the United States draft, they either concerned matters of style, or 
involved making explicit matters which the Western powers agreed 
were implicit. For example, one Soviet amendment specified that 
diplomatic pouch privileges should be limited to official business. 
As accepted by the three powers, Annex II closely resembled, 
both in general structure and in substance, the four international 
27GEN/DNT/PV. 222, p. 9. 
28Jbid., p. 14. 
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agreements which set the pattern for the original American pro-
posal. All these documents have substantially identical provisions 
concerning the organization's legal personality and the privileges 
and immunities with respect to its funds, assets, and communica-
tions. However, unlike the other agreements, the Annex contains 
no general provision for the settlement of disputes concerning its 
interpretation or application. In an early paper describing the out-
lines of the treaty, the United States delegation indicated that it 
would propose an article dealing with settlements of disputes arising 
out of the treaty. 29 However, such an article was the subject of 
disagreement within the Western councils and was never proposed. 
According to the Annex, representatives of parties on the Con-
trol Commission, defined to include all members of the official staffs 
except those whose duties were exclusively clerical, would be given 
both in the country of the Organization's headquarters, and, when 
performing Commission duties, on the territory of another party to 
the treaty, the same privileges and immunities that were accorded 
by the respective governments to accredited diplomatic envoys. In 
addition, representatives of parties on any organ of the Organization 
together with the members of their official staffs, including clerks, 
would enjoy under the same circumstances (and also en route to 
and from meetings) enumerated privileges and immunities closely 
resembling those accorded to representatives of the parties in the 
agreements that served as models for the American proposal. Since 
these privileges and immunities would be accorded not for the per-
sonal benefit of the individuals but to assure their independence as 
officials, a party would have the duty to waive the immunity of its 
representatives where "in its opinion" the immunity would impede 
justice and could be waived without prejudice to the purposes for 
which it was granted. Moreover, the parties would not be required 
to extend privileged treatment to their own nationals or to aliens 
acting as their representatives. 
As for the staff and experts employed by the Control Organiza-
tion itself (as distinguished from the representatives of the parties 
and their national staffs), the top echelon, that is the Administrator 
and his deputies, would be given privileges and immunities "nor-
mally accorded" to diplomatic envoys. All other staff members 
29GEN/DNT/9, par. 8. 
314 DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS 
would be accorded enumerated privileges and immunities with re-
spect to currency facilities, personal baggage, immigration restric-
tions, repatriation, import duties, taxes, as well as 
Immunity from arrest or detention whenever assigned to a 
control post, an inspection group, or a routine or special 
flight; and at all times immunity from arrest, detention, or 
any legal processes with respect to words spoken or writ-
ten and acts done by them in the performance of their 
official functions. so 
Here, also, since the immunities would be granted in the interest 
of the Organization, the Administrator would be obligated to waive 
the immunity of any staff member or expert where it would impede 
justice and the waiver would not prejudice the working of the 
Organization. 
A party's right to refuse privileges and immunities to its own 
nationals, unrestricted, as was seen earlier, with respect to its rep-
resentatives on the Organization's organs, would be qualified in this 
section in two ways. A party would be required to grant to its 
own national serving as a staff member or an expert of the Organi-
zation only one immunity and one privilege: first, the immunity for 
his official acts, and second, the privilege of access to facilities with 
respect to currency and exchange restrictions so far as necessary 
for the effective exercise of his functions. With only one exception, 
which will be noted, the international agreements upon which the 
Annex is patterned contain no such restriction upon the immunities 
of international staff personnel vis-a-vis their own country; by 
implication, these agreements require the parties to make available 
to their own nationals on the international staff the full range of 
privileges and immunities. The reason for this is that the purpose 
30The novel phrase "at all times" in the Annex provision quoted in the 
main text was probably not intended to indicate that a staff member would 
retain his immunity with respect to past official acts even after his relation-
ship with the Organization was terminated. A more likely interpretation is 
that this phrase was intended as a juxtaposition to the clause "whenever 
assigned ... " in the first part of the paragraph. However, even if this was 
the purpose of the phrase the better view would be that immunity with 
respect to official acts would continue after the termination of the official 
position. 
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of international immunities is to protect the international responsi-
bilities of international staff personnel and as one authority has 
written "they require protection against the State of which the official 
is a national as fully as, and perhaps more fully than, against any 
other State. "31 It is interesting to note that the limiting provision of 
Annex II was strikingly similar to Article 23 of the Agreement on 
the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National 
Representatives, and International Staff, 32 and one can speculate that 
it was inserted in the American proposal with an eye on the United 
States Senate. As far as the Annex was concerned, this right of a 
party to refuse privileges and immunities to its own nationals was 
an important point as the negotiations made it clear that the control 
posts would be staffed in part by local nationals and that local 
nationals would be stationed on the territory of their own state, 
possibly also in other official capacities. 
The exact extent to which an individual would be free from 
action by his government in other respects was not quite clear. There 
could be some question, for instance, whether the individual would 
remain immune from his government's action with respect to his 
official acts after his relationship with the Organization had come to 
an end, although the better view would require continuation of such 
immunity. Again, in the discussion of the laissez passer arrange-
ments, Ambassador Wadsworth stated that they would have to 
include provision for enabling individuals to return either to their 
country of origin or to the country where the headquarters of the 
Organization was located. 33 Then he went on in the next sentence to 
state that the laissez passer regulations should in no way prejudice 
the right of a government to prescribe whatever regulations it chose 
with respect to its own citizens. 
In considering generally the extent of the limitations imposed 
by the Annex upon a party's control over access to and activities 
on its territory, it is pertinent that the Administrator would have 
31C. Wilfred Jenks, International Immunities (London: Stevens & Sons, 
1961), p. 112. Jenks concludes that while the principle of enforcing stipu-
lated privileges and immunities of international staff personnel against their 
own States is clear, practice has always tended to lag behind it. 
32U.S. Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts 
Series, No. 2992. 
33GEN/DNT/PV. 193, p. 7. 
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been obliged to inform the party concerned in advance of any pro-
posed assignment of staff members or experts to its territory, and 
that party would have had an "opportunity to comment" on the 
proposed assignment of any particular individual. This proved to be 
perhaps the most controversial issue of the Annex, but all three 
parties agreed that the opportunity to object to any individual should 
not be used often.34 In this context the Annex also provided that, if 
in a party's view a staff member or expert posted on its territory 
had abused his privileges, the party would ultimately have the right 
to require that the Administrator arrange for an immediate replace-
ment. A similar provision would apply mutatis mutandis in case of 
abuse of privileges by a representative of a party present in the 
territory of another party. 
It is difficult to speculate whether the privileges and immunities 
defined in the Annex and fashioned after the patterns evolved for 
other international agencies would have met adequately the special 
needs and novel features of the Control Organization, particularly 
if applied to a large number of personnel at control posts and on 
inspection teams. Again, caution is in order if one desires to 
evaluate the significance of the Soviet acceptance of the American 
proposal, considering the lack of detailed Soviet comment and the 
limited discussion. The Soviet Union may have been content to 
concentrate its effort upon the important and controversial staffing 
provisions of the treaty on the assumption that, if these provisions 
were formulated to its satisfaction, it could probably agree to a 
standard grant of privileges and immunities in the Annex. 
After the three states agreed to the Annex, they also agreed 
to a new and briefer article on privileges and immunities to replace 
that which they had already adopted in the text of the treaty. This 
article merely stated that the privileges and immunities which the 
Organization, its staff, and the representatives of parties shall enjoy, 
34See GEN/DNT/PV. 146, p. 5; GEN/DNT/PV. 167, p. 13; and 
GEN/DNT/PV. 177, p. 5. There is no comparable provision for advance 
notification and opportunity to comment in the Conventions on the Privi-
leges and Immunities of the UN or the Specialized Agencies or in the 
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. But there are comparable provisions in Article XI, Section 
D and Article XII, Section A of the Statute of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. 
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and the legal capacity of the Organization "shall be as set forth in 
Annex II of this Treaty." 
These were the last agreements achieved during the Geneva 
Conference, and the only ones achieved after the collapse of the 
summit meeting. 
The Remaining Disagreements 
Although the parts of the treaty which were adopted repre-
sented a significant measure of agreement, several disagreements 
remained. They centered on four principal issues: the staffing of 
control posts; the composition of the Control Commission; voting 
in the Control Commission, especially the privileges to be given to 
the Original Parties; and the role and structure of executive author-
ity. 
(1) National or International Control Post Staffs? 
As stated earlier, at the outset the Soviet Union took the posi-
tion the control posts should be completely staffed by nationals of 
the host country except for one or two foreign controllers. The 
Western powers, on the other hand, had held that host country na-
tionals should be barred from serving on the staff of control posts. 
Each side took the position that the view advanced by the other 
would not provide a sufficient guarantee of its security. The West 
argued that in the event of a suspected violation host country per-
sonnel would be torn between loyalty to their own state and to the 
Control Organization and could not be counted on to choose the 
latter. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, argued that under a 
system of international staffing, it would have no assurance that 
Soviet nationals would in practice be given positions which would 
enable them effectively to exercise control over the other side, and 
cited the predominantly Western character of the secretariats of the 
major international organizations. To buttress their position, each 
side developed elaborate technical arguments about the possibility 
of mufHing and fabricating seismic signals. These then called for 
equally elaborate rebuttals. One slightly ironic aspect of this debate 
was that at the time when the Western representatives in Geneva 
were arguing that the only way in which the proper operation of 
instruments could be assured was through an international staff, 
the Berkner Panel suggested the introduction of large numbers of 
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unmanned stations as one possible way around the difficulties with 
respect to technical issues which plagued the Conference. To put 
it more sharply, while Ambassador Wadsworth was arguing in 
Geneva that instruments could not be made tamperproof, American 
scientists in the United States were asserting that they could. Mr. 
Tsarapkin made the most of this contradiction. 35 
By the time of the recess on March 19, 1959, the Soviet 
Union had agreed that there might be as many as four or five foreign 
controllers stationed at control posts. On May 8, 1959, the Western 
powers met this compromise by agreeing that it might be possible 
for a limited number of host country nationals to serve on the 
staffs of control posts. 36 
Next, in mid-July, the West proposed that the staff of each 
control post could be divided into thirds: one third would consist 
of nationals of the USSR, another third nationals of the United 
Kingdom and the United States, and the final third nationals of 
other parties to the treaty.37 This same formula had already been 
suggested by the West for the headquarters of the Control Organi-
zation.38 
The Soviet Union's immediate reaction, in both instances, was 
to question how the final third would be apportioned. It argued 
that there must be some way of maintaining a balance among 
countries allied with the United Kingdom and the United States, 
countries allied with the Soviet Union, and uncommitted countries. 
The West, on the other hand, maintained that it would be both 
politically and administratively difficult to elaborate a rigid formula 
to define eligibility for the third third. The Western powers argued 
that some countries would not easily fit into the three-fold catego-
rization proposed by the Soviet Union, that international align-
ments of states were subject to change, and that too rigid restric-
tions should not be imposed on the Administrator, whose judgment 
in such matters should be trusted. The Soviet rebuttal was that 
without a rigid formula there would be nothing to prevent the 
Administrator from recruiting the third third solely from Western 
states, thus assuring the West two-thirds of the staff at control posts. 
35GEN/DNT/PV. 100, p. 12. 
86Jbid., p. 7. 
37GEN/DNT/PV. 113, p. 5. 
SSGEN/DNT/PV. 68, p. 6. 
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On December 14, 1959, the USSR accepted the broad prin-
ciple that the staff of control posts should be divided into thirds, 
subject to agreement on the third third, and proposed that the 
third third be divided equally among Western allies, Soviet allies 
and uncommitted countries.39 The Western powers were unwilling to 
accept this rigid formula. They did, however, propose various com-
promises. On May 9, 1960, they tabled detailed staffing regulations 
which would have required the Administrator to give preference to 
nationals of the host country in recruiting the third third if the 
control post happened to be on the territory of a state other than 
the Original Parties to the treaty, and to take into account the 
"legitimate interests" of the Original Parties.40 On June 29, 1960, 
the United Kingdom went even farther and suggested that person-
nel appointments to the third third should "be made in such man-
ner and proportions as to maintain an equal balance between the 
interests of the Soviet Union on the one hand and of the United 
Kingdom and the United States on the other."41 Since these com-
promises were not acceptable to the Soviet Union, and the West 
would not go further, an impasse resulted. That was where matters 
stood at the end of 1960. 
The differences between the two sides were not very great, but 
they nevertheless continued to exist. The two sides also disagreed on 
the nationality of the head of the staff of the control posts. The 
West maintained that he could not be a host country national 
while the Soviet Union maintained that he must be a host country 
national. 
(2) Power Balance in the Commission 
A second major difference concerned the composition of the 
Control Commission. Agreement had been reached fairly early that 
this body should consist of seven states, and that the three Original 
Parties should have permanent membership. The disagreement 
concerned the four other states. Even before the March 19, 1959 
recess the Western powers had suggested that these four might 
consist of one state from the East and one from the West and two 
39GEN/DNT/PV. 148, p. 11. 
40GEN/DNT/89. 
41GEN/DNT/PV. 221, p. 10. 
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uncommitted states, giving an overall balance of 3 (West), 2 
(East), 2 (uncommitted); while the USSR had proposed one 
from the West, two from the East and one uncommitted state, giv-
ing an overall balance of 3 (West), 3 (East), 1 (uncommitted). 
Through 1960, neither side altered its position. The USSR made 
acceptance of its formula a part of its package proposal of Decem-
ber 14, 1959.42 The West countered on August 9, 1960, by raising 
the status of its formula of 3-2-2 from that of a suggestion to that 
of a formal proposal. 43 The Soviet Union justified its position on 
the ground of parity between the two sides; and the West, on the 
ground of the necessity of reflecting actual alignments throughout 
the world and of avoiding too great a burden of decision on any one 
uncommitted state. Each side was in reality attempting to maximize 
its influence within the Commission. 
( 3) The Reach of the "Veto" 
The question of voting rights in the Commission was closely 
linked to that of its composition, and in its package proposal of 
December 14, 1959, the Soviet Union actually tied the two to-
gether. As early as January 30, 1959, the Soviet Union had sub-
mitted a comprehensive list of seven categories of decisions which 
would require the affirmative votes of four members of the Com-
mission, including the Original Parties, and thus be subject to a 
veto by the Original Parties. 44 These included: 
(a) revision of the Treaty and its annexes, and adoption 
of amendments thereto; 
(b) any accusation against a State of a violation of the 
Treaty, and other matters relating to violations of the 
Treaty; 
(c) appointment of the Administrator, definition or alter-
ation of his terms of reference, recruitment of the 
main engineering and technical personnel of the Con-
trol Organization's headquarters, controllers and in-
spection groups; 
(d) adoption of a decision to despatch inspection groups 
for on-site investigation of an event suspected of 
42GEN/DNT/PV. 148, pp. 10-11. 
43GEN/DNT/PV. 240, p. 6. 
44GEN/DNT/29. 
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being a nuclear explosion, and adoption of decisions 
on the basis of the results of such investigation; 
(e) revision of existing methods and approval of new 
methods of observation and types of apparatus in the 
control system; 
(f) determination of location sites of the control posts 
and of the routes for control aircraft flights; 
(g) budgetary, financial, administrative, and economic 
matters connected with the Control Organization's 
activities, including matters relating to the recruit-
ment and dismissal of the supporting and auxiliary 
personnel. 
321 
The Soviet Union was willing to have procedural decisions settled 
by a simple majority vote. 
In the subsequent negotiations the Western powers sought to 
narrow the USSR's "veto list," as they called it, which had been 
put forward as an amendment to a paragraph of the proposed article 
dealing with the Commission. Two techniques were employed. One 
consisted of agreeing that unanimity among the Original Parties 
would be required with respect to a specified matter, but placing 
the statement of this requirement in the section of the treaty dealing 
with that particular matter. For example, the article which the 
three states adopted on amendments specified that amendments 
would go into effect only when ratified by two-thirds of the parties 
to the treaty including the three Original Parties. The other tech-
nique was to include substantive provisions which would be ac-
ceptable to the Soviet Union and render any specification of the 
voting requirement unnecessary. As a case in point, the Soviet 
Union agreed to remove the last part of section (g) relating to 
administrative personnel from its list when the Western powers 
agreed that the auxiliary and supporting personnel would be host 
country nationals. 
By November 25, 1959, the Soviet Union had agreed or of-
fered to delete all but one· section of subparagraph (g) from the 
list. 45 The deletion of subparagraph (a) has already been covered. 
The Soviet Union agreed to delete subparagraph (b) when the 
Western powers agreed that the Control Organization as such 
45See Mr. Tsarapkin's summary of the negotiations on these points: 
GEN/DNT/PV. 138, pp. 3-7. 
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would not make accusations of violations. The first part of sub-
paragraph (c) was deleted when the Western powers agreed that 
the appointment of the Administrator would require the agreement 
of the three Original Parties and that his terms of reference could 
only be changed by amending the treaty. The USSR offered to 
delete the remainder of subparagraph (c) relating to the Control 
Organization's staff if the Western powers would agree to the 
Soviet proposals on the distribution of the staff. It offered to delete 
subparagraph (d) if the Western powers would accept the proposal 
for an annual quota of on-site inspections. (The negotiations con-
cerning this point have already been analyzed.) The Soviet Union 
agreed to delete subparagraph (e) on revisions in the system, be-
cause these would fall under the provisions relating to amend-
ments to the treaty, since the components of the system would be 
specified in an annex. It agreed to delete subparagraph (f) when 
the Western powers agreed that the location of sites for control 
posts and of routes for control aircraft would be determined in 
agreement with the interested government. The Western powers pro-
tected their position by insisting that if the interested government 
rejected a proposal of the Commission it would be obliged to pro-
vide an alternative acceptable to the Commission. The Soviet Union 
accepted the requirement with respect to control post sites but not 
aircraft flights. The deletion of the final section of subparagraph 
(g) has already been mentioned. 
Thus the principal remaining question related to those issues 
covered in the first section of subparagraph (g), namely "budget-
ary, financial, administrative and economic matters connected with 
the Control Organization's activities. . . ." The essential issue in 
controversy was whether or not the agreement of all the Original 
Parties would be required for the budget. The Soviet Union argued 
that this was necessary because of the magnitude of the expendi-
tures which would be involved. The West on the other hand main-
tained that to allow this would allow one of the Original Parties 
effectively to block the operations of the Control Organization, and 
argued instead that the budget should only require a two-thirds 
majority in the Control Commission and a simple majority in the 
Conference. 
On December 14, 1959, as a part of its package proposal, the 
Soviet Union stated that it would agree to such a provision if its 
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proposal for the composition of the Control Commission were 
accepted; that is, the 3-3-1 formula.46 As the Western powers 
pointed out, under such arrangements the Soviet Union would have 
retained the ability to block the budget and in fact to block any 
section of the budget since the Soviet Union insisted that the Com-
mission should not merely vote on the total budget but also on 
each individual section. In the December 14 proposal the Soviet 
Union also insisted that the share of the contributions to be borne 
by each of the Original Parties would have to be specified in the 
treaty. 
The following year brought no resolution of these differences. 
Although the gap between the two sides on voting procedures in 
the Commission was narrowed considerably in the first twenty-
seven months of the Geneva Conference, it nevertheless continued 
to exist. 
( 4) How Much Independence for the "Executive,? 
A final major controversy concerned the Administrator. As 
will be recalled, the original Soviet plan made no provision for a 
chief executive officer, and appeared to assume that the Commis-
sion would oversee the operation of the control system. However, 
prior to the March 19, 1959 recess, the USSR had agreed that 
an administrator might be required, but only after the West had 
affirmed that such an individual would be subordinate to the Con-
trol Commission and that his appointment would require the agree-
ment of all the Original Parties. During the remainder of 1959 and 
1960, agreement was reached on several aspects of the general 
functions and character of the office of the Administrator. It was 
agreed that he should view his task in international terms, not as a 
representative of any side. This was understood to mean that he 
would most likely be a national of an uncommitted country. It 
was also agreed that he would be responsible for the general man-
agement of the control system, and that in connection with this, he 
would prepare budget estimates, forward reports to the Commis-
sion, and encourage the staff of the system to participate in basic 
research. 
Despite this broad area of agreement, there were various dis-
46GEN/DNT/PV. 148, p. 11. 
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agreements. The two sides could not agree to treaty language 
defining the relationship between the Administrator and the Con-
trol Commission. The original United States proposal had con-
tained the provision that the Administrator should be "responsible 
to the Commission in the performance of his duties,"47 and this was 
subsequently modified " ... for the installation and operation of 
the control system."48 On December 3, 1959, the Soviet Union 
sought to establish the dominant role of the Commission even 
more clearly, by suggesting that the relevant section should read: 
He shall be responsible to the Commission and is directly 
subordinated to it in all his acts, and shall provide to the 
Commission such advice, reports and assistance as the 
Commission may request. 49 
Although the distance between the two concepts was narrowed 
somewhat in the following month and a half, agreement could not 
be achieved. The West proposed as a compromise formulation: "He 
shall be responsible to the Commission and, under its supervision, 
shall carry out its policy directives"50 but would go no further. The 
USSR, on the other hand, never accepted this formulation. 
The essential issue at stake was the freedom to be given the 
Administrator, and the position of the two sides was in accord 
with that which they have taken with respect to other international 
organizations, particularly the United Nations. The same issue arose 
in the consideration of various specific powers which the West 
proposed to give to the Administrator, such as appointment of his 
staff, the authority to determine the location of control posts and 
bases for inspection teams, and the authority to despatch special 
aircraft sampling flights and on-site inspection teams. The USSR 
consistently sought to eliminate these provisions and hedge the 
Administrator's freedom. Where it did not succeed, the matters re-
mained in dispute. 
The original United States proposal had not specified any 
upper level staff other than the Administrator. On December 3, 
1959, the Soviet Union proposed that two deputy administrators 
47GEN/DNT/PV. 25, p. 12. 
4BGEN!DNT/PV. 106, p. 15. 
49GEN/DNT/PV. 142, p. 26. 
50GEN/DNT/PV. 155, p. 6. 
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should be appointed who "shall assist the Administrator in his 
day-to-day work and shall be entitled equally to participate in the 
preparation of questions for decision by the Administrator."51 In 
his oral presentation, Mr. Tsarapkin made it clear that the two 
deputy administrators should represent the two sides, and asserted 
that their constant presence could do much to prevent friction, 
especially between the Control Organization and the Original Par-
ties.52 This appeared to the Western powers to be an attempt to 
intrude national elements into what they conceived of as an inter-
national staff. At first the Western powers were disinclined to 
compromise their concept in this way. 
Movement toward agreement was only possible because of the 
Western powers' growing concern for another problem, on which the 
Soviet Union was willing to make concessions in return for counter 
concessions. At about the same time that the Soviet Union raised 
the proposal for two deputy administrators, the United States be-
came worried about the problem of continuity in the executive 
authority, and proposed that the Administrator should continue to 
serve until his successor was appointed. 53 Obviously the United 
States had in mind the situation in the United Nations when the 
permanent members of the Security Council could not agree to a 
successor for Secretary General Trygve Lie, whose term of office 
was extended over the most strenuous Soviet opposition until agree-
ment was reached on the new chief executive. Because of that very 
situation, however, and because the Western proposal would for the 
future "legalize" what the Western powers had done in that instance 
in the United Nations, the suggestion was an anathema to the Soviet 
Union. 
On April 18, 1960, the United States tried a different approach 
to assure a measure of continuity in the performance of the admin-
istrative function. In January of that year the United States had 
agreed that there might be one Deputy Administrator, and that his 
appointment would require the concurrence of the Original Parties. 54 
It now suggested that while the terms of both the Administrator and 
the Deputy Administrator would be three years, the initial term of 
olQEN/DNT/73. 
52QEN/DNT/PV. 142, p. 16. 
53QEN/DNT/PV. 141, p. 18. 
54QEN/DNT/PV. 153, pp. 3-4. 
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the Deputy Administrator would only be two years, so that the 
terms of the two officers would always overlap. 55 
On June 21, 1960, the Soviet Union proposed that there should 
be three deputy administrators, a first deputy who would be a 
national of an uncommitted country, and who could serve as Ad-
ministrator in his absence, and two representing the two sides. 56 At 
the same time, Mr. Tsarapkin stated that the USSR would accept 
the Western concept of staggering the terms of the Administrator 
and the principal Deputy. After a series of informal meetings, Sir 
Michael Wright suggested ad referendum that there should be five 
deputy administrators, a first deputy from an uncommitted state, 
and two from each side. 57 The Soviet Union accepted this proposal 
on July 5, and the United States, the following day. However, 
agreement could not be obtained on the manner of appointment of 
the Deputy Administrators. The West felt that the Administrator 
should have some role in the selection of his principal assistants, 
but the Soviet Union insisted that they should all be appointed by 
the Control Commission. 
Of course there were other differences among the three parties 
in the Geneva Conference, relating for example to communications 
and regional offices, but these four were the principal ones. Review-
ing them, and considering them in conjunction with the agreements 
that were achieved, one can only conclude that in mid-1960, when 
progress in the negotiations fell sharply, issues relating to the Con-
trol Organization were not the principal obstacles to the adoption 
of a nuclear test ban treaty. Given the extent of the compromises 
which had occurred, it is hard to believe that further agreements 
could not have been arranged. 
IV 
The Renewed Western Effort 
The April 18, 1961, Western Draft Treaty 
In fact, the West did offer further concessions. When the Kennedy 
Administration assumed power in January, along with reconsidering 
Western positions on such fundamental issues as the coverage of 
55GEN/DNT/PV. 195, p. 4. 
56GEN/DNT/PV. 216, p. 6. 
57GEN/DNT/PV. 223, pp. 3-7. 
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the treaty and the phasing of the installation of the control system, 
it also reexamined Western positions relating to the structure of the 
Control Organization. New positions were formulated as a con-
sequence. The principal explanations for the changes were two. 
First, President Kennedy wanted to make a determined effort to 
achieve a treaty, and so instructed his aides. Secondly, the member-
ship of the Committee of Principals was modified. Perhaps the most 
crucial change was that Glenn T. Seaborg replaced John A. McCone 
as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. McCone was 
the strongest personality on the Commission and as a consequence 
of his departure the AEC eased its position on several aspects of the 
proposed treaty and Control Organization. For example, at one point 
the AEC had taken the position that no instrument operated by 
Soviet technicians could be considered reliable. After agreement 
had been achieved within the United States government, the new 
positions were presented to the British, who readily agreed. 
The new Western position, several aspects of which have already 
been discussed, was advanced in a series of oral presentations by 
Ambassador Dean starting March 21, 1961, and in the draft treaty 
tabled April 18, 1961.58 With one exception relating to the number 
of states on the Control Commission, this treaty incorporated the 
articles which had already been adopted in the Conference. Beyond 
that, it was based on previous Western positions, with certain 
modifications. Several of the changes were designed to eliminate 
outstanding controversies. 
So far as staffing was concerned, the Western powers were 
willing to specify in the treaty that in all cases where deputies were 
appointed, a national of the United Kingdom or the United States 
should have a deputy from the USSR and vice versa. They were not, 
however, willing to go beyond their previous commitment with 
respect to the third third at control posts, and they continued to 
insist that the head of a control post could not be a host country 
national. 
Perhaps the most far-reaching change in the Western position 
was with respect to the composition of the Control Commission. 
The new proposal was for a Commission consisting of eleven states: 
the three parties to the negotiations as permanent members; two 
58For the draft treaty, see Geneva Conference, pp. 475-520. 
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states associated with the United Kingdom and the United States; 
three states associated with the USSR; and three uncommitted 
states; thus yielding a 4-4-3 composition with East and West repre-
sented equally. Actually Mr. Tsarapkin had casually mentioned this 
figure June 14, 1960, but the Western powers had not responded.G9 
As another fairly significant concession, the new Western 
proposal provided that decisions in the Commission concerning the 
scale of contributions and the total amount of each annual budget 
would require the unanimous agreement of the three Original 
Parties. By accepting substanfially the Soviet position the Western 
powers sought to eliminate the last major point of disagreement 
on the scope of the "veto." Thus, contrary to the United Nations 
pattern where budgetary decisions are made by the veto-less General 
Assembly, the budgetary control in the control organization would 
be subject to the veto. Finally, with respect to the four deputy 
administrators from the two sides, the new draft treaty provided 
that they should be appointed by the Administrator "on the recom-
mendation, or with the approval," of the party or parties concerned. 
The new Western position also contained other innovations, 
the most important of which related to the accession of other states 
to the proposed treaty. Although the three parties had at an early 
stage agreed that it should be possible for other states to accede to 
the treaty, they had never worked out the procedures for this. On 
July 26, 1960, the United States had tabled two draft paragraphs 
on this point. 60 The paragraphs had two notable features. First, 
others could become parties to the treaty only if the Commission 
found that their adherence was "essential in order to achieve the 
fundamental Treaty purpose of a permanent discontinuance of 
nuclear weapons test explosions on a world-wide basis or that ele-
ments of control are required to be installed in territory under" their 
jurisdiction. Secondly, the two articles throughout used the phrase-
ology "states or authorities." The obvious purpose of these two 
features was to allow the West to insist that certain states should 
accede to the treaty, and yet to avoid any impairment of the United 
States policy of nonrecognition of these or other states or their 
governments. The necessity of the adherence of the People's Repub-
59GEN/DNT/PV. 213, p. 10. 
60GEN/DNT/ 102. 
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lie of China was one obvious case which the authors had in mind. 
On the other hand, these provisions would enable the West to block 
the accession of certain states, for example, the Democratic Repub-
lic of Germany. Mr. Wadsworth patiently explained that no one 
would ever know whether a party acceded to the treaty as a state 
or as an authority. This terminology and the entire procedure, 
however, were totally unacceptable to the Soviet Union. 
The new Western draft attempted to meet the Soviet objection 
by dropping the obnoxious words "or authority." On the other 
hand, the West still opposed the Soviet proposal for automatic 
adherence of other states and would have the Commission screen 
membership applications. The new draft specified that in Commis-
sion decisions concerning adherence of new parties to the treaty, 
Original Parties "associated" with the candidate must abstain. 
The question of the timing of the accession of other states was 
also altered in the new proposal. The six months' time limit on sign-
ing in the article on signature, ratification, acceptance, and entry into 
force was dropped. At the same time, a schedule in the new Annex 
I specified a timetable according to which elements of the Detection 
and Identification System would have to be installed. Among other 
things it specified that within five years of the entry into force of the 
treaty twenty-one control posts would have to be established in Asia 
outside of the territory of the USSR. If this commitment were not 
fulfilled, parties would have the right to invoke the right of with-
drawal under the duration article. Thus Communist China's acces-
sion would have had to have been achieved within the five-year time 
period. Whether or not these arrangements would have insured this 
is far from clear.61 
One final minor change was that according to the new Western 
draft the initial review of the effectiveness of the Detection and 
Identification System should occur three rather than two years after 
the coming into force of the treaty. 
The Soviet Response 
To the disappointment of the Western powers, there was little 
real negotiation on their new proposals. On March 21, 1961, the 
61For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Ciro E. Zoppo with the 
collaboration of Alice L. Hsieh, The Accession of Other Nations to the 
Nuclear Test Ban (Santa Monica: The RAND Corp., 1961, RM-2730-ARPA). 
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day that the Conference resumed, before Ambassador Dean and Mr. 
Ormsby-Gore had an opportunity to speak, Mr. Tsarapkin launched 
an attack on the concept of a single executive head in international 
organizations, often illustrating his point by referring to the activities 
of the Secretary General of the UN in the Congo, and proposed that 
the Control Organization should have, rather than an Administrator, 
an Administrative Council, consisting of three members, represent-
ing respectively the USSR and its allies; the United Kingdom, the 
United States and their allies; and neutral states. According to Mr. 
Tsarapkin, this Administrative Council "would act as a single whole 
and would agree amongst themselves on all steps which they would 
undertake in the execution of their duties."62 In subsequent ques-
tioning he never went beyond this brief formulation in explaining 
how decisions would be taken in the Administrative Council. He 
never gave an answer to queries about whether or not voting would 
take place and unanimity be required, other than to say that the 
members of the Administrative Council would "act in agreement."63 
Mr. Tsarapkin did state, however, that the proposal for the Admin-
istrative Council eliminated the necessity for having Deputy Ad-
ministrators. 
The Soviet proposal for an Administrative Council met firm 
opposition from Western negotiators, both because they felt that it 
would prevent the Control Organization from taking effective action, 
and because they feared the implications of any compromise on this 
issue, both for the UN and for other international organizations 
which mieht be established in the future. 
Why the Soviet Union shifted its position is not clear. In break-
ing the moratorium on nuclear testing slightly over five months 
later, the USSR demons1rated that at that point, August 31, 1961, 
it was willing seriously to jeopardize the negotiations, and thus pre-
sumably had little interest in continuing them. Chairman Khrushchev 
had indicated as much in his meeting with President Kennedy in 
Vienna on June 3 and 4. Preparations for the extensive test series 
which the USSR initiated in the fall must have been well underway 
by the time that the Geneva Conference resumed on March 21. Thus 
Mr. Tsarapkin's move could be interpreted as designed to block the 
62GEN/DNT/PV. 274, p. 14. 
63GEN/DNT/PV. 298/Rev. 1, p. 32. See also GEN/DNT/325, p. 21. 
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negotiations. At the same time, the Soviet Union was profoundly 
unhappy and disturbed with Secretary General HammarskjOld's ac-
tivities in the Congo. Like the Western powers, it too was interested 
in implications of positions taken in the Geneva Conference for 
events and institutions elsewhere. Moreover, its fear of giving sig-
nificant power to a single executive head of a control organization 
had been manifest throughout the negotiations, and the proposal for 
an Administrative Council was only a slight modification of its earlier 
stand on the question of deputy administrators. 
The only one of the new Western proposals which the Soviet 
Union accepted was that relating to the composition of the Control 
Commission. On April 7, 1961, Mr. Tsarapkin agreed to the total 
figure of 11 and the 4-4-3 distribution. 64 On the other hand, he 
continued to insist that the composition of the third third of the staff 
of control posts had to be specified in the treaty, and that the agree-
ment of the original parties would be necessary for individual sec-
tions of the budget as well as for the total figure. He also argued 
that the contributions of the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States would have to be equal.65 The Western draft treaty 
provided for equal contributions only from the United States and the 
USSR. Basically, however, Mr. Tsarapkin paid little attention to the 
Western proposals. 
Despite this rebuff, and the deep impasse on the question of 
the Administrator, the Western powers sought to keep the negotia-
tions alive, and on August 30, 1961, the United States tabled further 
compromise proposals. The first of these would have given the 
Commission the right to dismiss the Administrator.66 This would 
have required only the concurring votes of any seven members. 
The second proposal related to the composition of on-site in-
spection teams. In May 1960, the Western Powers had suggested 
that on-site inspection teams in the USSR should be staffed by West-
ern nationals and vice versa. They had always maintained that host 
country nationals could not participate, although they were willing 
to allow the possibility of "one or more" host country observers. 
Originally the Soviet Union had proposed that on-site inspection 
64GEN/DNT/PV. 286, p. 8. 
65Jbid., p. 6. 
66GEN/DNT/ 110/ Add. 2. 
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teams should be composed of host country nationals, with one or 
two controllers from the other side. Subsequently it modified this 
stand and suggested that on-site inspection teams on the territories 
of the original parties should be divided equally between nationals 
of the USSR on the one hand, and nationals of the United Kingdom 
and the United States on the other. On-site inspection teams on the 
territories of other parties would be divided into thirds: one third 
from the USSR, one third from the United Kingdom and the United 
States, and one third from the host country. The draft treaty of 
April 18 had continued the previous Western position. Now, how-
ever, the United States proposed that in the case of inspections on 
the territories of the Original Parties, one half of the staff might 
consist of nationals of uncommitted states, the other half and the 
leader of the party being nationals of the other side. 67 
These proposals were never discussed. During the evening of 
the day on which they were presented, the Soviet Union announced 
its decision to resume testing nuclear weapons, and on November 28, 
1961, it tabled a treaty which would rely solely on national detec-
tion systems. 
v 
Conclusions 
It is obviously impossible to analyze fully the postures of East 
and West concerning the proposed Control Organization in isola-
tion from their positions on other issues in the negotiations. One 
cannot, for example, estimate the significance of the agreements that 
were achieved without making some assumptions about the broad 
goals of the three states. Many comments and speculations can 
therefore best be postponed until a later stage. Some limited con-
clusions, however, can be drawn at this point. 
The negotiations illustrated in detail the differing approaches 
of the United States, and to a lesser extent of the United Kingdom, 
on the one hand, and of the Soviet Union on the other, to the 
question of international organization. The Western position seemed 
to be dominated by a desire to establish a control organization in-
volving if necessary thousands of personnel, the operations of which 
67GEN/DNT/110/Add. 3. 
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could not be blocked by any one party and which would be capable 
of providing incontestable evidence if a treaty violation occurred. 
Western policy-makers were haunted by the fear of a situation in 
which violations were known to be occurring, but could not be 
proved conclusively. Realizing that the main if not the only sanction 
in case of a violation would be Western resumption of nuclear 
testing, they seemed to feel that they could only take such a step if 
they had incontrovertible evidence of a violation. 
Whether or not the Control Organization proposed in the West-
em draft treaty of April 18, 1961, would have yielded such incon-
trovertible evidence may be debatable. Some have argued that the 
Western powers made so many concessions to the Soviet Union and 
in so doing mL'!:ed the "impartial" and the "reciprocal" approaches 
with the result that, had an Original Party been interested in violat-
ing the treaty, it would have had ample opportunity to block the 
effective functioning of the Control Organization.68 Nevertheless, 
there can be no question about the aim of the Western powers. 
The Western position implicitly contained several interesting 
assumptions, which deserve careful examination. First, it assumed 
that the evidence of a violation would most likely be ambiguous. 
Given the technical situation as it was understood during this period, 
all but underground shots of less than 50 kiloton yield or decoupled 
underground shots of larger yield would have been easily detected 
by systems independent of the Control Organization and would have 
been widely recognized as nuclear detonations. Moreover, single 
shots would have escaped detection easier than a series. Of course, 
certain categories of shots at high altitudes and in outer space would 
have been difficult to detect, but since detection in this environment 
relies almost entirely on mechanical means, this problem was hardly 
discussed in the negotiations concerning the Control Organization. 
The Western position therefore assumed that a violator would be 
interested in the kinds of technological developments that could be 
gained through testing in the yield ranges and in the environments 
where detection would be difficult. Whether or not this was a valid 
assumption is at least subject to question. Certainly when the Soviet 
68See Fred C. lkle and others, Alternative Approaches to the Inter-
national Organization of Disarmament (1962), Appendix A, "The Western 
Proposal for A Nuclear Test Ban: How Would the Control Organization 
Function," pp. 25-37. 
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Union broke the moratorium it was equally if not more interested 
in very high-yield nuclear weapons, the detonation of which could 
not be concealed. 
The Western position also assumed that domestic public opinion 
within the Western states, and the opinion of the uncommitted states, 
would be extremely important in determining the conduct of the 
Western governments. The Western position implied that Western 
governinents would find it extremely difficult to take so serious a 
step as to denounce a nuclear test ban treaty on the basis of private 
information. Perhaps this assumption is correct, but it has never been 
proved. It also minimizes the ability of Western governments to 
influence and shape their domestic public opinion. 
Finally, the Western position was based on the assumption, 
often explicitly stated, that it would be easier for the Soviet Union 
to keep clandestine activities secret than it would be for the Western 
powers. The most interesting aspect of this assumption is that dur-
ing the period under consideration, because of important techno-
logical developments especially in the area of space reconnaissance, 
it was becoming less and less true. 69 
Apart from these specific policy considerations relating to possi-
ble treaty violations, the Western attitude seemed to have been 
influenced also by the more general philosophy that any progress 
toward control and reduction of armaments would require an inter-
national organization which would assure a degree of "openness" 
throughout the world and guarantee a measure of restraint on na-
tional action. 
The Soviet position, on the other hand, was based on extreme 
reluctance to allow an international organization to be established 
which might take action over Soviet opposition. The rationale which 
it advanced most often for this position was that it needed to be in a 
position to prevent the Western powers from using the organization 
for espionage. The Western powers always minimized this argu-
ment, disavowing espionage aims and pointing out the limited in-
cursions which would be involved. However, Russian regimes have 
traditionally maintained a tight veil of secrecy, and the Soviet gov-
69For an interesting discussion ot some of the techniques involved in 
this change see Clark C. Apt, ''The Problems and Possibilities of Space 
Arms Control," Journal of Arms Control, Vol. I, No. 1 (January 1963), pp. 
18-43, at 29-32. 
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ernment has frequently used or attempted to use secrecy to its 
military and political advantage. 70 The Soviet fears served to con-
firm, and in a sense were in accord with, the Western belief that 
they knew and could know less about the Soviet Union than the 
Soviet Union did and could know about them. Thus Soviet secrecy 
became a subject of and a factor in the bargaining. 
In addition, Mr. Tsarapkin often asserted that the Western 
powers might illegitimately use the Control Organization to promote 
their interests, and averred that past experience in international 
organizations proved this possibility. Clearly this position was based 
on a profound distrust of the West and of any international organi-
zation in which the West played a major role, and was deeply rooted 
in the Soviet Weltanschauung. The Soviet position is perhaps only 
understandable in these terms. If one assumes that others are by 
nature hostile, one obviously cannot allow them to have important 
powers. Thus, even if the USSR had no intention of breaking the 
treaty, it might desire to be in position to block any action by the 
Control Organization. Soviet policy-makers probably also desired 
to limit their freedom of action as little as possible. 
Given the different assumptions, fears, and interests of the three 
states, it is significant that they achieved as much agreement as they 
did, even though this agreement was not lasting. It is also significant 
that they agreed to the broad outlines of such an extensive inter-
national organization to perform so modest a function. To many of 
the participants from both East and West, the Control Organization 
envisaged in the Geneva Conference seemed to be greatly out of 
proportion to the limited tasks that it would have been assigned. 
70For an insightful discussion of Soviet attitudes toward secrecy and 
arms control agreements, see Alexander Dallin and others, The Soviet 
Union, Arms Control, and Disarmament: A Study of Soviet Attitudes 
(1964), pp. 142-58. 
Appendix 
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon 
Tests in the Atmosphere , in Outer 
Space, and Under Water 
The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties," 
Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achieve­
ment of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict 
international control in accordance with the objectives of the United 
Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate 
the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, in­
cluding nuclear weapons, 
Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nu­
clear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this 
end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environ­
ment by radioactive substances, 
Have agreed a� follows: 
Article I 
1 .  Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to 
prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any 
other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control: 
(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or 
underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or 
(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive 
debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose 
jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in 
this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without 
prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning 
of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, 
the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to 
this Treaty, they seek to achieve. 
2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to 
refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the 
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carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear 
explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments 
described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article. 
Article II 
1 .  Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of 
any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Govern­
ments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if 
requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary 
Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all 
the Parties, to consider such amendment. 
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority 
of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of 
the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties 
upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the 
Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Original 
Parties. 
Article III 
1 .  This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State 
which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance 
with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. 
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. 
Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited 
with the Governments of the Original Parties-the United States of 
America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-which are hereby designated 
the Depositary Governments. 
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the 
Original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. 
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are 
deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter 
into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or 
accession. 
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory 
and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of 
each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of 
its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences 
or other notices. 
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments 
pursuant to Article 1 02 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Article IV 
This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 
Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right 
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to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, re­
lated to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme 
interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other 
Parties to the Treaty three months in advance. 
Article V 
This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally 
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Govern­
ments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the 
Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acced­
ing States. 
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed 
this Treaty. 
Done in triplicate at the city of Moscow, the fifth day of August, 
one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three. 
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Molnar, Julius P., 1 5 1 n  
Molotov, V .  M., 3 1  
Moore, Virgil L., 1 1 4n 
Moratorium on nuclear testing, 45, 
89, 90, 1 08, 1 1 0, 1 20, 1 35, 1 43, 
1 47, 1 74, 247, 267, 290, 495; 
broken by USSR, Sept. 1, 1 96 1 ,  
280-8 1 ,  341 , 356; debate on, in 
US, decision on resumption of 
atmospheric testing announced 
March 2, 1 962, 345; Eisenhower 
declaration on voluntary, Dec. 
1 959, Khrushchev repeats pledge, 
Jan. 1 960, 233 ; Eisenhower de­
cision to continue, UK decision 
to continue, Soviet statement on, 
Aug. 1 959, 201-3; Kennedy 
order for test resumption i n  
laboratory and underground, 
283; opposition by AEC, 9 1 ;  
opposition by Department of 
Index 527 
Moratorium (continued) 
Defense, 9 1 ;  pledges to honor by 
Presidential candidates, 247; po­
sition of three powers at expir­
ation of Spring 1 960, 249; 
Soviet decision to discontinue 
tests, March 3 1 ,  1 958, 45; So­
viet ends, 1 1 9 ;  Soviet proposal 
for (with partial treaty) , March 
1 9, 1 960, 240; temporary, 
urged by USSR, 28; US, con­
tinued in summer of 1961,  279; 
US, resumes atmospheric test­
ing, April 26, 1962, 377; un­
policed, 387; USSR for first time 
drops as condition to partial 
test ban 
Morgan, H. T., 254n 
Morocco, 208 
Morris, Donald, 55 
Morse, John H., Jr., viii, 54 
Morse, VVayne, 448n 
Morton, Louis, 5n 
Moscow Treaty; see Treaty Ban­
ning Nuclear VVeapon Tests in 
the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, 
and Under VV ater 
Moss, Frank E., 448n 
Multilateral Nuclear Force ( MLF ) ,  
435-36, 443, 46 1 ;  see also 
North Atlantic Treaty Or­
ganization 
Munk, VValter H., 1 5 1 n  
Murphy, Charles J .  V., 28n, 46n, 
48n, 63n, 155n, 1 60n 
Murray, Thomas E., 25n, 29, 9 1 n, 
1 67n, 173, 269 
Murrow, Edward R., 86, 281 
Muske, Edmund S., 448n 
Myrdal, Aiva, viii, 395-96, 442n 
Nagasaki, 1 9  
Nathan, Robert R., 158 
National detection systems, 69, 
1 27, 172, 36 1 ,  363-68; for mon­
itoring nuclear testing, 29 1 
N a tiona! stations ,  international 
supervision of, 434 
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 20-21 ,  40-41 
Nepal, 4 1 9  
Netherlands, 42 1 
Neuberger, Richard L., 448n 
Neutral states, 1 25 
Neutron bomb, 28, 30, 35, 39, 62, 
147, 244, 347, 382 
Nevins, Allan, 269 
New seismic data; see Seismic 
data; Technology 
New Zealand, 4 1 8, 421 
Niger, 4 1 9  
Nigeria, 42 1 ;  ENDC, 357-58 
Nitze, Paul H., 408-9, 4 1 2, 459 
Nixon, Richard, 263 
Nogee, Joseph L., 6n, 1 5n 
Nonaggression pact between NATO 
and VVarsaw Pact countries, 
proposed, 443 
Nonaligned states, 4 1 3  
Nongovernmental organizations, 
hearings granted to, 1 17 
Non-nuclear powers, influence of, 
1 2; transfer of nuclear weapons 
to, 1 6 ;  see also Nth country 
problem 
Nordness, Nedville E., 352n 
North Atlantic Treaty Organiza­
tion (NATO ) , 1 03, 1 10, 1 33, 
273-74, 357, 383, 421 ;  Agree­
ment for Cooperation, US-UK, 
37; Council meeting, 40, 175; 
crisis of strategic doctrine, 38; 
forces, strength of, 341 ;  intel­
ligence agents, 453; missiles for 
NATO countries, 1 74-76; Multi­
lateral Nuclear Force ( MLF) ,  
443, 46 1 ;  Multilateral Nuclear 
Force ( MLF ) ,  plans for, 435-
36; nuclear striking force, 1 1 0-
1 1  ; pressure against test ban, 3 8;  
programs, 267; selected coun­
tries of, to receive missiles, 36; 
strategy of, in 1 957, 29-3 1 , 36-
40; strategy, pressure for "clean" 
bomb and dispersal of nuclear 
weapons, 30-3 1 ;  see also Privi­
leges and Immunities 
North Atlantic Treaty Organiza­
tion and VVarsaw Pact govern­
ments, discussion of nonaggres­
sion pact between, 455 
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Northrup, Doyle L., 47n, 55n, 
73-74, 1 1 4n, 270n 
Norway, 22, 4 1 8 ,  421 
Nth country problem, 7, 1 6, 30-
3 1 , 5 1 , 88, 1 03 , 1 1 1 ,  1 25, 1 74, 
200, 208-9, 237-38, 267-68, 
273-75, 284, 37 1 , 387, 4 1 1 ,  
414, 436, 443, 446, 455, 457, 
500; Communist China, 25 1 ;  
France, 38; France and Com­
munist China, 455 
Nuclear detonations for peaceful 
purposes, 1 56-58, 405; see also 
Project Plowshare 
Nuclear explosions, at high alti­
tudes, in outer space, 1 46, 1 89, 
333, 344, 348 
Nuclear test ban, linked to other 
measures of arms control and 
disarmament; see "Link" 
Nuclear test ban negotiations, as 
case study, 1 1 - 1 3  
Nuclear warheads, US, 340 
Nuclear weapons, "clean"; cut-off 
on production, 1 7; development 
of, versus control, 5-7; exist­
ing stockpiles, no control pos­
sible of, 43-44; high yield, 342; 
largest tested ( USSR) ,  342; 
new tasks for, 26-29; prohibi­
tion of, resolution in 1 6th UN 
General Assembly, 285; see also 
"Clean" nuclear weapons 
Nuclear weapons control, inter­
action with Soviet behavior, 8-9; 
link to world order, 7-9 
Nuclear weapons tests, as political 
issue, 1959 Presidential cam­
paign, 209; at high altitudes, 63; 
comprehensive agreement for 
suspension of, 1 7 1 ;  deep under­
ground, 58; extremely high alti­
tudes, 58; first underground det­
onation by USSR, 353; 1 958 
US series, Hardtack I (Teak, 
Orange, Argus) ;  Hardtack II 
( Tamalpais, Logan, Blanca) ,  
1 45-47; improved detection of, 
368; in atmosphere, resumed by 
US, April 26, 1 962, 377; more 
extensive in 1962 than in any 
other year, 378; opposition to 
resumption of, in US, 345-49; 
President's assurances on Mos­
cow Treaty, 462; resumption by 
USSR, August 5, 1962, 393; 
resumption of, in laboratory and 
underground, ordered by Ken­
nedy, September 5, 196 1 ,  343; 
underground, 63; under water, 
in the atmosphere, in the bio­
sphere, detection and identifica­
tion of, 366-67; USSR resumed, 
September 1 ,  1961,  280, 332; 
USSR test of "superpowerful" 
bomb, 284; see also Morato­
rium on nuclear testing 
Oliver, Jack E., 1 5 1 n, 21 2n 
Olmstead, George B., 55n 
On-site inspections, 6 1 ,  72, 7 4, 
1 34-35, 149, 1 7 1 , 253, 280, 
303, 322, 369, 376; annuru 
quota of, 1 77, 226; continued 
deadlock over quota, 433 ,  438-
39; criteria for, 1 8 1 ,  1 85 , 226-
28; criteria in US-UK draft 
comprehensive test ban treaty 
(Aug. 1 962 ) ,  402-5; difficulty 
of, 253; discussion in the Con­
ference of Experts Report, 78; 
in mainland China, 1 66; new 
approach suggested by US, 275; 
number of, 241 ;  number of, as 
political issue in Technical 
Working Group II, 221 ;  quota 
of, 249; quota of three not ac­
ceptable to US Senate, 449; re­
duction in number of, 363; 
Soviet proposal for temporary 
criteria for initiation of, 238; 
Soviet proposal of three per 
year, 1 99; Soviet proposal on 
annual quota, 1 99, 235; Soviet 
reaction to Western draft of 
Aug. 1 962, 4 1 4; still required in 
1 962 for comprehensive ban, 
388; two schemes proposed by 
US, 236-37; of unidentified 
events, 352; US insistence on, 
On-site inspections (continued) 
432; US offer to reduce num­
ber of, 393; US position on 
quotas, 272; USSR quota ac­
ceptable to US, 426; veto on, 
1 77; Western modification of 
process suggested, 441 ;  West­
ern proposal on composition of 
inspection teams, 3 3 1 -32; see 
also Technical Working Group 
II 
"Operation Deadline," 99 
Opponents of test ban, 1 24, 1 37, 
1 39-40, 1 57 
Orear, Jay, 44, 59n, 6 1 n  
Organization of American States 
(OAS ) ,  1 03 
Original Parties, 305, 3 1 0, 458; 
unanimity among, 203, 302-3 
Ormsby-Gore, David, 1 14, 1 29, 
1 32, 1 34, 1 40, 1 50, 1 62, 1 67, 
330 
"Other States," 305; adherence of, 
328-29; role in negotiations ap­
praised, 498 
Our Nuclear Future, 2 1 9  
Outer space, 92; peaceful use of, 
106-7; reconnaissance of, 334 
Overflight for radioactive debris, 
dispute over, 70-73 
Padilla Nervo, Luis, 360, 379-80, 
4 1 6  
Pakistan, 22, 1 04 
Palais des Nations, 363 
Panofsky, Wolfgang K. H., vii, 
viii, 1 46, 1 86-90, 1 9 1 n, 1 92n, 
1 93-94, 2 1 2n, 2 1 4n, 2 1 5n, 
2 1 8n, 2 19, 221 , 222n, 227, 
228n, 229n, 270n, 277, 480 
Panofsky Panel, 1 78, 1 82, 1 87 ;  
report, 278 
Panton F., 2 1 8n, 254n 
Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 
1 1 5, 1 27, 1 7 1 -77, 286, 415, 
454; Soviet proposal ( Mar. 19,  
1 960) , 240-41 ; US suggestion 
for, 1 7 1 ;  US verbal proposal 
for (Feb. 1 1 , 1 960), 234-38, 
and Soviet response, 238-40; 
Index 
USSR draft (July 15,  1 963 ) ,  
454-55; Western draft (Aug. 
27, 1 962) , 389, 397, 409-1 3, 
455; Western proposal ( Sept. 
3, 1961 ) '  282-83 
Parties to treaty, 1 30-32 
Pasechnik, I. P., 254n 
Pashchnik, D. R., 57, 2 14n 
Pastore, John 0., 446 
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Pauling, Linus C., 25, 34, 56, 460, 
464, 479-80 
Peaceful uses of nuclear explo­
sions, 463; see also Project Plow­
share 
Pell, Claiborne, 448n 
Peng, Tehhuai, 96 
Penney, Sir William, 54, 76-77, 
85, 2 1 8, 452n 
People's Republic of China, 66, 
95, 96, 37 1 ;  Condition for par­
ticipating in disarmament con­
ference, 25; explosions by USSR 
on its territory, 1 3 1 ;  not bound 
by treaty, 25 1 ; see also Com­
munist China. 
Peru, 207, 4 1 8  
Petersen, Allen M . ,  1 86n 
Phased treaty; see Partial test ban 
treaty 
Philippines, 4 1 9, 42 1 
Piore, Emanuel R., 33n 
Poland, 40, 52, 57, 419; resolution 
in U.N General Assembly, 267; 
Ten-Nation Disarmament Com­
mittee, ENDC, 357 
Policy-makers, in open and closed 
societies, 496; understanding of 
detection problems, 62-64 
Political compromise, search for, 
23 1 -6 1  
Political instructions, for Soviet 
delegate to TWG II, 2 1 6; for 
US delegates to TWG II, 2 1 6-
1 7  
Popper, David H., 1 1 4, 24 1 n  
Portugal, 42 1 
Power, Thomas S., 459 
Pravda, 94, 99, 1 63 
Preparatory Commission, 2 1 2, 
242, 309-1 0; Annex III adopted, 
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Preparatory Commission (cont.) 
309-10; composition of, 309- 10; 
functions of, 309-10; see also 
Control Organization 
President (US ) ,  presidential cam­
paign and test ban, 24-25, 263 
President's Science Advisory Com­
mittee (PSAC) ,  46-49, 63, 88, 
93, 1 49-51 ' 1 53, 156, 1 60; ad 
hoc panel appointed by Ken­
nedy, 277; appointment of 
Panofsky Panel, 1 46, 153;  mem­
bers, 277n 
Press, disclosure to, 1 1 8  
Press, Frank, 62, 1 5 1 n ,  2 1 2n, 219,  
254-55, 259, 277n, 352n, 455 
Press, R., 1 86n 
Pressure; by public opinion, 80, 
91 , 1 80; on public officials, by 
insistent press corps, 390-9 1 ;  
to resume testing, 275, 279; 
against test ban, from NATO, 
38, 275; for test ban, 1 9-21 ,  
25-26; for test ban negotiations, 
277; against testing, 37 1 ;  see 
also Public opinion 
Privileges and Immunities, abuse 
of, 3 1 6; Agreement on the Priv­
ileges and Immunities of the 
International Atomic Energy 
Agency, 3 1 1 ;  Agreement on the 
Status of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, National 
Representatives and Interna­
tional Staff, 3 1 1 ;  Annex II, 258, 
3 1  0-1 7 ;  access of personnel to 
party's territory, 3 1 6 ;  of Con­
trol Organization, 3 1 3-14;  repre­
sentatives on Control Commis­
sion, 3 1 3; of staff and experts, 
3 1 3-14; waiver of immunities, 
3 1 3;  Specialized Agencies, 1947 
Convention on, 3 1 1 ;  to be 
granted by parties to own na­
tionals, 3 1 4-16; of the UN, 
1 946 Convention on, 3 1 1  
Production of nuclear weapons, 
cut-off, 4 1 ,  9 1 -92 
Project Cowboy, 223, 351 
Project Gnome, 3 5 1 -52 
Project Plowshare, 35, 35 1 , 456 
Projects Vela and Cowboy, 177-
80; see also Vela Program 
Proliferation; see Nth country 
problem 
Proof testing of existing weapons, 
378 
Propaganda (by USSR) ,  1 1 3;  
benefits for USSR, 1 80, on pre­
ventive war, 422; victory for 
USSR, admitted by Dulles, 46 
Prouty, Winston, 448n 
Proxmire, William, 448 
Public opinion, 95, 1 62; British, 
1 69;  concern of, since 1954, 
15;  domestic, in Western and 
uncommitted states, 334; Soviet 
control over, 99; Soviet effort to 
influence Western and uncom­
mitted countries, 1 1 8; in US, 
39, 1 69, 470; Western sensi·tiv­
ity to, 350; see also Pressure 
Pugwash Conference (Tenth) , on 
Science and World affairs, 425 
Purcell, Edward M., 33n, 46 1 
Quarles, Donald A., 48, 146, 1 78 
Quemoy, bombardment of, 94-97 
Rabi, Isador I., 33n, 460 
Radford, Arthur W., 46 1 
Radioactive fallout; see Fallout 
Rainier, data, 1 48-49; shot, mag-
nitude incorrectly estimated, 
2 1 8 ;  underground nuclear ex­
plosion in Nevada, Sept. 1 957, 
58-6 1 '  72, 1 48,  1 55, 1 63 
RAND Corporation, 36, 179, 252 
Randolph, Jennings, 448n 
Reciprocal control system, 502 
Reciprocal inspection, 446 
Reid, Luther, 1 1 4n 
Report of the Conference of Ex­
perts; see Conference of Ex­
perts 
Republican Conference on Nu­
clear Testing (early 1963 ) ,  437-
38 
Republican opposition to test ban 
negotiations, Jan. 1 963, 436-38 
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Research program, East-West, co­
ordinated, 237-41 ,  247-49; East­
West, agreed by USSR, 249; 
joint program, USSR insistence 
on, 249; joint Soviet-Western, 
of criteria for initiating on-site 
inspection, 239; Seismic Re­
search Program Advisory Group 
( SRPAG ) ,  248; in US. reported 
at SRPAG meetings, 254-55 
Ribicoff, Abraham A., 448n 
Rich, A., 425n 
Riznichenko, Y. V., 1 63-65, 2 1 4n, 
254n, 255-56, 425n 
Roberts, Chalmers M., 245n 
Robertson, A. W., 463n 
Robertson, H. P., 33n 
Roberston, Walter S., 66 
Rocard, Yves, 54 
Rockefeller, Nelson A., 209 
Roddis, Louis H., 277n 
Rome treaties, 307 
Romney, Carl F., 55n, 1 50, 1 5 1 n, 
1 60, 1 64-66, 2 1 2n, 2 1 8 ,  220n, 
222n, 254, 354n, 444 
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, Mrs., 
158 
Rumania, 52, 57,  4 1 9 ;  Ten-Nation 
Disarmament Committee, 
ENDC, 357 
Rusk, Dean, 80, 270, 276, 28 1 ,  
345, 362, 365, 390, 446, 453, 
456, 46 1 
Russell, Richard B., 444, 463n 
Sadovsky, Mikhail A., 56-57, 1 86, 
2 1 4n, 254-56, 258-60, 4 1 8n 
Sahlou, P., 375-76 
Saltonstall, Leverett, 462 
Saturday Evening Post, 346 
Saudi Arabia, 4 1 9  
Scheid, Robert C., 254n 
Schelling, Thomas C., 9n 
Schilling, Warner R., 6n 
Schlei, Norbert A., 20n 
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., 276n, 
277n, 278n, 279n, 28 1 n, 282n, 
285n, 346n, 348 and n, 43 1n, 
440n, 447n, 448n, 453n, 465n 
Schnierman, G. L., 254n 
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Schweitzer, Albert, 2 1  
Science, "betrayal by," 1 54-57 
Science Adviser; see Special As-
sistant for Science and Tech­
nology 
Science Advisory Committee of 
the Office of Defense Mobiliza­
tion (ODM) ,  32-33, 49; see also 
President's Science Advisory 
Committee 
Science policy, relation to security 
policy (US ) ,  477-78 
Scientific Committee on Effects 
of Atomic Radiation, 20 
Scientific literacy, importance for 
politicians and diplomats, 48 1 -
8 3  
Scientists, 185; a s  advisors and 
negotiators in international con­
ferences, 53, 486-90; conflicting 
advice by, 365, 483; East-West 
area of agreement, 225, 239; 
East-West disagreement on need 
for international control, 69; 
efforts to use for achieving 
agreement, 378; employed in 
executive agencies, 485; inter­
pretation of Hardtack II, 221 ;  
need for advice from mixture of 
scientific disciplines, 484; out­
side government, 485; panel of, 
proposed, 280; personal rela­
tionships of, 489; problems of 
communication with nonscien­
tists, 1 0, 48 1 -82; proposal for 
national scientific institute, 486; 
role in TWG I and II, 1 88-95, 
2 1 8, 223-25, 489; in Seismic 
Research Program Advisory 
Group, 254-57, 490; statement 
on 1 962 comprehensive draft 
treaty, 445; suggested use of 
"black boxes," 425; Sweden, 
369; use in informal sessions, 
490 
Scientists, US, ability to detect 
underground shots, 386; access 
to highest policy-makers, 3 3 ;  
ability t o  function apolitically 
doubted, 392; advice at highest 
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Scientists, US (continued) 
level of government, 483-84; 
advice within bureaucracy, 484-
86; arrangements for partici­
pation in policy process, 32-33;  
clarifying US position to ENDC, 
Subcommittee 1 ,  368-70; con­
tradictory replies to question­
naires on test ban control, 60-
61 ; divided over resumption of 
atmospheric tests, 346; en­
gaged in political negotiations, 
1 9 1 ;  in Geneva to explain tech­
nical situation in light of Vela 
Program data, 392; impact of 
Eight-Nations delegates, 394; 
interpretation of seismic data, 
1 49; lacking political guidance, 
1 92-93, 195; as new actors in 
policy process, 9-1 1 ;  opposition 
to acceptance of Soviet pro­
posals, 437-38; petition for test 
ban by, 25; as policy advisers, 
479-8 1 ;  political issue in TWG 
II, 221 ;  role in Conference of 
Experts, cri·ticism of, 487; role 
in consensus-building, 470-72; 
selected for Conference of Ex­
perts to balance differing views, 
55-56; Western panel at Con­
ference of Experts, 54-56; 
willing to generalize on basis of 
single Rainier experiment, 60 
Scott, Hugh, 448n 
Scoville, Herbert, Jr., 47n, 55n 
Seaborg, Glenn T., 86, 270, 327, 
461 
Secretary of Defense, 85-86 
Secretary of State, 85-86; see also 
Dulles, John Foster; Rusk, Dean 
Security Policy (US ) ,  ambiguous 
and vacillating, 490-9 1 ;  relation 
to science policy, 477-78 
Seismic data (new ) , 2 1 6, 303; 
USSR agrees to examine, 2 1 0; 
USSR reaction to, 1 62-66; US 
insistence on consideration of, 
2 1 0; see also Technology 
Seismic method of detection, 75-77 
Seismic research in USSR, 1 6 1-62 
Seismic recording stations, 75, 
1 48, 352, 502; automatic, 428, 
432, 434 
Seismic Research Program Ad­
visory Group (SRPAG) ,  248, 
254-6 1 ,  392; delegations from 
UK, US, USSR, 254; disagree­
ments, 259-6 1 
Seismic signals, 75, 1 60, 1 99, 369; 
disagreement on recording meth­
od, 72-73; decoupling or muf­
fling, 153;  effects of various 
media on transmission of, 352, 
369-70, 385-86; shots tamped 
in salt and in tuff, 35 1 ;  "Second 
Zone," 354; "Third Zone," 354, 
384 
Seismographs, improved effective­
ness of, 385 
Seismological stations, 59, 502; 
detection of French under­
ground shot in Algeria, 384; 
existing facilities, 395-96; in­
strumentation offered by US 
Coast and Geodetic Survey, 353; 
preliminary lis·ts of, exchanged 
by US and USSR, 434; proto­
type, established at Fort Sill, 
Oklahoma, 354 
Seismologists, Soviet, unavailable 
in Moscow, 455 
Semenov, N. N., 56-57 
Senate, Committee on Armed Serv­
ices, Preparedness Investigating 
Subcommittee, 4 1 2, 450-5 1 ,  
459, 462 
Senate, Committee on Foreign Re­
lations, 26, 445-46, 459, 46 1 -62; 
Subcommittee on Disarmament, 
26, 35, 43, 45, 60-63, 150, 
1 56, 2 1 3-14, 245, 475-76 
Senate, consent to Moscow Treaty, 
463; debate on Moscow Treaty, 
462; resolution on partial test 
ban, 448 
Shepilov, Dimitri T., 3 1  
Shulman, Marshall D., viii, 424n 
Shustov, V., 2 1 4n 
Siberia, on-site inspections in, 
363; central, 353 
Index 
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force of treaty, article on, 
adopted, 305 
Simp!!on, Milward L., 463n 
Sino-Soviet alliance, 66; border 
fighting, 37 1 ;  disarmament dif­
ferences, 25 1 ;  dispute, 424; 
ideological differences confer­
ence, 450; tensions, 265 
Smith, Margaret Chase, 463n, 464 
Solandt, Ormond, 54 
Somalia, 4 1 9  
Sorenson, Theodore C., 276n, 
277n, 283n, 344n, 345n, 346n, 
347n, 348n, 449n, 450n, 452 
and n, 456n, 463 and n 
South Africa, 42 1 
Southeast Asia, 339; guerilla ac­
tion, 382; SEATO, 1 03 
Sovereignty, cooperation among 
sovereign states, 1 32 
Soviet bloc, 207, 42 1 ;  vote in 
UN, 284-85 
Soviet press, 281 
Soviet Union; see Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics 
Spain, 4 19, 42 1 
Sparkman, John J., 448n 
Special Assistant for Science and 
Technology, 32, 86, 88, 93 
Special Assistant to the President 
for Disarmament, 43 
Special Assis·tant to the President 
for National Security Affairs, 86 
Speier, Hans, 30n 
Spence, Roderick, 47n 
Spiers, Ronald 1., 47, 55 
Sputnik I and Sputnik II, 32 
Starbird, Alfred D., 44, 47n, 
20 1, 270n, 344 
Stassen, Harold, 1 6- 1 7, 43-44, 
58, 9 1 ,  93, 460 
Stebbins, Richard P., 3 1 n, 96n, 
1 19n, 258n 
Stelle, Charles C., 1 14n 
Stennis, John, 463n 
Stevenson, Adlai E., 24-25, 345, 
456 
Stockholm, Defense Research Or­
ganization, 360 
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Strategic doctrine, US, 382; alert 
forces, 340; see also North At­
lantic Treaty Organization 
Strategy (US ) ,  "massive retalia­
tion" abandoned, 26 
Strauss, Lewis L., 25n, 29, 44, 
48, 55, 59n, 86, 88n, 46 1 
Street, Kenneth Jr., 1 5 1 n  
Stromberg, Roland N . ,  7n 
Subcommittee (tripartite) of 
ENDC, 4 1 6, 429, 442 
Summit meeting (Eisenhower and 
Soviet leaders) , 4 1 ;  collapse of, 
257-58 
Summit meeting, Western, May 
1 959, 1 68-69 
Supreme Soviet, Gromyko's speech 
before, 156 
Surprise attack, 92; agreement on 
meeting to consider, 67; Confer­
ence, 1 04, 1 1 1-12;  safeguards 
against, 1 6- 1 7  
Sweden, 1 05, 206-7, 268, 372, 
379, 421 ,  427; delegation to 
ENDC, 357-60, 395; Gnome 
shot recording, 352 
Symington, Stuart, 35, 444, 462 
Syria, 4 1 9  
Tactical nuclear weapons, 30, 62, 
1 26, 1 28, 147, 252; demanded 
by Germany, 3 1  
Talmadge, Herman E., 463n 
Tamm, I. Ye., 56-57, 425n 
Tass, 94 
Taubenfeld, Howard J., 2 1 1 n  
Technical agreement, search for, 
1 74-230 
Technical experts, 49; see also 
Scientists; Technology; Tech­
nical talks 
Technical preparation for negoti­
ations appraised, 49 1 -92 
Technical talks, 472; agreed to by 
Khrushchev, 50; conference on 
surprise attack, 1 04, 1 07, 1 1 1-
1 1 2; first suggested by UK, 17;  
group of experts suggested in 
UN resolution, 22, by Eisen-
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Technical talks (continued) 
bower, 4 1 ,  49-53; as a neutral 
device, 392; possible USSR op­
position to group, 392; proposal 
on "black boxes," 429; proposed 
working group, 1 39;  see also 
Technical Working Group I 
(TWG.I) ;  Technical Working 
Group II (TWG.II) ;  Confer­
ence of Experts; Seismic Re­
search Program Advisory 
Group (SRPAG ) 
Technical Working Group I, 1 83-
209, 472; agenda argument, 1 88 ;  
bulk o f  data from West, 1 89;  
delegates, 1 86-87; high altitude 
testing, and banning of, 1 82; 
little political guidance, 187;  
recommendations on basis for 
control system, proposed by 
US, 27 1 ;  report to diplomatic 
Geneva Conference, 1 90-9 1 ,  
1 95; terms of reference, 1 85-85 
Technical Working Group II, 210-
29; agenda for, 2 14-1 5 ;  agreed 
report on improvement of tech­
niques and instrumentation, 226; 
delegations : Soviet, 214,  UK, 
2 1 8, US 212; deadlock, 229; 
failure of, impact on morator­
ium, 232; lack of preparation, 
US delegation, 2 1 4; report, with 
four Annexes, 229; talks end 
without agreement, 229-30; 
terms of reference, 2 1 0-1 1 
Technological lead, impact of, on 
negotiations, 498 
Technology, changes in, impact on 
test ban negotiations, 497, 501 ; 
controlling modern, 501 ;  mili­
tary, impact on vulnerability of 
US, 5; military, revolution in, 
42; new date, 1 45; Soviet reac­
tion to new data, 1 62-68 
Teller, Edward, vii, 28, 36, 48, 
55-56, 1 5 1 -53, 2 19, 223, 251 -
52, 346, 437, 459, 479-80 
Ten-Nation Disarmament Com­
mittee, 202, 205, 207, 232; 
composition of, 357; Soviet sug-
gestion of adding five nonaligned 
nations, 357; USSR walks out, 
263 
Testing of nuclear weapons; see 
Moratorium on nuclear testing 
Test sites, funds for, 201 ;  US offer 
to allow Soviets to inspect, 279 
Thailand, 421 
Thomas, Norman, 25, 1 58 
Thompson, Llewelyn E., 272, 282, 
386, 453 
Thor intermediate range rockets, 
1 75 
Threshold, 74-77, 1 38, 1 8 1 ,  1 9 1 ,  
199-200, 236-37, 241 ,  290; 
failure by Administration to find 
acceptable, 62; acceptable risk 
disagreement, US, 196-97; seis­
mic magnitude (4.75) ; elimina­
tion of, 27 1 ,  280, 362; of detect­
ability, 250, 446 
Thurmond, Strom, 463n 
TNT explosions, data from, 73 
Toon, Malcolm, 7 1 4n 
Toussaint, Paul, 1 1 4n 
Tower, John G., 463n 
Treaties; see Comprehensive Nu­
clear Test Ban Treaty, drafts 
and agreed draft articles; Par­
tial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 
drafts; Treaty Banning Nuclear 
Weapon Tests in the Atmos­
phere, in Outer Space, and 
Under Water ( Moscow Treaty) 
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon 
Tests in the Atmosphere, in 
Outer Space, and Under Water 
( Moscow Treaty) ,  3-1 3, 444-66; 
assurances on, by Kennedy, 462; 
comparison with 1962 draft, 
456-58; consent by US Senate, 
463; drafts, 389, 397, 409-1 3, 
454-55; effect of Cuban crisis on 
signing, 424; effective date, 464; 
lack of control machinery, 288;  
negotiations opened, 454; nego­
tiations in retrospect, 469-503; 
Original Par·ties as depository 
governments, 458; preliminaries 
to negotiations, 444-54; ratifica-
Index 
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tion, 458-64; refusal to sign by 
Communist China, Albania, 
Cuba, France, 465; signed by 
more than 1 00 other states, 464; 
text of, 504-6; see also Partial 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
"Troika" concept, 357-58 
Truman, Harry S., 32, 48 
Tsarapkin, Semen K., 57, 75, 1 15, 
1 1 8,  1 20, 1 22, 1 27-28, 1 32n, 
1 35-37, 1 39, 1 62-63, 1 77, 1 82-
85, 1 96, 1 98 -99, 2 1 0, 2 1 6n, 230, 
235, 237-43, 249, 256, 258, 
264-65, 267, 272-73, 275, 286, 
296, 299, 303, 3 1 2, 3 1 8, 32ln, 
325-26, 328, 330-3 1 ,  335, 362-
64, 368, 376n, 446 
Tukey, John, 1 5 l n, 2 1 2n, 277n 
Tunisia, 22 
Turkevich, Anthony L., 55n, 2 1 2n 
Turkey, 1 75, 421 
Twining, Nathan F. (General ) ,  
46 1 
Tyler, William R., 452n 
Unilateral intelligence systems, 193 
Union of Soviet Socialist Repub­
lics (USSR) , Academy of Sci­
ences, 163;  accepted inspection 
in aseismic areas, January 7, 
1963, 433; armed forces, reduc­
tion suspended, 340; as nuclear 
power, 6; bombers, long-range, 
341 ; Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, 450; closed society, im­
pact on negotiations, 496; con­
cern at China's nuclear cap­
ability, 200; delegates to Geneva 
Conference, 1 1 5; delegates to 
Seismic Research Program Ad­
visory Group, 254; derision of 
Vela Program results, 393; dis­
continuance of nuclear assistance 
to Communist China, 200; dis­
cussions with Communist China, 
agreement on new technology, 
October 1 5, 1957, 95-96; drafts 
of comprehensive test ban treaty 
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tabled : October 31,  1958, 1 22-
24, 454, November 1 8, 1 96 1 ,  
286, 454-55; "global" intercon­
tinental missile, 360; high-yield 
weapons ( 1962 ) ,  423; insistence 
on "joint" research program, 
249; lead in areas of nuclear 
weapons development, 343 ; lead 
in ballistic missiles, 32; missiles, 
long-range, 341 ;  motivation i n  
agreeing t o  Conference o f  Ex­
perts, 5 1 ;  1961 nuclear weapons 
tests, 341-43; objections to meet­
ing of technical experts, 378-79; 
objections to NATO nuclear 
plans, 174-76; position in 15th 
General Assembly, 268; position 
on "black boxes," 428; prelim­
inary moves at Moscow treaty 
negotiations, 453-54; proposal 
for control system by, at Con­
ference of Experts, 75; proposal 
for nonaggression pact, etc. in 
ENDC, March 1 963, 443; reac­
tion to "new data," 1 62-68; re­
action to Western draft treaties 
of August 1962, 4 1 3-14; readi­
ness for partial test ban without 
unpoliced moratorium, July, 
1 963, 453; refusal to assist Com­
munist China, 274; reinstatement 
of offer of 3 on-site inspections 
( 1 962) , 426; rejection of offer to 
reduce number of on-site inspec­
tions and control stations, 394; 
response to US suggestion for 
phased treaty, Feb. 1960, 238 ;  
resumption of atmospheric test­
ing, Dec. 1 3 ,  1962, 429; resump­
tion of testing, Sept. 1 ,  1 96 1 ,  
280-81 ; sharp change in conduct 
in negotiations, 275; Soviet mem­
bers, Conference of Experts, 56-
58; Soviet sites for "black 
boxes," Dec. 1 0, 1 962, 429; 
superiority in conventional 
forces, 1 6 ;  superiority over 
US in intermediate and long­
range ballistic missiles, 341 ; test 
series completed in March 1958, 
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Soviet Union (continued) 
45; troop strength reduced, 234; 
underground nuclear explosion, 
first (Feb. 1962 ) ,  353 ; unwill­
ingness to accept inspection, 
245; willingness to establish con­
trol system (June 1958) ,  1 5 ;  
viewed as expansionist by US, 
6; willingness to consider direct 
line of communication with US, 
446; see also Khrushchev, 
Nikita S. 
United Arab Republic, 357, 420-
2 1 ,  427 
United Kingdom ( UK ) ,  Agree­
ment for Cooperation with US 
( 1 958 ) ,  37; agreement with US 
on Thor rockets ( 1 958 ) ,  1 75; 
Atomic Energy Authority, 56; 
Bomber Command, 436; decision 
to continue moratorium, 203; 
delegates to Geneva Conference, 
1 1 4-1 5 ;  delegates to Seismic 
Research Program Advisory 
Group, 254; delegation to TWG 
I, 1 86 ;  draft treaty ( with US, 
April 1 8 ,  1961 ) ,  363-64; Labor 
Members of Parliament, 20; 
members of Conference of Ex­
perts, 56; position in 1 5th Gen­
eral Assembly, 268; primary ob­
jective to perpetuate negotia­
tions, 29 1 ;  proposed technical 
talks on "black boxes," 429; 
suggestion for meeting of tech­
nical experts, 378-79; technical 
talks : first suggestion, 1 7, fa­
vored again, 392; willingness to 
accept partial test ban (July 
1 963 ) ,  454; see also Macmillan, 
Prime Minister 
United Nations (UN ) ,  agreements 
authorized between Control 
Organization and UN, 143;  
Charter, 305; Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 
2 1 1 ;  Convention on Privileges 
and Immunities, 1946, ratified 
by USSR and UK, 307; Conven­
tion on Privileges and lmmuni-
ties of the Specialized Agencies, 
1 947, 3 1 1 ;  Economic and Social 
Council, 2 1 ,  373; expanded 
membership, implications, 53; 
impact on US position, 108; 
role of, in international political 
system, 12;  Scientific Commit­
tee on the Effects of Atomic 
Radiation, 395; Secretariat, 371 ; 
Secretary General, 1 17, 290 
(see also Hammarskjold ) ;  Secu­
rity Council, 289, 303; Subcom­
mittee of the Disarmament Com­
mission, 1 4-24, 9 1 ;  see also 
Disarmament Commission; Gen­
eral Assembly 
United States, Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA ) ,  
38 1 ,  474; Army, 340; Coast and 
Geodetic Survey, seismological 
network, 353; Disarmament Ad­
ministration, 269; Information 
Agency (USIA ) ,  Director of, 
86; National Security Council 
(NSC) , 46-47, 63; Office of 
Defense Mobilization ( ODM) , 
Director of, 33;  President's 
Science Advisory Committee 
(See President's Science Advi­
sory Committee ) ,  Seismological 
stations equipped by, 384; ab­
sence of contingency planning, 
39; Administration's defense of 
draft comprehensive treaty, 445-
46, Agreements of Cooperation 
with UK and others; 1 958, 37; 
assurance against misuse of on­
site inspections, December 20, 
1 962, 43 1 ;  assurances by Pres­
ident to Congress on Moscow 
Treaty, 462; atmospheric testing 
resumed, April 26, 1 962, 377-
78; bilateral agreements with 
Greece, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Netherlands, Turkey, 
Canada (May 1 959 ) ,  1 75; Cold 
War attitudes reexamined, July 
1 963, 449; conflicting forces in 
nuclear test ban policy formula­
tion, 1 8-33 ;  confusion over 
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necessity of control posts in 
USSR, 389-90; decision not to 
resume testing ( 1 961 ) ,  278; 
decision to continue priority for 
comprehensive test ban (June 
1963 ) ,  452; defense appropria­
tions, 27, 339; defense strategy, 
339-40; delegates to Geneva 
Conference, 1 1 3-14; delegates to 
Seismic Research Program Ad­
visory Group, 254; delegates to 
TWG I and II, 1 86-87, 2 1 2; 
delegation to Geneva political 
negotiations, 1 1 3; development 
of policy leading to the Con­
ference of Experts, 39-53; do­
mestic opposition to 1962 com­
prehensive draft treaty, 444; 
evolution of policy on nuclear 
weapons test ban, 40-4 1 ;  formu­
lation of security policy, 470-90; 
impact of changes in interna­
tional system upon, 4; impact of 
"new data" on US position, 1 45-
62; instructions to scientists, 
Conference of Experts, 64-66; 
integration of scientist into policy 
process in, 9; interagency ad 
hoc committee (April-July 
1962 ) ,  38 1 ,  386-89; lead in 
nuclear weapons ( 196 1 ) ,  278; 
memorandum on draft treaty 
changes (April ! ,  1 963 ) ,  44 1 ;  
military power, 339-4 1 ,  439-4 1 ;  
need to explain policy changes 
( 1962) to different audiences, 
39; new concessions offered by 
Dean (Aug. 28, 1961 ) ,  280; 
new negotiating position tabled 
(Feb. 1 1 , 1 960) , 235; new 
policy approved by Kennedy, 
27 1 ;  number of on-site inspec­
tion control stations in USSR 
acceptable to ( October 1 962) , 
426; offer to allow Soviet ex­
perts to examine US testing sites, 
279; opposition to resumption of 
testing in atmosphere, 354; par-
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tial treaty suggested by (April 
1 3, 1959 ) ,  1 7 1 ;  policy i n  transi­
tion, April 1958, 50; position in 
1 5th General Assembly, 268; 
power increasing, 339-41 ;  proc­
esses of decision-making, 233-
34; proposal (verbal) for partial 
test ban, Feb. 1 1 ,  1 960, 234-38; 
readiness in 1962 to accept in­
ternationally supervised, nation­
ally manned control stations, 
390; security policy of, 1 1 - 1 3 ;  
strategic doctrine, 382; strategic 
forces, 436; strategy and nuclear 
weapons under Kennedy, 499; 
( with UK) tabling of draft par­
tial test ban treaty (Aug. 27, 
1 962 ) ,  455; tactical air squad­
rons, 340; technical memoranda 
for General Assembly ( 1 962 ) ,  
4 1 8 ;  technical preparation of 
delegation to Conference of Ex­
perts, 58; technical preparation 
for negotiations inadequate, 49 1 -
93; test ban policies appraised, 
494-95; underground tests post­
poned (Jan. 26, 1963 ) ,  432; 
underground tests (Sept. 1 3, 
1963 ) ,  463; underground tests 
series began (Feb. 8, 1963 ) ,  
438; weapons progress i f  tests 
resumed, 278; willingness to 
accept a partial test ban, July 
1 963, 454; see also Atomic 
Energy Commission; Committee 
of Principals; Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, West­
ern drafts; Congress (also Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy; 
Senate, Committee on Armed 
Services; Senate, Committee on 
Foreign Relations ) ;  Department 
of Defense; Department of State; 
Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Eisen­
hower Administration; Kennedy, 
John F.; Kennedy Administra­
tion; Senate 
University of California Radiation 
Laboratory, 179 
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Van Allen radiation belts, 1 9 1  
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390-9 1 ,  4 12, 445 
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Veto; see Control Commission; 
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3 12, 3 1 8, 329, 494n 
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Weapons development, 462; state 
of, impact on negotiations, 498 
Wennerstrom, Stig, 360 
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Western press, conflicting views of 
scientists reported in, 365 
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Weisner, Jerome B., viii, 33n, 86, 
270 and n., 341, 345, 362, 368-
69, 393, 426, 43 1 , 439-40, 475 
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8;  see also Duration of treaty on 
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Organization 
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technology 
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